Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The defendant’s third-party claim against the plaintiff’s lawyers was dismissed for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

• Allegations of contribution, indemnity, champerty, and maintenance were found unsustainable under Ontario law.

• The court reaffirmed that actions of a plaintiff’s lawyer, acting within the scope of representation, are attributable to the client, not actionable by opposing parties.

• Champerty and maintenance require officious intermeddling with improper motive, which was not established in this case.

• The court found no basis to grant leave to amend the pleadings due to a fundamental legal defect in the claim.

• The third-party claim was deemed a potential abuse of process, possibly intended to delay proceedings or displace opposing counsel.

Background and procedural history

In Shillingford v. 9706151 Canada Ltd. et al., 2025 ONSC 2840, the plaintiff, Gur Prem Pyari Shillingford, brought a civil action involving allegations that the defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to strip equity from her property at 16 Mara Crescent in Brampton. The claims arose following the enforcement of a second mortgage originally held by 9706151 Canada Ltd., transferred to 11037315 Canada Inc., which later initiated possession proceedings. After being evicted from her home, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, including Roy D’Mello and others, executed a plan that unjustly deprived her of the property's remaining value through overinflated renovations, impersonation, and unauthorized transfers.

In response, defendant Roy D’Mello brought a third-party claim against the plaintiff’s lawyers, Neil Colville-Reeves and the firm Reeves Richarz LLP, asserting that they instigated the litigation to serve another client’s interests and should be held liable for contribution and indemnity, as well as for the torts of champerty and maintenance. The third parties moved to strike the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

Court’s reasoning on striking the third-party claim

Justice Lemay ruled in favor of the third-party lawyers, striking the claim in its entirety and denying leave to amend. The court emphasized that lawyers act as agents for their clients and cannot be sued by opposing parties for actions taken in the course of legal representation. Following appellate authority such as Hengveld v. Personal Insurance Co., the court found that any alleged liability arising from the litigation conduct must lie with the client—not the client’s lawyer—particularly when the lawyer acts under instruction.

The court further held that the torts of champerty and maintenance were not made out. Even if the third-party lawyers encouraged or assisted the plaintiff in bringing the action, this alone does not establish improper motive or “officious intermeddling.” Assistance by counsel in pursuing legitimate legal claims—especially where the claim concerns the plaintiff’s own property and interests—is not actionable under those tort doctrines.

Denial of leave to amend and concerns about abuse of process

Justice Lemay was unequivocal in denying leave to amend. He noted that no amendment could cure the legal deficiencies in the third-party claim because its basis—imposing liability on opposing counsel—was fundamentally unsustainable. Moreover, the court expressed concern that the claim was being used for improper purposes: either to delay proceedings or to force the plaintiff to change legal representation. Both scenarios would constitute an abuse of process.

The court also took into account that Mr. D’Mello is a former lawyer and experienced litigant. His failure to articulate any plausible or novel legal theory to support the third-party claim further justified denying leave to amend.

Outcome and further directions

The court granted the motion to strike the third-party claim without leave to amend and provided a timetable to move the main action toward trial. The parties were directed to complete document disclosure and examinations by late 2025, with trial scheduling expected by early 2026. Cost submissions related to the motion were invited under a strict timeline.

This decision reinforces the limits of third-party claims against opposing counsel and discourages misuse of procedural tools to harass or delay opposing parties through unfounded litigation.