Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Allocation of $262,500 in agreed partial-indemnity costs between a person under disability (Anne Meehan), her litigation guardian (Anthony Meehan), and the Estate of Michael Meehan.
• Interpretation and application of Rule 57.06(2) and Rule 7.02(h) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act in determining whether a litigation guardian or the party under disability should ultimately bear costs.
• Impact of the timing of incapacity: proceedings were commenced by a capable adult plaintiff, who later became a party under disability, on the allocation of costs responsibility.
• Assessment of litigation guardian conduct, including whether Anthony Meehan acted reasonably and in good faith when deciding to settle after damaging evidence emerged at trial.
• Evidentiary significance of previously undisclosed pre-accident medical records and financial history that undermined catastrophic injury findings and the foundation of the plaintiffs’ claim.
• Policy tension between holding litigation guardians accountable for litigation decisions and avoiding costs rulings that would deter capable individuals from assuming guardianship roles in civil proceedings.

Facts of the case

Michael and Anne Meehan were involved in a motor vehicle accident on September 26, 1999. They pursued personal injury claims arising out of the accident, including both a tort action and an accident benefits action. Their counsel in those proceedings was Donald Good, who acted in both streams of litigation. Those personal injury matters were resolved before trial, through minutes of settlement dated June 16, 2005 and January 18, 2007. After the settlements, concerns arose regarding the adequacy of the outcomes and the handling of the files.

Dissatisfied with the settlements and with Mr. Good’s conduct, the Meehans retained another lawyer, the defendant John Cardill, to have Mr. Good’s fees assessed under the Solicitors Act. In the course of that retainer, Mr. Cardill indicated that there were serious issues concerning Mr. Good’s handling of the personal injury actions and that those concerns would be explored during the assessment process. The plaintiffs ultimately alleged that, in this context, they were not properly advised about their rights and potential recourse against their original lawyer.

On January 16, 2013, the plaintiffs commenced a solicitor’s negligence action. They alleged that Mr. Good had mishandled their personal injury cases and that their later lawyer, Mr. Cardill, failed to advise them that any negligence or professional liability claim against Mr. Good was subject to a two-year limitation period. The claim was framed as a solicitor’s negligence case arising from alleged failures in advice and case management flowing from the original accident litigation and its aftermath rather than as a fresh personal injury suit. As the action progressed, it was dismissed as against Mr. Good in 2015 and as against another defendant, Ian Stauffer, in 2018, leaving only Mr. Cardill as the remaining defendant by the time of trial.

During this period the personal circumstances of the plaintiffs changed significantly. In 2020 and 2021, capacity assessments were conducted in relation to Anne Meehan. The assessing physician, Dr. Bruto, concluded that she was incapable of instructing counsel and therefore required the protection of a litigation guardian to continue the proceeding. On September 19, 2022, the Court granted leave to amend the claim: Michael Meehan was appointed as Anne’s litigation guardian, and at the same time Anne was removed as litigation guardian for her son, Anthony, who had by then reached the age of majority. Shortly thereafter, on December 28, 2022, Michael Meehan passed away. Following his death, Anthony Meehan assumed a dual role as litigation guardian for his mother, Anne, and as litigation administrator for the Estate of Michael Meehan.

The trial of the solicitor’s negligence action, now focused solely on the claim against Mr. Cardill, proceeded over several days in 2025. Evidence was heard on March 25 and 31, April 14, and June 2, 2025. The plaintiffs’ case initially appeared strong. On paper, Anne Meehan had been assessed as catastrophically injured, had been found entitled to Canada Pension Plan disability benefits, and there were prior judicial comments suggesting that the original personal injury settlements might have been inadequate. In particular, in a previous costs assessment in relation to the original litigation, Justice Hackland had noted that the claims were not properly worked up or presented and that the adequacy of the settlement was very much in question. This context underpinned the plaintiffs’ theory that their lawyers, including Mr. Cardill, had not properly protected their interests.

However, the evidentiary picture began to shift as trial unfolded. Through cross-examination and production of historical medical records, it emerged that Anne Meehan had reported a series of significant symptoms prior to the accident, including intense headaches, paresthesia, left arm numbness, temporomandibular joint pain, and chest and back pain. These pre-accident complaints had not been disclosed to the doctors who later assessed her and opined that she was catastrophically injured as a result of the motor vehicle collision. The assessors had proceeded on the assumption that she had been free of relevant pre-existing impairments. Trial evidence also disclosed post-accident physiotherapy records indicating that Ms. Meehan was capable of performing demanding physical tasks, undermining the foundation for the catastrophic impairment findings that had supported the plaintiffs’ damages theory.

When confronted with these undisclosed records at trial, key medical experts adjusted their views. Dr. Morrison acknowledged that the newly revealed records were totally inconsistent with the picture that had been presented at the time of her original assessment. Another assessor, Dr. Gagnon, testified that in light of this additional information her earlier conclusion that Ms. Meehan was catastrophically injured could not be considered reliable. At the same time, financial evidence showed that the Meehans had faced serious financial difficulties before the accident, contradicting a Canada Pension Plan Disability Tribunal description that they had operated a very productive farming operation for many years until the motor vehicle accident. This created a substantial inconsistency between the factual foundation accepted by the CPP tribunal and the evidence now before the Court.

These evidentiary developments significantly weakened the persuasive force of the plaintiffs’ case. The trial judge, Justice A. Kaufman, noted that the cross-examination of witnesses and production of additional records led to a reassessment of the strength of the claim. While the Court was cautious not to make definitive findings of fraud in the absence of complete evidence and final submissions, the record was sufficiently troubling to prompt a reconsideration by the plaintiffs and their counsel. Ultimately, on August 11, 2025, after several days of trial, the parties entered into minutes of settlement under which the plaintiffs’ action against Mr. Cardill was to be dismissed.

Because Anne Meehan had by this time been found incapable of instructing counsel and was proceeding through a litigation guardian, the settlement required court approval under the rules governing parties under disability. On August 21, 2025, Madam Justice Jensen approved the settlement. The minutes of settlement left one important issue unresolved: the allocation of costs. The parties agreed to the quantum and scale of costs payable to the defendant—$262,500 on a partial indemnity basis—but left it to the trial judge to determine who should bear those costs: the Estate of Michael Meehan, Anne Meehan as a party under disability, or her litigation guardian, Anthony Meehan.

Legal framework and key issues

The costs endorsement delivered by Justice Kaufman on December 1, 2025 addresses this single but significant question: in circumstances where an adult plaintiff later becomes a party under disability with a litigation guardian, and the action is ultimately dismissed after trial has commenced, should the costs be borne by the party under disability, the litigation guardian, or both? The case therefore raises intertwined issues of civil procedure, the law of costs, and guardianship practice in Ontario.

Section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act provides that costs are in the discretion of the Court, both as to whether they are awarded and against whom. That discretion must be exercised on a principled basis, with reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure and existing jurisprudence. Rule 7.02(h) requires every litigation guardian to acknowledge, by affidavit, that they understand they may be personally liable for costs awarded against them or the person under disability. Rule 57.06(2) then provides that where a litigation guardian is ordered to pay costs, that guardian is presumptively entitled to recover those costs from the person under disability, unless the Court orders otherwise.

In this case, the parties modified that default position by agreement. In their minutes of settlement they agreed that Anthony Meehan, as litigation guardian, would not have recourse to Rule 57.06(2). In other words, if he were ordered to pay costs, he could not seek to recoup them from his mother, Anne. They also agreed that the trial judge would determine whether Anthony ought to be personally liable for the defendant’s costs or whether the costs should instead fall on the Estate and/or Anne directly.

Against this procedural background, Justice Kaufman canvassed the established jurisprudence on costs where parties under disability and litigation guardians are involved. The authorities show that there is no rigid rule; rather, the cases turn on factors such as the conduct of the litigation guardian, whether the guardian acts for a plaintiff or defendant, whether the guardian is a public body or a private individual, who stands to gain financially from the litigation, whether the person under disability is a child, broader public policy considerations encouraging guardians to act, and the parties’ financial circumstances.

The endorsement reviews several leading cases. In Berman v. Schwartz, the court emphasized the balance between not deterring guardians from acting and holding them accountable. In MacMaster v. York (Regional Municipality), the Court of Appeal upheld an order requiring a litigation guardian who had initiated unsuccessful proceedings to bear costs, highlighting that she chose to commence the action and accept the litigation risk. Other authorities, such as Lopaschuk v. Henderson and Houston, Socha v. Millar, and Hockey-Sweeney v. Sweeney, illustrate how courts sometimes protect guardians—particularly public guardians like the Public Guardian and Trustee—from personal exposure to costs when they act in good faith and without personal financial interest, while still ensuring that those who stand to gain from litigation may be required to bear costs when claims fail.

Justice Kaufman also addressed the earlier decision in Asselin-Normand v. King Edward Realty, where Justice Stinson suggested that there was a general practice of avoiding costs orders against minors because they lack capacity to conduct litigation and cannot meaningfully incur costs themselves. Justice Kaufman confined that reasoning to its context, noting that it concerned a minor plaintiff who lacked any capacity to sue and that some older cases even held solicitors personally responsible for costs where they commenced actions on behalf of minors without proper guardianship. The endorsement rejects the notion that there is a broad, categorical rule against awarding costs against parties under disability more generally, while accepting that in cases involving children, it usually makes sense that the litigation guardian rather than the child bear primary responsibility if the claim fails.

Taken together, these authorities guided the Court’s inquiry into whether it was more appropriate to impose costs on Anne, as the person who stood to benefit from the action and who started it while capable, or on Anthony, who stepped in as litigation guardian part-way through for protective reasons and without a personal financial interest in the outcome.

Application of principles to the Meehan litigation

In applying these principles to the facts, Justice Kaufman first noted that the plaintiffs themselves did not oppose a costs order in the agreed amount against Anthony. However, the Court was required to go beyond the parties’ consent and determine, as a matter of principle and policy, whether that was the appropriate allocation.

The defendant submitted that Anne and Michael Meehan had advanced the case on a fraudulent basis and that Anne’s alleged misrepresentations to medical assessors and the CPP Disability Tribunal for financial gain should lead to a costs order against her. Justice Kaufman expressed caution about making definitive findings of fraud, given that the trial had not been completed and full argument had not been heard. Nevertheless, the Court accepted that trial evidence had revealed significant undisclosed pre-accident symptoms and post-accident functional capacity inconsistent with the catastrophic-injury narrative, and that financial evidence undermined the portrayal of a previously robust farm enterprise destroyed by the accident. These evidentiary developments clearly weakened the plaintiffs’ position and contributed to their decision to settle and discontinue the action.

Crucially, Justice Kaufman considered the timing of Anne’s incapacity. The action was commenced in 2013, when Anne was an adult with full legal capacity to instruct counsel and to make litigation decisions. At that time she accepted, or was taken to accept, the standard risks of civil litigation, including exposure to an adverse costs award if her claim failed. She was also the person who stood to gain directly from the case had it succeeded. It was not until 2020–2022 that capacity concerns arose, resulting in her being declared incapable and requiring a litigation guardian. Anthony only became litigation guardian in September 2022, nearly nine years after the action was launched and long after Anne had chosen to pursue the claim.

The judge contrasted these facts with cases where a litigation guardian initiates proceedings from the outset on behalf of a person who has never had capacity to sue, such as a child or a person permanently incapable of managing litigation. In such scenarios, courts more readily assign costs responsibility to the guardian, who makes the decision to expose defendants to litigation and costs consequences. By contrast, here Anne was a capable adult for most of the life of the action, and the claim was her own undertaking from inception, with Anthony stepping in later to ensure the litigation could continue in an orderly fashion.

The Court then evaluated Anthony Meehan’s conduct. Unlike the PGT in Cameron v. Louden, who was criticized for pressing on with a weak case in the face of obvious warning signs and refusing a reasonable offer, Anthony did not engage in unreasonable or vexatious conduct. The action appeared viable at the outset, with expert support and some external indications that the original settlements might have been inadequate. Once the cumulative trial evidence undercut the plaintiffs’ position, Anthony made the responsible decision to settle and agree to dismissal of the action. Justice Kaufman accepted that he acted out of filial duty and in good faith to protect his mother’s interests, rather than for personal financial gain.

Finally, the Court placed significant weight on the broader policy objective of encouraging individuals to accept appointments as litigation guardians. If private family members who step in to assist vulnerable relatives are too readily exposed to large personal costs orders, they may be reluctant to accept such roles, to the detriment of access to justice for parties under disability. In this case, imposing substantial costs solely on Anthony, in circumstances where he did not initiate the litigation and ultimately took reasonable steps to bring it to a close in light of the evolving evidence, would run counter to that policy and might chill others from stepping into a guardian role in complex civil matters.

Balancing all of these considerations—Anne’s original capacity and decision to sue, her potential financial benefit from the litigation, the late appointment and reasonable conduct of Anthony as litigation guardian, and the need to support rather than deter private guardians—Justice Kaufman concluded that responsibility for the costs should rest with Anne and with the Estate of Michael Meehan, rather than with Anthony personally.

Outcome of the proceeding

The solicitor’s negligence action itself did not proceed to a final adjudication on liability or damages at trial. Instead, after significant evidence had been heard and the plaintiffs’ case had been materially weakened by newly surfaced records and expert concessions, the parties entered into minutes of settlement on August 11, 2025 under which the plaintiffs’ claim against the remaining defendant, lawyer John Cardill, was dismissed. Because one of the plaintiffs, Anne Meehan, had become a party under disability, that settlement required and received court approval on August 21, 2025. The only outstanding issue was the allocation of costs.

In the costs endorsement dated December 1, 2025, Justice Kaufman exercised the Court’s discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, and determined that the successful party in the action was the defendant, John Cardill. The Court confirmed the parties’ agreement that he was entitled to costs fixed at $262,500 on a partial indemnity basis. After analyzing the respective roles and responsibilities of the plaintiffs, the estate, and the litigation guardian, Justice Kaufman ordered that these costs be borne by the Estate of Michael Meehan and by Anne Meehan, rather than by her litigation guardian, Anthony Meehan. Accordingly, the final monetary outcome in favour of the successful defendant consisted of a costs award of $262,500, with no damages awarded to the plaintiffs and no additional monetary relief granted beyond that fixed amount of costs.