Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The applicant challenged municipal sign restrictions as unconstitutional under section 2(b) of the Charter.

• The by-law limited the timing, location, and placement of municipal election signs.

• Restrictions were found to directly impair political expression, a core Charter right.

• The court held the by-law did not minimally impair the right and lacked evidentiary justification.

• Discriminatory treatment of election signs versus other signage undermined the by-law’s objectives.

• The applicant was awarded damages for unjust enrichment after paying fees under an invalid law.

Factual background and legal context

Charles Frederick Armstrong, the applicant, won the 2024 municipal by-election in the Township of Russell. During his campaign, he displayed election signs earlier than permitted by the Township’s Sign By-Law 2016-052, which restricted municipal candidates from posting signs until 30 days before voting day. Mr. Armstrong placed 14 signs in early August, while the by-election date was set for September 30. The Township warned him about the violation and later removed nine of his signs. He paid $450 to retrieve them and was also issued nine charges under the by-law, which remained in abeyance pending the outcome of this constitutional challenge.

Mr. Armstrong brought an application challenging several provisions of the sign by-law as violating his freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He also sought reimbursement of the $450 he paid to recover his signs, arguing the Township was unjustly enriched under an unconstitutional law.

Legal framework and Charter analysis

The court considered whether the by-law infringed Mr. Armstrong’s freedom of expression. It first confirmed that election signs are protected as political expression under section 2(b). The Township argued that its by-law was content-neutral and targeted only physical consequences like visual clutter or safety risks. The court rejected this, stating that restrictions on political signs are inherently tied to the content of expression and, therefore, fall within the scope of Charter protection. It cited precedent from the Supreme Court, including Irwin Toy and Ramsden, to reinforce the point that restrictions on the form or manner of political communication are protected expression.

Section 1 justification and failure to meet the Oakes test

Having found an infringement of section 2(b), the court turned to section 1 of the Charter to determine whether the infringement was justifiable in a free and democratic society. Mr. Armstrong conceded the by-law’s objective—avoiding signage clutter and promoting aesthetics—was pressing and substantial. He also conceded the by-law was rationally connected to those goals. However, the dispute centered on the issues of minimal impairment and proportionality.

The court found that the Township did not provide evidence of a good-faith effort to minimally impair expression. Its reliance on practices in other municipalities was insufficient to prove a carefully considered solution. The court was particularly concerned that the by-law restricted campaign signs for more than half the duration of the by-election period, with no empirical evidence supporting the need for such a severe limitation.

Further, the court found the by-law treated election signs more harshly than other types of signs, such as real estate or community event signs, without justification. It imposed more stringent restrictions on placement and timing that did not apply to other expressions. The court held this imbalance was unjustified and disproportionate to the stated objectives of the by-law.

Claim for unjust enrichment

The court also addressed Mr. Armstrong’s claim for unjust enrichment after he paid $450 to retrieve his signs. It found that the Township had no valid legal reason to retain the money, as it was collected under an unconstitutional provision. The three-part test for unjust enrichment was satisfied: the Township received a benefit, Mr. Armstrong suffered a corresponding loss, and there was no juristic reason for the transaction. He was awarded damages in that amount.

Conclusion and outcome

Justice Flaherty concluded that multiple provisions of the Township’s Sign By-Law violated Mr. Armstrong’s Charter rights and could not be justified under section 1. The impugned restrictions—particularly those limiting signage timing and location—were struck down. Mr. Armstrong was also awarded $450 in damages for unjust enrichment. The parties were encouraged to settle costs, failing which they could file short written submissions. The case underscores the constitutional limits on municipal regulation where political expression is concerned and reinforces the principle that government must justify any impairment of Charter rights with evidence, not assumptions.