Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The appellant’s defamation claim was dismissed under Ontario’s anti-SLAPP legislation, section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

• The impugned statements, including a Law Society complaint, were found to be expressions on matters of public interest.

• The appellant failed to show that his claim had substantial merit or that there were no valid defences.

• The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge’s analysis of harm, public interest, or the balancing test.

• Claims for intentional infliction of mental suffering and harassment were derivative of the defamation claim and lacked independent viability.

• Costs were awarded to the respondent in both the motion and the appeal.

Background and procedural history

Rocco Galati, a lawyer known for constitutional litigation and public commentary, brought a civil action against Andrew Toews, alleging defamation and other related torts. The claims stemmed from public statements made by Toews criticizing Galati’s conduct, comments on pandemic-related litigation, and the use of donated funds. Toews also filed a complaint with the Law Society of Ontario about Galati’s alleged misconduct. Galati argued these acts damaged his reputation, caused mental distress, and amounted to a campaign of harassment.

In response, Toews brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, Ontario’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) legislation. The motion judge granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the expressions were on matters of public interest and that Galati had failed to meet the burden of showing substantial merit or absence of valid defences. The motion judge also concluded that the harm suffered by Galati did not outweigh the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

Galati appealed the dismissal to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Legal framework and Court of Appeal analysis

The appeal centred on whether the motion judge erred in applying the anti-SLAPP framework set out in section 137.1. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the provision exists to safeguard free expression on matters of public interest while filtering out lawsuits designed to silence critics.

First, the court held that the motion judge correctly concluded the expressions were on matters of public interest. They concerned the administration of justice, professional regulation, and the handling of public donations—topics central to public discourse.

Second, the court found no reversible error in the motion judge’s conclusion that Galati’s claims lacked substantial merit. The motion judge had carefully examined the content and context of the statements and correctly identified that they attracted potential defences, including fair comment and qualified privilege.

Third, the Court agreed with the finding that Galati had not demonstrated that any resulting harm was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the respondent’s right to speak. The motion judge appropriately considered the evidentiary record and applied the balancing test required under section 137.1(4)(b).

The Court also upheld the dismissal of Galati’s additional tort claims, including intentional infliction of mental suffering, harassment, and conspiracy. These were found to be either derivative of the defamation claim or devoid of sufficient pleadings and evidence to survive the anti-SLAPP motion.

Disposition and costs

The Court of Appeal dismissed Galati’s appeal, affirming the motion judge’s ruling in its entirety. Costs of the appeal were awarded to Toews in the amount of $15,000, consistent with the anti-SLAPP framework which encourages early resolution of meritless claims that threaten public discourse.

This decision reinforces the importance of protecting expressions made on matters of public interest and confirms the high bar plaintiffs must meet to overcome anti-SLAPP motions when initiating defamation actions.