Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Judicial review focused on whether the Hospital Appeal Board’s decision to discipline a doctor violated Charter rights.

• The Charter’s applicability to the disciplinary process under the Hospital Act was contested and central to the case.

• The petitioner challenged her suspension after refusing COVID-19 vaccination required by a provincial health order.

• The court evaluated whether section 7 of the Charter (life, liberty, and security of the person) was engaged.

• The Hospital Appeal Board’s decision was upheld as a reasonable administrative action, not subject to the Charter.

• Costs were awarded to the Interior Health Authority; no damages were granted to the petitioner.

Facts and outcome of the case

Dr. Theresa Szezepaniak, a long-practicing hospitalist and clinical instructor, filed a petition for judicial review after her hospital privileges were suspended by the Interior Health Authority (IHA), a regional health body in British Columbia. Her suspension followed her refusal to comply with a COVID-19 vaccination order issued by the Provincial Health Officer (PHO) in 2021, which mandated vaccination for healthcare workers operating in hospital settings.

Rather than resign or comply, Dr. Szezepaniak opted to remain unvaccinated, which rendered her statutorily ineligible to work in the hospital. The IHA initiated disciplinary proceedings that led to the cancellation of her privileges. She appealed to the Hospital Appeal Board (HAB), which agreed with the IHA's disciplinary grounds but found termination too harsh. The HAB substituted a suspension and noted that her privileges would not be renewed if she remained ineligible at the time of the annual review.

The petitioner brought her grievance before the Supreme Court of British Columbia, arguing that her Charter rights under section 7 were infringed, as the decision affected her ability to work and carried professional stigma. She also claimed that the disciplinary process implemented by IHA and affirmed by HAB amounted to a government action and should be scrutinized under the Charter.

The court disagreed. Justice Wilson found that the HAB’s decision was operational, not governmental in nature, aligning more closely with prior case law such as Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, rather than Eldridge v. British Columbia, where the Charter did apply. The court ruled that the Charter did not apply to the HAB’s actions and that, even if it did, section 7 was not engaged because the decision did not interfere with Dr. Szezepaniak’s right to bodily integrity or impose medical treatment. The psychological and financial consequences she experienced were considered indirect results of her personal choice, not unconstitutional state action.

The court dismissed the petition and awarded costs to the Interior Health Authority. No damages were awarded, and the petitioner’s Charter arguments were fully rejected.