Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The central question on the merits was whether Mr. Fearing's unpaid-wage complaint under the Canada Labour Code fell outside the six-month statutory limitation period.
• Whether the Canada Industrial Relations Board had any statutory authority to extend that limitation period was directly contested.
• Characterization of the complaint was also disputed, as Mr. Fearing argued in oral submissions that it concerned a training practice rather than unpaid wages.
• Procedural fairness was raised in connection with the Board's decision to proceed without an oral hearing.
• On the subsequent costs assessment, the applicable column of Tariff B and whether an assessment officer may award a lump sum were the main issues.
• Evidentiary and procedural objections concerned cost items raised for the first time in reply and the proof required to support claimed disbursements.

Facts of the case
Richard Fearing, who was self-represented, applied to the Federal Court of Appeal for judicial review of a decision of the Canada Industrial Relations Board dated June 18, 2024 (2024 CIRB LD 5375). The Board had upheld a decision of a Labour Affairs Officer, who found that Mr. Fearing's complaint for the non-payment of certain wages — made under subsection 251.01(1) of the Canada Labour Code — was brought outside the applicable six-month limitation period. The complaint related to unpaid wages for the period of April 8 to April 17, 2019, but was not made until August 22, 2020. The respondent was his employer, GardaWorld Cash Services Canada Corporation. The application was heard at Toronto on September 17, 2025, with Mr. Fearing appearing by videoconference, and judgment was delivered from the Bench the same day.

Statutory provisions at issue
The dispute turned on the wage-recovery scheme in the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2. Subsection 251.01(1) permits an employee to file a complaint for unpaid wages, while paragraph 251.01(2)(a) imposes a six-month limitation period for doing so. Subsection 251.01(3) governs — and limits — the circumstances in which that period may be extended. Section 16.1 of the Code authorizes the Board to determine a matter without holding an oral hearing.

The court's reasoning on the merits
Writing for the court, Stratas J.A. observed that the Board had to make only one factual finding: the date of the complaint. Having found that the complaint was made on August 22, 2020 — well beyond six months — the Board could apply the limitation period and conclude the complaint was untimely. The court held it was reasonable for the Board to find no statutory basis on which to extend the period, noting that the text of subsection 251.01(3) confirmed no extension was available on these facts. Mr. Fearing's argument that an extension should have been granted because the matter was an ongoing violation of the collective agreement, or could have formed part of a civil action, was found to be without merit. His attempt in oral argument to recharacterize the matter as a complaint against a training practice was rejected as inconsistent with his own complaint form and paragraph 8 of his memorandum of fact and law; the Board's characterization of it as a wage complaint was reasonable. The court also saw no procedural unfairness in the Board proceeding without an oral hearing under section 16.1, given the simplicity of the case, and found that Mr. Fearing knew the case to meet and had a full opportunity to respond.

The assessment of costs
Because the application was dismissed with costs, GardaWorld filed a bill of costs on November 20, 2025 seeking a total of 170.8 units, and the assessment proceeded in writing. Assessment Officer Stéphanie St-Pierre Babin resolved three preliminary issues before assessing the claim. First, she held that costs were to be assessed under column III of Tariff B pursuant to Rule 407, since the judgment simply awarded costs without directing any other column; column III provides partial, not full, indemnity. Second, she declined GardaWorld's request for a $10,000 lump sum under subsection 400(4), holding that only the Court, and not an assessment officer, has jurisdiction to award a lump sum. Third, she found that the pre-amendment version of Tariff B (in effect from January 13, 2022 to December 20, 2025) applied, because costs were ordered before the December 21, 2025 amendments took effect and the transitional provision operated prospectively. On the assessable services, she allowed 6 units for the memorandum of fact and law under Item 2 (correcting GardaWorld's misfiling under Item 19), 5 units for hearing preparation under Item 13(a), and 4 units for attendance under Item 14(a) — the latter calculated by rounding the hearing's actual duration of 1 hour and 50 minutes (1:47 p.m. to 3:37 p.m.) up to 2 hours and multiplying by 2 units. Claims for Items 24, 26 and 27 were denied because they were raised for the first time in reply, depriving Mr. Fearing of an opportunity to respond. A disbursement of $136 for photocopying and binding was allowed, supported by the affidavit of Quinn Hartwig sworn February 5, 2026.

Ruling and overall outcome
On the merits, the court found the Board's decision reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review with costs. On the assessment that followed, GardaWorld — the successful party — had its bill of costs assessed and allowed in the amount of $2,836.00, payable by Mr. Fearing. That figure is substantially less than GardaWorld had sought, given that its claim for 170.8 units and its alternative request for a $10,000 lump sum were both significantly reduced or refused.