Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Prematurity of judicial review where the underlying Agricultural and Rural Affairs Tribunal proceeding on a regulated dealership termination remains ongoing.
• Whether an interlocutory recusal decision based on alleged reasonable apprehension of bias in handling production motions can be reviewed before the merits hearing is complete.
• Application of the “exceptional circumstances” standard to justify early judicial intervention in administrative proceedings involving bias allegations.
• Timeliness of the judicial review application under s. 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act and grounds for extending time under s. 5(2).
• Impact of interlocutory production orders, including disclosure related to a draft settlement report, on claims of bias and alleged prejudice.
• Proper scope of judicial review where the applicant seeks to challenge a recusal ruling but effectively asks the court to address disclosure issues that have not been directly put in issue.

Facts of the case

The dispute arises out of a regulated dealership relationship in the agricultural equipment sector. Sunova Implement Ltd. was a dealer operating under a regulated dealership agreement with CLAAS of America Inc., a manufacturer and supplier of agricultural machinery. The underlying proceeding, commenced before the Agricultural and Rural Affairs Tribunal by a request for hearing dated September 1, 2022, concerns Sunova’s allegation that CLAAS unlawfully terminated this regulated dealership agreement. The Tribunal proceeding on the merits remains ongoing and has not yet resulted in a final determination on liability or damages.
While the Tribunal case was underway, the parties brought competing interlocutory production motions. Sunova first sought production from a third party, which was argued on August 23, 2023. The Tribunal released its decision on September 22, 2023, dismissing Sunova’s motion and refusing the requested third-party production. Shortly thereafter, CLAAS brought its own motion for production from Sunova. That motion was heard on September 5, 2023, and the Tribunal again issued a decision on September 22, 2023, this time ordering Sunova to produce various documents.
These interlocutory rulings became the foundation for a recusal motion by Sunova. It alleged that the presiding Tribunal member displayed a reasonable apprehension of bias in dealing with the production issues, including a concern about disclosure obligations connected to a draft report said to have been used within the context of settlement discussions. Sunova argued that aspects of the disclosure ordered, particularly in relation to settlement-related materials, were improper and reflected bias, and that a different Tribunal member should hear at least some of the issues in the proceeding. The Tribunal rejected Sunova’s recusal motion in a decision dated December 19, 2023, holding that the applicant had not demonstrated actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias that would require the member to step aside.
Rather than seeking judicial review of the production decisions themselves, Sunova applied to the Ontario Divisional Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s refusal to recuse. It asked the court to set aside the recusal decision on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias and to grant appropriate relief that would effectively alter the composition or conduct of the Tribunal hearing. Sunova also framed aspects of its argument around the alleged significance of the Tribunal’s disclosure order involving a draft settlement-related report, warning that other litigants might rely on this precedent to pursue production of settlement materials. However, those broader disclosure issues were not clearly raised in the written submissions on the original production motion and the production decisions themselves were not placed directly in issue in the judicial review.
Complicating matters procedurally, Sunova did not commence its judicial review within the 30-day time limit prescribed by s. 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act. The Tribunal’s recusal decision was rendered on December 19, 2023, but the application for judicial review was not filed until March 14, 2024. Sunova therefore required an extension of time under s. 5(2) of the Act, which allows the Divisional Court to lengthen the filing period if there are apparent grounds for relief and no substantial prejudice or hardship to those affected by the delay. Sunova did not bring a formal motion for an extension; instead, it sought the extension within its factum. CLAAS, however, had notice of the request and responded to it in its own factum, so the issue of timing and the need for an extension was directly before the panel.

Issues before the court

The Divisional Court was asked to resolve two main procedural and substantive questions. First, it had to decide whether to extend the statutory 30-day deadline to permit the late filing of the judicial review application. That required the court to assess whether there were apparent grounds for relief and whether any substantial prejudice or hardship would result to CLAAS or any other affected person if the extension were granted.
Second, assuming the deadline were extended, the court had to determine whether the application itself was premature. The underlying Tribunal proceeding was still in progress, and the challenged decision was an interlocutory ruling on a recusal motion flowing from production orders. The court therefore had to apply the well-established principle that judicial review will generally not be entertained before an administrative process is complete, save in “exceptional circumstances.” This involved consideration of the line of authorities emphasizing judicial restraint and the avoidance of fragmented, multiple proceedings, including Malekzadeh v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, Kadri v. Windsor Regional Hospital, C.B. Powell Ltd. v. Canada, National Car Rental Inc. v. Municipal Property Assessment Corp., and the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex on the continued relevance of judicial discretion in granting or refusing judicial review remedies.
A further, related issue was the proper scope of the judicial review, as Sunova’s arguments sometimes blended concerns about the production order involving a draft settlement-related report with its allegations of bias. The court had to differentiate between matters properly raised in the recusal motion and matters that were really about the merits of the production rulings, which had not been directly challenged.

Court’s analysis

On the extension of time, the court acknowledged that the application had been brought outside the 30-day window prescribed by s. 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act. Nonetheless, the panel considered the procedural history, the conduct of the parties, and the nature of the issues raised. It noted that although a formal motion for extension was not brought in the ordinary way, the request for an extension was flagged in Sunova’s factum and was squarely addressed in CLAAS’s responding materials. The Divisional Court concluded that CLAAS would not suffer substantial prejudice or hardship if the extension were granted. It therefore exercised its discretion under s. 5(2) to extend the time for service and filing of the judicial review application, while at the same time underscoring that, in the ordinary course, litigants should bring a formal motion where an extension is required.
The court used the extension ruling as an opportunity to provide guidance on the relationship between prematurity and allegations of bias in the administrative context. It emphasized that even where a party invokes reasonable apprehension of bias, the court remains bound to consider whether it is appropriate to intervene before the completion of the administrative process. Referring to Malekzadeh and Yatar, the court reaffirmed that the principle against premature judicial review remains in force and that Yatar did not displace the requirement for “exceptional circumstances” to warrant early intervention. The Supreme Court’s clarification in Yatar that judicial review remains available in principle does not oblige a court to hear every application on the merits, nor does it remove the discretion to decline relief where the timing and context are unsuitable.
In applying the exceptional-circumstances standard, the Divisional Court drew on Kadri and C.B. Powell, which stress that early recourse to the courts is rare and is generally limited to situations where proceeding with the administrative process would cause irreparable harm of a kind that cannot be addressed later. Mere concerns about procedural fairness or bias, the presence of important legal or constitutional issues, or the parties’ preference to have an issue decided before the tribunal finishes its work, are not by themselves enough to justify bypassing the normal process, so long as the administrative forum can address those issues and provide an effective remedy at the end of the hearing.
Turning to Sunova’s specific allegations, the court distinguished between the production orders and the recusal ruling. It observed that the applicant had not actually brought judicial review of the disclosure decisions but instead framed its case as a challenge to the Tribunal’s refusal to recuse the presiding member. Arguments that the Tribunal had made a significant error in ordering disclosure connected with a draft settlement report, and that this would open the “floodgates” to similar requests by other litigants, were therefore not directly before the court and had not formed part of the written submissions on the original disclosure motion. In effect, Sunova was asking the Divisional Court to address issues that had neither been squarely raised nor properly placed in issue within the scope of the judicial review.
On the recusal question, the court treated the Tribunal’s denial of the recusal motion as an interlocutory decision within an ongoing proceeding. The Divisional Court held that the proper assessment of actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias ordinarily takes place in light of the administrative proceeding as a whole. Fragmenting that assessment by isolating a single interlocutory ruling for early review would risk multiple trips to court and undermine the efficiency and coherence of the tribunal process. The court emphasized that simply alleging bias or reasonable apprehension of bias in relation to an interlocutory decision does not automatically qualify as an exceptional circumstance that warrants early judicial intervention.
Having reviewed the record and the nature of the alleged bias, the court concluded that Sunova had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify hearing the judicial review before the Tribunal completed its adjudication on the merits. Allowing the application to proceed at this stage would, in the court’s view, lead to a fragmented administrative process and a possible multiplicity of proceedings, contrary to the strong policy favouring finality and efficiency in administrative adjudication. The court clarified that only in the clearest of cases should judicial review of an interlocutory decision on the ground of bias proceed before the end of the underlying proceeding.

Outcome and implications

In the result, the Divisional Court granted an extension of time under s. 5(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, thereby regularizing the late filing of the judicial review application. However, having done so, it exercised its discretion to decline the application as premature. The court dismissed Sunova’s judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision refusing recusal, expressly without prejudice to Sunova’s right to renew its judicial review once the Tribunal has concluded the main proceeding on the alleged unlawful termination of the regulated dealership agreement. In other words, the applicant remains free to raise any bona fide concerns about bias or procedural fairness at the end of the Tribunal process, when the full record and outcome are known and can be assessed in context.
The decision sends a clear signal to litigants that attempting to characterize interlocutory procedural disputes—especially those involving production or disclosure orders—as bias issues will not, without more, justify early judicial review. The court reaffirmed that allegations of actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias relating to interim rulings must ordinarily wait until the administrative process is complete, absent truly exceptional circumstances. It also underlined that Yatar does not displace the court’s discretion to refuse relief on grounds of prematurity and that parties cannot sidestep the administrative process merely by reframing disagreements with evidentiary or procedural rulings as bias claims.
On costs, the parties had agreed that costs of the application would be fixed at a specified amount payable to the successful party. Because the judicial review application was dismissed as premature, CLAAS of America Inc. was the successful party. Consistent with the parties’ agreement, the court ordered Sunova to pay CLAAS an all-inclusive costs award of $10,000, with no costs payable to or by the Tribunal, and no damages or other monetary relief being determined at this stage of the underlying dispute.