Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Enforceability of a one-year residential mortgage after default and maturity, including assignment from Computershare to Community Trust Company.
• Use of OPCA-style defences (wet-ink argument, promissory note “payment,” securitization, double recovery, “freehold” and land-description points) and their rejection as abusive and meritless.
• Application of the summary judgment test under Rule 20 and Hryniak v. Mauldin, given uncontradicted lender evidence and no cross-examinations.
• Interpretation of standard charge terms, especially consent to assignment and the lender’s contractual entitlement to specific enforcement and administration fees.
• Dismissal of constitutional and Indigenous rights arguments because the lender is not government and no evidentiary foundation was provided.
• Award of money judgment, possession of the property, and substantial indemnity costs based on the mortgage and the defendants’ delay-driven litigation conduct.

Facts and mortgage background

The case concerns a residential property at 2 Erindale Crescent, Brampton, owned by defendants Monique Peart-Williams and Michael Williams. They entered into a one-year mortgage starting December 12, 2023, for $690,000 at 7.74% interest, with monthly payments of $5,322.20 covering principal, interest, and property taxes. The mortgage was registered in favour of Computershare Trust Company of Canada, acting as title custodian for Community Trust Company (CTC). Under a custodial arrangement, Computershare held legal title while CTC held the beneficial interest in the loan. On January 27, 2025, the charge was formally transferred to CTC. The standard charge terms included Article 10.10(a), under which the borrowers consented to the mortgage being transferred, sold, or assigned, and provisions allowing various enforcement and administration fees and substantial indemnity costs if enforcement became necessary.

Default and enforcement steps

The defendants defaulted on November 13, 2024, before the mortgage’s December 13, 2024 maturity. They did not renew or pay out the mortgage but continued living in the home. On January 7, 2025, CTC demanded full repayment of $707,003.03. No payments were made after default. A notice of sale was issued on February 5, 2025, and CTC commenced a claim on January 27, 2025. The defendants delivered a defence on February 8, 2025. On June 3, 2025, Justice Doi set a timetable for a summary judgment motion. The plaintiff complied; the defendants did not. An October 2, 2025 occupancy check confirmed that the defendants still resided at the property. The first motion date, October 16, 2025, was adjourned once to November 13, 2025, marked peremptory on the defendants. Shortly before that hearing, the defendants filed an affidavit from “Chief Michael,” a non-lawyer “legal assistant” who had assisted them in crafting OPCA-type materials.

Adjournment request and procedural ruling

At the November 13, 2025 hearing, the defendants sought a second adjournment, saying Chief Michael was unavailable and they needed his help. The court had already ruled he could not address the court, only assist them in preparation. No evidence explaining his unavailability was provided. Given the previous adjournment, the peremptory marking of the hearing, the defendants’ failure to meet the timetable, and the growing prejudice to the lender—including nearly a year of occupation without mortgage payments—the court refused a further adjournment. It proceeded to hear the motion using the plaintiff’s affidavit material and the defendants’ statement of defence and Chief Michael’s affidavit.

Summary judgment standard and plaintiff’s proof

The plaintiff moved under Rule 20.01, relying on the framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin. The question was whether there was any genuine issue requiring a trial that could not be fairly resolved on the written record. The plaintiff filed evidence proving the mortgage’s existence, key terms, default, amounts owing, and enforcement history. The defendants had made prior payments in line with the mortgage, which supported the conclusion that they knowingly entered the contract. They did not cross-examine the plaintiff’s affiant, leaving the evidence unchallenged. On this record, the court was satisfied that CTC had made out a prima facie claim and that any real issue would have to arise from the defences, not from gaps in the lender’s proof.

Policy terms, fees, and interest

CTC claimed several components as of November 13, 2025: a principal balance of $688,398.25; accrued interest; a property tax balance; and a suite of contractual charges including covenant review, maintenance, enforcement administration, discharge administration, and property management fees. Two additional items were a $500 returned-payment fee and a $285 payment processing fee. The court accepted that the standard charge terms clearly entitled CTC to most of the enforcement-related fees because they flowed directly from the defendants’ default and the lender’s need to enforce the security. However, there was no specific evidence of any returned or late payments that would justify the $500 and $285 line items. Those were disallowed. After removing them, the court found CTC was entitled to $750,478.78, with post-judgment interest at the contractual rate of 7.74% per annum.

Rejection of OPCA-style and constitutional defences

The defendants’ core strategy rested on OPCA-inspired arguments. They demanded “strict proof” and alleged that CTC had not produced a “wet ink” original mortgage, claiming this defeated the lender’s case under the Evidence Act and the Electronic Commerce Act. The court characterized this as a classic “wet ink” OPCA argument, noting that courts across Canada and other common-law jurisdictions have repeatedly rejected such claims. Borrowers cannot avoid payment merely because the physical original is not filed when uncontroverted evidence—and their own payment history—proves the contract. The defendants also argued that a promissory note signed with the mortgage had “settled” the debt under various statutes, public policy orders, and foreign references. The court observed that there was no proof of any such note; even if there were, a unilateral promissory note does not extinguish a secured debt unless the lender agreed to accept it as payment. Their securitization claim—that the lender had turned the mortgage or a note into a financial instrument and thus already profited—was treated as another OPCA trope. The court held that borrowers cannot rely on securitization or the lender’s insurance coverage to escape repayment; privity of contract confines the rights and obligations to the parties to the mortgage. The “double recovery” allegation, based on supposed insurance payouts, failed for the same reason. Further, the defendants claimed the mortgage violated their constitutional and Indigenous rights under the Charter and section 35, asserting systemic disadvantage and breaches of land-based rights. The Charter does not apply to purely private lenders, and the defendants provided no credible evidence of Indigenous status or of any misconduct by CTC. These assertions were therefore dismissed at a preliminary level as legally and evidentially unsupported.

Property-status arguments: consumer goods, land description, and freehold

The defendants attempted to reframe the property as “consumer goods” not used for commerce, suggesting the mortgage could not validly be enforced. The court held that the use of the home—residential or commercial—does not affect the validity of a mortgage contract. They also argued that land can only be identified by latitude, longitude, or metes and bounds and that the existing description was invalid. The court relied on the Land Titles Act, which allows the land registrar to determine suitable descriptions and does not require the specific technical form the defendants demanded. Finally, they claimed that because the title was “freehold,” the defendants owned the land absolutely and there was no room for co-ownership or a mortgagee’s interest. The judge clarified that “freehold” simply distinguishes a freehold estate from a leasehold; it does not prevent owners from granting a charge or other interests in the property. If it did, virtually all residential mortgage financing would be impossible.

Outcome, judgment, and total amount ordered

After addressing every defence, the court concluded that none raised a genuine issue requiring a trial. The OPCA-style arguments were described as meritless and abusive, and allowing the matter to proceed further would waste court resources and unfairly prejudice a legitimate lender. Summary judgment was therefore granted in favour of the plaintiff, Community Trust Company. The court ordered the defendants to pay CTC $750,478.78, with post-judgment interest at 7.74% per annum, and to deliver possession of 2 Erindale Crescent, Brampton, so the lender could proceed with recovery through sale. On costs, the court applied section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57, as well as the mortgage’s substantial indemnity clause, and took into account the defendants’ role in lengthening the proceeding by non-compliance and meritless defences. It fixed costs at $6,978.61, with interest at 4% per annum. In total, the successful party, Community Trust Company, obtained monetary orders of $757,457.39 as of the judgment date (combining the mortgage judgment and the costs award), plus ongoing interest at the specified contractual and statutory rates, as well as an order for possession of the mortgaged property.