Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Jurisdictional limits of the Divisional Court over applications for judicial review of Superior Court judges’ decisions, given the statutory scheme under the Judicial Review Procedure Act and Courts of Justice Act.
• Characterization of Mr. Salehi’s judicial review as an abuse of process because it sought to challenge decisions that were properly the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal, not judicial review.
• Application of Rule 2.1 as a gatekeeping mechanism to summarily dismiss proceedings that are frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process based on the face of the pleadings.
• Treatment of the orders of Akazaki J. as effectively subsumed in the final order of Hood J., thereby focusing the analysis on the final disposition of the action and avoiding a delay-based ruling.
• Assessment of whether the monetary amount in issue exceeded $50,000 for purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction and routing (Divisional Court versus Court of Appeal).
• Allegations of judicial bias rejected in light of the proper use of the Rule 2.1 process, where preliminary concerns about frivolousness or abuse are expressly contemplated and do not, by themselves, demonstrate partiality.

Background and parties

The litigation arises out of a long-running dispute between Behrouz Salehi and the Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO), together with two individual defendants, Bernard C. LeBlanc and Natasha S. Danson. Mr. Salehi alleged that PEO had engaged in “illegal actions” over a lengthy period that adversely affected his professional and personal life, including his income, costs over many years, and his family’s standard of living. His claims also included a specific figure of $20,000 and additional unquantified damages for loss of income over ten years plus sixteen years of alleged illegal actions by PEO, along with emotional and reputational harm. Although he did not fix a total amount in his Statement of Claim, the nature and scope of those allegations led the court to conclude that his intended damages exceeded $50,000.

Procedural history in the Superior Court

The underlying civil action was first addressed by Justice Akazaki of the Superior Court of Justice. In an endorsement dated January 24, 2024, Akazaki J. set aside the noting in default of the defendants and granted them leave to bring a motion in writing for summary dismissal. The defendants contended that the action effectively repeated matters that had already been determined in a previous proceeding and thus amounted to a collateral re-litigation of earlier determinations. In a later endorsement dated July 8, 2024, Akazaki J. dismissed an attempt by Mr. Salehi to obtain default judgment, reinforcing that the matter would proceed by way of the defendants’ summary dismissal motion rather than through a default judgment route.

The summary dismissal motion then came before Justice Hood. In an endorsement dated September 10, 2024, Hood J. granted the defendants’ motion, striking out Mr. Salehi’s claim without leave to amend. The core rationale was that the new action constituted a collateral attack on a prior court order in a previous case involving the same issues. Rather than being a genuinely new cause of action, the proceeding sought to undermine or re-open matters that had already been adjudicated. In addition to dismissing the action, Hood J. ordered costs totaling $13,000 against Mr. Salehi.

Initiation of the judicial review proceeding

Following these Superior Court decisions, Mr. Salehi attempted to challenge the outcome through an application for judicial review to the Divisional Court. The record indicates that he first contacted the court on October 10, 2024 with a notice of application that was rejected as late. He later filed a new notice of application dated August 12, 2025. The notices of application did not clearly specify which orders he sought to have judicially reviewed, though they suggested an attempt to attack at least the August 21, 2023 order of Justice Merritt in an earlier related context and the later orders of Akazaki J. and Hood J.

In case management directions, Justice O’Brien of the Divisional Court requested clarification of the specific orders under challenge and a copy of the Statement of Claim from the underlying action. These steps were aimed at assessing whether the Divisional Court had jurisdiction over any appeal or review of the orders and whether judicial review was the appropriate remedy. After reviewing the materials, O’Brien J. directed that a notice be issued under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, signalling a concern that the application might be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Issues relating to jurisdiction and appropriate remedy

The central legal issue before the Divisional Court was whether it had jurisdiction to entertain a judicial review of the decisions of Superior Court judges and, more specifically, whether judicial review was an appropriate mechanism to challenge the orders of Akazaki J. and Hood J. Justice O’Brien identified several concerns at the Rule 2.1 stage. First, the Divisional Court’s power to grant judicial review is discretionary and is generally confined to reviewing decisions of tribunals, inferior courts, and other decision-makers exercising statutory powers. Second, there is a statutory right of appeal from final orders of judges of the Superior Court of Justice. Third, the routing of that appeal—whether to the Divisional Court or to the Court of Appeal—depends on the amount in issue under section 19(1.2)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, which directs appeals involving claims not more than $50,000 to the Divisional Court, and otherwise to the Court of Appeal.

Based on the underlying Statement of Claim, the Divisional Court concluded that Mr. Salehi’s intended claim exceeded $50,000, given the combined demand for a specific $20,000 payment plus long-term loss of income and extensive damages over many years. That meant that any appeal from the final order dismissing his claim would lie to the Court of Appeal, not to the Divisional Court. In a further jurisdictional refinement, O’Brien J. recognized that there was an even more fundamental barrier: the Divisional Court has no jurisdiction to judicially review decisions of Superior Court judges. Under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, judicial review is a “public law concept” focused on decisions of tribunals and inferior courts, not on the appellate review of Superior Court judges, which is governed by the appeal provisions in the Courts of Justice Act.

Application of Rule 2.1 and treatment of delay

Rule 2.1 permits the court to stay or dismiss a proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process, using an attenuated process in “the clearest of cases.” The rule is designed as a robust gatekeeping mechanism that allows the court to weed out plainly abusive litigation without the need for a full hearing, based on the pleadings and submissions. Justice O’Brien considered that bringing an application for judicial review to attack the decisions of Superior Court judges, when the proper route was an appeal to the Court of Appeal, constituted an abuse of process in itself, even if the claims were not otherwise frivolous or vexatious.

In responding to the notice under Rule 2.1, Mr. Salehi largely focused on the merits of his grievances rather than the jurisdictional and procedural concerns. He attempted to assign a monetary value to the judicial review by aggregating three figures: $13,000 related to the costs ordered by Hood J.; $20,000 for reimbursement of an alleged unauthorized credit card charge; and $17,000 for costs in the current proceeding, for a total of $50,000. However, the court held that his attempt to recast the amounts in the judicial review did not alter the fact that the original Statement of Claim realistically sought more than $50,000, so section 19(1.2)(c) still directed any appeal route to the Court of Appeal.

Although there was an issue of timeliness with respect to any attempt to review the earlier orders of Akazaki J., O’Brien J. expressly declined to base the ruling on delay. Instead, the court took the position that Akazaki J.’s orders were effectively subsumed in the final order of Hood J. dismissing the action, and that timeliness was not the decisive factor. The determinative issue was that the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to judicially review a Superior Court judge’s decision and that the proper challenge, if any, lay by way of appeal to the Court of Appeal, likely with a required motion for an extension of time.

Allegations of bias and the court’s response

Mr. Salehi argued that Justice O’Brien displayed bias by allegedly concluding, prior to formal filing, that the proceeding was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The court rejected that submission. O’Brien J. explained that Rule 2.1 expressly contemplates the court acting on its own initiative when a proceeding appears on its face to be abusive, and that the issuance of directions expressing “concern” and inviting submissions is part of the structured Rule 2.1 process rather than evidence of pre-judgment. The judge emphasized that only after considering Mr. Salehi’s written submissions, and finding that they did not adequately address the jurisdictional defects and the impropriety of judicial review in this context, did the court decide to dismiss the application.

Outcome and monetary consequences

Ultimately, Justice O’Brien held that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a judicial review of the orders of Superior Court judges and that pursuing such a review, when the proper remedy lay in an appeal to the Court of Appeal, rendered the application doomed to fail and therefore an abuse of process. On that basis, the application for judicial review was dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1. The successful parties in the overall litigation were the defendants/respondents: Bernard C. LeBlanc, Natasha S. Danson, and the Professional Engineers of Ontario. The only specific monetary figure ordered in their favour on the record provided is the $13,000 in costs awarded by Justice Hood in the underlying action; the Divisional Court endorsement does not specify any additional costs or damages, and the total monetary amount ultimately ordered in favour of the successful parties across all stages cannot be definitively determined from this decision alone.