Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Dispute centered on whether a human resources consultant could recover unpaid professional fees, including time billed for “disponibilité” (standby) and “temps de recouvrement” (recovery/collection activities), under a service contract with a childcare center (CPE).

• Interpretation of the contract’s fee clause was crucial, particularly whether it allowed billing for recovery efforts, litigation-related time, and unutilized availability dates not expressly requested by the client.

• The evidentiary conflict involved credibility issues between the consultant and the CPE’s director over the duration, usefulness, and even occurrence of certain billed meetings and contacts (e.g., a 3.5-hour Zoom meeting and communications with the T.A.T.).

• The court evaluated whether the consultant had proved, on a balance of probabilities, that specific time entries corresponded to actual services providing value to the client.

• Legal principles on “offre réelle” (tender of payment) and its liberatory effect were applied to determine whether the CPE’s prior payment fully discharged its contractual obligation for invoice #22-124 as amended.

• Established case law was invoked to reject compensation for a self-represented party’s time spent preparing and pursuing litigation, treating such time as non-indemnifiable and inherent in exercising the right to sue or defend.

Facts of the case

Serge Rippeur is a human resources consultant with approximately fifteen years of experience, providing training and coaching to various organizations. In March 2022, he entered into a written service contract with CPE Trois Petits Points, a childcare center in Gatineau, Quebec, represented by its executive director, Chantal Massie. The mandate was to support the CPE in negotiations toward the conclusion of a collective agreement with its unionized employees. As negotiations progressed, tensions escalated between the employer and the union, particularly after a union interference complaint was filed, which seriously disrupted the dialogue between the parties.
The relationship between the consultant and the CPE deteriorated as well. According to Mr. Rippeur, the breakdown in the labour relations climate was largely attributable to Ms. Massie’s conduct. By contrast, Ms. Massie testified that once the situation became more complex and legal in nature, Mr. Rippeur appeared “dépassé par les événements” and was unable to adequately assist or reassure the employer in handling the dispute. In November 2022, she decided to retain a lawyer to take over the negotiations with the union. The parties disagreed on the exact date of termination of the contract, but they accepted that, from November 2022 onward, the CPE’s lawyer effectively assumed the central role in the negotiations and that any ongoing role for the consultant became marginal or non-existent.
Prior to the conflict about fees, the CPE had paid an initial invoice dated 7 November 2022 totalling 11,219.09 $. A second invoice (no. 22-124), dated 1 December 2022, sought 2,229.09 $ for 11.75 hours of work at the agreed rate of 165 $ per hour. When this invoice remained unpaid, Mr. Rippeur issued an amended invoice on 13 February 2023, increasing the amount to 2,608.50 $ by adding two hours for “temps de recouvrement” related to the follow-up on the unpaid account. He then commenced an action in the Small Claims Division of the Court of Québec in May 2023, ultimately claiming a total of 5,335.54 $. This amount included the amended invoice, time spent preparing a demand letter, postal costs, and extensive time and travel related to filing and pursuing the small claims action and attending the hearing in Gatineau.
The CPE partially acknowledged owing some amount under the amended invoice but firmly contested the remainder. In particular, it disputed: a four-hour entry on 29 November 2022 for a “journée de disponibilité non utilisée”; the billing of recovery and litigation-related time; a 3.5-hour entry on 18 November 2022 for a Zoom “mise au point” with return to the union; and 1.5 hours on 22 November 2022 for reading communications and contacting the Tribunal administratif du travail (T.A.T.). According to Ms. Massie, the 18 November Zoom discussion lasted only about ten minutes, produced no useful advice, and did not provide solutions or reassurance regarding the union interference complaint. She also maintained that the CPE had never requested that the consultant reserve 29 November or 12 December for their benefit, nor had it confirmed any meetings, Zoom links, or specific time slots for those dates.

Contract terms and disputed billing items

The written service contract contained a clause on professional fees that governed the dispute. It set hourly rates of 165 $ for professional services, 115 $ for travel time, and a mileage rate of 0.60 $/km. It stated that the same hourly rate applied to “préparation, recherche, rédaction” as well as to all negotiation meetings and follow-up sessions, and that a detailed report of hours would accompany invoicing. Fees were payable upon receipt of the invoice.
Significantly, the contract said nothing about billing time for collection efforts, litigation preparation, or “temps de recouvrement.” Nor did it mention charging for a mere “standby” or “disponibilité” day on which no services were requested or actually rendered. The absence of any express clause authorizing such charges became central in the court’s analysis.
The largest contested entries revolved around (1) the four hours of “disponibilité” on 29 November 2022; (2) the 3.5 hours billed for a Zoom “mise au point / retour au syndicat” on 18 November 2022; (3) the 1.5 hours on 22 November 2022 for reading communications and contacting the T.A.T.; and (4) the two hours of “temps de recouvrement” added in the amended invoice. The CPE argued that no real value was delivered for these segments, that the contract did not authorize billing for recovery or court-related time, and that the consultant had unilaterally blocked off dates without any confirmed appointment or request from the client.
The evidence included email exchanges showing that by 21 November 2022, Ms. Massie had indicated a preference to work with a lawyer for the complaint, and that an eventual discussion between the lawyer and the consultant never occurred. An email of 21 November from Mr. Rippeur indicated he “could be available” on 29 November or 12 December and that he awaited a follow-up, but there was no confirmation from the CPE, no Zoom link, and no scheduled time. In a later email dated 30 November 2022, Ms. Massie expressly stated that the CPE had never asked him to reserve those dates and did not see why any such fees should be charged, while confirming that the CPE would proceed henceforth with its lawyer.

Legal issues and evidentiary assessment

The court characterized the claim as a civil, contractual dispute governed by Quebec civil law. It reminded that the burden lay on the plaintiff, as claimant, to establish his entitlement on a balance of probabilities by clear and convincing evidence. The nature of the liability was contractual, under article 1458 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.c.Q.), and the assessment required interpreting the scope of the parties’ agreement on billable services.
The judge first considered whether the additional time entries on the amended invoice were authorized by the contract and substantiated by the evidence. On the issue of “temps de recouvrement,” the court emphasized that the contract was silent about recovery-related time and that a clause allowing a service provider to bill the client for the time spent collecting overdue accounts or litigating could, at most, exist only if expressly stated. Given the absence of such a provision, and without commenting on whether such a clause would itself be valid or excessive, the court held that these two additional hours could not be charged to the CPE.
Regarding the four hours of “disponibilité” for 29 November 2022, the court stressed that the contract did not provide for billable “standby” time in the absence of an actual service request. The evidence showed that the CPE never requested that the consultant reserve that date, nor did it schedule a meeting or confirm any engagement. The consultant had only indicated he “could be available” on that date, and no follow-up or confirmation occurred. Since no services were rendered and no value was conferred on the client, the court found no contractual basis to bill those four hours.
On the contested November 18 and November 22 entries, the judge confronted contradictory accounts. Ms. Massie testified that the Zoom “mise au point” on 18 November lasted about ten minutes, produced no solutions, and left the employer without reassurance, while billing 3.5 hours. The consultant offered no detail sufficient to persuade the court of the reasonableness or usefulness of that duration. For the 22 November entry referencing T.A.T. communications, the descriptions were similarly vague and unsupported. Given the inconsistencies and lack of precise proof of what was done, for how long, and with what benefit, the court concluded that the evidence supporting these entries was not preponderant.
The court also addressed the broader question of whether a self-represented litigant can recover, as damages, the time devoted to preparing a case, drafting documents, traveling to court, and attending hearings. Relying on Supreme Court of Canada authority (Hinse v. Canada (Attorney General)) and Quebec Superior Court and Court of Québec jurisprudence, the judge reaffirmed that such time is normally not compensable. The courts have consistently treated the time and inconvenience of preparing and attending litigation as inherent in the exercise of judicial rights, rather than a compensable, separate loss. Consequently, all the hours claimed by the consultant for drafting the demand letter, filing the small claim, traveling to Gatineau, and preparing and attending the hearing were rejected as non-indemnifiable. The only potential exception identified was the actual postal fee for sending the demand letter, but no specific dollar amount or proof of that disbursement was in evidence.

Outcome and financial consequences

Before trial, the CPE had made a formal “offre réelle” (tender of payment) in the amount of 1,090.87 $, which it deposited with the court. This amount represented the fees it recognized as legitimately owing under invoice no. 22-124 (as amended), after excluding the disputed entries. The Ministry of Justice later transmitted a cheque for this amount to Mr. Rippeur, who cashed it.
After reviewing the evidence on all contested entries, the court found that the sum tendered by the CPE was sufficient and reasonable to cover the properly demonstrated work under the disputed invoice. All additional amounts claimed for standby time, Zoom and T.A.T. communications, recovery time, and litigation-related work were found not to be contractually authorized or not proven on a balance of probabilities. The accompanying claims for time devoted to the small claims process and for travel and parking expenses associated with attending court were rejected in light of the established principle that such efforts are not compensable damages.
In its final orders, the Court of Québec declared the CPE’s “offre réelle” of 1,090.87 $ valid, sufficient, and liberatory, took note that Mr. Rippeur had already cashed the cheque, and dismissed the balance of his claim. Given that part of the original claim was well-founded (to the extent recognized and paid by the CPE) but that the plaintiff ultimately failed to obtain any further relief, the court exercised its discretion to order that each party bear its own legal costs. As a result, the successful party was CPE Trois Petits Points, and no additional monetary award or damages were ordered in its favour beyond the pre-judgment tender of 1,090.87 $, meaning the court itself ordered no further sum and the total new amount in favour of the successful party was effectively 0 $.