Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Jurisdiction of the Tribunal administratif du logement (TAL) is contested where the landlord’s claim is framed around harassment and interference that may fall under extra-contractual civil liability rather than obligations arising directly from the lease.
• The scope of article 1855 C.c.Q. is in issue, specifically whether the tenant’s duty to use the dwelling “with prudence and diligence” extends to regulating conduct that affects the landlord’s management rights rather than the physical use of the premises or neighbors’ enjoyment.
• The relationship between articles 1855 and 1860 C.c.Q. is questioned, including whether the TAL improperly merged the duty not to disturb other tenants’ enjoyment with the duty of prudent and diligent use.
• A central evidentiary tension arises from the TAL’s finding that tenant John Gravel himself did not have problematic behavior, contrasted with its attribution to him of responsibility for the acts of his husband and occupant, Robert Mostaway.
• The case raises whether a tenant who cannot prevent an occupant’s problematic behavior toward the landlord can be held to have acted in bad faith, despite no direct misconduct by the tenant himself.
• The decision scrutinizes whether lease termination for serious prejudice requires contemporaneous defaults at the time of the hearing, given evidence of behavioral improvement over several years and an absence of recent incidents.

Facts of the case

John Gravel has been a residential tenant since 1997 in a large 126-unit, twelve-storey building owned by L.T. Investments in Montréal. He occupies the unit with his husband, Robert Mostaway. Over time, their relationship with the landlord has become strained, generating multiple proceedings before the Tribunal administratif du logement (TAL).

In 2014, the parties reached an agreement allowing Gravel to keep a dog in the apartment, on condition that the animal be kept on a leash in common areas. That agreement was later endorsed by the TAL. Despite this, a new dispute emerged related to the dog. On 2 June 2021, the TAL issued a decision ordering Gravel to take necessary measures to ensure there were no longer dog excrements on the roof of the building, indicating prior non-compliance with building rules concerning cleanliness and use of common or related areas.

Subsequently, L.T. Investments instituted another proceeding before the TAL. In this new file, the landlord alleged that Gravel was breaching his contractual obligations under the lease by causing neighborhood disturbances, failing to use the dwelling with prudence and diligence, and obstructing the landlord’s management rights in the building. The case became complex and protracted: the TAL held seven separate hearing days between 13 May 2022 and 3 July 2025, during which the landlord called various tenants and its representatives to testify, focusing mainly on the conduct of Mostaway toward staff and, to a lesser degree, other occupants.

The evidence, as recounted in the later Cour du Québec decision, showed that most of the complained-of conduct was attributable to Mostaway rather than Gravel personally. Witnesses, including building staff, described interactions in which Mostaway’s attitude and behavior toward employees of the landlord allegedly interfered with the landlord’s ability to manage the property. This went beyond ordinary disagreement, entering into a pattern which the landlord argued undermined its managerial authority and the proper operation of the building.

The TAL decision and legal framework

After the lengthy evidentiary hearings, the TAL issued its decision on 11 September 2025. Importantly, the tribunal expressly held that, aside from the dog-excrement issue and non-compliance with a prior order, Gravel himself “n’a pas eu un comportement problématique,” meaning he personally had not engaged in problematic behavior. Nonetheless, the TAL ruled that Gravel, as tenant, was responsible for the conduct of the occupant living with him, his husband Mostaway. The tribunal reasoned that Gravel had a contractual duty to ensure that the behavior of persons residing in his dwelling did not cause him to breach his own obligations under the lease.

Drawing on this reasoning, the TAL concluded that Mostaway’s conduct toward the landlord’s employees had impeded the landlord’s “droit de gérance,” or management power, in the building. Because Gravel was deemed unable to control his husband’s actions, the TAL found that he had indirectly failed to use his dwelling “correctement,” in accordance with his contractual obligations. On that basis, the TAL ordered the termination of the lease (résiliation du bail) and the eviction of all occupants from the dwelling.

In its analysis, the TAL’s approach necessarily engaged core provisions of the Civil Code of Québec. Article 1855 C.c.Q. imposes on the tenant an obligation to use the leased property with prudence and diligence. Article 1860 C.c.Q. governs the tenant’s duty not to disturb the peaceful enjoyment of other tenants. Gravel later argued that the TAL conflated these two provisions, expanding article 1855 beyond its proper scope—physical use and condition of the premises—into a broader behavioral duty more properly captured, if at all, by article 1860 C.c.Q. or by extra-contractual civil liability rules.

The landlord’s recourse was also framed, in substance, as arising from alleged harassment and interference with management. This gave rise to a jurisdictional issue: whether such claims, directed at behavior that might better be characterized as extra-contractual wrongs (e.g., harassment of the landlord or its employees), fall within the TAL’s competence, which is normally limited to disputes arising from lease relationships and contractual obligations between landlords and tenants. Gravel argued that the TAL lacked jurisdiction to resolve what amounted to an extra-contractual civil liability claim.

Application for permission to appeal and relevant legislation

Gravel, dissatisfied with the TAL’s decision terminating his lease and ordering eviction, applied to the Cour du Québec for permission to appeal under article 91 of the Loi sur le Tribunal administratif du logement (LTAL). Under that article, decisions of the TAL can be appealed with leave where the question at issue is one that ought to be submitted to the Cour du Québec.

The Cour du Québec, sitting in its Administrative and Appeal Division, recited the established criteria governing permission to appeal. Leave may be granted where the questions raised are serious or meritorious, novel, controversial, or of general interest. Leave can also be justified if the interests of justice are engaged—for example, if the TAL refused to exercise its jurisdiction, exceeded it, made an apparent error of law, provided inadequate reasons, or failed to respect natural justice in the conduct of the proceedings.

Key legal issues raised on appeal

Gravel’s application raised several interrelated legal issues. First was the question of jurisdiction and the contractual or extra-contractual nature of the landlord’s claim. Gravel argued that the dispute did not truly arise from the lease itself, but from extra-contractual obligations not to harass or cause harm to others. Since Mostaway, an occupant but not a party to the lease, had no contractual obligations toward the landlord, Gravel contended that the TAL could not validly sanction his behavior by terminating the lease.

On a preliminary view, the Cour du Québec found this jurisdictional argument sufficiently serious to warrant full appellate consideration. The court relied, among other things, on Kerassinis c. Boretsky (2012 QCCA 886), in which the Court of Appeal held that harassment by a tenant against a landlord belongs more properly to extra-contractual damages than to the lease relationship, and that the housing tribunal (then the Régie du logement) has no jurisdiction over extra-contractual disputes between lessors and lessees. That line of authority suggested that, when a landlord’s claim is rooted in harassment or behavior far removed from contractual civilities, jurisdiction may lie with the ordinary civil courts rather than the TAL.

Second, Gravel challenged the TAL’s legal interpretation of article 1855 C.c.Q. He maintained that the duty to use the dwelling with prudence and diligence concerns the way the premises themselves are used and maintained, not interpersonal conduct toward the landlord or its staff. In his view, the TAL impermissibly broadened article 1855 by treating it as if it encompassed behavior that, if governed at all by lease-based duties, would be addressed under article 1860 C.c.Q. or by specific lease clauses concerning disturbances and peaceful enjoyment. The Cour du Québec held that this question—the proper reach of article 1855, particularly as to whether it can justify lease termination based on conduct affecting the landlord’s management power—clearly merited appellate consideration.

Third, Gravel disputed the TAL’s conclusion that he failed to act in good faith. The TAL had expressly recognized that he personally did not engage in problematic conduct. Despite that, it held he violated his duty of good faith by not being able to control his husband’s behavior. The Cour du Québec saw a genuine legal issue in determining whether a tenant’s inability to prevent an occupant’s problematic interactions with the landlord automatically translates into a breach of the tenant’s own duty of good faith, especially when the tribunal has specifically found no wrongful conduct by the tenant himself.

Fourth, Gravel argued that the TAL erred in basing lease termination primarily on past incidents, without identifying sufficiently serious, contemporaneous defaults at the time of the hearing. The proceedings unfolded across nearly three years, and the TAL recognized an improvement in behavior and the absence of testimony from the current concierges. The tribunal nevertheless terminated the lease partly on the concern that prior problematic conduct might recur once the pending decision was rendered and the “épée de Damoclès” was lifted. The Cour du Québec noted that TAL jurisprudence, such as Hau c. Chaab, has emphasized that the right to terminate a lease for serious prejudice must be assessed by reference to facts contemporaneous with the hearing. This apparent tension in the TAL’s reasoning was another issue the court found worthy of appellate review.

Outcome of the Cour du Québec decision

Having considered these arguments, the Cour du Québec concluded that Gravel’s application for permission to appeal met the criteria under article 91 LTAL. The court held that the issues raised were serious, implicated the proper jurisdictional boundaries of the TAL, affected the correct interpretation of key Civil Code provisions governing residential leases, and raised important questions about good faith and contemporaneous defaults in the context of lease termination for serious prejudice.

The court therefore granted Gravel’s request for permission to appeal. In doing so, it formally framed four questions to be addressed on the appeal: whether the TAL had jurisdiction to sanction the conduct of the tenant and the occupant toward the landlord; whether article 1855 C.c.Q. can justify terminating a lease based on conduct impacting the landlord’s management power; whether Gravel breached his obligation of good faith by being unable to prevent Mostaway’s interference with management; and whether the TAL must base lease termination on defaults that are contemporaneous with the hearing when serious prejudice to the landlord is alleged. The court ordered that, upon payment of the required court fees, Gravel’s application for leave would stand as his inscription in appeal, and it reserved costs (“frais à suivre”), leaving any costs determination to the eventual merits decision.

In this Cour du Québec decision on permission to appeal, the successful party is the tenant, John Gravel. The court granted his application for leave to appeal the TAL’s decision, but it did not award any damages or fix any amount for costs. No monetary award, costs, or damages were quantified or ordered in this judgment, and any future costs or monetary consequences will depend on the outcome of the appeal on the merits; at this stage, the total amount ordered in favour of the successful party cannot be determined.