Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope of the Professional Conduct Committee’s (PCC) statutory authority under s. 25 of The Physical Therapists Act, 1998 to expand an investigation beyond the specific allegations in a written complaint
• Characterization of the initial complaint’s wording (including the reference to a “common practice at this clinic”) as justifying a broader inquiry into clinic-wide assessment, supervision, and billing practices
• Reviewability on judicial review of the PCC’s recommendation to refer a formal complaint to the discipline committee, and whether the executive/disciplinary process itself is an “adequate alternative remedy”
• Application of the reasonableness standard under Vavilov to the PCC’s implied interpretation of its jurisdiction and to its decision to audit 30 randomly selected patient files and related invoices
• Use and evaluation of documentary and testimonial evidence from patient files, patients, the unlicensed assistant, and insurers (WCB and SGI) to establish potential patterns of billing and supervision inconsistent with regulatory standards
• Reasonableness of including multiple additional charges (beyond the MW incident) in the formal complaint where those charges mirrored in nature and wording the allegations arising from the initial complaint

Facts and background

Scott Anderson is a licensed physical therapist in Saskatchewan who owns and operates Scott Anderson & Associates Physiotherapy, a private physiotherapy clinic in Regina. The case arises from concerns about how his clinic used an unlicensed support worker, Adam Strueby, and how patients were billed for services performed at the clinic. The trigger for regulatory scrutiny was an August 2020 patient experience. A patient referred to as “MW” attended the clinic on August 11 and 21, 2020. She believed she had been booked to see Anderson but in fact received both assessment and treatment from a support staff member, later identified as Strueby, who was not then a member of the Saskatchewan College of Physical Therapists (the College) or any regulated profession. MW reported that Strueby periodically left the room to consult with Anderson but that Anderson never personally treated her. Despite this, MW was invoiced for “Private Physiotherapy – Initial Assessment” listing Scott Anderson as the professional providing services. Another physical therapist, Alistair Wilson, later treated MW and, concerned about what she described, wrote a formal complaint letter to the College in November 2020. He alleged that Anderson’s conduct might be contrary to ss. 23(a) and (b) of The Physical Therapists Act, 1998 (the Act) as well as to regulatory bylaws, the code of ethical conduct, and core standards of practice. Importantly, Wilson’s complaint stated there was potential for harm “if this is a common practice at this clinic” and expressly urged the College “to investigate this occurrence to ensure it is not a common practice of this clinic.” MW agreed to cooperate and provided supporting documentation, including the August 11, 2020 invoice naming Anderson as the provider. The College forwarded the complaint and invoice to Anderson, who responded in December 2020. He denied the factual premise of the complaint, asserting that he had personally seen MW, performed the objective physical examination, developed the treatment plan, and sent a follow-up letter to her physician. He characterized Strueby’s role as limited to conducting the subjective history and implementing exercises under Anderson’s supervision while he awaited his physiotherapy licensing exams.

The PCC investigation and expansion beyond the original incident

The Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) of the College first considered the matter on January 27, 2021. It summarized the complaint as alleging that a clinic owner had allowed an unlicensed staff member to provide assessment and treatment services and then billed in the member’s name. A PCC member, Lee Hall, was appointed as lead investigator. She interviewed MW and Anderson, confirmed that Strueby’s kinesiology and physiotherapy degrees were displayed in the treatment room, and discussed clinic scheduling and assessment practices. By March 3, 2021, based on preliminary information from Anderson and MW, the PCC began asking broader questions: how long Strueby had worked at the clinic since obtaining his physiotherapy degree, and how many times he had provided “unauthorized” physiotherapy services while unsupervised. To answer these questions, Hall requested booking and billing records for the period December 2019 to December 2020. Recognizing the breadth and complexity of what it was uncovering, the PCC decided on April 1, 2021 that “extensive further investigation” was required and retained an external firm, Benard + Associates Inc., through investigator Ziggy Bardel. The investigation then expanded beyond MW’s individual complaint. Anderson provided data on patient volumes, his and Strueby’s appointment records, and a billing summary of revenue attributable to Strueby. In May 2021, the PCC’s legal counsel attended the clinic and obtained an initial set of patient files, followed by a request that resulted in 30 patient files being selected at random from Anderson’s and, in particular, from Strueby’s appointment records. Bardel and the investigation team reviewed clinical notes and invoices and interviewed a sample of patients. In some cases, patients reported that Anderson personally assessed them and oversaw treatment. In other cases, patients indicated they had seen other staff (including Strueby or other support staff) while invoices or internal records identified Anderson as the treating practitioner. When MW was interviewed again in June 2021, she repeated that both appointments were with Strueby alone, that she believed him to be a physiotherapist based on framed degrees on the wall, and that the invoices nonetheless listed Anderson as the provider. Later, Bardel interviewed Strueby, who directly contradicted MW and insisted Anderson had been present at both of her appointments, and Anderson again, who explained his version of clinical and billing practices.

Findings about billing and insurer relationships

As the investigation progressed, the PCC learned that many of the randomly selected patients were covered by the Saskatchewan Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) or Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI). The investigators noticed that clinical notes frequently described staff other than Anderson as providing day-to-day services—even where the invoices or billing records identified Anderson as the treating practitioner. The PCC therefore sought more detailed information from WCB and SGI. SGI advised that it expected physiotherapists treating its claimants to be licensed and in good standing with the College, issued payee numbers both to individual physiotherapists and to clinics, and did not permit physiotherapists with restricted licences to treat SGI clients. It also confirmed that it could identify who actually performed treatments only from progress reports submitted by providers. WCB confirmed that it maintained an approved provider list, that Anderson had long been accredited as a provider, that a second clinic location required its own provider number, and that restricted-license practitioners such as Strueby could only provide services when properly approved and accredited at specific locations and dates. Each provider was required to submit progress reports identifying who rendered services. Taken together with the documentary record from the clinic, this insurer evidence fed into the PCC’s assessment of whether invoices and reports consistently and accurately reflected who had provided treatment.

The investigator’s report and the charges recommended

Bardel delivered a lengthy report in January 2022, summarizing the focus of the investigation as alleged professional misconduct by Anderson. According to the report, the core concerns were that Anderson had: failed to act in the best interests of the public and the profession; failed to comply with established standards of practice; improperly assigned initial review, assessment, or reassessment of clients to a support worker; failed to screen clients before allowing them to be seen by an unregulated health care provider; and failed to act transparently and with integrity in professional and business practices, particularly around fees and billing, advertising, and conflicts of interest. In February 2022, the PCC formally reported to the discipline committee. It identified several factual conclusions: that Strueby, while unlicensed, had performed at least parts of MW’s assessment, communicated diagnosis and treatment, and administered treatment; that it was likely, despite Anderson’s denial, that MW had not met him at her August 2020 appointments; that the broader analysis of clinic files showed discrepancies between clinical notes and related invoices for WCB, SGI, and private patients, often listing Anderson as the treating practitioner when he was not; and that, at relevant times, Strueby and certain clinic locations were not yet accredited or authorized by WCB or SGI for the services billed. On the basis of these findings, the PCC concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe Anderson had committed professional misconduct under s. 23 of the Act by breaching core standards of practice, the Code of Ethical Conduct, and the College’s Regulatory Bylaws. The PCC recommended that the discipline committee hear and determine a formal complaint containing 17 charges. These included: alleged failures to communicate clearly the roles and accountability of supervisees to new patients; alleged improper assignment of assessments to an unregulated support worker; an alleged failure, as clinic owner, to screen an injured client before permitting them to receive services from an unregulated employee; alleged misrepresentation in reports and invoices to WCB, SGI, and private patients about who provided services; and an allegation that, between December 2019 and December 2020, Anderson allowed Strueby to display his university degrees in the treatment room in a way that might lead patients to believe he was a licensed physiotherapist.

The judicial review application

Anderson applied for judicial review in the King’s Bench for Saskatchewan. He asked the court to quash or prohibit 12 of the 17 charges (the “Impugned Charges”), all of which related to patients other than MW or to systemic billing and practice issues identified through the random file audit. He argued, among other things, that: the PCC exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 25(1) of the Act by investigating random patient files and broad billing practices unrelated to the specific complaint about MW; any formal complaint should have been confined strictly to MW’s two appointments; s. 25(2) and (3) did not authorize the PCC to recommend charges arising from matters outside the original written complaint; and the decision to “broaden” the investigation amounted to an unreasonable “fishing expedition” or “rooting around” beyond the statute’s limits. He also contended that judicial review was available at this stage and that he should not be forced to defend ultra vires charges in a discipline hearing before challenging their legality. The College resisted. It argued that the PCC’s investigation and recommendations were authorized and reasonable because the statute allowed the formal complaint to relate to “any matter” disclosed in the investigation of the original complaint, and because Wilson’s letter itself raised concerns about whether MW’s experience reflected a “common practice” at the clinic. The College further submitted that, even if the investigation could be reviewed, the court should decline to intervene because Anderson had an adequate alternative remedy in the pending discipline hearing and subsequent statutory appeal.

Reviewability and alternative remedy

The court first addressed whether it could and should entertain judicial review. Relying on the earlier case of Swanson v Institute of Chartered Accountants of Saskatchewan, the judge held that a professional conduct committee’s decision to refer a matter to discipline is reviewable even though it is not a final determination on the merits. Such a referral can significantly affect a member’s reputation, practice, and financial position and thus is not immune from judicial scrutiny. The court accepted that Anderson’s challenge was twofold: he attacked the specific decision to recommend the Impugned Charges to the discipline committee, and he implicitly challenged a series of investigative decisions by which the PCC expanded its inquiry to 30 randomly selected files and related billing practices. Although the judge was reluctant to parse every investigatory step individually—warning that judicial review of granular investigation steps should not be encouraged—the court confirmed that the PCC’s overall decision to refer the Impugned Charges was properly subject to review. On the issue of alternative remedy, the court rejected the College’s argument that Anderson should be required to proceed through the full discipline hearing and appeal process before challenging jurisdiction. The statutory appeal under the Act is available only after a finding of professional misconduct or incompetence and would not be an effective or reasonable way to correct a jurisdictional excess at the charging stage. Forcing a member to defend multiple ultra vires charges through a full hearing, with all its cost, reputational risk, and time, would be inappropriate where the core issue is whether the PCC had authority to bring those charges at all. Accordingly, the court exercised its discretion to hear and determine the judicial review application.

Standard of review

Both parties agreed that the applicable standard of review for the PCC’s interpretation of its statutory authority and for its decision to refer charges was reasonableness, as articulated in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov. Under this standard, the court examined whether the PCC’s implicit interpretation of s. 25 of the Act and its use of investigative powers, as reflected in the record and in the final report, were justified, transparent, and intelligible, and whether the result fell within a range of acceptable outcomes in light of the statutory text, scheme, and purpose. The judge also emphasized that, under Vavilov, even where decisions do not come paired with formal reasons (as is typical at an investigative stage), a reviewing court can and must look to the record as a whole to understand the rationale.

Statutory interpretation of s. 25 and the scope of the PCC’s investigative powers

The central legal question was how broadly to read s. 25 of The Physical Therapists Act, 1998. At the time of the PCC’s investigation, s. 25(1) required the PCC, upon receiving a written complaint, to “review the complaint” and “investigate the complaint by taking any steps it considers necessary,” including summoning the member or assessing competence. Section 25(2) then required the PCC, at the conclusion of its investigation, to report in writing to the discipline committee, either recommending that the discipline committee hear a formal complaint or that no further action be taken. Crucially, s. 25(3) provided that the formal complaint “may relate to any matter disclosed in the complaint received … or the investigation” conducted under s. 25(1). Applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation, the court read these words in their grammatical and ordinary sense, in harmony with the Act’s overall scheme and purpose, and in light of The Legislation Act’s direction that statutes be given a “fair, large and liberal” construction that best attains their objects. The judge compared this structure to other professional regulation statutes considered in prior cases, noting that s. 25(3) explicitly allowed the PCC to formulate a formal complaint around any matter disclosed in the investigation, not just the narrow particulars of the original written complaint. The Act, as a whole, was found to share the common objective of self-regulating professional statutes: protection of the public. This is reflected in its provisions empowering the College to set standards of practice, adopt ethical codes, regulate education and continuing competence, and define professional misconduct and incompetence in terms that prioritize the interests and safety of the public and the profession. Against that backdrop, the court rejected Anderson’s argument that investigative powers under s. 25 should be narrowly constrained in favour of the member. While acknowledging older authority that disciplinary legislation must be applied fairly, the judge found that more recent jurisprudence emphasizes broad, purposive interpretation of regulatory powers to ensure adequate public protection. The court expressly endorsed the principle that, where a statute authorizes investigation of a complaint and allows charges to be based on matters “of the nature” disclosed in the complaint or in the course of the investigation, the regulator may investigate and proceed on related conduct and patterns of practice rather than the single incident alone.

Application to the complaint and the 30-file audit

The judge then applied this interpretation to the facts. Wilson’s complaint, while triggered by MW’s experience, was not limited to that incident. It explicitly raised the possibility that what happened to MW was part of a “common practice” at Anderson’s clinic and requested that the College investigate to “ensure it is not a common practice.” In the court’s view, it was therefore reasonable for the PCC to treat the complaint not merely as a discrete allegation about two appointments, but as a broader concern about how Anderson routinely used unregulated staff and how he billed for their work. Investigating whether Anderson performed initial assessments himself, how treatment plans were formulated, how supervisees’ roles were disclosed to patients, and whether invoices accurately reflected who provided services fell squarely within the complaint’s language and the statutory mandate. The decision to examine 30 randomly selected patient files, rather than a larger number or a limitless review, was found to be a measured approach intended to test whether MW’s experience was atypical or representative. The court rejected the characterization of this as an indiscriminate “fishing expedition.” In light of the volume of patients treated at the clinic, a sample of 30 files—supported by interviews and billing analysis—was considered reasonable, proportionate, and not unduly intrusive.

Reasonableness of including the Impugned Charges

Finally, the court assessed whether the specific Impugned Charges could properly be grounded in matters “disclosed in the investigation” and reasonably related to the original complaint. Two of the challenged charges (1(a) and 1(b)) alleged that Anderson failed to communicate supervisees’ roles to a new patient and improperly assigned an initial assessment to unregulated staff—mirror allegations to those raised in relation to MW, but concerning another patient whose file had surfaced during the random audit. The court held that these charges plainly related to the same type of conduct described in the original complaint and thus fell within s. 25. The remaining Impugned Charges centred on billing and invoicing practices. One (3(a)) alleged improper reporting to WCB that Anderson had provided services when, in fact, they were provided by an unregulated, non-accredited support worker. Other charges (3(b)(i) through 3(b)(ix)) alleged that Anderson submitted invoices to multiple patients indicating he had provided physiotherapy services when, in reality, services were delivered by Strueby or other unregulated staff. The wording of these charges closely tracked charge 3(b)(x), which dealt with MW’s own invoices. The judge concluded that the billing-related charges, too, addressed conduct of the same nature as the concerns in Wilson’s complaint and arose directly from the statutory investigation into that complaint. On the evidence, they were not new, free-standing investigations untethered to the original complaint; they were logically connected extensions of the same subject matter: whether Anderson was using an unregulated person to assess or treat patients and then billing as if he had personally provided the services. Given the statutory text, the public-protection purpose of the Act, and the specific language of Wilson’s complaint, the PCC’s interpretation of its jurisdiction and its decision to include all of the Impugned Charges in its report were found to be reasonable and within its lawful authority.

Outcome

In the result, the King’s Bench for Saskatchewan held that the Professional Conduct Committee’s investigative steps and its decision to recommend the full set of charges, including the 12 Impugned Charges, were reasonable exercises of its statutory mandate under s. 25 of The Physical Therapists Act, 1998. The court confirmed that judicial review was available and appropriate at this stage, but then dismissed Anderson’s application on the merits. The successful party was the Saskatchewan College of Physical Therapists (the respondent). The court ordered that Scott Anderson’s application for judicial review be dismissed with costs in favour of the College; however, the decision does not specify any monetary quantum for those costs, and no damages or other monetary awards were fixed in the judgment, so the total amount ordered in favour of the successful party cannot be determined from the decision text.