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Background and tenancy history
The case of Cockney v NWT Housing and Inuvik Housing Authority, 2025 NWTSC 85, arises from the long-term tenancy of Jennifer Cockney in a subsidized public housing unit in Inuvik, Northwest Territories. Ms. Cockney had occupied a five-bedroom public housing unit since approximately 2009 (possibly as early as 2007), with a written tenancy agreement dated April 1, 2012. The tenancy was governed by the Residential Tenancies Act, RSNWT 1988, c R-5, and by the terms of a subsidized housing lease under which the tenant would pay market rent unless she qualified for, and maintained eligibility for, a rent subsidy by accurately and regularly reporting income for herself and all authorized occupants.
The unit was home to the appellant and her children. As of 2024, three adult or near-adult children lived with her: a daughter aged 18 and two sons aged 20 and 26. All three were listed as authorized occupants. The tenancy had a long history of financial strain. The appellant’s income was irregular, and she was often behind on rent. The landlord, the Inuvik Housing Authority, required updated income information and signed tax consent forms from the adult children to adjust the rent and maintain subsidy eligibility. Failure to provide this information meant that rent would be charged at the higher market rate, increasing rental arrears.
Communications, inspections, and rental arrears in 2024
The relationship between the tenant and landlord deteriorated sharply in 2024. From February 2024 onwards, the housing authority attempted repeated contact with the appellant, including telephone calls to her listed number, mailed letters, and hand-delivered notices. These communications covered a range of issues: unit cleanliness, requests that her adult children attend the office to sign income verification and tax consent forms, and multiple notices of termination for failure to pay rent.
On February 7, 2024, the landlord issued a warning about the cleanliness of the unit. A first termination letter for non-payment of rent followed on February 28, 2024. On May 16, 2024, the landlord wrote seeking the children’s attendance to sign income verification forms. A further termination letter for non-payment of rent was mailed on June 10, 2024. In June and July 2024, the landlord delivered several inspection notices and conducted inspections which repeatedly suggested that the unit was either unoccupied or only sporadically occupied. On June 11, a notice of inspection was left at the unit, and an employee observed one of the appellant’s adult sons looking out the window. The June 12 inspection found the unit very dirty and apparently empty.
Over the summer, the pattern continued. The landlord wrote about an inoperable or unlicensed vehicle on the yard, and mailed further letters about income verification and unit cleanliness. On July 3, a 24-hour inspection notice was hand-delivered, and the July 4 inspection again indicated that the unit appeared unoccupied and even dirtier than in June. A series of further termination notices for unpaid rent were mailed on July 23 and August 2. At an August 26 inspection, the 24-hour notice remained in the door, no one was present, the unit was still in poor condition, and the upright freezer door stood open with food leaking onto the floor; employees opened windows to address the odour. A September 5 inspection again found the 24-hour notice still in the door, no one in the unit, unchanged poor cleanliness, and the freezer door still open; this time the windows were closed.
During this same six-month span (April 1 to October 1, 2024), only two partial rental payments were made: $200 on July 2 and $300 on August 16, both paid by one of the appellant’s adult sons. Substantial arrears accumulated, with some months charged at market rent because updated income information for the household had not been provided.
The landlord’s abandonment decision and the tenant’s response
Against that backdrop, the Inuvik Housing Authority concluded on September 24, 2024 that the unit had been abandoned. Relying on its statutory powers and its understanding of the tenancy terms, it changed the locks and effectively treated the tenancy as ended by abandonment. A letter dated October 21, 2024 informed the appellant of the abandonment determination and the lock change.
The appellant learned of the changeover when a family member with keys attempted to access the unit and discovered the keys no longer worked. On October 25, 2024, more than a month after the landlord had deemed the premises abandoned, she contacted the housing authority seeking access and applied to the NWT Rental Office for reinstatement of her tenancy. She claimed she had been wrongfully locked out despite paying rent and sought both reinstatement and compensation for alternative accommodation and utilities paid after being locked out.
Meanwhile, the landlord’s correspondence was not entirely consistent. On September 10, 2024, a termination letter for unpaid rent was sent, stipulating that the termination would be cancelled if rent were paid by October 31, 2024. Then, in early October, a further termination letter dated October 7, 2024 advised that arrears had reached $9,700 and indicated that payment or an agreement by November 29, 2024 would prevent termination. The landlord later acknowledged that this October 7 letter was sent in error, because the tenancy had already been treated as terminated by abandonment.
After the lock change, the appellant made two more partial payments: $700 on October 31 and $400 on November 29, 2024. Taking those into account, arrears stood at $6,848.26 as of November 29, 2024. Due to the absence of updated income information, some rent had been charged at market rates; if the tenant had qualified for full subsidy during that period, arrears would have been approximately $3,285.26 instead.
Factual position of the tenant
At the hearing before the Rental Officer, and later before the Supreme Court on appeal, the appellant’s position was that she had not abandoned the unit. She explained that she was away from the community for extended periods in 2024 due to seasonal work and caring for a sick family member, which was not unusual for her. She asserted that her adult children remained in the home for much of the relevant period, and that she had instructed her eldest son to make rent payments on her behalf, which he did on two occasions. She argued that the unit’s increasingly dirty condition and the fact that an employee saw one of her sons at the window were consistent with the premises being occupied, not abandoned.
She also challenged the characterization of her communications with the landlord. The Rental Officer had found there had been no communication from her since January 2024, but she contended she had been at the housing office in May 2024. Her mother, who worked for the landlord but recused herself from dealing with her daughter’s tenancy due to conflict of interest, gave affidavit evidence that the appellant had indeed been in the office in May. However, the mother did not have direct involvement in her daughter’s file, and her evidence did not clarify the purpose or content of any visit or communication. In any event, she retired in May 2024, and there was no evidence of contact between the appellant and the landlord from late May until the appellant re-appeared on October 25, 2024.
Tenancy agreement and statutory framework
The tenancy agreement, a standard form subsidized public housing lease, contained several important obligations. The tenant’s rent was nominally set at market levels, but a rent subsidy was available if the tenant supplied current and accurate income information for all authorized occupants. Failure to provide such information could result in loss of subsidy and payment of full market rent. The lease also required the tenant to notify the landlord if she intended to be away from the unit for more than seven days at a time, a clause material to assessing whether an extended absence without notice, combined with non-payment and lack of communication, would support a finding of abandonment.
Statutorily, the case turned on the interpretation and application of the Residential Tenancies Act. Section 62(1) provides that where a tenant abandons a rental premises, the tenancy agreement is terminated on the abandonment date, although the tenant remains liable for loss of future rent. Section 1(3) defines when a tenant is taken to have abandoned the premises in two primary scenarios: where the landlord has reasonable grounds to believe the tenant has left, or where the tenant no longer ordinarily lives in the premises, has not expressed an intention to resume living there, and the rent paid is no longer sufficient to meet rental obligations. These provisions framed the central dispute: whether, on the facts, the unit had been legally abandoned.
On appeal, the Supreme Court also considered section 87 of the Act, which allows a party affected by a Rental Officer’s order to appeal within 14 days and permits the Court to extend the time for appeal. The standard of review for questions of fact or mixed law and fact in these statutory appeals had been established as “palpable and overriding error,” a deferential standard limiting the Court’s ability to overturn factual assessments absent clear and material error.
Proceedings before the Rental Officer
An expedited hearing took place before the Rental Officer on December 11, 2024, following the tenant’s October 25 application. The appellant sought reinstatement of her tenancy and compensation for being locked out, including alternate accommodation costs and utilities she continued to pay. The landlord defended its decision on the basis of abandonment and arrears.
In Reasons for Decision issued December 17, 2024 and an order filed December 19, 2024, the Rental Officer upheld the landlord’s position that the unit had been abandoned. She found that the landlord had made numerous attempts to reach the appellant; that there was no meaningful response over an extended period; that multiple inspections showed the unit in a deteriorating, apparently unoccupied state; and that the rent was substantially in arrears with no clear plan to bring it current. She concluded that the statutory tests for abandonment under both s. 1(3)(a) and 1(3)(b) were met.
The Rental Officer also found that, apart from abandonment, the landlord would have been justified in terminating the tenancy on the basis of unpaid rent alone, given the persistent arrears and lack of evidence that the tenant intended or was able to bring the account up to date.
While she declined to reinstate the tenancy or award broader damages, the Rental Officer ordered the landlord to reimburse the tenant for utilities paid after the tenancy had been deemed abandoned. On the evidence before her, those utility costs totalled $565.61, and she ordered that amount to be repaid to the appellant.
Initiation and procedural history of the appeal
The appellant was served with the Rental Officer’s Reasons and Order on December 22, 2024. Under s. 87(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, she had 14 days to appeal. She filed her appeal on January 17, 2025, 11 days late, and sought an extension of time, citing office closures during the Christmas period and difficulties in securing legal representation. She was self-represented and experienced challenges both in understanding the process and in paying filing fees.
Initially, Housing NWT was named as sole respondent, but a representative appeared and indicated that Housing NWT was not the proper party and would take no position. On February 11, 2025, the Inuvik Housing Authority was added as the correct respondent. That same day, the Court made an interim order under Rule 600 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories preventing the landlord from renting the unit pending appeal, in light of the appellant’s evidence that her possessions remained in the unit and that it was difficult to remove them promptly.
The appeal was first scheduled for June 24, 2025. Directions issued February 28, 2025 regulated additional affidavits and hearing briefs. The appellant filed a pre-hearing brief in April 2024 (likely a typographical error for 2025) with appended evidence. At a pre-hearing conference on June 6, 2025, it became clear she wished to rely on evidence not properly before the Court by affidavit, while the respondent sought to cross-examine on affidavits already filed. The hearing was adjourned, and the appellant was directed to file any additional affidavits by June 27, 2025 and any supplemental brief at least 10 days before the rescheduled hearing. These directions were reduced to an order and served on her.
The appeal was rescheduled to November 26, 2025. Despite the deadlines, the appellant only filed additional affidavits and a further brief on the morning of the rescheduled hearing. The respondent, however, elected not to seek a further adjournment and was prepared to proceed. In the circumstances, the Court agreed to consider the late-filed materials in the interest of resolving the matter on its merits. Meanwhile, on January 24, 2025, the Court had issued a stay of enforcement of the Rental Officer’s order, preserving the unit and preventing re-rental while the appeal was outstanding. As a result, the unit remained vacant but continued to hold the appellant’s and her family’s belongings.
Extension of time to appeal
The first issue for the Supreme Court was whether to grant an extension of time to appeal. Under s. 87(3) of the Residential Tenancies Act, the Court has discretion to extend time either before or after expiry of the 14-day limit. Relying on the test from Inuvik Housing Authority v Kendi, the Court considered three factors: whether the appellant demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period, whether there was at least an arguable case that the decision could be wrong, and whether there was a reasonable explanation for the delay.
Although the appellant did not file sworn evidence directly addressing her intention to appeal within the time, the Court accepted that she was self-represented, that navigating the court system was challenging, and that she had encountered genuine difficulties obtaining legal advice and paying filing fees. The judge took judicial notice of the limited availability of counsel in the Northwest Territories and the fact that Legal Aid generally does not fund rental appeals. The appellant’s active participation before the Rental Officer, the importance of the housing to her and her family, and the existence of a non-frivolous ground of appeal all supported an inference of genuine intention and an arguable case.
Balancing these considerations, the Court held that it was in the interests of justice to extend the time to appeal. The extension validated the late-filed appeal and allowed the Court to move to the substantive question of whether the Rental Officer erred in upholding the landlord’s abandonment determination.
Standard of review and the abandonment analysis
On the merits, the appeal raised issues of fact and mixed law and fact: whether the evidence supported a finding of abandonment, whether the landlord’s conclusion under s. 1(3)(a) and (b) was reasonable, and whether the Rental Officer misapprehended or misused the evidence. The Supreme Court applied the established “palpable and overriding error” standard of review for such issues in appeals under the Residential Tenancies Act, a highly deferential standard requiring not just an error, but one that is obvious and goes to the outcome.
The appellant argued that the Rental Officer’s decision was not justified on the evidence because the unit was not truly abandoned: her children occupied it at various times; she was away for seasonal work and family reasons; and some rent was still being paid. She highlighted the sighting of her son in the window and the landlord’s own observations that the unit had become “dirtier” between inspections, which she said implied continuing occupancy.
She also took issue with the finding that she had not communicated with the landlord since January 2024, pointing to her alleged visit to the office in May and her mother’s evidence. The Court acknowledged that the Rental Officer had relied on the landlord’s evidence of no response to communications since February 2024, and that there was at least some support for the appellant’s claim of a May office visit. However, the judge concluded that even if the date of last contact had been slightly misapprehended, the error was not material. The appellant’s mother, who expressly did not deal with her daughter’s file and retired in May, could not attest to the substance of any tenancy-related communication. Crucially, there was no contact at all from late May until October 25, 2024, a five-month period.
The Court also reviewed the Rental Officer’s treatment of indirect occupancy evidence. The officer had noted that even if an adult son was living in the unit, he was not the tenant; it remained the appellant’s responsibility to communicate with the landlord and comply with her obligations, including reporting absence beyond seven days and addressing arrears and inspection concerns. Against the background of repeated unanswered communications, inspections showing an apparently empty and deteriorating unit, substantial unpaid rent, and the tenant’s prolonged absence and silence, the officer had concluded that the landlord had reasonable grounds to find abandonment under s. 1(3)(a) and that the elements of s. 1(3)(b) were also met.
The Supreme Court agreed. The combination of multiple, unanswered letters and phone calls; repeated inspections with no one present; the unchanged and worsening condition of the premises; the open freezer and attempts by staff to mitigate odours; the long gap with no contact; and serious arrears with only sporadic partial payments supported the landlord’s conclusion that the unit had been abandoned. Even if there had been a minor factual misstatement regarding the exact date of last contact, it did not undermine the overall reasonableness of the abandonment finding and did not rise to the level of palpable and overriding error.
Effect of inconsistent termination notices and arrears
One complicating feature of the case was that, even after treating the unit as abandoned and changing the locks in late September 2024, the landlord continued to send termination letters based on rent arrears. The September 10 and October 7 notices, in particular, set future deadlines by which arrears could be paid to avoid termination. The October 7 letter was acknowledged as an error, given the earlier abandonment determination.
The Rental Officer found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that this “dual process” understandably caused confusion. The October letter in particular suggested that the tenancy might yet be salvaged if arrears were paid up by November 29. However, the Court noted that even by that date, arrears remained substantial; the appellant had not complied with the payment conditions that would have been required to save the tenancy even under the arrears-based approach. More importantly, the existence of these inconsistent letters did not negate the factual basis for the abandonment finding. The Supreme Court held that there was no error in the Rental Officer’s treatment of this aspect of the evidence.
Sympathetic circumstances but no legal error
The Court recognized that the appellant’s circumstances were compelling on a human level. She had lived in the unit for at least 16 years, raised her children there, and faced health and family challenges in 2024. Her employment and finances were precarious, and it was not unusual for her to fall behind in rent. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that the appeal had to be decided according to the law and the governing statutory framework. Under the deferential standard of review, and on the evidentiary record, the Rental Officer’s decision was entitled to respect. The Supreme Court concluded that there was no palpable and overriding error in the findings that abandonment occurred, that the statutory conditions were met, and that the landlord would in any event have had grounds to terminate based solely on arrears.
Outcome and final orders
In its conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and thereby affirmed the Rental Officer’s decision. The abandonment finding stood, and the tenancy was not reinstated. The earlier stay of enforcement simply had the effect of delaying re-rental while the appeal was pending; it did not alter the underlying outcome.
However, the Court tailored its final order to mitigate harsh practical consequences for the appellant. Acknowledging that she had substantial personal effects still in the unit, the judge directed that she be given until the end of January 2026 to remove her belongings. The Court also expressed an expectation that the landlord would act reasonably regarding additional time to remove items outside the unit, such as vehicles, in light of northern winter conditions that may complicate removal.
As for monetary relief, the only quantified award arising from the litigation remained the Rental Officer’s order that the landlord reimburse the appellant $565.61 for utility costs incurred after the tenancy was deemed abandoned. That order was neither disturbed nor increased on appeal. The successful party on the appeal itself was the respondent landlord, the Inuvik Housing Authority, which obtained dismissal of the tenant’s appeal. No additional damages or compensation were ordered in its favour, and the Supreme Court’s written reasons do not specify any quantified costs award in favour of the landlord, such that the total amount ordered in favour of the successful party cannot be determined from the decision.
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Appellant
Respondent
Court
Supreme Court of the Northwest TerritoriesCase Number
S-1-CV-2025-000 020Practice Area
Civil litigationAmount
$ 565Winner
RespondentTrial Start Date