Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The Federal Court lacked jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims against Toronto-Dominion Bank, as no federal statute supported the action.

• Allegations of systemic fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and inaccurate record-keeping fell outside the scope of sections 17, 20 to 23 of the Federal Courts Act.

• PIPEDA claims were deficient because the Plaintiff had not first submitted a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner and obtained a report, a prerequisite for Federal Court jurisdiction.

• Federal regulation of the Defendant under the Bank Act did not automatically confer Federal Court jurisdiction over a private banking dispute.

• On reconsideration, the Plaintiff's reliance on an August 12, 2025 letter to the Privacy Commissioner failed because it was never properly included in the motion to strike materials.

• Given the struck statement of claim and the lack of grounds for reconsideration, the Court ordered the file closed and barred further filings and communications, while separately addressing the Plaintiff's abusive conduct toward Registry staff.

The banking relationship and the Plaintiff's allegations

Marie Pia Fazio, a self-represented litigant, maintained a banking relationship with the Toronto-Dominion Bank since October 2020. Her claims arose from what she described as an alleged pattern of institutional and financial misconduct. Specifically, Fazio contended that the bank failed to maintain accurate and reliable records of her accounts, misrepresented its staff's positions, and failed to provide a complete transaction history. She further alleged that the bank's coding practices did not accurately identify fraudulent transactions, causing it to record false or omit legitimate transactions. According to Fazio, these actions and omissions misrepresented her income from workplaces and government deposits, ultimately affecting her claim to government benefits and her emotional well-being.

Filing the statement of claim and procedural developments

On September 26, 2025, Fazio filed a statement of claim in the Federal Court alleging systemic fraud, negligent misrepresentation, misrepresentation of staff positions, and access to information under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). She served the claim on the bank on October 3, 2025. Between October and November 2025, the parties exchanged emails and phone calls concerning the proceeding, including whether it was filed at the proper court. On November 5, 2025, the Court allowed the bank to file its notice of intention to respond despite exceeding the time limit under Rule 204.1 of the Federal Courts Rules. On November 13, 2025, Fazio submitted a motion record requesting default judgement and other equitable relief. The bank then filed a motion to strike on November 20, 2025, and Associate Judge Milczynski directed on December 9, 2025, that the motion to strike should proceed first, holding the default judgement motion in abeyance in the interest of efficiency.

The jurisdictional question and the motion to strike

The central issue in the first decision, dated December 16, 2025, was whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear Fazio's claims. Justice Ahmed agreed with the bank that it did not. Fazio had pleaded jurisdiction based on sections 17, 20 to 23 of the Federal Courts Act. The Court found that section 17 concerned relief against the Crown, which was not a party; sections 20 and 22 dealt with copyright and maritime law, which had no bearing; paragraph 23(a) applied only where the Crown is a party; and paragraph 23(c) could not apply because an individual's relationship with a national bank does not constitute a federal work or undertaking extending beyond provincial limits, as established in Dalfen v Bank of Montreal. The Court further held that the bank's status as a federally regulated institution under the Bank Act did not automatically confer Federal Court jurisdiction over claims brought against it.

The PIPEDA claims and their deficiency

Regarding PIPEDA, the Court noted that complaints under the statute must first proceed to the Privacy Commissioner, and only after receiving the Commissioner's report may a complainant apply to the Federal Court for a hearing. Because Fazio had not pleaded that she submitted a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner, her PIPEDA claims could not support the Court's jurisdiction.

The motion for reconsideration

Following the December 16, 2025, order striking her claim without leave to amend, Fazio brought a motion for reconsideration under Rule 397 of the Federal Courts Rules. In the second decision, dated February 10, 2026, Justice Ahmed found the motion meritless. Rule 397 limits reconsideration to very narrow grounds: that the order does not accord with the reasons given, or that a matter was overlooked or accidentally omitted. The Court emphasized that reconsideration does not permit relitigation of the same arguments or the introduction of new facts. Many of Fazio's submissions — including arguments about the bank's late filing, the sequence of motions, and the alleged collapsing of her jurisdictional arguments — had already been addressed in the original order or constituted new arguments that fell outside the scope of reconsideration. Her appeal to the interests of justice and her hardship as a self-represented litigant, while acknowledged, did not constitute valid grounds under Rule 397.

The alleged complaint to the Privacy Commissioner

The only fact Fazio submitted the Court had overlooked was her alleged complaint to the Privacy Commissioner, contained in a letter dated August 12, 2025. However, the Court found that this letter was not properly before it during the motion to strike because it had been included only in the motion record for the default judgement motion, not in her response to the motion to strike as required by Rule 365(2)(e). The Court reiterated that all documents relied upon must be included in the specific motion materials. Even had the letter been properly before the Court, the original order had already specified that a report from the Privacy Commissioner — not merely a complaint — was required under subsections 11(1) and 14(1) of PIPEDA before the Court could exercise jurisdiction.

Conduct toward Registry staff and the final orders

Separate and apart from the reconsideration determination, Justice Ahmed addressed Fazio's behaviour toward the Court's Registry staff, noting that she had repeatedly visited the Registry and attempted to lodge letters containing abusive language, claiming procedural unfairness related to the order and the decision not to hold a hearing for the reconsideration motion. The Court clarified that Registry staff play no role in decisions as to whether to schedule a hearing and the outcome of any direction, order, or judgement, and cannot provide legal advice, put litigants in contact with a Judge or Associate Judge, predict what the Court may decide, or assist litigants in understanding the orders or decisions of the Court. The Court affirmed that while Fazio had the right to appeal — which she had already exercised — no party has the right to threaten or use abusive language toward Registry staff. Considering that the statement of claim had been struck and that there were no grounds for reconsideration, the Court dismissed the motion without costs in favor of the Toronto-Dominion Bank, represented by McCarthy Tétrault LLP, and ordered the Registry to close file T-3726-25, to cease accepting any further documents from the parties in the file, and to refrain from responding to any further requests or communications from Fazio regarding the matter. No monetary award was ordered in either decision, and no exact amount was at issue given that the claim was struck on jurisdictional grounds before proceeding to the merits.