Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Superior Court’s jurisdiction under rule 7.08 to approve statutory accident benefits (SABs) settlements for minors despite section 280 of the Insurance Act directing SABs disputes to the LAT.
• Distinction drawn between ongoing disputes over SABs (reserved to the LAT) and settled SABs claims that still require court approval for parties under disability.
• Reliance on inherent and parens patriae jurisdiction and the mandatory wording of rule 7.08(1) to protect minors in all settlements, including insurance-based SABs settlements.
• Use of appellate insurance and civil authorities (Tomlinson, Yang, S.E.C., Wu Estate, Rivera, Spicer) to reject an implied ouster of Superior Court jurisdiction and to avoid a jurisdictional vacuum in settlement approvals.
• Evidentiary assessment of the minor’s injuries, recovery, ongoing psycho-social impairments, and treatment recommendations to test whether the SABs settlement is fair, reasonable, and in his best interests.
• Structure of the insurance settlement: exhaustion of the $65,000 non-catastrophic medical/rehabilitation limit, payment of the remaining $18,674.40, approval of counsel’s 10% fee plus HST, and court-directed allocation between immediate treatment use and funds held in court until age 18.

Background and procedural history
This case involves a statutory accident benefits claim arising out of a motor vehicle collision, and it sits at the intersection of insurance law and the procedural protections for minors under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The applicant, Dustin Gomez, born February 17, 2015, was injured in an August 4, 2018 collision and pursued both a tort action and a statutory accident benefits (SABs) claim. The tort settlement was previously approved by the court by judgment dated December 20, 2024. In this proceeding, Dustin, through his mother and litigation guardian, applies under rule 7.08 for court approval of a proposed full and final settlement of his SABs claim against The Personal Insurance Company. The application was heard in writing, and Firestone R.S.J. released reasons on December 16, 2025, in which the primary legal issue concerned the court’s jurisdiction to approve a SABs settlement for a minor in light of section 280 of the Insurance Act.

Facts of the accident and the minor’s injuries
Dustin was three years old when the accident occurred on August 4, 2018. The collision produced significant immediate effects: seizure activity, loss of consciousness, injury to the flava ligament at C4/C5 and C5/C6 in his neck, behavioral regression, abdominal pains, abrasions to his forehead, right clavicle and neck, and an overall trauma response. He remained hospitalized until September 7, 2018, and made what the court described as a very good recovery during his hospital stay. After discharge from the Hospital for Sick Children, the only medical issues requiring follow up were his ligamentous neck injury and emotional and psychological concerns. Over time, the neck injury fully resolved. However, Dustin experienced continuing behavioral and emotional difficulties related to the trauma of the collision. He worked with a social worker, an occupational therapist, and a behavioral therapist to address these issues. Although his psycho-social and emotional symptoms improved markedly, by 2022 he still exhibited impaired functioning, particularly poor coping mechanisms when dealing with stress and frustration. On the evidentiary record, various supports were recommended: individual psychological treatment, family therapy, behavioral therapy, occupational and rehabilitation therapy, tutoring support, school-based mental health supports, and academic accommodations. At the time of the application, Dustin was not engaged in active treatment other than occasional tutoring, but the medical and rehabilitation evidence supported a conclusion that further services could benefit him and that he retained ongoing treatment needs connected to the accident.

The insurance framework and statutory accident benefits claim
From an insurance law perspective, the case turns on Ontario’s statutory accident benefits regime and the non-catastrophic medical and rehabilitation limits applicable under the Insurance Act and its regulations. Dustin’s SABs claim was treated as non-catastrophic, with an available medical/rehabilitation limit of $65,000. The court noted that Dustin had already accessed $46,325.60 of these non-catastrophic medical/rehabilitation benefits, leaving a remaining entitlement of $18,674.40. Under the proposed settlement, The Personal Insurance Company agreed to pay this full remaining balance without any discount. As a result, the total non-catastrophic medical/rehabilitation limit of $65,000 would be fully exhausted in Dustin’s favour. The decision does not turn on any narrow policy exclusion or a contested interpretation of specific private policy clauses; instead, it applies the statutory SABs structure that sets fixed monetary limits for medical and rehabilitation benefits. Importantly, the settlement is characterized as a “full and final” resolution of Dustin’s SABs claim, meaning that, once approved, there will be no further entitlement to SABs arising out of this accident, and the statutory limits are fully committed. The insurance law question, therefore, is not whether the insurer owes coverage—the insurer has agreed to pay the balance of the limit—but whether, after the parties have agreed to settle, the Superior Court still has a lawful supervisory role in approving that settlement for a minor under rule 7.08.

Rule 7.08, rule 1.02 and section 280 of the Insurance Act
The central legal conflict is between the statutory dispute-resolution framework for SABs and the court’s protective jurisdiction over settlements involving persons under disability. Rule 7.08(1) states that no settlement of a claim made by or against a person under disability is binding without the approval of a judge, whether or not a proceeding has been commenced in respect of the claim. This is a broad, mandatory rule designed to protect vulnerable parties by subjecting all settlements affecting them to court oversight. Rule 1.02 governs the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure, providing that they apply to all civil proceedings in the Court of Appeal and the Superior Court of Justice, subject to listed exceptions. Clause 1.02(1)3. adds that the Rules do not apply where a statute provides a different procedure. Section 280 of the Insurance Act, introduced in 2016, sets up an administrative dispute-resolution process for SABs via the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT). Subsections 280(2) and (3) provide that an insured person or insurer may apply to the LAT to resolve disputes about entitlement or quantum of SABs and that no person may bring a proceeding in any court about such disputes, except for appeals from LAT decisions or applications for judicial review. In a recent case, Borok, Abraham v. Primmum Insurance Company, another Superior Court judge held that, because section 280 prescribes a different procedure, the Superior Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under rule 7.08 to approve SABs settlements. Firestone R.S.J. directly addressed this line of reasoning and, applying principles of horizontal stare decisis from R. v. Sullivan, carefully analysed but ultimately declined to follow Borok, concluding that it misread the interaction between section 280, rule 1.02 and rule 7.08.

Appellate authorities and preservation of Superior Court jurisdiction
The reasons place heavy emphasis on appellate authority confirming that any removal of the Superior Court’s jurisdiction must be expressed in clear statutory language. In R.W. Tomlinson Limited v. Labourers’ International Union of North America Local 527, relying on Skof v. Bordeleau, the Court of Appeal reiterated that the law requires clear and express statutory wording to take away the Superior Court’s jurisdiction or to extinguish a right to sue. Section 280’s language is unquestionably strong when dealing with disputes about SABs entitlement or quantum: it sends those disputes exclusively to the LAT and bars court proceedings on such matters except through appellate or judicial review routes. However, Firestone R.S.J. held that section 280 is directed at the forum and process for adjudicating ongoing disputes, not at the separate question of who may approve a settlement involving a minor once the insurer and insured have reached agreement. The judgment also relies on R.W. Tomlinson’s broader policy rationale: preserving the Superior Court’s jurisdiction in appropriate areas upholds the rule of law, avoids jurisdictional vacuums, and promotes access to justice. Applied in the insurance context here, if the LAT is focused on deciding live SABs disputes and the legislation is silent on who approves settlements of those disputes for minors, reading section 280 as ousting the court’s settlement-approval role would leave minors without a clear protective forum at the settlement stage. Firestone R.S.J. concluded that such an outcome is contrary to the rule of law and the access-to-justice values articulated in Tomlinson. The decision also draws support from Yang v. Co-operators General Insurance Company, where the Court of Appeal confirmed that section 280 grants the LAT exclusive jurisdiction over SABs disputes and thus deprives the Superior Court of jurisdiction to decide those disputes. Crucially, Yang did not address rule 7.08 settlement approvals for minors. Similarly, in S.E.C. v. M.P., the Court of Appeal considered the open court principle in the context of rule 7.08 motions and applications approving settlements for minors and parties under disability, including a combined tort and SABs approval arising from a post-2016 collision. The Court of Appeal in S.E.C. did not question the Superior Court’s jurisdiction to approve a SABs settlement in that context and expressly described rule 7.08 as designed to protect parties under disability by ensuring judicial oversight of settlements they cannot fully control themselves. Firestone R.S.J. treated S.E.C. and Yang together as reinforcing the view that section 280 targets the dispute-resolution phase, whereas rule 7.08 governs the settlement-approval phase when the claimant is a minor or otherwise under disability. The reasons also reference Wu Estate v. Zurich Insurance Co., Rivera v. LeBlond, and Spicer v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, all of which highlight the court’s inherent and parens patriae jurisdiction and the protective purpose behind requiring judicial scrutiny of settlements involving vulnerable parties, including those against insurers.

Conclusion on jurisdiction and interaction of rule 7.08 and section 280
On this analysis, Firestone R.S.J. held that the Superior Court of Justice has jurisdiction to approve statutory accident benefits settlements for minors under rule 7.08. Section 280 removes the right to commence court proceedings over disputed SABs but does not expressly displace the rule 7.08 mechanism when the dispute has been resolved and only settlement approval for a person under disability remains. There is no language in section 280 or rule 1.02 that excludes SABs settlements from the reach of rule 7.08. By preserving the court’s settlement-approval role, the decision maintains a coherent division of labour: disputes about entitlement and quantum go to the LAT under section 280, but once those disputes are resolved and a settlement is reached for a minor, the Superior Court continues to act as the guardian of the minor’s interests through rule 7.08. This avoids a jurisdictional vacuum and ensures that the protective function traditionally exercised by the Superior Court in insurance settlements involving minors is maintained.

Evaluation of the settlement’s fairness and reasonableness
Having confirmed jurisdiction, the court turned to the substance of the proposed settlement. The key questions were whether the settlement reasonably reflects Dustin’s accident-related needs and whether the proposed distribution of funds is appropriate for a minor. The evidence showed that Dustin had already received significant medical and rehabilitation treatment funded through SABs, consuming $46,325.60 of the $65,000 non-catastrophic limit. The insurer agreed to pay the entire remaining $18,674.40 with no discount, ensuring full exhaustion of the non-catastrophic medical/rehabilitation limit. This means that, from an insurance law standpoint, Dustin receives the maximum medical and rehabilitation benefits available to him under the statutory non-catastrophic regime. From the $18,674.40 to be paid by The Personal Insurance Company, counsel sought a fee of $1,867.44 (10% of the settlement amount) plus HST of $242.77. After these deductions, the net settlement proceeds amounted to $16,564.19. In weighing the evidence, Firestone R.S.J. considered Dustin’s history of significant but improving psycho-social and emotional injuries, his continued vulnerability, and the professional recommendations for further psychological and educational support. Against this background, the court concluded that the settlement, including the agreed exhaustion of the remaining SABs limits and the proposed fee structure, was fair and reasonable and in Dustin’s best interests.

Directions for the administration of settlement funds and overall outcome
The court then structured how the net settlement should be managed to balance Dustin’s immediate and longer-term needs. Of the $16,564.19 net proceeds, $5,000 was ordered to be paid to Dustin’s mother and litigation guardian, Abegail Gomez, under section 51 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, to be used specifically for Dustin’s immediate treatment needs, such as psychological support, educational assistance, and other services tied to his accident-related impairments. The remaining $11,564.19 was ordered to be paid to the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice, to be held in trust until Dustin reaches the age of 18. At that time, the principal and any accrued interest are to be paid out to Dustin, subject to any further order of the court, giving him a modest capital sum as he enters adulthood. In the final analysis, Dustin, as the minor applicant, is treated as the successful party: the court affirms its jurisdiction to oversee his statutory accident benefits settlement, approves the settlement as fair and reasonable, and orders The Personal Insurance Company to pay the remaining $18,674.40 of the non-catastrophic medical/rehabilitation benefits limit. After payment of counsel’s approved 10% fee plus HST, a net amount of $16,564.19 is preserved and allocated by court order between immediate treatment needs and funds held in court for Dustin until he turns 18, with the total monetary benefit fixed and clearly determinable under this decision.