Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Dispute centred on whether the condominium corporation’s handling of barking-dog complaints and related enforcement steps amounted to oppression or unfair prejudice under s. 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998.
• Evidence on noise and nuisance was sharply contested, with logs, neighbour letters, surveillance data, and the complainant board president’s credibility all scrutinised by the Condominium Authority Tribunal (CAT) and referenced in the court’s reasons.
• The adequacy of medical evidence supporting disability accommodation (for two service dogs and in-unit laundry) was a recurring issue, including how much detail the condo could demand about diagnoses and the nexus between disability and requested accommodations.
• The corporation’s reliance on expert engineering reports (for plumbing capacity and noise studies) and the reasonableness of insisting on unit access to investigate leaks and sound transmission were key factual and legal questions.
• Board governance and neutrality were tested by the fact that the principal complainant was also board president, raising concerns about recusal, impartial decision-making, and the impact of the owner’s own combative conduct on board dynamics.
• The accuracy and completeness of the status certificate, particularly around anticipated reserve fund increases and a contemplated but never-taken loan, were examined to determine if there was a compensable misrepresentation under s. 76 of the Condominium Act.

Facts and procedural history

The dispute in Baha v. Waterloo North Condominium Corporation No. 37 arose in a Waterloo condominium after Antoaneta Claudia Baha purchased her unit in January 2023 and moved in with her partner, Joseph Murphy. Both use service dogs to assist with mental health conditions. Almost immediately, conflict erupted with the downstairs neighbour, who happened to be the condominium board president, over after-hours renovation noise and what he described as constant barking from the unit above. Ms. Baha maintained that her small service dog barked only briefly to signal needs or redirect her attention during panic attacks, and that she worked from home so there was no persistent barking. She disclosed her disability and her service dog to the property manager with supporting medical documentation, and later advised that Mr. Murphy also had a service dog.
Despite this, the property manager initially told her that because Mr. Murphy was not on title he could not bring his dog on the property, “service animal or not”, and that her first doctor’s note was insufficient. That communication, combined with repeated complaints from the board president and a later suspected plumbing leak traced to her unit, intensified her anxiety and led her to appoint Mr. Murphy as her proxy for communications with the corporation. Tensions escalated as she felt her mental health needs were being trivialised and her rights misunderstood.
In April 2023, she formally requested accommodation for an in-unit washer and dryer. She explained that her generalized anxiety disorder made her vulnerable to sensory overload and that the bright lights, loud machines and strong scents in the shared laundry room triggered severe panic attacks. Around the same time, the board was receiving intermittent noise complaints from the president about barking and other sounds from her unit. Because the complainant was a director, the remaining board members engaged condominium counsel to help them navigate the issues and maintain neutrality.
On 4 May 2023, the corporation’s lawyer sent a detailed letter to Ms. Baha raising three main points: that the corporation believed there were three or four dogs in her unit despite a one-pet rule; that it had received multiple complaints of excessive barking; and that it required more robust medical documentation to substantiate both her service dog and Mr. Murphy’s, as well as the need for an in-unit laundry as a disability accommodation. The letter relied on the condominium’s rules limiting pets and prohibiting in-suite laundry but noting exceptions for service animals and Code-based accommodations. Photos of her walking a dog were enclosed, which she perceived as surveillance.
She responded forcefully, confirming there were only two dogs, both service animals, denying any excessive barking and pointing to AI-enabled in-unit cameras that could provide objective noise logs. She also took issue with the assertion that the condo’s rules limited dog size, correctly noting that the operative rules did not include a weight or “easily carried” restriction, and accused the corporation of failing in its duty of procedural fairness and misrepresenting the facts. Mr. Murphy’s psychiatrist later provided letters confirming his disability and that his specific service dog was necessary to manage his condition. The board, guided by counsel, continued to press for more granular information on the nature of his disability and alternatives to a second dog, asserting this was needed to assess accommodation properly.
The corporation simultaneously retained engineering firm Pretium to assess whether the aging 1970s building could safely support in-unit laundry. Pretium reported that the plumbing, designed without suite laundry in mind, could face flow, blockage, pressure and hot-water problems, along with potential mould and mildew, if in-unit machines proliferated. Relying on that report, the board refused in-suite laundry but proposed alternative accommodations in the common laundry room, such as reserved solitary usage times and modified lighting. Ms. Baha rejected these options as undignified and tantamount to turning her disability into a public spectacle, and insisted that only in-unit laundry would suffice.
Relations deteriorated further after a significant water leak in September 2023 that damaged at least the unit below and which plumbers considered consistent with heavy water use or possible illicit installations such as a washer. The corporation also commissioned a noise study by HGC Engineering in response to continued complaints of barking and large rushes of water. To carry these out, the corporation sought entry to her unit under the Condominium Act’s statutory right of access for maintenance, repair, and investigation of suspected rule breaches. Ms. Baha, deeply distrustful by this point, demanded further explanation, characterised the entry requests and sound study as harassment and abuse of power, and ultimately refused access for investigative purposes (though she maintained she would permit entry for true emergencies and regular common-element inspections).
The conflict spawned five separate proceedings. The corporation filed a Condominium Authority Tribunal (CAT) application regarding the number of dogs and alleged nuisance barking. It also brought a Superior Court application for an order allowing entry to her unit to investigate plumbing and noise issues. Ms. Baha, in turn, brought a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) application over denial of in-unit laundry; initiated this oppression application in the Superior Court under ss. 37 and 135 of the Condominium Act; and later sued a fellow owner and his spouse in Small Claims Court for alleged defamation related to her removal from the board.
Meanwhile, in late 2023, she successfully ran for election to the corporation’s board, campaigning on a platform of more inclusive, less aggressive management and better owner engagement. Her tenure on the board was short-lived. Other directors and the property manager described her as combative and obstructive, claiming meetings became extremely stressful and two directors resigned. The community itself grew divided, with flyers, newsletters (including one she authored, the “Bluevale Tower Tribune”), door-to-door canvassing and social media campaigns preceding a requisitioned special owners’ meeting. That meeting considered two requisitions: one to remove several long-serving board members and the management company, which failed, and another to remove her from the board, which passed. She alleged that the second requisition and commentary at the meeting were defamatory, humiliating and driven by the existing board’s hostility to her advocacy.
A further element of her oppression claim concerned the status certificate issued before she purchased the unit. The November 2022 certificate stated there was no known circumstance that might result in an increase in common expenses for her unit, that a new reserve fund study would be conducted by April 2023, and that there were no plans to increase the reserve fund under a proposed plan. Subsequent reserve fund work recommended unexpectedly large reserve contributions, driven mainly by pandemic-era construction cost inflation, and internal board minutes from 2022 showed they had at least discussed the possibility of a multimillion-dollar loan to fund future capital projects. She argued the certificate should have flagged an underfunded reserve and likely large increases, which would have influenced her purchase decision.

Tribunal and appellate decisions on the service dogs

The service-dog issues were adjudicated first at the Condominium Authority Tribunal. The CAT accepted that both Ms. Baha and Mr. Murphy had disabilities within the meaning of the Human Rights Code and that each relied on a service dog. It concluded the corporation had not proven that barking from the dogs rose to the level of unreasonable noise or nuisance. The tribunal emphasised that the condo’s evidence hinged largely on the noise log and affidavit of the downstairs president, whose account was not corroborated by other residents and conflicted in some respects with the property administrator and another neighbour, while the applicants produced security-camera logs and an across-the-hall neighbour letter suggesting minimal disturbance.
On accommodation, the CAT found that the condo’s insistence on more and more detailed medical information, with an eye to proposing substitute accommodations (such as sharing a single service dog), paid insufficient respect to clear professional opinions that Mr. Murphy’s particular dog was the appropriate accommodation. The tribunal reiterated that service dogs are not interchangeable “widgets” and that, absent evidence of undue hardship, the board could not override treating physicians’ considered views about the necessity of a second dog. It concluded that the corporation failed to reasonably exercise its discretion under its own pet rules and that this failure contributed to Ms. Baha and Mr. Murphy leaving their home. The CAT dismissed the condominium’s application, ordered that the second service dog be permitted as an accommodation, and awarded $15,000 in damages to Ms. Baha for the harm flowing from the board’s mishandling of the accommodation process.
The condo appealed to the Divisional Court. The appeal challenged the CAT’s legal framework for accommodation, its conclusion that two dogs were warranted, its approach to procedural fairness and its authority to award damages. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the tribunal had properly applied Code-based accommodation principles, drawn permissible factual inferences from the record, and acted within its jurisdiction in awarding damages. In a separate costs ruling, the court declined to give full indemnity costs to the successful respondents, noting that the corporation had a statutory right of appeal and that exercising that right was not in itself negligent or wrongful.

The oppression application in the Superior Court

In the oppression application now at issue, Ms. Baha relied on ss. 37 and 135 of the Condominium Act. She alleged that the condominium corporation and its directors engaged in oppressive, unfairly prejudicial and unfairly disregarding conduct by: mischaracterising and exaggerating dog-related complaints; demanding excessive medical disclosure; relying on baseless noise accusations; commissioning a sound study and pressing for entry to her unit as a form of harassment; mishandling and misrepresenting the Pretium engineering report to deny in-unit laundry; conducting litigation in a heavy-handed, bad-faith manner; selectively enforcing rules; ridiculing and marginalising her as a disabled resident; and issuing a misleading status certificate regarding reserve funding. She sought declarations, damages (including aggravated damages) for intentional infliction of mental suffering, and financial relief linked to any “overpayments” of common expenses.
Justice I.R. Smith began by situating s. 135 within the broader oppression jurisprudence, emphasising the two-part test: breach of the claimant’s reasonable expectations and conduct that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards those interests. He stressed that the remedy is equitable and contextual and that the corporation’s conduct must be assessed in light of the applicant’s own behaviour.
On the evidentiary record, the judge rejected her broad claims that the corporation, its directors, or its lawyers had acted dishonestly, in bad faith, or with intent to harm. He characterised her own communications as consistently rude, sarcastic and aggressive, and found that the corporation’s letters—including those from counsel—were firm but civil and professional. The May 4, 2023 letter was seen as imperfect but not improper: it incorrectly alluded to a size restriction on dogs that no longer existed in the operative rules and should not have enclosed surreptitious photos of her walking her dog, but it was not abusive; it gave her an opportunity to correct misunderstandings, which she did in part. Retaining counsel, particularly where the complainant was a sitting director who recused himself, was held to be reasonable, not retaliatory.
With respect to the service dogs, Justice Smith substantially agreed with the CAT’s core criticisms. By mid-July 2023, after multiple letters from physicians, the corporation had enough information to accept that both residents needed their own service dogs, and it should have acceded to the requested accommodation at that point. Instead, it became “too entrenched” in a strict enforcement mind-set and unduly fixated on the one-pet rule and speculative noise concerns, while undervaluing the medical evidence and the absence of compelling proof of nuisance. This failure, in the judge’s view, breached her reasonable expectation that the board would engage properly and sensitively in the accommodation process. However, he declined to characterise the corporation’s position in the CAT or on appeal as frivolous or abusive: it relied on existing case law, conceded their disabilities, and advanced arguable—if ultimately incorrect—submissions about the scope of the right to accommodation. Filing the CAT application and appealing to the Divisional Court were not themselves oppressive steps.
On in-unit laundry, the court held that the board acted prudently by commissioning Pretium’s engineering report and relying on its warnings about building-wide plumbing risks if suite laundries proliferated. While the HRTO will ultimately decide whether denying her in-unit laundry constitutes a failure of Code accommodation, Justice Smith saw nothing in the Pretium-based decision, or the condo’s alternative proposals for using the laundry room, that amounted to bad faith or unfair targeting. He rejected her view that mentioning “danger to the property” based on Pretium’s conclusions was a gross misrepresentation or that the report was irrelevant. The board was entitled—and arguably obliged—to prioritise building integrity on the strength of professional advice.
Regarding unit entry and the sound study, Justice Smith adopted and endorsed the earlier ruling of another judge who had already granted the condominium’s separate “entry application.” He found that the corporation’s request to enter her unit to investigate a significant leak and to allow the noise engineers access was reasonable, proportionate and squarely within its statutory authority. The purpose was precisely to investigate and resolve factual disputes about leaks and noise, not to intimidate or fabricate evidence. Her refusal to allow access, even after explanations were provided and against the background of repeated complaints and a real leak event, forced the corporation to litigate unnecessarily.
On governance and her removal from the board, the judge distinguished between actions of the corporation and those of the ownership community more broadly. Her election and later removal both occurred via democratic owner votes at duly called meetings. Any allegedly defamatory statements by individual owners were the subject of separate Small Claims proceedings and were not corporate acts for purposes of s. 135. While he accepted that her time on the board was highly contentious and that she faced strong pushback, he found the record equally supported the board’s contention that her conduct had made meetings unworkable and heightened community tension, and he did not find evidence that the board as such orchestrated a bad-faith campaign to remove her.
On the status certificate, Justice Smith contrasted the case with Bruce v. Waterloo North Condominium Corporation No. 26, where a corporation knew of a specific, very costly water-main repair and an impending special assessment or loan but failed to disclose those looming liabilities. Here, the status certificate correctly stated that a new reserve fund study was pending and that there were, at that time, no adopted plans to increase the fund under a s. 94(8) plan. Board minutes referring to a potential $10 million loan for “projects not yet determined” showed only exploratory discussion, and in the end no loan was taken. The later reserve study’s recommended increases were driven mainly by an unanticipated 50% rise in construction costs, not by pre-existing hidden problems. On the evidence, the court could not conclude that the board knew or ought to have known, when issuing the certificate in November 2022, that dramatic reserve increases were imminent. Accordingly, there was no actionable misstatement or omission under s. 76, and her claim for exemption from later increases failed.

Outcome and monetary consequences

Applying the oppression framework, Justice Smith held that most of Ms. Baha’s reasonable expectations had not been breached. She had ample opportunity to present her case and evidence; the board acted impartially by having the complaining president recuse himself and by seeking external legal and expert advice; its requests for unit access and its litigation strategies were reasonable; and its communications, though firm, remained professional. The one significant breach of her reasonable expectations lay in the board’s handling of the two-dog accommodation request, where it gave excessive weight to rigid rule enforcement and insufficient weight to disability rights and medical evidence. That breach, he concluded, amounted not to “oppression” in the strict, bad-faith sense, but to conduct that was unfairly prejudicial to, and unfairly disregarded, her interests under s. 135. On that basis, the court granted a declaratory remedy that the corporation had engaged in conduct which unfairly prejudiced and unfairly disregarded her interests in relation to the service-dog accommodation.
However, the judge refused to award any compensation or aggravated damages. He noted that the CAT had already awarded her $15,000 specifically for the corporation’s failure to reasonably exercise its discretion in dealing with the service dogs, including the consequential decision to move out, and that she had not produced new medical or financial evidence of additional losses attributable to the same wrong. To grant further monetary relief would be to risk double recovery. He also found no evidentiary basis for aggravated damages, given the absence of proven bad faith or intentional infliction of mental suffering. Her broader oppression, harassment and status-certificate claims were dismissed.
As to costs, the Superior Court did not fix any figure in its reasons. Instead, it set a timetable for written costs submissions from the condominium corporation and responsive briefs from Ms. Baha, leaving the ultimate costs determination to a later order. When the related CAT and Divisional Court decisions are viewed together with this oppression judgment, the net monetary result is that the only quantified award in her favour is the CAT’s $15,000 damages, while the Superior Court’s oppression decision grants her solely a declaration with no money, the Divisional Court upholds the CAT result without adding further sums, and the total costs payable by or to either party across the court proceedings cannot be determined from the available decisions.