Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope of the Manitoba Labour Board’s exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, in light of rule 21.01(3)(a) of the Manitoba King’s Bench Rules and the duty of fair representation in section 20 of The Labour Relations Act.

• Proper characterization of the “essential character of the dispute” under the Weber test, including whether it concerns unfair labour practices by a union president administering a member’s contractual rights.

• Treatment of unparticularized allegations that the defendant “colluded with others to remove him as their supervisor and force his retirement” as bald assertions or conclusory statements requiring particulars.

• Determination of whether duties alleged (breach of fiduciary duty, inducing breach of contract, and violation of solicitor and client confidentiality) arise solely from the defendant’s role as president of the Winnipeg Police Association under the collective agreement and WPA constitution.

• Evaluation of whether the remedial scheme under The Labour Relations Act, despite a six-month limitation period and a $2,000 limit on amounts payable for an unfair labour practice, nonetheless provides an “effective” alternative remedy.

• Appellate review of a discretionary stay order and whether any palpable and overriding error occurred in applying the Weber framework and related case law.

Background and procedural history

The case in the Court of Appeal of Manitoba is Alexander v Sabourin, 2025 MBCA 106, on appeal from Alexander v Cheadle et al, 2024 MBKB 190. The plaintiff, Keith Alexander, appealed a motion judge’s order staying his action against the defendant, Maurice Sabourin, under rule 21.01(3)(a) of the Manitoba King’s Bench Rules. The motion judge concluded that the Manitoba Labour Board (MLB) has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. After the hearing of the appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with reasons to follow; the written reasons were released on December 12, 2025. The Coram consisted of Chief Justice Marianne Rivoalen, Madam Justice Janice L. leMaistre and Mr. Justice David J. Kroft. The appeal was heard and the decision pronounced on December 5, 2025. Alexander was the plaintiff and appellant, represented by R. I. Histed, and Sabourin was the defendant and respondent, represented by J. M. Woolley.

Facts as pleaded and factual context

The motion judge took the factual context from the statement of claim. He found that the defendant was the president of the Winnipeg Police Association (WPA) and was acting in that capacity throughout his involvement in the matters that are the subject of the claim. The plaintiff was a member of the WPA. The plaintiff was charged with two counts of uttering threats. The WPA provides counsel to its members when they are facing criminal charges. The plaintiff retained counsel who was facilitated and approved by the defendant (the “initial lawyer”), and the WPA paid the initial lawyer’s fees. The plaintiff later retained other counsel after the defendant told him the WPA could withdraw his initial lawyer’s representation if he did not accept the proposed plea bargain arranged by his initial lawyer. The criminal charges were stayed. After the charges were stayed, the defendant advised the plaintiff, in response to a concern that the initial lawyer had inappropriately shared information about the case, that it was “common practice” for the lawyer to discuss the case with the WPA because the WPA was the client who retained the initial lawyer on the plaintiff’s behalf.

Allegations and causes of action in the civil claim

Alexander’s action included claims for damages against Sabourin for breach of fiduciary duty, inducing a breach of contract and violation of solicitor and client confidentiality. In his reasons, the motion judge noted that, during the hearing before him, the plaintiff’s counsel confirmed what was evident from the pleading: as against Sabourin only, the alleged causes of action were breach of fiduciary duty and inducing a breach of contract between the lawyer hired to represent the plaintiff on the criminal charge and the plaintiff. The motion judge also referred to the plaintiff’s motion brief, which stated that “[i]n its essential character, this dispute is about the defendant attempting to subvert the criminal defence of the plaintiff to a failed prosecution maliciously initiated by other union members who are co-defendants.” In the Court of Appeal, the plaintiff argued in his factum that the dispute was “about [the defendant] promoting a malicious prosecution by illegal means for harmful ends,” but the Court observed that this assertion was not pled and that this argument was not raised before the motion judge.

The “bald assertion” of collusion and pleading sufficiency

The plaintiff’s statement of claim included an assertion that the defendant colluded with others to remove him as their supervisor and force his retirement. The Court of Appeal held that it was not convinced the motion judge erred in finding that this was a bald assertion or conclusory statement rather than a fact pled. The Court relied on the explanation in Gay v Alberta (Workers’ Compensation Board), 2023 ABCA 351, that bald assertions of misconduct—such as malice, fraud, deceit, “absence of honest belief” and misfeasance in public office—will not be accepted as true without reasonable particulars of the allegations. The Court noted that the plaintiff’s claim failed to particularize the collusion assertion, which was a conclusory statement about the defendant’s state of mind and intent.

Weber framework, essential character of the dispute and statutory scheme

The motion judge understood that the facts pleaded in the statement of claim are presumed to be true and provable. He also understood the test for determining whether exclusive jurisdiction over a matter vests in a forum other than a court, as articulated in Weber v Ontario Hydro, 1995 CanLII 108 (SCC), and as applied in Manitoba cases such as Giesbrecht v McNeilly et al, 2008 MBCA 22, Warraich v University of Manitoba, 2003 MBCA 58, and Phillips v Harrison, 2000 MBCA 150. In his reasons (as quoted by the Court of Appeal), the motion judge set out three questions to be analyzed in shorthand: what is the essential character of the dispute; what is the ambit of the collective agreement or statutory scheme; and whether the collective agreement or statutory scheme provides an effective remedy. The motion judge recognized that the Weber test applies in circumstances engaging a statutory scheme. The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge did not mischaracterize the essential character of the dispute. He found that the essential character was “of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith treatment of a union member, by an agent of the union, for a purpose inconsistent with the requirements of the union in representing that member” and that it was about “an unfair labour practice” by the president of a union who had a duty to “properly represent” a union member. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the motion judge mischaracterized the substance of the claim when he said the defendant “arranged” for the initial lawyer to represent the plaintiff and that the defendant was “representing [the plaintiff] . . . respecting criminal charges.” The plaintiff’s position was that the defendant did not arrange the initial lawyer and did not represent him on the criminal charges or at all. The Court stated that it was not its role to finely parse the motion judge’s reasons and that, when his reasons were considered in context, it was apparent that he understood the scheme provided for in the collective agreement and the WPA constitution for the provision of legal services and the role of the WPA, and that he recognized the plaintiff’s initial lawyer was representing the plaintiff on the criminal charges.

Contractual and constitutional framework: WPA constitution and collective agreement

The Court of Appeal accepted the defendant’s position that any duty alleged to be owed by Sabourin to the plaintiff arose solely from his role as president of the WPA. The collective agreement gave the plaintiff the right to have his legal representation arranged and paid for by the WPA, and it gave the WPA the responsibility to administer those rights. The plaintiff’s claim was that the defendant administered those rights in a manner that was discriminatory and in bad faith, such that the essential character of the dispute was about how the plaintiff’s contractual rights were administered. The Court also noted that the role of the WPA pursuant to its constitution was more involved than simply paying for the legal services. Section 4.4.10 of the WPA constitution stated that the member “shall” be represented by the lawyer chosen by the WPA, and section 4.4.12 provided the WPA with “full discretion to deny, cancel or reduce the Legal Assistance to a member” for reasons that included a member acting in a manner that was, in the lawyer’s opinion, detrimental to the case.

Duty of fair representation and unfair labour practice under The Labour Relations Act

Section 20 of The Labour Relations Act, CCSM c L10, was set out in the reasons. It provides that every bargaining agent that is a party to a collective agreement, and every person acting on behalf of the bargaining agent, which or who, in representing the rights of any employee under the collective agreement, commits certain acts, commits an unfair labour practice. In the case of the dismissal of an employee, it is an unfair labour practice if the bargaining agent or person acts in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith, or fails to take reasonable care to represent the interests of the employee; in any other case, it is an unfair labour practice if the bargaining agent or person acts in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. The Court noted that, as explained in Warraich, jurisdictional issues should be decided in a manner consistent with a liberal interpretation of the governing statutory scheme, and that, as explained in Giesbrecht, the rights provided for in the collective agreement must also be interpreted in a large and liberal fashion. In the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the motion judge’s finding that the dispute involved an allegation of an unfair labour practice under section 20 of the LRA was reasonable.

Effectiveness of the LRA remedy and limitation/cap arguments

The plaintiff argued that the motion judge erred by finding that The Labour Relations Act provides an effective alternative remedy. He said that the six-month limitation period and the $2,000 limit on amounts payable for an unfair labour practice are not effective in the circumstances of this case. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It stated that the LRA provides a solution to the problem, citing Giesbrecht. The Court further noted that the remedy under the LRA may be different than the remedies available in a civil suit, but that does not mean the remedy is not “effective,” again relying on Giesbrecht. The Court held that it saw no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the remedies provided for in the LRA for unfair labour practices are “no less effective” than those available in a civil action, “especially in the context of a complaint respecting whether a union failed to properly represent a member, for whatever reason.”

Standard of review and appellate disposition

The motion judge’s decision to stay the action was a discretionary decision. The Court of Appeal quoted Hozaima v Perry et al, 2010 MBCA 21, for the principle that such decisions should not be overturned unless the motion judge has misdirected himself or his decision is so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice. The plaintiff did not take issue with the facts found or the legal principles articulated by the motion judge. The issues raised on appeal all related to the motion judge’s application of the law to the facts and were reviewed for palpable and overriding error. The Court concluded that it was not convinced that the motion judge erred in treating the collusion allegation as a bald assertion, that he did not mischaracterize the essential character of the dispute, that his understanding of the role of the WPA and the initial lawyer was adequate when his reasons were read in context, and that his conclusion on jurisdiction and the effectiveness of the LRA remedy was reasonable. In the result, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Subsequent unfair labour practice complaint and motion for further evidence

After the motion judge rendered his decision, the plaintiff filed an application alleging an unfair labour practice with the Manitoba Labour Board. The MLB determined that the plaintiff “unduly delayed” the filing of his application and dismissed it pursuant to section 30(2) of The Labour Relations Act. On the appeal, the defendant brought a motion for further evidence seeking to admit the MLB’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s application, as well as the underlying complaint and responses. His position was that the civil proceedings would constitute a collateral attack on the MLB’s decision and/or an abuse of process. He conceded that, if the appeal were dismissed, the further evidence would be irrelevant. As the appeal was dismissed, the Court held that it was unnecessary to deal with the motion for further evidence.

Ruling, successful party and monetary outcome

The Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal and upheld the motion judge’s order staying the action against the defendant under rule 21.01(3)(a) on the basis that the Manitoba Labour Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. The successful party in the appeal was the defendant/respondent, Maurice Sabourin, and the Court ordered that the appeal was dismissed with costs. The decisions do not state the specific amount of costs or any other monetary award, and no total dollar figure for costs, damages or other sums ordered in favour of the successful party.