Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Seven defendants applied to remove four certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) registered by the plaintiffs against two “Bridgeview Properties” and two “Residential Properties” in Surrey, British Columbia.

• The plaintiffs allege they advanced $1,403,000 to the defendants for the purchase of South Sumas Road properties in Chilliwack, but that the funds were instead misappropriated and used toward the Surrey properties, for which they claim a constructive trust.

• The Court applied s. 215(1) of the Land Title Act and recent authorities, holding that a CPL is an extraordinary pre-judgment mechanism and can only be maintained where the pleadings disclose a valid claim to an interest in land.

• Justice Lawn found that the Notice of Civil Claim does not plead sufficient facts to establish a nexus between the alleged misappropriated funds and the four Surrey properties, and that the allegations about use of funds for acquisition, mortgage payments, taxes, maintenance, or development were “bare” or “bald” assertions.

• On that basis, the Court granted the application under s. 215, ordered that all four CPLs be cancelled and removed by the Registrar of Land Titles, and did not find it necessary to decide the alternative hardship argument under ss. 256 and 257 of the Land Title Act.

• The Court held that, consistent with Bilin v. Sidhu and Beijing Tian Zi Property Group Trading Ltd. v. Jia, the plaintiffs may amend their pleadings and, if they then properly claim an interest in land, they may file a further CPL; costs of the application were ordered in the cause.

Factual background and parties

The proceeding is in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry, under Docket S259681, before the Honourable Justice Lawn, with reasons for judgment in Chambers released January 7, 2026. The hearing took place in New Westminster, British Columbia, on December 4, 17 and 18, 2025.

The plaintiffs are 10163563 Manitoba Ltd., 1463672 BC Ltd., Smart Truck Sales Inc. and Jaspreet Singh. The defendants are 1411541 B.C. Ltd., 1341414 BC Ltd., Sarabjit Singh Lally, Amrit Singh Lally, Prabhjeet Kaur Lally, Kulvinder Kaur Lally, BG Bridgeview Ventures Inc., Jaswant Singh Johal, and Investa Prime Realty Inc.

The underlying Notice of Civil Claim (NOCC), commenced on September 19, 2025, alleges that the defendants misappropriated $1,403,000 that the plaintiffs provided to them for the purpose of purchasing properties at 45063 and 45083 South Sumas Road in Chilliwack, British Columbia, described by their PIDs as LOT 1 DISTRICT LOT 280 GROUP 2 NEW WESTMINSTER DISTRICT PLAN 12235 and LOT “F” DISTRICT LOT 280 GROUP 2 NEW WESTMINSTER DISTRICT PLAN 22793 (the “South Sumas Properties”).

The NOCC pleads that between May 2, 2023, and January 16, 2024, the plaintiffs advanced a total of $1,403,000 to the defendants, either directly or through a related entity, in reliance on a “Verbal Contract” for short-term financing with an agreed return of 11% annually, with monthly payments of $60,000 over 20 months and default interest at 16% per annum, and with an understanding that the funds would be repaid with interest. It further pleads that the plaintiffs were led to believe that they would either be repaid or would receive a 50% beneficial interest in the South Sumas Properties and be included as equal partners in the development project, with profits shared proportionally.

The NOCC also pleads that Prabhjeet and Kulvinder Lally are the registered owners, as joint tenants, of the properties at 10702 and 10710 132 Street, Surrey, B.C. (the “Residential Properties”), and that BG Bridgeview Ventures Inc. is the registered owner of properties at 12561 King George Boulevard and 12562 112A Street, Surrey, B.C. (the “Bridgeview Properties”).

Procedural history of the CPL application

The application before Justice Lawn is brought by seven of the defendants (the “Applicants”) to remove four CPLs. The plaintiffs had registered CPLs against each of the Bridgeview Properties and Residential Properties on the basis of a claimed constructive trust. One of the CPLs was registered later than the others; initially, the Applicants sought cancellation of three CPLs and an order that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a CPL over the fourth property, but, after the fourth CPL was registered, they sought removal of all four, and there was no issue as to that position.

The application first came before the Court in Chambers on December 4, 2025. The plaintiffs asked the Court not to hear it at that time, raising concern about a late-filed affidavit and its similarity to another proceeding involving CPLs and some of the same defendants, Thind v. 1411541 BC Ltd., New Westminster Registry No. 259846 (the “Thind Proceeding”). In the Thind Proceeding, the hardship aspect of similar CPL issues had been heard in part by Justice Lamb, and the s. 215 application had been heard in part by Justice Norell, whose decision was under reserve.

The Applicants referred to urgency relating to financing and the need for a determination by year’s end or by January 15, 2026, and the unavailability of plaintiffs’ counsel during most of that period. Counsel ultimately agreed that Justice Lawn would hear the s. 215 portion of this application on December 4, with the balance of the application to be completed later in December at 9:00 a.m., with plaintiffs’ counsel appearing remotely. Two further chambers appearances were held on December 17 and 18, 2025. During the intervening period, the Thind Proceeding was resolved without requiring a decision.

In this application, the Applicants’ primary argument is that the NOCC does not disclose an interest in land as required by s. 215(1) of the Land Title Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 250. In the alternative, they seek removal of the CPLs over the two Bridgeview Properties under ss. 256 and 257 of the Land Title Act on the basis of hardship, asserting that the CPLs prevent them from securing necessary financing.

Legal framework for CPLs and interest in land

Section 215(1) of the Land Title Act provides that a person who has commenced or is a party to a proceeding and is claiming an estate or interest in land, or is given a right of action in respect of land by another enactment, may register a CPL against the land in the same manner as a charge is registered, and that the registrar of the court must attach to the CPL a copy of the pleading or petition by which the proceeding was commenced.

Justice Lawn referred to Deol v. Hans, 2024 BCSC 2254, which summarizes the law relating to the Court’s jurisdiction to remove a CPL where the pleading fails to assert an interest in land. Deol describes a CPL as an “extraordinary pre-judgment mechanism” intended to protect a valid claim to an interest in land; confirms that to register and maintain a CPL a party must claim an interest in the land; states that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to cancel a CPL where the pleading fails to meet that threshold; and affirms that an application under s. 215 is determined solely on an examination of the pleadings, with no evidence adduced, and asks whether the pleadings disclose a proprietary claim for an interest in land. Deol also reiterates that it is improper to file a CPL as leverage to secure a financial claim or as a negotiating tool, that an interest in land is claimed where title may change as a result of the proceedings, and that an interest in land cannot be based solely on unsubstantiated assertions with no factual underpinning.

Justice Lawn noted that, in this case, the interest in land alleged by the plaintiffs is a constructive trust. Earlier decisions, such as 11179727 B.C. Ltd. v. Bold and Cypress (Grange) GP, 2020 BCSC 1435, had suggested that a plaintiff claiming a constructive trust in property must plead that a remedy in damages would be inadequate, but more recent caselaw, including Treasure Bay HK Limited v. 1115830 B.C. Ltd., 2024 BCSC 294, indicates that there is no immutable rule to that effect. The judgment emphasizes that what is clear is that there must be a nexus or link between the claim and the property in question.

The reasons refer to Wai v. Chung, 2020 BCSC 34, where Justice D. MacDonald held that an interest in land must be established through the pleadings and that a mere assertion with no proper factual foundation is insufficient. In Wai and in 1077708 BC Ltd. v. Agri-Grow Farm Services Ltd., 2019 BCSC 977, the courts found that allegations that funds were misappropriated and used to maintain properties were unsupported by pleaded details such as specified time periods or amounts, and therefore did not meet the threshold for a CPL.

The Court also discussed Batth v. Sharma, 2024 BCCA 29, where the Court of Appeal distinguished Wai and Agri-Grow on the basis that in those cases the plaintiffs had not pleaded that the defendants held interests in the properties in question, whereas in Batth, read as a whole, the NOCC did disclose a claim to an interest in the properties, including allegations that the plaintiff’s money was wrongly used towards their acquisition or to increase equity and that tracing of funds and profits was sought.

Justice Lawn then returned to Deol, noting that in that case the subject property was described as the defendant’s property and residence, but the Court still found a failure to plead a sufficient nexus between the claim and the property, concluding that the pleadings did not sufficiently disclose a temporal connection and lacked basic facts such as relevant dates and information about mortgages or maintenance.

Documents incorporated by reference and evidentiary limits

An issue arose regarding whether the Court could consider documents said to be incorporated by reference into the NOCC. The NOCC refers to a “Verbal Contract,” and the Applicants argued that the Court could treat documents exhibited to an affidavit of Amrit Lally, described as “documents surrounding the Verbal Contract,” as incorporated by reference and use them to interpret or qualify what the plaintiffs had pleaded about that contract. They relied on Montaigne Group Ltd. v. St. Alcuin College for the Liberal Arts Society, 2023 BCSC 1257, and Yi Teng Investment Inc. v. Keltic (Brighouse) Development Ltd., 2019 BCCA 357.

Justice Lawn noted that Deol and other cases make clear that a s. 215 application must be determined on the pleadings. In Montaigne, the Court had referred to a joint venture agreement that was specifically incorporated into the pleading by reference and treated it as part of the pleading itself, analogous to documents referred to on a Rule 9-5(1)(a) application, where evidence is not admitted but documents incorporated by reference in the pleadings may be consulted. The Court of Appeal in Situmorang v. Google, LLC, 2024 BCCA 9, has explained that such a document is not evidence but part of the pleading.

In this case, however, the Applicants asked the Court to use Mr. Lally’s affidavit and associated documents to show that the plaintiffs had misstated the Verbal Contract. Justice Lawn held that this went beyond the limited use of documents incorporated by reference, because it would require the Court to engage in an interpretative exercise about what those documents signified and whether they gave rise to the Verbal Contract as alleged. This was found to be outside the Court’s role on a s. 215 application. The Court therefore declined to consider Mr. Lally’s affidavit evidence.

Assessment of the pleadings and the “bald assertion” issue

The Applicants’ central submission was that the NOCC amounted to the kind of bald assertion found insufficient in Deol, Wai, and Sidhu v. Nagpal, 2025 BCSC 443. The plaintiffs distinguished Wai and Agri-Grow on the basis that, in those cases, there was no pleaded allegation that the defendants held ownership interests in the properties, whereas in this NOCC the Residential and Bridgeview Properties are pleaded as being owned by specific defendants.

Justice Lawn accepted that, unlike Wai and Agri-Grow, there was no issue here about pleading an ownership interest in the properties. However, following Deol, the Court held that this did not resolve the question; there still had to be a sufficient nexus between the plaintiffs’ claim and the properties.

The reasons focus on paragraphs 38 to 41 of the NOCC and Part 3 of the Legal Basis, where the plaintiffs plead that the funds provided for the South Sumas Properties were impressed with a trust, that instead of completing on those properties the funds were misappropriated to “various properties owned or controlled by the Defendants,” including the Bridgeview and Residential Properties, and that the funds “have been used for mortgage payments, maintenance, property taxes, and development costs” of those properties. The plaintiffs plead that BG Bridgeview Ventures Inc. holds the Bridgeview Properties and that Prabhjeet and Kulvinder Lally hold the Residential Properties on constructive trust for the plaintiffs’ benefit to the extent that plaintiffs’ funds were used for acquisition, mortgage payments, maintenance, improvements, or to support obligations on title, including mortgage servicing, upkeep, or property tax payments.

Justice Lawn found that, as in Deol, the NOCC did not plead a temporal connection between the claim and the properties. The NOCC does not plead when or how the defendants allegedly used the funds towards acquisition, mortgage payments, maintenance, property taxes, or development costs of the properties. It does not state what amount of funds were used, when the properties were acquired, how long the defendants lived at or operated the properties, what mortgages existed on the properties, or how the properties were maintained or developed with the use of the funds.

The plaintiffs argued that the dates of the nine advances pleaded in paragraph 22 of the NOCC made the payments contemporaneous with maintenance of the properties and therefore established a nexus. Justice Lawn held that the pleadings still did not set out what the defendants allegedly did with the funds and when they did it.

Relying on Deol and Agri-Grow, the Court concluded that more is required than a mere assertion that funds were diverted into specific properties. The missing details about dates, mortgages, acquisition, and maintenance left the constructive trust allegations as unsubstantiated assertions, which Deol describes as insufficient to support a CPL.

Justice Lawn acknowledged the plaintiffs’ submission that some of the missing information, such as the amount of mortgage payments, might be uniquely available to the defendants, but found that this concern did not justify concluding that the pleading threshold had been met. As in Wai, this was not seen as a sufficient reason to relax the requirement that a CPL be grounded on more than conjecture.

Disposition of the CPLs and treatment of the hardship argument

Having found that the NOCC did not disclose a sufficient nexus between the plaintiffs’ claim and the properties to support an interest in land under s. 215, Justice Lawn granted the application under s. 215 of the Land Title Act. The four CPLs registered against the properties described at paragraphs 1–2 of the Notice of Application were ordered cancelled and to be removed by the Registrar of Land Titles. Costs were ordered “in the cause.”

Because of this conclusion under s. 215, Justice Lawn found it unnecessary to address the Applicants’ alternative submission that the CPLs over the Bridgeview Properties should be cancelled due to hardship under ss. 256 and 257 of the Land Title Act.

Leave to file any future CPLs and overall outcome

The Applicants also sought an order that the plaintiffs be required to seek leave of the Court before filing any further CPLs against the properties, relying on Beijing Tian Zi Property Group Trading Ltd. v. Jia, 2021 BCSC 423. The plaintiffs pointed to Bilin v. Sidhu, 2017 BCCA 429, and other cases, and argued that they are entitled to file another CPL if their pleadings support it.

Justice Lawn agreed with the plaintiffs. The reasons state that, as articulated in Beijing, plaintiffs may amend their pleadings and, if they fulfil the requirement to properly claim an interest in land, they may refile a CPL. The Court did not order that they must obtain leave before filing any future CPLs.

In summary, the Court ordered that the four CPLs registered against the Bridgeview Properties at 12561 King George Boulevard and 12562 112A Street, Surrey, B.C., and the Residential Properties at 10702 and 10710 132 Street, Surrey, B.C., be cancelled and removed, with costs in the cause, while confirming that the plaintiffs may, if they amend their pleadings to properly claim an interest in land, file a further CPL consistent with the statutory and case law requirements described in the reasons. No exact monetary amount granted, ordered, or awarded can be determined.