Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Jurisdictional misstep in commencing and pursuing the appeal in the Court of Appeal instead of the Divisional Court for an order under $50,000.
• Prolonged and inadequately explained delay in seeking an extension of time to appeal, despite repeated clear judicial directions on the correct forum and procedure.
• Significant prejudice to the respondent arising from multiple misguided motions, unilateral scheduling steps, and unpaid costs orders.
• Weak merits of the proposed appeal, given the Assessment Officer’s correct application of the burden of proof and Cameron J.’s deferential review upholding that assessment.
• Persistent attempts by the appellant to relitigate the solicitor’s account assessment and introduce new issues (such as solicitor–client privilege) outside the proper procedural context.
• Litigation conduct by the appellant displaying hallmarks of vexatiousness, justifying substantial indemnity costs against her.

Background and underlying dispute

The case arises from a breakdown in the solicitor–client relationship between Joanne Vaughan and her former lawyer, Jimmie Chen. Mr. Chen had represented Ms. Vaughan in a defamation action launched by her former lawyer, Shawn Hamilton. After that retainer ended, Ms. Vaughan became dissatisfied with Mr. Chen’s accounts for legal services and moved to challenge the fees he charged in connection with that defamation litigation. Ms. Vaughan filed a notice of intention to act in person in the defamation matter and then initiated a solicitor’s account assessment in the Superior Court of Justice in Newmarket. The assessment focused on whether Mr. Chen’s accounts were fair and reasonable in light of the work performed in the defamation proceedings.

Assessment of accounts and review by the Superior Court

An Assessment Officer, M. Sellers, reviewed the solicitor’s accounts. The Officer modestly reduced the total fees from $9,383.13 to $8,750 and ordered that Ms. Vaughan pay costs of $1,500 to Mr. Chen as part of the assessment outcome. Unhappy with this result, Ms. Vaughan brought a motion to oppose the confirmation of the Report and Certificate of Assessment. That motion was heard in writing by Justice Cameron. Ms. Vaughan argued that the Assessment Officer had made errors of law and palpable and overriding errors of fact, including mishandling of her evidence, and that she had been denied procedural fairness during the assessment hearing. Central to her position was the claim that the Assessment Officer improperly reversed the onus by directing her to proceed first “by way of Examination in Chief”, which she said deprived her of a fair process because she believed the solicitor bore the burden of justifying his fees. Both parties filed written materials and factums for Justice Cameron. In detailed reasons released January 25, 2024, Justice Cameron concluded that the Assessment Officer had correctly understood and applied the burden of proof, expressly recognizing that the obligation to justify the accounts rested on the solicitor and finding that this burden had been met. The Officer’s reasons referenced the solicitor’s burden and confirmed that, on a balance of probabilities, the accounts were substantiated. Justice Cameron also endorsed the Assessment Officer’s credibility findings, which favoured Mr. Chen’s evidence over that of Ms. Vaughan, and rejected the allegations of procedural unfairness. On this basis, she dismissed the motion to oppose confirmation and ordered Ms. Vaughan to pay substantial indemnity costs of the motion to Mr. Chen.

Misplaced appeal to the Court of Appeal and dismissal for delay

Instead of appealing to the Divisional Court, which has jurisdiction over final orders of the Superior Court where the amount in issue is less than $50,000, Ms. Vaughan filed a Notice of Appeal in the Court of Appeal for Ontario. While the notice was filed within the 30-day deadline, it was both in the wrong court and technically premature, as costs issues from Justice Cameron’s decision were not yet fully resolved. On March 12, 2024, Mr. Chen strongly urged Ms. Vaughan by email to seek legal advice regarding the monetary limits of the Court of Appeal. On March 25, 2024, the Court of Appeal issued a Notice of Intention to Dismiss the Appeal for delay, clearly advising that the appeal would be dismissed if not perfected by April 16, 2024, and that any extension had to be sought before that date. Despite this explicit warning, Ms. Vaughan brought a motion on May 10, 2024—after the deadline—to extend the time to perfect her appeal. On May 28, 2024, Justice Paciocco of the Court of Appeal refused to extend time. He held that it was not in the interests of justice to grant an extension for an appeal over which the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction, and he expressly indicated that the proper forum for the appeal was the Divisional Court. Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for delay and addressed costs, reinforcing that the appeal could not proceed in that court.

Further attempts to reopen and transfer in the Court of Appeal

Notwithstanding these clear jurisdictional rulings, Ms. Vaughan persisted in seeking relief from the Court of Appeal. She contacted the Divisional Court in Sudbury seeking to “transfer” the appeal from the Court of Appeal and invoked concerns about neutrality and fairness, even though there was no live appeal there. She then brought a “Motion for Reopening and Transfer” in the Court of Appeal, seeking to reopen the dismissed appeal, transfer it to the Divisional Court, set aside or suspend prior costs orders, extend time to perfect, and obtain costs in her favour. Justice Favreau dismissed this motion, finding no merit in it and reiterating that there was no live appeal before the Court of Appeal. Justice Favreau again pointed out that if Ms. Vaughan wished to pursue her appeal, she had to follow the Divisional Court’s process for obtaining an extension of time. Despite that direction, Ms. Vaughan brought yet another motion to a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeal seeking to “amend” Justice Favreau’s decision. She asked the panel to grant the earlier dismissed motion, to set aside cost orders, to extend time to perfect, and even to award punitive and aggravated damages against Mr. Chen on the basis of alleged false affidavits. The panel dismissed this further motion, holding that there was no error in principle in Justice Favreau’s order, and it confirmed that the merits of any appeal would be for the Divisional Court, if Ms. Vaughan successfully obtained an extension of time there.

Proceedings in the Divisional Court and collateral litigation

After those unsuccessful steps in the Court of Appeal, Ms. Vaughan finally served a Notice of Appeal to the Divisional Court on February 13, 2025, together with an Appeal Book and Compendium, Factum, and the Divisional Court Intake Form. Instead of immediately bringing the required motion for an extension of time to appeal, she commenced a separate civil action against Mr. Chen in North Bay, alleging legal “malpractice”, fraud, lost wages, and seeking punitive and aggravated damages. The pleadings in that action essentially revisited the same factual ground as the solicitor’s assessment, attempting to re-litigate the propriety of Mr. Chen’s conduct and fees through a fresh civil claim. Ms. Vaughan also threatened criminal proceedings against Mr. Chen and filed a complaint with the Law Society of Ontario about his conduct. On May 13, 2025, she filed her Notice of Appeal and supporting materials with the Superior Court of Justice, even though she had not obtained leave to extend the time to file that appeal. At civil triage court on June 12, 2025, Regional Senior Justice Edwards directed that Mr. Chen would bring a motion to dismiss the appeal as out of time, that Ms. Vaughan would respond, and that the matter would be placed on a regular motions list. On August 13, 2025, that motion came before Justice Vernor. Justice Vernor dismissed the appeal as out of time but did so without prejudice, specifically permitting Ms. Vaughan to file a notice of application for an extension of time to appeal within 30 days. Justice Vernor also ordered Ms. Vaughan to pay costs of the motion to Mr. Chen.

Repetitive and abusive procedural steps in the Divisional Court

Rather than simply bringing the extension motion contemplated by Justice Vernor, Ms. Vaughan embarked on further complex and largely collateral procedural steps. In August 2025, she sent an extensive and accusatory letter to the principal of Mr. Chen’s firm, alleging misuse of privileged communications in court filings. She demanded that the firm consent to a sealing or striking order, agree to the dismissal of all costs awards, and pay her a $20,000 financial settlement. By the court’s calculation, the total of the outstanding costs orders against her already exceeded the amount at stake in the original solicitor’s assessment, and there was no evidence that any of those orders had been honoured. On September 8, 2025, Ms. Vaughan finally served a notice of motion and motion record in the Divisional Court, seeking an order extending the time to perfect her appeal. That motion was initially returnable December 10, 2025. Within weeks, however, she launched a separate “urgent” motion around September 23, 2025, in which she sought to have her notice of appeal deemed filed nunc pro tunc as of February 8, 2024, requested that the matter be transferred to a “more neutral court location”, and asked for the immediate removal of solicitor–client communications from the court record. Through communications with the court that were not fully documented, she obtained an earlier motion date of October 29, 2025 and informed Mr. Chen that the December 10 date had been rescheduled and effectively “replaced” by the earlier motion. When that matter came before Justice Smith on October 29, 2025, he concluded that Ms. Vaughan could not seek such extensive relief unless and until she succeeded in obtaining an extension of time to file her notice of appeal. Justice Smith therefore dismissed the urgent motion without prejudice, emphasizing that the proper starting point was the extension of time. He reserved the costs of that appearance to be dealt with later in connection with the main extension motion.

Legal test for extension of time and its application

The central motion decided by Justice Healey on December 10, 2025 asked whether the time for Ms. Vaughan to file her notice of appeal to the Divisional Court should be extended under rule 3.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The court applied the familiar four-factor test developed in authorities such as Javid Estate v. Watson and Rizzi v. Marvos: whether the appellant had an intention to appeal within the relevant period; the length of, and explanation for, the delay; the prejudice to the responding party; and the merits of the proposed appeal. On the first factor, Justice Healey accepted that Ms. Vaughan had indeed formed an intention to appeal in a timely way, but she directed those efforts to the wrong forum by going to the Court of Appeal and then refused to redirect promptly when told she was in the wrong court. On the second factor—the delay—Justice Healey found that the delay was exceptional in length and poorly explained. The order under appeal was issued May 2, 2024, yet the Divisional Court appeal process was not properly engaged until well into 2025, and the extension motion itself was not served until September 8, 2025. Throughout this period, Ms. Vaughan had been repeatedly and clearly told that she was in the wrong forum and that she needed to seek an extension of time in the Divisional Court, including in endorsements by Justices Paciocco and Favreau and even in her own admissions that she would seek an extension “promptly”. Nonetheless, she chose to pursue multiple additional motions in the Court of Appeal, collateral attacks, and a new civil action, rather than advancing the proper extension motion. On the third factor—prejudice—Justice Healey concluded that the prejudice to Mr. Chen was substantial. He and his firm had been forced to devote disproportionate time and resources to defending a series of overlapping, often procedurally improper motions and filings. Many of these steps generated costs awards, none of which had been paid, and the overall amounts now exceeded the underlying value of the solicitor’s fee dispute. The court also considered the tone and content of Ms. Vaughan’s email attacks on Mr. Chen and his firm, which were characterized as vindictive and harassing, further illustrating the burden of her litigation conduct. On the fourth factor—the merits—Justice Healey found that the proposed appeal lacked compelling merit. The Assessment Officer had correctly recognized that the burden of proof lay on the solicitor and had expressly found that Mr. Chen met that burden, while Justice Cameron’s review was thorough and properly deferential, rejecting Ms. Vaughan’s allegations of procedural unfairness and misapprehension of evidence. In that light, the Divisional Court saw no strong legal or evidentiary basis for allowing an appeal to proceed.

Costs, conduct, and final outcome

In evaluating costs, Justice Healey noted that although the issue of formally declaring Ms. Vaughan a vexatious litigant was not before the court, her conduct exhibited many hallmarks of vexatious litigation: repetitive attempts to re-argue matters already decided by the Assessment Officer, introduction of new issues not raised before Justice Cameron (notably solicitor–client privilege complaints), motions in the wrong forum ignoring clear judicial direction, and misrepresentation of the respondent’s position to the court and to court staff. She had unilaterally attempted to alter motion dates, claimed that Mr. Chen consented to her relief when he had not, and sent lengthy, inflammatory communications that further increased the costs of the proceeding. These behaviours led the court to conclude that the proceeding had been conducted in a vexatious manner and that substantial indemnity costs were appropriate. Ultimately, Justice Healey dismissed Ms. Vaughan’s motion to extend the time for filing her notice of appeal. The court held that she had not provided a reasonable explanation for the extraordinary delay, had not shown genuine merit in her proposed appeal, and had caused significant prejudice to Mr. Chen. As the successful party, Mr. Chen was awarded substantial indemnity costs for this motion and for the earlier motion before Justice Smith, fixed in the amount of 15,535, payable within 30 days.