Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope and duration of a condominium corporation’s right to possession under s. 80 of The Condominium Property Act, 1993 and the related Residential Tenancies Act writ of possession process
• Lawfulness of a condominium corporation conditioning an owner’s access to their unit on payment of disputed “arrears” and engagement of a particular brokerage
• Adequacy and admissibility of condominium corporation affidavit evidence to justify significant chargebacks and a lien registered against a unit owner
• Interpretation and application of the condominium oppression remedy under s. 99.2, including what constitutes oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregarding conduct toward a unit owner
• Legitimacy of various chargebacks (security, cleaning, repairs, extermination, ORT hearing costs, lien costs) as common expense contributions or owner-specific liabilities
• Appropriate remedies for oppression, including return of possession, rectification of the unit ledger, damages for lost rent, and enhanced but not solicitor-client costs

Background and parties

Stephen Norman McLeod owned a condominium unit in a building managed by McAuley Court Condominium Corporation in Saskatoon. He purchased the unit in 2020 and, as an owner, was entitled to use, rent out, and potentially sell the property subject to the condominium bylaws and applicable legislation. In early 2025, he rented the unit to a tenant. Complaints soon arose from the condominium corporation and other residents about the tenant’s behavior and the alleged impact on the building. The relationship between the condominium corporation, acting through its president and property manager, and Mr. McLeod’s tenant deteriorated significantly, ultimately leading to a physical confrontation and an application to the Office of Residential Tenancies (ORT).

Events leading to the ORT proceedings

After Mr. McLeod rented his unit as of January 1, 2025, the condominium corporation raised concerns with him in January and February 2025 about the tenant. On March 17, 2025, the corporation’s president and property manager, Mr. Murdoch, personally attended at the unit to address these issues. A confrontation with the tenant ensued, culminating in a physical altercation and a broken mirrored door, which resulted in a police report. The corporation’s building manager, Blue Marble Agencies (operated by Mr. Murdoch), informed residents on May 10, 2025 that building locks would be changed, signalling heightened security concerns tied to the tenant and his guests. Based on ongoing complaints about disturbances, alleged drug activity and safety issues in the building, the condominium corporation pursued formal proceedings before the ORT in an effort to remove the tenant from the premises.

The ORT decision and writ of possession

The condominium corporation brought an application under s. 80 of The Condominium Property Act, 1993 together with ss. 68 and 70 of The Residential Tenancies Act, 2006. The first application, heard June 4, 2025, was dismissed for technical deficiencies. A second application was heard June 26, 2025, resulting in a decision dated June 27, 2025 (2025 SKORT 1672). In that decision, the hearing officer found insufficient evidence that the tenant was responsible for homeless individuals in the building or that he was using or trafficking drugs. However, the hearing officer did find that the tenant assaulted Mr. Murdoch by spitting on him during the March 17, 2025 incident. Given that finding, the ORT concluded that it would be unreasonable to wait for the lease to expire and ordered a writ of possession as an exceptional remedy under the Residential Tenancies Act framework. The writ placed Blue Marble Agencies in possession of the unit and, by its terms and the governing regulations, was effective for 30 days from the date of the order unless otherwise specified. The tenant appealed but did not appear at the appeal hearing, and the appeal was abandoned.

Possession, eviction and the owner’s exclusion

On July 22, 2025, the sheriff enforced the ORT order and evicted the tenant from the unit, changing the locks. At that point, the immediate object of the ORT process—removing the tenant—had been achieved. The next day, July 23, 2025, Mr. McLeod requested the new keys so that he could enter the unit and clean it. Blue Marble Agencies responded that legal possession rested with it, not with Mr. McLeod, and that he no longer had access. He was told to submit a written plan, subject to board review and legal considerations, for any access to be considered. On August 4, 2025, Mr. McLeod asked again for the unit to be returned, stating that his plan was to prepare the property for sale and then list it. Blue Marble Agencies replied that the keys could not be returned without board approval, and that no access would be granted until the board made a determination. In effect, the corporation treated the ORT order as transferring an ongoing right of possession to the condominium corporation, while also using that position to control when, how, and under what conditions the owner might re-enter.

Inspection, remediation and expanding chargebacks

On August 10, 2025, Blue Marble Agencies sent Mr. McLeod an email summarizing an inspection of the vacated unit. It reported accumulated garbage and spoiled food, piles of bagged debris, numerous bicycles and electronics in disarray, evidence of insect infestation including cockroaches and maggots, and possible bedbug presence. The manager indicated that immediate remediation would be undertaken at Mr. McLeod’s expense. As matters progressed, the condominium corporation compiled a list of “arrears” and chargebacks totaling more than $11,000. These included multiple security invoices, lock and door work, carpet steam cleaning, extermination services, hauling and cleaning costs, Office of Residential Tenancies fees, attendance fees for ORT hearings, sheriff’s costs to enforce the ORT order, and the cost of registering a lien on title. The corporation treated these items as properly chargeable to Mr. McLeod’s unit, increased the ledger balance accordingly, and registered a lien to secure the alleged debt.

Conditional access and lien dispute

On August 26, 2025, Mr. McLeod’s counsel wrote to Blue Marble Agencies requesting that possession of the unit be returned so the property could be cleaned and listed for sale. That same day, Blue Marble Agencies responded that possession would not be released until condominium “arrears” had been paid in full. It advised that a formal demand for $9,266.89 had been served and that a further $1,050 had been added, bringing the total to $10,316.89. It explicitly stated that no access to the unit would be provided until those arrears were settled. On September 9, 2025, Mr. McLeod’s counsel asserted that the writ of possession had expired, that the corporation was unlawfully withholding access, and that many of the charges were baseless, warning that court proceedings might be commenced. On September 10, 2025, Blue Marble Agencies advised that a lien for $10,316.89 had been registered and confirmed that the corporation would retain possession until the arrears were fully paid. A further email that day characterized the return of the unit as “premature” and linked access to several conditions, including the risk of Mr. McLeod re-tenanting the unit and the possibility he might contest the lien. It also suggested the corporation would consider releasing the unit if Blue Marble Agencies were formally retained as the listing brokerage, and invited Mr. McLeod to bring a court application if he disagreed. By late September, the corporation softened its position somewhat, indicating that it would allow access for sale-related purposes while still asserting it would retain legal possession until arrears were paid or arrangements for payment from sale proceeds were in place. No final resolution was reached through correspondence, and issues remained outstanding into November 2025.

The oppression application and procedure before the court

Mr. McLeod commenced an originating application under s. 99.2 of The Condominium Property Act, 1993, seeking a range of remedies, including a declaration that the corporation’s conduct was oppressive, a declaration that the writ of possession had expired, a grant of possession to him, removal of numerous chargebacks, damages for improperly charged amounts, damages for lost rent and mortgage payments, and solicitor-client costs. There were preliminary procedural and evidentiary issues. At the hearing, the condominium corporation was represented by its president, Mr. Murdoch, a non-lawyer. The judge canvassed the rule requiring corporations to appear by counsel but, balancing fairness and the need to hear both sides, ultimately allowed Mr. Murdoch to make oral submissions, rather than adjourning the matter. The court also reviewed the affidavit evidence. Mr. Murdoch’s affidavit included unsworn emails and statements from other residents and a regulator’s letter, much of which was hearsay, irrelevant, or argumentative. Certain paragraphs of Mr. McLeod’s affidavit similarly contained legal opinions and interpretations rather than proper factual evidence. The judge ultimately disregarded the impugned evidentiary portions but concluded that, even if they had been accepted, they would not have changed the outcome because the key questions turned on statutory interpretation and undisputed facts.

Ability to decide the case summarily

The court considered whether the issues could be decided on the existing affidavit record. Under the King’s Bench Rules, applications for statutory remedies like oppression can be brought by originating application, and the court retains discretion to treat such proceedings summarily or to convert them into full actions if material facts are genuinely contested. Here, the judge found that the material facts were largely uncontested and that the dispute focused on the proper interpretation of The Condominium Property Act, The Residential Tenancies Act, and the effect and duration of the writ of possession. As such, there was no need for viva voce evidence or the full procedural apparatus of a traditional action, and the matter was resolved on a summary basis.

Statutory framework and right to possession

A central legal issue was how s. 80 of The Condominium Property Act, 1993 interacts with the Residential Tenancies regime. Section 80 allows a condominium corporation to apply to the ORT for possession of a rented unit in defined circumstances, incorporating the Residential Tenancies Act provisions “with any necessary modifications.” Under the Residential Tenancies Act, a landlord may apply for an early order of possession in specified exigent situations, and a hearing officer may issue a writ of possession in a prescribed form. The regulations provide that such a writ expires 30 days from the date of the order unless a different period is expressly specified. In this case, the ORT ordered possession and a writ issued in favor of Blue Marble Agencies, but the order did not specify a different period. The judge concluded that the net effect of the statutory and regulatory scheme was that the condominium corporation, via its manager, was entitled to possession for 30 days from June 27, 2025, the date of the ORT order. Thereafter, the writ expired and the condominium corporation had no continuing statutory right to maintain exclusive possession of Mr. McLeod’s unit. By continuing to hold possession and control access well into late 2025, the corporation had gone beyond the authority conferred by the ORT decision and legislation.

Chargebacks, lien and evidentiary deficiencies

The corporation had posted approximately $11,574.97 in “arrears” and charges to Mr. McLeod’s ledger. These included lock changes, steel bar installation near the door, extensive security services, carpet cleaning of hallways and stairs, further lock and key costs, ORT filing fees, attendance time for the two ORT hearings, sheriff’s enforcement costs, building-wide carpet steam cleaning, additional security services, an internal “ORT s. 68 services” fee from Blue Marble, hauling costs, repairs to a damaged buzzer speaker, land titles lien costs, cleaning charges from Elite Facility Solutions, and extermination costs from Bye Bye Bugs. The condominium corporation sought to justify these items under s. 63 of The Condominium Property Act, 1993, treating them as contributions recoverable through a lien. The judge emphasized that s. 63 is an enforcement mechanism: it allows a corporation to register a lien for unpaid contributions to the common expenses or reserve funds; it does not itself define what can properly be charged back to a unit owner. Whether these specific expenses could legally be levied turned on other provisions, including the bylaws and any tort or contractual responsibility of the owner or his tenant. Critically, the corporation’s evidence simply asserted that the charges were lawful and supported by documentation, but did not substantively connect them to Mr. McLeod or his tenant’s conduct. The ORT decision itself did not establish that the extensive security, cleaning, and extermination costs were caused by the tenant, beyond the isolated assault incident that justified early termination. With no proper sworn evidence linking the expenses to Mr. McLeod or his tenant, the court declined to treat them as legitimate charges against the unit. The judge ordered that the bulk of those chargebacks—covering items such as security services, building-wide cleaning, lock changes, exterminator work, hauling and cleaning services, lien costs, and ORT attendances—be removed from the unit ledger, while expressly leaving open the possibility that the corporation could, in a future properly constituted action with adequate evidence, pursue damages or statutory remedies if it could establish liability.

Oppression analysis and owner’s reasonable expectations

The heart of the decision lay in the oppression remedy under s. 99.2. Drawing on the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s decision in Goertz and the Supreme Court of Canada’s corporate oppression jurisprudence, the court framed the analysis around the unit owner’s reasonable expectations and whether the corporation’s conduct was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregarded those expectations. Mr. McLeod’s expectations included that, as legal owner, he would have access to his unit, be able to use it, rent it, or sell it, and be treated fairly regarding charges posted to his ledger, with amounts only levied where they could reasonably be attributed to his or his tenant’s actions. The judge found those expectations objectively reasonable and consistent with general property rights and condominium ownership norms. The condominium corporation’s conduct violated those expectations in multiple ways. It kept Mr. McLeod out of his own unit for many months after the writ had expired, insisted on conditions (including hiring its affiliated brokerage and fully paying disputed arrears) that were not grounded in the legislation, and assessed numerous charges and registered a lien without establishing a proper basis for doing so. This sustained pattern was found to be not just mistaken but oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, and indicative of an unfair disregard for Mr. McLeod’s interests, particularly as he continued to shoulder mortgage and condominium fee obligations while being unable to exercise normal ownership rights.

Remedies granted and overall outcome

Having found oppression, the court exercised its broad remedial discretion. It ordered that Mr. McLeod be given immediate and unconditional access to his unit, including keys to both the unit and the building, and directed that he be treated in the same way as any other owner, with no special limitations on leasing or selling the property. It further ordered that the ledger be rectified by removing the disputed chargebacks, thereby invalidating the bulk of the alleged “arrears” and undermining the basis for the lien, although the judgment did not assign a precise dollar value to the financial benefit of those removals. In addition, the court awarded Mr. McLeod damages for lost rent, finding that the unit would reasonably have generated $1,500 per month and that the corporation should have returned possession in July 2025. For the six months from August 2025 to January 2026, this produced a monetary award of $9,000. The court declined to add mortgage and condominium fee payments on top of that, reasoning that those obligations would ordinarily have been met from rental income and that awarding both would amount to double recovery. On costs, while the judge rejected Mr. McLeod’s request for solicitor-client costs as too extreme, the condominium corporation’s meritless positions and its role in forcing the litigation justified enhanced costs above the mid-range tariff. The court fixed costs at $7,500, reflecting both the moderate complexity of the matter and the corporation’s unreasonable insistence that Mr. McLeod litigate to regain access and correct the ledger. Taken together, Mr. McLeod emerged as the successful party, obtaining return of possession, substantial rectification of his account, $9,000 in damages for lost rent, and $7,500 in costs, for a total quantified monetary award of $16,500 in his favor, with additional financial benefit from removal of improper chargebacks that could not be precisely valued on the record.