Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Dispute over whether the plaintiff has a beneficial interest in the Renfrew property through alleged financial and labour contributions to the former Erin property and its proceeds.
• Sharp factual conflict on whether the Erin and Renfrew properties were jointly owned or solely owned by the defendant, including competing evidence on who paid the purchase funds and who performed renovations.
• Whether the plaintiff’s constructive and resulting trust claims justify a Certificate of Pending Litigation when his likely remedy, if successful, would be monetary damages rather than a proprietary remedy in land.
• Evaluation of the adequacy of damages versus the need to protect an alleged interest in land, including the significance of substantial equity in the Renfrew property and the absence of evidence that the property is unique.
• Balancing prejudice between the parties, particularly the defendant’s need to refinance or sell to meet mortgage, renovation, and living/education expenses versus the plaintiff’s desire to secure his claim against the land.
• Application of stringent principles governing Mareva-type preservation relief and the court’s refusal to treat a Rule 45.01 order as security for judgment in the absence of evidence of asset dissipation or removal from the jurisdiction.

Background and relationship between the parties
The case arises from a property and trust dispute between the plaintiff, Marek Binio, and the defendant, Agnieszka Kotarak, who were previously in an intimate relationship. The plaintiff alleges that they were in a common-law relationship and began cohabiting in 2015, during which time they acquired a property in Erin, Ontario. That Erin property was later sold in 2022 for approximately $1.7 million. The defendant disputes this characterization of their relationship and contends that they were in an intimate relationship for only one year, after which they lived merely as housemates with separate bedrooms and a rental arrangement under which the plaintiff was expected to pay rent. She relies on her tax returns, showing rental income attributed to payments from the plaintiff, to support her position. The relationship eventually deteriorated, and according to the plaintiff, it ended in April 2025, when he was removed from the Renfrew property.

Competing narratives about the Erin and Renfrew properties
The plaintiff claims that he contributed $52,000 from his personal savings to the purchase of the Erin property and that a friend advanced an additional $45,000 on his behalf, which he later repaid. He also alleges that he performed substantial renovations and improvements that enhanced the value of the Erin property. He asserts that when the Erin property was sold in 2022, the sale proceeds were used to acquire the Renfrew property at 528 Opeongo Road, which was registered solely in the defendant’s name. He says he did not intend either his financial contributions or his labour to be a gift and that his contributions should translate into a beneficial interest in the Renfrew property.
The defendant’s position is markedly different. She says that the Erin property was not jointly purchased and that she was at all times the sole registered and beneficial owner, having alone provided the funds for its acquisition. She denies that the plaintiff contributed to the purchase price of either property or that he performed substantial renovations, characterizing his efforts as limited to occasional tasks such as cutting grass and shovelling snow. In her account, the Renfrew property was likewise acquired and improved with her own resources. She further emphasizes that she has been renovating the Renfrew property for three to four years, has attempted to sell it on four occasions without success, and has reduced the listing price significantly from $1,299,900 to $949,900. She denies that the property is unique in any special way.

The plaintiff’s legal claims and requested remedies
In his Statement of Claim, the plaintiff seeks relief grounded in the equitable doctrines of resulting trust and constructive trust. He asks the court to recognize a beneficial interest in the Renfrew property on the basis of his alleged contributions to the Erin property and the tracing of those contributions into the Renfrew property. As part of his interim relief, he moves for leave to issue and register a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the Renfrew property to protect his claimed interest in land pending trial. He also seeks a preservation order under Rule 45.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to restrain the defendant from selling, transferring, or further encumbering the Renfrew property. These motions are designed to preserve the status quo and ensure that the property remains available to satisfy any proprietary or monetary relief that might ultimately be awarded in his favour.

The defendant’s opposition and concerns about prejudice
The defendant opposes both the CPL and the preservation order. She argues that the plaintiff has adduced no documentary evidence corroborating his alleged financial contributions, nor any meaningful detail on the nature or extent of the improvements he claims to have performed. She relies on her stronger documentary record, including tax returns reflecting rental income from the plaintiff, to undermine his claim that they jointly owned or intended to jointly own the properties. She also raises significant practical concerns. The existing mortgage on the Renfrew property is scheduled for renewal in May 2026, and she says she must refinance the property to meet not only mortgage and renovation expenses but also her living costs and to support her adult son, who is a full-time university student. She submits that registration of a CPL would jeopardize her ability to refinance or sell, thereby causing real prejudice, and maintains that any loss the plaintiff might prove at trial can be adequately compensated by damages, especially given the substantial equity (estimated at about $600,000) in the property. Additionally, the defendant points out that the plaintiff was charged on April 1, 2024 with harassment, uttering death threats, and assault against her, and a release order dated April 2, 2024 prohibits him from contacting her. While not determinative of the property dispute, this background reinforces her concern about ongoing conflict and her need for control over her home and finances.

Legal framework for certificates of pending litigation and proprietary relief
Justice Kaufman reviews the legal principles governing CPLs. A CPL is a notice instrument intended to alert third parties to a claimed interest in land and to protect a party’s asserted proprietary claim pending adjudication on the merits; it does not itself create any right or interest in land. The court relies on established jurisprudence, particularly Perruzza v. Spatone, which sets out the principles under section 103 of the Courts of Justice Act. The threshold requirement is that the plaintiff must demonstrate a “triable issue” as to a reasonable claim to an interest in the land; the plaintiff does not need to show a likelihood of success at trial. If this threshold is met, the court must then consider various discretionary factors, including whether the land is unique, whether damages are an adequate remedy, the difficulty of assessing damages, the existence of a willing purchaser, and the comparative harm to each party if the certificate is granted or refused. The decision emphasizes that the court’s role is not a mechanical application of a checklist but an equitable exercise of discretion on the totality of the circumstances. The court also cites authorities confirming that these discretionary factors apply equally where the plaintiff seeks an equitable tracing remedy or a constructive trust over property. In considering proprietary remedies such as constructive trust or specific performance, the court notes that the central question is not whether the property is inherently “unique,” but whether a transfer of title, as opposed to a monetary award, better serves justice between the parties.

Assessment of the CPL request and adequacy of damages
Justice Kaufman finds that the plaintiff has met the relatively low threshold of demonstrating a triable issue regarding a reasonable claim to an interest in the Renfrew property, largely because he has sworn to his version of events under oath. At this stage, the court does not resolve disputed facts or make credibility findings. However, satisfying the threshold does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a CPL. The court then turns to the discretionary analysis and concludes that a certificate should not issue. The judge emphasizes that even if the plaintiff were to prove some financial or labour contributions, his realistic remedy would be in damages rather than ownership of the property itself. Given that the defendant has also contributed to the property, there is no reasonable prospect that he would be awarded sole ownership; at most, a successful trust claim might require the defendant to buy out his share or lead to a partition and sale order, resulting in a sale of the property in any event. Importantly, there is no evidence that the Renfrew property is unique in a way that would make damages inadequate, and the plaintiff has not shown why a monetary award would not sufficiently redress his alleged loss. The court notes that CPLs are not appropriate where damages provide an effective remedy, underscoring that the primary purpose of a CPL is to protect an interest in land only when other remedies would be ineffective.

Equitable balancing and evidentiary considerations
In weighing the equities, the court places considerable weight on the prejudice the defendant would suffer if a CPL were registered. The impending mortgage renewal, her need to refinance or sell to meet carrying costs, renovation expenses, and her son’s education costs, and the dampening effect a CPL would have on refinancing or selling, all point to significant hardship for her. By contrast, the evidence suggests there is substantial equity in the property—estimated at approximately $600,000—sufficient to satisfy any monetary award the plaintiff might eventually obtain. The court also considers evidentiary imbalances. The plaintiff has produced no documentary proof of his alleged financial contributions and has not described his supposed improvements in any detail, whereas the defendant has provided documentary support, including tax records showing rental income from him. While the judge stresses that the ultimate merits remain to be determined at trial, the relative strength of the plaintiff’s case is a relevant discretionary factor at the interlocutory stage and, on this record, favours the defendant. Ultimately, Justice Kaufman concludes that, although there is a triable issue, the equitable considerations and adequacy of damages weigh against granting a CPL, and the motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation is refused.

Request for a preservation order and Mareva-style relief
The plaintiff also seeks an order under Rule 45.01 restraining the defendant from selling, transferring, or further encumbering the Renfrew property. The court characterizes this request as, in substance, an attempt to obtain security for any future judgment, a function typically associated with a Mareva injunction rather than a simple preservation order. A Mareva injunction is an extraordinary remedy that restrains defendants from dissipating assets to defeat a potential judgment, and courts apply a stringent test to protect property rights. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently warned against pre-trial orders that effectively amount to execution or security before judgment; any interference with assets must be justified under the well-known interlocutory injunction framework from RJR-MacDonald, including proof of irreparable harm. Applying these principles, Justice Kaufman finds that there is no evidence that the defendant is attempting to dissipate her assets or remove them from the jurisdiction. Although the property is listed for sale, the defendant resides in Canada, her son attends university here, and the property retains substantial equity. The plaintiff’s concern that he may in the future have to resort to normal enforcement mechanisms if he obtains a judgment is not considered “irreparable harm” warranting extraordinary injunctive relief. As a result, the court declines to grant the requested preservation order under Rule 45.01.

Outcome, costs, and overall result
The court ultimately dismisses the plaintiff’s motion in its entirety. The request for leave to issue and register a Certificate of Pending Litigation is refused, and the court also declines to make any preservation order restraining the defendant from dealing with the Renfrew property. As the successful party on the motion, the defendant is presumptively entitled to her costs. Both sides filed comparable costs outlines, with the defendant seeking just over $7,500 on a partial indemnity basis and the plaintiff seeking a slightly higher figure plus minor disbursements. Taking into account the outcome, the relative complexity of the matter, and the factors under Rule 57, Justice Kaufman fixes the defendant’s costs at a lump sum of $7,000, payable by the plaintiff within 30 days. As a result, the defendant succeeds on the motion and is awarded a total monetary amount of $7,000 in costs in her favour, with no damages or other monetary relief being granted at this interlocutory stage.