Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Plaintiff sought judicial disqualification based on reasonable apprehension of bias, not actual bias, arising from the judge's prior legal career and institutional affiliations.

• Justice LeBlanc's former representation of British Columbia Housing Management Commission (BCHMC) was challenged despite BCHMC being a legally distinct Crown corporation from the defendant.

• Concerns were raised about potential financial incentives tied to the judge's former law partner continuing to represent BCHMC in ongoing litigation.

• The plaintiff alleged the judge's prior role as Governor of the University of Victoria could unconsciously influence credibility assessments, even though the University is not a party.

• A strong presumption of judicial impartiality applies, requiring demonstration that an informed, reasonable person would conclude the judge would likely not decide fairly.

• The disqualification application was dismissed as the plaintiff failed to meet the high threshold, with connections deemed inconsequential and indirect.

Background of the wrongful dismissal claim

Wendy-Lou Taylor, a former civil servant employed by His Majesty the King in Right of British Columbia (HMTK), commenced an action seeking damages for wrongful dismissal, aggravated damages, breach of good faith damages, indemnification for legal expenses, punitive damages, and costs. Her claim arises from her June 29, 2017, without cause termination when she was working as an investigator tasked with investigating management and use of private information records within the Ministry of Health. That investigation received wide public attention and resulted in the British Columbia Ombudsperson releasing a report entitled "Misfire: The 2012 Ministry of Health Employment Terminations and Related Matters."

The disqualification application

On January 8, 2026, the plaintiff was informed that Justice LeBlanc was the assigned trial judge. The following day, the plaintiff made an informal request through the Supreme Court Scheduling office that the judge consider recusing herself. The basis for this request centered on several concerns: Justice LeBlanc had been elevated to the bench in November 2024 after serving as senior counsel representing the Provincial Government agency, B.C. Housing, as plaintiff in a case that had been the subject of a fair degree of media attention before the Court. That case, British Columbia Housing Management Corporation v. Yu (case no. 222380), had not concluded and remained active, with the firm in which Justice LeBlanc had been a principal at the time of her judicial appointment a single year ago continuing to represent the Provincial Government agency. The plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Hutchison, K.C., was at all times and remains opposing counsel for the defendant in that matter, which has been strongly defended, including making successful application to strike out portion of the Justice's pleadings.

Expanded grounds and judicial disclosures

Following the initial informal request, application materials exchanged over the weekend raised new and expanded concerns, including Justice LeBlanc's past involvement with the University of Victoria and her former law practice. At the commencement of the trial on January 12, 2026, Justice LeBlanc made several disclosures: she had served as a Governor of the University between 2012 and 2017, and while serving in that role, the matters that are the substance of this claim were not brought to her attention, and she had no knowledge of them prior to reading the pleadings over the weekend. The memorial scholarship referenced in the affidavit materials was not a matter of which she had direct knowledge while serving as a Governor, although she accepted that it may have been referenced in the financial statements that were approved by the University board. At the time of her appointment to the Court, she was a director of UVic Properties and UVic Heritage Properties (two companies incorporated pursuant to the Business Corporations Act that are legally distinct from the University), a director of the BC Scholarship Society, second vice president of the Law Society of British Columbia, and one of the four representatives of the Law Society of British Columbia on the Legal Professions Act Transitional Board. She resigned from these roles at the time of her appointment. The judge further disclosed that she did not act for HMTK and was unaware of her former firm having acted for HMTK for at least five years prior to her appointment to the Court.

The plaintiff's arguments

The plaintiff advanced three principal arguments in support of disqualification. First, with respect to BCHMC, the plaintiff recognized that it is a separate Crown corporation, distinct from HMTK; however, she argued the reasonable person would not perceive BCHMC as being distinct from HMTK, and that an appropriate cooling off period is required before the judge can preside over cases involving HMTK, Crown corporations, and the Crown counsel's office. The plaintiff also submitted that bad faith allegations arise in the BCHMC litigation and in this litigation, which suggests the judge would be unconsciously biased to HMTK's position. It was also suggested the judge may have a financial reason for preferring HMTK, as her former law partner continues to represent BCHMC. Second, the plaintiff submitted that because of the judge's work as a lawyer, she personally, and through her former firm, has a strong connection to HMTK that would be perceived by the reasonable onlooker as unconsciously favouring HMTK. Third, while the plaintiff acknowledged that the University is not a party to this proceeding and it is not anticipated that any witnesses will be called from the University, she submitted that the judge will be required to make credibility assessments throughout this trial that will be influenced by her prior relationship with the University. The plaintiff argued that evidence concerning the University may be raised as the University's data access was denied for a period, some of the individuals impacted had connections to the University, and a memorial scholarship was endowed at the University.

Applicable legal framework

The legal test for disqualification is the reasonable apprehension of bias, as set out in Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area No. 23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, which asks what an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and having thought the matter through, would conclude—specifically, whether such a person would think it is more likely than not that the decision-maker, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly. As noted in Pereira v. Dexterra Group Inc., 2023 BCCA 201, there is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality that is not easily displaced, and a party must meet a high burden to prove that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists. As summarized in De Cotiis et al. v. De Cotiis et al., 2004 BCSC 117, the court must concern itself with what a "reasonable" person might apprehend rather than satisfying "the cynical, the capricious, the excessively suspicious, the paranoid or the perfectionist." As explained in Pereira, judges must necessarily not habitually yield to parties who want them to step down, as doing so would erode the administration of justice and damage the reputation of the judiciary. Judges have a duty to hear the cases assigned to them, and an additional danger of frequent recusals is that parties could use such motions strategically, including attempting to judge-shop or delay proceedings.

The court's analysis and ruling

Justice LeBlanc rejected each of the plaintiff's arguments. Regarding BCHMC, the judge noted that BCHMC was constituted as corporate body, pursuant to the Housing Act (as it was then), by an order in council approved in 1967, and that BCHMC and HMTK are legally distinct entities. The judge did not find that a reasonably informed person with an understanding of the strong presumption of judicial impartiality would conclude that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias based on her prior representation of BCHMC on a matter that is unrelated to this action. The suggestion of financial incentive was unsupported by cogent evidence; upon her appointment to the Court, she formally resigned as a partner with her former firm, severing her financial connection. Concerning the alleged strong connection to HMTK, the plaintiff had not put cogent evidence before the court to support the assertion. As disclosed, the judge had not acted for HMTK and was not aware of members of her former firm having acted for HMTK for at least five years prior to her appointment. A review of the type of cases she was involved in prior to her appointment disclosed that she routinely acted on matters where HMTK was a party adverse in interest. As for the University connection, the University is not a party to this action, there are no witnesses from the University on the witness lists, and the judge did not have prior knowledge of the matters related to this action. Finding the connections raised by the plaintiff to be "inconsequential and indirect, rather than substantive," Justice LeBlanc declined to disqualify herself and dismissed the plaintiff's application. No specific monetary amount was determined in this preliminary ruling, as the disqualification motion was decided before the trial on the merits of the underlying wrongful dismissal claim could proceed.