Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• University’s motion for security for costs turned on whether the self-represented plaintiff was “ordinarily resident outside Ontario” under Rule 56.01(1)(a), based on his ties to Iran, lack of stable employment, and minimal assets in the province.
• The court rejected the university’s attempt to label the action as “frivolous and vexatious” under Rule 56.01(1)(e), finding that pleading deficiencies and a limitation defence did not, at this interlocutory stage, render the claim “devoid of merit.”
• Evidence about the plaintiff’s personal circumstances (long residence and family in Iran, Uber work in Ontario, and a single 2016 Honda Civic as his only asset) was accepted as unchallenged and central to both the residence and asset questions.
• The plaintiff’s August 2019 internal complaint to the university and his expressed intention then to “pursue in court” were key to the limitation-period argument, but the judge held that potential limitation issues did not justify treating the entire action as frivolous or vexatious.
• The university’s late, under-particularized request to strike portions of the plaintiff’s affidavit for being argumentative and inflammatory was dismissed, with the court emphasizing fairness obligations toward self-represented litigants and counsel’s duty to do the “parsing,” not the court.
• Ultimately, the court balanced access to justice against the risk the university would be “left holding the (costs) bag” and exercised its discretion to order the plaintiff to post $42,700 as security for costs on a partial indemnity basis, in two instalments, while awarding no costs of the motion itself.

Facts of the case

Daniel Hosseinlou was a graduate student in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Engineering, enrolled in the PhD program in Civil Engineering from 2013 until he received his doctorate in December 2022. The university had advised him at admission that a PhD “normally requires four (4) years of study,” yet his program extended to more than nine years. During this prolonged period, he contends that he was subjected to unfair and discriminatory academic conditions which delayed his completion and harmed his career prospects.
In September 2023, after completing his PhD, Hosseinlou commenced a civil action against the University of Ottawa. He framed his claims in breach of contract, negligence, and discrimination, alleging that the university’s conduct caused him loss of income, loss of earning capacity, loss of career advancement opportunities, and significant emotional and physical suffering. Although he claims damages in these categories, he does not specify a dollar amount in his statement of claim, and the action originally proceeded under the Simplified Procedure before he later opted into the ordinary procedure, exposing the university to potential damages in excess of $200,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
The factual narrative in the pleading centres on the university’s alleged “systematic discrimination” and “arbitrary and discriminatory conditions.” He complains about higher publication requirements imposed on him, problematic supervision, alleged academic plagiarism by a supervisor, and an allegedly unfair and ineffective internal process for addressing his concerns. He asserts that, while he had engineering and teaching experience in Iran, the university’s conduct and resulting stigma left him unable to secure employment in his field in Canada, essentially limiting him to driving for Uber with flexible hours that he views as the only work he can manage given the effects of what he describes as “torture,” emotional distress, and mental and psychological issues.
There is also a significant temporal and psychological dimension to the facts. Hosseinlou emigrated from Iran to Canada in his early thirties to undertake the PhD, leaving behind his family and extended family, all of whom remain in Iran. He asserts that he originally intended to stay in Canada after graduation, but given his depression, sense of isolation, and lack of academic or engineering work in Canada, he “has to move back to Iran.” His affidavit evidence, which was not tested by cross-examination, notes that on his limited income he could at one point only afford a one-way ticket to Iran, and that medical and psychological professionals had advised that visiting his family there would benefit his mental health.

The underlying claims and limitation issues

Legally, the claim is built on a combination of contractual, negligence, and discrimination theories. The “contract” element is grounded in the relationship created when the university admitted him to the PhD program with certain expectations about duration, supervision, academic standards, and internal complaint processes. The negligence aspect arises from alleged failures in supervision, handling of alleged plagiarism, and management of his program that, he says, caused undue delay and psychiatric and economic harm. The discrimination angle is expressed in repeated references to “systematic injustice,” “discriminatory conditions,” and “systematic discriminatory conditions,” which he associates with being an Iranian international student treated differently from other candidates.
The university’s defence raises, among other things, a two-year limitation-period defence. It points to a detailed 15-page complaint Hosseinlou filed internally with the university on August 15, 2019, in which he not only catalogued his grievances but also expressly indicated his intention to share the complaint with a “governmental organization” and to pursue the matters “in court.” The university argues that this document proves he knew, or ought to have known, of the material facts giving rise to his claims by at least that date, and therefore that the two-year basic limitation period expired well before he commenced his action in September 2023.
The judge declined, at this interlocutory stage, to treat the possible limitation issue as rendering the action “frivolous or vexatious” or “devoid of merit.” She noted that determining whether each cause of action and each head of damage was captured by the 2019 complaint would require a level of detailed analysis not appropriate on a motion for security for costs. She emphasized that some causes of action could have crystallized after August 2019, that some claims might be statute-barred and others not, and that an otherwise meritorious claim can still be out of time without being frivolous. If the university is confident in its limitation defence, the proper route would be a motion for summary judgment on that specific issue, with related costs potentially forming part of any future staged security request.

Procedural history and the university’s motion for security for costs

Procedurally, the parties attended a case conference in September 2024, where a timetable was set for the university’s motion for security for costs and the university flagged its intention to later bring a motion to strike the statement of claim. The university’s motion for security for costs was argued by counsel; Hosseinlou appeared self-represented by videoconference. The university advanced two grounds under Rule 56.01: first, that Hosseinlou was “ordinarily resident outside Ontario” under Rule 56.01(1)(a); and second, in the alternative, that there was good reason to believe the action was “frivolous and vexatious” and that he had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay its costs, under Rule 56.01(1)(e).
The court applied the principles from Coastline Corporation Ltd. v. Canaccord Capital Corporation, which set out the structure for a security for costs analysis. Under that framework, the moving defendant first must show that it appears there is good reason to believe one of the specified circumstances exists (for example, non-residence or frivolous/vexatious claims coupled with insufficient assets). If that threshold is met, the onus shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that an order for security would be unjust in all the circumstances. The court must then exercise a broad discretion, balancing access to justice with the legitimate concern that a successful defendant not be left unable to collect costs from a judgment-proof or out-of-jurisdiction plaintiff.

Determination of the residence issue

On the question of ordinary residence, the judge concluded there was good reason to believe that Hosseinlou was not ordinarily resident in Ontario. The decision relied heavily on his own unchallenged affidavit evidence: that he had lived in Iran for over 30 years before coming to Canada; that all of his family and extended family remain in Iran; that he is single and, as of late 2024, worked only as an Uber driver with no other employment or assets; and that his only property in Ontario is a 2016 Honda Civic. His affidavit also described his lack of financial resources, including that any trip to Iran would have to be on a one-way ticket and likely involve moving back.
The court further considered his April 10, 2024 email to the university’s counsel, in which he explained that he wished to complete discovery and mandatory mediation while physically in Canada but anticipated doing pre-trial and trial from Iran because he could not find a suitable job in Canada and had lined up work in Iran through his contacts. He wrote that he “unfortunately” had to leave Canada because he could not live without a job and that his jobs in Iran were “ready over there.” Combined with the pleading’s description of his background in Iranian universities and engineering firms, and his assertion that he “has to move back to Iran,” the judge found there was effectively nothing tethering him to Ontario.

Frivolous and vexatious claim argument and limitation defence

On the second ground, the university argued that the statement of claim was so defective and the limitation defence so strong that the action was frivolous and vexatious within Rule 56.01(1)(e). It pointed to alleged failures to plead material facts for each cause of action and suggested the pleading bore hallmarks of meritless litigation that could be struck. It also advanced the limitation argument based on the 2019 complaint and claimed that any admissible parts of Hosseinlou’s affidavit strengthened, rather than weakened, that defence.
The court accepted that the pleading had real deficiencies and might be vulnerable on a motion to strike. The eight-page statement of claim uses broad, sometimes rhetorical language and does not clearly segregate the elements of breach of contract, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional harm (the latter being the judge’s reading of the reference to “emotional distress” and “torture”). However, the judge emphasized that on a motion for security for costs, the merits analysis is not the same as on a summary judgment motion. The court primarily examines the pleadings and only lightly engages with the evidence, and it should not attempt to decide complex or credibility-laden issues at this interim stage.
Applying that standard, the judge held that deficiencies in the statement of claim do not automatically make an action “so unreal that no reasonable or sensible person could bring it” or “devoid of merit.” Questions about which portions of the pleading, if any, should be struck and whether leave to amend should be granted are more properly determined on a formal motion to strike. Likewise, even a potentially strong limitation defence does not, by itself, convert an action into a frivolous or vexatious proceeding for Rule 56 purposes. The university, if confident in the limitation defence, could pursue summary judgment on that issue; but that strategic option is distinct from satisfying the high “frivolous and vexatious” threshold on a security motion.

Challenge to the plaintiff’s affidavit and treatment of self-represented litigants

An important procedural skirmish in the motion concerned the quality of Hosseinlou’s affidavit evidence. The university, in a single paragraph of its factum and without pinpointing specific passages, invited the court to strike all or part of his affidavit on the basis that it contained argument, opinion, and inflammatory rhetoric, relying on Rule 25.11 (which permits striking out scandalous, frivolous, or abusive material in pleadings or documents). It neither brought a separate motion nor supplied case law, and it did not identify the particular paragraphs or sentences it sought to have struck.
The judge dismissed this request. She acknowledged that the affidavit indeed contained improper elements—argument and expressions of belief—but stressed the framework set out in the Canadian Judicial Council’s “Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons.” While self-represented individuals must attempt to familiarize themselves with the rules of evidence and procedure, counsel and the court also bear responsibilities to ensure fairness. Here, the university’s “single paragraph” approach failed to give a self-represented litigant fair notice of what was said to be objectionable, and it improperly invited the court to perform counsel’s work of parsing the document line-by-line. The judge found that this did not conserve judicial resources; it did the opposite.
Consequently, the affidavit remained in the record in its entirety for purposes of the security for costs motion, although the judge implicitly treated the argumentative and conclusory portions with appropriate caution. This result underscores that while self-represented litigants will not be exempt from substantive rules, courts will insist that represented parties treat them fairly and do not attempt to obtain procedural advantages through underdeveloped motions or vague objections.

Assessment of the plaintiff’s assets and ability to pay costs

On the “insufficient assets” prong, the university needed to show that there was good reason to believe Hosseinlou had insufficient assets in Ontario to satisfy a future costs award. The threshold under Rules 56.01(1)(d) and (e) has been characterized as “relatively light” and below a balance of probabilities, and the same wording appears in both provisions. The court looked at Hosseinlou’s affidavit and at additional financial documents he uploaded to the electronic case portal on the eve of the hearing: bank assessments from TD and RBC covering chequing, savings, credit lines, and a loan/mortgage, as well as his vehicle permit for the 2016 Honda. He was permitted to give brief oral evidence explaining these materials, and the university declined to cross-examine him on that evidence.
The judge found that the plaintiff’s financial position was modest in the extreme. His only asset in Ontario was the 2016 Honda. His employment income was limited to part-time Uber driving. As of January 27, 2025, his bank balances totalled roughly $2,000. He argued that his ability to borrow from friends, family, or financial institutions should be treated as a mitigating factor, but the court rejected this. Citing prior authorities, the judge held that mere capacity to borrow does not count as an “asset” for security for costs purposes. On this record, she concluded there was good reason to believe that Hosseinlou lacked sufficient Ontario assets to satisfy any substantial costs order in favour of the university.

Whether an order for security for costs would be unjust

Because the court was satisfied on two fronts—non-residence outside Ontario and insufficient assets in the jurisdiction—the burden shifted to Hosseinlou to show that ordering security would be unjust. Coastline describes three principal ways a plaintiff can discharge this burden: showing sufficient assets in Ontario or a reciprocating jurisdiction; establishing impecuniosity coupled with a non-frivolous claim; or, where impecuniosity is not established, demonstrating very strong prospects of success.
Hosseinlou failed on all three routes. He had no meaningful assets in Ontario or elsewhere, apart from the car, and no evidence of assets in any reciprocating jurisdiction. He did not advance a positive case of “impecuniosity” in the technical sense, and even if he had, his financial proof fell short of the high standard courts require before finding a party effectively unable to pay. And because the merits of the action could not be fully assessed at this stage—given pleading deficiencies, the factual complexity of the academic relationship, and unresolved limitation issues—the court could not conclude that his chances of success were so strong as to outweigh the risks to the university.

Outcome of the motion and financial consequences

Having found the jurisdictional and asset thresholds met and that Hosseinlou had not shown injustice, the judge stepped back to assess the “justness” of making an order for security for costs in the overall context. She emphasized that if the university were ultimately successful at trial (or earlier), it would face significant difficulty recovering any costs from a plaintiff who could leave the jurisdiction and had little in the way of local assets. She also noted that, where the ground is non-residence (Rule 56.01(1)(a)), the relative strength of the underlying claim is a less weighty factor in the security analysis. She observed that the university had acted proportionately and promptly in bringing the motion rather than allowing costs to mount unchecked.
The university sought $65,000 in security, calculated on a substantial indemnity basis to cover steps up to the completion of discoveries, including a motion to strike. The court turned to the principles for setting quantum, analogizing the discretion on security for costs to that exercised under Rule 57.01 when fixing costs. The amount should reflect what a successful defendant might reasonably expect to recover, taking into account the litigation steps contemplated and the usual practice of ordering security on a partial indemnity scale. Given that Hosseinlou was self-represented and his conduct had not been so egregious as to warrant elevated costs, the judge saw no basis to depart from the partial indemnity standard.
Relying on the university’s detailed costs outline, the judge fixed security at $42,700 (inclusive of HST) on a partial indemnity basis. This figure encompassed both actual costs incurred to date (pleadings, initial document exchange, and a case conference) and projected costs for a motion to strike, another case conference, and further documentary and oral discovery under the ordinary procedure. Recognizing the plaintiff’s limited means, the court adopted a staged approach: 50 per cent of the security must be paid within 60 days of the ruling, and the remaining 50 per cent within 120 days. Under Rule 56.05, Hosseinlou cannot take further steps in the proceeding—apart from appealing this ruling—until the ordered security is posted, although that technical restriction was not spelled out as a term in the formal order. The order is without prejudice to the university’s right to seek further security after examinations for discovery, including, if it chooses, security for a summary judgment motion on the limitation issue.

Ruling, successful party and monetary amounts ordered

In the final disposition, the court granted the University of Ottawa’s motion for security for costs but denied its request to strike any portion of Hosseinlou’s affidavit, and it rejected the contention that the action was frivolous and vexatious. Because the university succeeded only in part on its various grounds and failed to obtain more generous (substantial indemnity) security, the judge ordered that there be no costs of the motion, leaving each side to bear its own legal expenses for this step. The draft order was to be prepared and filed by the university without needing the plaintiff’s approval as to form, given his self-represented status and limited procedural sophistication.
Overall, in this motion decision, the successful party is the University of Ottawa, which obtained an order that the plaintiff post security for its potential costs in the total amount of $42,700, payable in two equal instalments; however, the court did not make any damages award or net costs award in favour of either party on the motion, and no monetary damages have yet been determined in the underlying civil action.