Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• An interim interlocutory injunction of August 15, 2025, restricts Mr. Makis from holding himself out as a regulated member of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta, from implying he is licensed to practise medicine in Alberta, from using titles such as “Doctor”, “Dr”, or “oncologist”, and from offering or providing health services to the public regarding cancer treatment, with a compliance date of September 7, 2025.

• Because portions of an earlier vexatious litigant order against Mr. Makis remain in force, he must obtain permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal under rule 14.5(1)(j) of the Alberta Rules of Court.

• The chambers judge in the Court of King’s Bench repeatedly directed that the College’s permanent injunction application proceed to a special chambers hearing, and granted only an interim interlocutory injunction as a temporary measure pending that fuller hearing.

• The Court of Appeal held that this matter should not be before it at this time, because an appeal of the interim interlocutory order would unduly hinder the progress toward the special chambers hearing already directed by the Court of King’s Bench.

• Applying the RJR-MacDonald tripartite test, the Court focused on the balance of convenience and accepted the College’s position that, as Alberta’s regulator of the practice of medicine, the public interest in protection from unlicensed practice of medicine weighs against granting a stay.

• The applications for permission to appeal and for a stay of the interim interlocutory injunction (including a stay pending return to the Court of King’s Bench) were dismissed, and the parties were directed to proceed to special chambers, with the possibility of joining the permanent injunction and civil contempt applications.

Background and facts of the case
The proceeding arises from an interim interlocutory injunction obtained by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta against Viliam (also known as William) Makis. The injunction restricts him from representing or implying that he is a regulated member of the College or licensed to practise medicine in Alberta, and from using titles, abbreviations, or initials including “Doctor”, “Dr”, or “oncologist”, as well as from offering or providing health services to the public regarding cancer treatment, among other things. He was given until September 7, 2025 to comply with those restrictions.
On December 3, 2018, the Court of King’s Bench declared Mr. Makis a vexatious litigant in Makis v Alberta Health Services, 2018 ABQB 976. On March 1, 2020, the Court of Appeal set aside portions, but not all, of that vexatious litigant order in Makis v Alberta Health Services, 2020 ABCA 168. Because he remains subject to a vexatious litigant order, the Alberta Rules of Court, AR 124/2010, r 14.5(1)(j), require him to obtain permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Before the application in the Court of Appeal was heard, the College brought a further application in the Court of King’s Bench to have Mr. Makis held in civil contempt of the interim interlocutory injunction of August 15, 2025. That application was returnable January 19, 2026, but the date is to be adjourned by consent to special chambers or another urgent application date.

Procedural history in the Court of King’s Bench and the interim injunction
In the Court of King’s Bench, the College applied for a permanent injunction. In chambers, Mr. Makis applied for an adjournment so that the matter could be rescheduled to a special chambers date to allow for a fuller and more comprehensive hearing, and at the very least be sent to special chambers where it could be tested on a full evidentiary record.
On the adjournment application, the chambers judge agreed on several occasions that the matter should be heard in special chambers and stated that it required full argument with respect to the permanence of the injunction. Until a special chambers application could be scheduled, the judge identified “kind of a halfway point”: he was not prepared to entertain a permanent injunction but, in the meantime, would grant an interim interlocutory injunction pending special chambers.
The judge stressed that he was not granting any injunction with permanence attached to it and that it would be an interim interlocutory measure pending a full hearing. The interim order was intended to be very short-lived, to temporarily protect the public until a special chambers application could be heard.

Scope and rationale of the interim interlocutory injunction
In submissions on the injunction, the chambers judge reiterated that he was only granting an interim interlocutory injunction for a very short, defined period of time to allow the parties to proceed to fulsome argument in special chambers. He noted that the matter was proceeding on “skeleton” information and that a more thorough argument was needed, including a fuller understanding of what Mr. Makis’ role was, how he saw his role, and how he saw it proceeding in the future.
As a short-term compromise, the judge stated that, in the meantime, there needed to be some protection to the public. On the limited information before him, it appeared that Mr. Makis was arguably practising medicine and holding himself out as being a physician, which he was prohibited from doing. The judge concluded that the information before him was not sufficient to grant a permanent injunction and stated that he was not about to do that; instead, the question of permanent relief had to be the subject of a special application that he was directing the parties to bring.
The judge ordered and directed the parties to book a special application to deal with the matter in a fuller sense, indicating that such an application could be scheduled for a half day. He concluded that this was an interim injunction and that the matter would be heard in a more thorough sense at a special application.

Application for permission to appeal and the proper forum
In the Court of Appeal, Mr. Makis sought permission to appeal the interim interlocutory injunction of August 15, 2025. He advanced two primary grounds:

• that his application for an adjournment of the College’s permanent injunction application was dismissed; and

• that the interim interlocutory injunction was granted without sufficient evidence to establish a strong prima facie case, irreparable harm, and a balance of convenience favouring the College.
  The Court of Appeal held that the application could be determined on the basis that the matter should not have been the subject of an appeal at this stage, but rather a special chambers application in the Court of King’s Bench, as directed by that court. The whole purpose of the interim interlocutory injunction was to allow the parties to proceed quickly and efficiently to a special chambers application. That had not occurred, and the Court of Appeal found that an appeal should not proceed before the mandated process in the Court of King’s Bench was completed.
  In considering permission to appeal by a vexatious litigant, the Court referred to the question whether an appeal would unduly burden the progress of the action, citing Rana v Rana, 2022 ABCA 270, para 44, and Thompson v Procrane Inc (Sterling Crane), 2016 ABCA 71, para 7. Here, the Court concluded that hearing the proposed appeal of the interim interlocutory order would unduly hinder the progress of the matter toward the full hearing already directed by the Court of King’s Bench. It stated that the parties must return to the Court of King’s Bench and do as that court had directed by making fulsome arguments.
  The Court also noted that, given the College’s civil contempt application (to be adjourned by consent to special chambers or an urgent application date), the parties should consider joining the injunction application with the contempt application so they could be heard together at the earliest opportunity.

Application for a stay pending return to the Court of King’s Bench
In addition to seeking permission to appeal, Mr. Makis asked for a stay of the interim interlocutory injunction. In oral submissions, he amended his request to seek a stay pending the return of the injunction application to the Court of King’s Bench.
The Court applied the tripartite test for a stay set out in RJR-MacDonald, following Manitoba (Attorney General) v Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd. Under that test, the applicant bears the burden of showing:

• a serious question to be tried (an arguable issue that is not frivolous or vexatious);

• irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and

• that the balance of convenience favours granting the stay.
  The Court noted that the threshold for a serious question to be tried is low, and that a judge on such an application should not engage in an extensive review of the merits, subject to two narrow exceptions that did not apply in this case. On irreparable harm, the Court quoted RJR-MacDonald to the effect that the issue is whether refusing relief could adversely affect the applicant’s interests in a way that cannot be remedied if the eventual decision on the merits differs from the interlocutory result, and that “irreparable” refers to the nature of the harm rather than its magnitude.
  On the balance of convenience, the Court cited RJR-MacDonald’s statement that the relevant factors are numerous and will vary from case to case, and that it would be unwise to attempt to list or rank them exhaustively.
  The decision on the stay turned on the balance of convenience. Mr. Makis argued that without a stay he would suffer reputational damage, income loss affecting his family, and irreversible social media changes that could not be compensated by damages, and that the balance favoured a stay because, in his view, the status quo showed no immediate risk while enforcement would cause disproportionate harm.
  The College responded that, as Alberta’s regulator of the practice of medicine, its role is to protect the public by ensuring that physicians practising medicine in Alberta are qualified to do so, which it accomplishes through registration and licensing. It alleged that Mr. Makis has not been licensed to practise medicine in Alberta since February 2019, is not currently licensed to practise elsewhere in Canada, and continues to hold himself out, directly or indirectly, as a medical doctor, physician, radiologist, nuclear medicine specialist, or oncologist. It submitted that there is a strong public interest in protecting the public from individuals who are not licensed to practise medicine, and that the public interest favoured refusing a stay.

Outcome and next steps
The Court of Appeal concluded that the balance of convenience, particularly the public interest component, favoured not granting a stay pending the return of the injunction application to the Court of King’s Bench (which may be combined with the College’s civil contempt application and heard in special chambers or as another urgent application). The Court held that this outcome was just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed both of Mr. Makis’ applications: permission to appeal was refused, and the request for a stay pending return to the Court of King’s Bench was denied. The interim interlocutory injunction therefore remains in place while the parties are to proceed in the Court of King’s Bench in accordance with the directions already given there. No total monetary award, costs, or damages identified.