Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Status of the Leitrim Road properties (4016 and 4048) as estate assets versus trust or gift interests claimed by Todd and Colin, and the impact of that characterization on available estate value for support.
• Weight given to the 2011 declaration of trust, land registry entries, and corroborative witness testimony in establishing an express trust in favour of Colin over 4016 Leitrim.
• Serious credibility and hearsay problems in Todd’s affidavit evidence, including conflicts about who controlled CTM Sweeping and who actually funded and built the house at 4048 Leitrim.
• Application and rejection of constructive trust, resulting trust, unjust enrichment and gift doctrines to Todd’s claim to ownership of 4048 Leitrim.
• Determination of what constitutes “adequate provision for proper support” for a dependant spouse under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, considering Lise’s age, health, income, needs and lifestyle against the size and liabilities of the estate.
• Use of a life annuity with a reversionary interest to secure long-term support for Lise while preserving testamentary autonomy and the residual interests of Jean-Guy’s three children.

Background and parties

Lise Cassan lived with the deceased, Jean-Guy Villeneuve, in a long-term common law relationship of about 16 years, from around 2006 until his death in January 2022. He was a businessman with real estate holdings and operations centred on Leitrim Road in Ottawa, including the CTM Sweeping business at 4020 Leitrim. His three children—Manon Giroux, Todd Villeneuve and Colin Villeneuve—were closely connected with the business and its properties. In his will, Jean-Guy left his estate to his children and made no provision for Lise. She was not designated as a beneficiary of his registered investments or life insurance. After his death, tensions escalated between Lise and the children: she was made to leave Jean-Guy’s home within weeks, accused of misconduct, and her status as his partner was minimized despite the obituary describing her as his “longtime partner.”

Procedural history and related proceedings

Three related matters were heard together. The first was Lise’s application for dependant’s relief from the estate under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA), known as the Cassan application. The respondent was Manon Giroux, sued in her capacity as estate trustee. The second was the Villeneuve action, brought by Todd and Colin (and initially their company 3408671 Canada Inc. o/a CTM Sweeping Co.), seeking declarations that certain Leitrim Road properties were not estate assets but were legally and beneficially theirs. The third was the Villeneuve application, in which Todd and Colin advanced equitable and restitutionary claims—unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, constructive trust and resulting trust—again asserting that 4048 Leitrim belonged to Todd and 4016 Leitrim to Colin. Their own dependant’s relief claims were abandoned before the hearing. In a 2024 decision in the Cassan application, the court held that Lise was Jean-Guy’s “spouse” and “dependant” within the meaning of the SLRA and that he was providing or obligated to provide support immediately before his death. The court ordered interim support of $2,000 per month from September 15, 2024 until final resolution. The 2026 reasons had two key questions: whether 4016 and 4048 Leitrim were estate assets, and what final amount and structure of support should be awarded to Lise.

Facts and findings about 4016 Leitrim Road

The property at 4016 Leitrim is a residence adjoining the CTM Sweeping site at 4020 Leitrim. It became central to Colin’s claim. In 2011, Jean-Guy purchased 4016 Leitrim for $250,000. The land titles register and deed recorded him as holding the property “in the capacity of trustee,” clearly signalling that he was not the beneficial owner. A declaration of trust dated May 17, 2011, one day before registration of the deed, identified Colin as the sole beneficiary and stated that Jean-Guy held 4016 in trust for him. Colin moved into 4016 Leitrim around the time his child was born and lived there with his wife and son. Multiple witnesses—including the family’s former nanny and a long-time employee—confirmed that 4016 was treated as Colin’s house and that Jean-Guy had purchased it specifically so Colin could live close to the family business. Colin did not file an affidavit in support of his own beneficial ownership, and much of the affidavit evidence about the trust came from Todd, whose evidence was problematic. However, the judge regarded the registered deed and the written declaration of trust as powerful, objective proof that Jean-Guy was holding the property in trust for someone, with the declaration of trust tying that role to Colin. Combined with the consistent oral evidence that 4016 was “Colin’s house,” the court found that there was an express trust in Colin’s favour. Jean-Guy had only legal title as trustee, while Colin held the beneficial interest and could have demanded transfer of legal title at any time. Consequently, the court concluded that 4016 Leitrim was not an asset of the estate and could not be used to satisfy Lise’s dependant’s relief claim.

Facts and findings about 4048 Leitrim Road

The property at 4048 Leitrim is a much larger parcel, about 25.58 acres, also adjacent to 4020 Leitrim. A house was built there where Todd has lived since approximately 2001. Most of the land is cleared or gravelled and has been used to store vehicles and equipment for CTM Sweeping, with some units straddling the boundary between 4020 and 4048 Leitrim. An appraisal obtained shortly after Jean-Guy’s death valued the land (without the house) at $640,000. Todd claimed that when his parents separated in the 1990s, they decided to give each child either $30,000 in cash or a piece of land, and he said he chose land in the form of what became 4048 Leitrim, while Manon and Colin took cash. He further asserted that he and his father built the house on the land together, partly with construction financing and partly through bartering and labour by friends and his godfather. His evidence shifted significantly over time: initially he claimed the house cost under $50,000 to build and that he and his father obtained financing for the balance, later he insisted that he alone was on the loan and that the true cost was $150,000. Todd also alleged that he and Colin, rather than Jean-Guy, owned and controlled CTM Sweeping from its early days, and that the company paid house-related expenses as part of their compensation. These assertions conflicted with his earlier sworn evidence that Jean-Guy had started CTM Sweeping, was the “sole decision-maker,” and continued making all financial decisions about payments, including those relating to 4016 and 4048, until shortly before his death. The court found Todd to be an unreliable witness: he contradicted his own affidavits in significant ways, recanted statements as “a lie,” breached affidavit rules on hearsay and sources, and was combative on cross-examination. Weighing the totality of evidence, the judge accepted that CTM Sweeping, under Jean-Guy’s control, funded construction of the 4048 house at a cost of about $50,000 and paid the property taxes, insurance and maintenance thereafter. Todd personally paid for utilities and some renovations. He had lived at 4048 for approximately two decades without paying rent to Jean-Guy or CTM Sweeping. The evidence also showed that Jean-Guy treated 4048 as partly his own: his driver’s licence listed 4048 as his address, he came and went freely and sometimes slept there, and for a six-year period he designated 4048 as his principal residence for tax purposes. There was no severance of a smaller residential lot from the larger parcel; the entire 25.58-acre tract remained a single legal property.

Rejection of Todd’s constructive trust and unjust enrichment claim

Todd and Colin argued that the estate had been unjustly enriched by Todd’s contributions to the construction and improvement of the 4048 property and that a constructive trust ought to be imposed, vesting beneficial and legal ownership in Todd. The court accepted in theory that the estate was “enriched” in the sense that legal title to the land with the house rested in the estate and that a developed property is more valuable than bare land. However, the analysis did not stop there. For unjust enrichment, Todd also needed to prove a corresponding deprivation and the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment. On the evidence, the judge concluded that Todd had not established a meaningful deprivation. Construction of the house had been funded by CTM Sweeping, not Todd personally, and the company’s expenditures were directed by Jean-Guy, who controlled its finances and used it to pay many of his personal expenses. Todd’s later renovation spending (he claimed over $150,000 since 2015) was only partially documented; a small pre-litigation subset of receipts was clearly dated before 2023, while the rest were dated or incurred after he was on notice of Lise’s claim. The court held that any such post-notice expenditures were made at Todd’s own risk. Even if the earlier renovation costs were accepted, their quantum was modest compared to the benefit of living rent-free for roughly twenty years in a house whose construction and major costs were borne by the business. Put another way, the value of Todd’s free housing outstripped any financial sacrifice he made. Without a proven, corresponding deprivation, the unjust enrichment claim failed, and there was no foundation for granting him a constructive trust over 4048 Leitrim.

Rejection of resulting trust and gift theories for 4048 Leitrim

Todd and Colin also advanced resulting trust and outright gift arguments. For a resulting trust, they asserted that Todd was always the beneficial owner of 4048 because he contributed to the property and Jean-Guy allegedly intended it for him. For a gift, they argued that the “land instead of cash” arrangement during the parents’ separation showed donative intent. The court was not persuaded by either theory. On resulting trust, there was no gratuitous transfer of title from Jean-Guy to Todd; legal title remained with Jean-Guy until death, and no written agreement complying with the Statute of Frauds established an enforceable transfer. On the alleged gift, the law requires clear, cogent evidence that the donor intended an immediate gift, that the donee accepted it and that there was an act of delivery or transfer. Here, Jean-Guy never transferred title, continued to use the land (including for business storage), treated 4048 as his principal residence for tax purposes for several years and used the address personally. His will later specifically left 4048 to Todd. The court inferred that Jean-Guy’s intention was to allow Todd to live in a house built and funded on Jean-Guy’s land, partly to keep him close to the CTM Sweeping yard, and to transfer ownership to Todd only upon his death. That intention supported the testamentary gift in the will, not a lifetime transfer or trust. The court therefore rejected both the resulting trust and gift claims and held that 4048 Leitrim was fully an asset of the estate at Jean-Guy’s death.

Valuing the estate and its liabilities

Because Part V support orders must be calibrated to the size of the estate, the court reconciled competing valuations. Lise initially valued the estate’s assets at about $2.684 million, assuming both 4016 and 4048 Leitrim were owned by Jean-Guy. The estate’s estimate of about $1.677 million assumed neither property was an estate asset. After the court found that 4016 was held in trust for Colin (and thus excluded) but 4048 was owned by the estate (and added in), both sides’ figures had to be adjusted. On that basis, the judge accepted a rough asset value around $2.325 million. On the liability side, the parties disagreed particularly over tax exposure associated with winding up a corporation (112266 Canada Inc.) that held some real estate. The estate’s accountant proposed two wind-up scenarios with differing tax consequences; the court preferred the lower, more plausible tax figure and folded that into the liability estimate, alongside other debts and obligations. While the court did not fix liabilities down to the last dollar, it concluded that total liabilities would fall somewhere between about $1.035 million and $1.254 million, leaving roughly $1.07 million available for distribution among Lise and the three children.

Lise’s financial position, health and lifestyle

Lise’s income came from a disability pension, Canada Pension Plan and Old Age Security, with small dividend amounts in 2023 and 2024. Notices of assessment showed that she earned about $31,072 in 2023 and $29,712 in 2024. Her assets were modest: a 2021 Kia gifted by Jean-Guy, a trailer she sold for $50,000 to fund living expenses and legal fees, and some disputed pre-death gifts from Jean-Guy. After Jean-Guy’s death, the children also gave her $15,000. Lise was 76 at the time of the final hearing and had multiple serious physical health conditions. She also experienced psychiatric and cognitive issues leading to hospitalizations in late 2024 and April 2025. A psychiatrist’s report in April 2025 diagnosed a major neurocognitive disorder of mixed etiology (Alzheimer’s-type and vascular), but follow-up records, including a discharge summary and later medical updates, were not produced. Despite those problems, Lise continued to drive and to live independently in a retirement residence in Stittsville that she said she “loves.” Her monthly rent of around $3,150 covered accommodation, food, utilities, cable and weekly housekeeping; she paid extra for parking, a cell phone, fuel, insurance and small leisure activities like poker nights and hair and nail appointments. With the interim support of $2,000 per month added to her pensions, the estate calculated that her monthly income exceeded her documented current expenses by about $700.

Projected needs and the court’s assessment of proper support

Lise argued that she required significantly more support, including funds to move to a particular retirement residence in Almonte near her daughter, to purchase an assisted living or memory care package there and to maintain a higher level of discretionary spending on clothing, toiletries, personal care and travel. She projected annual expenses of about $101,936 and relied on Statistics Canada life expectancy data to suggest she might live another 13 years, asking for a lump sum of $1,136,000 to cover current and future shortfalls plus additional sums for vacations. The estate challenged the reasonableness and evidentiary basis of these figures. It highlighted the lack of comparative evidence about costs at other facilities, the scant medical proof about the timing and intensity of future care needs and inconsistencies between amounts claimed in Lise’s factum and her own affidavits, particularly in relation to personal and discretionary spending. The court agreed that Lise’s current needs were largely being met at Stittsville at a standard that exceeded subsistence. It accepted that she could not afford the kind of Caribbean vacations she had previously taken with Jean-Guy or the higher-end amenities she now sought, but it found, on the record, that she could live comfortably and independently where she was. The judge did, however, accept that there was a real and substantial possibility that Lise would require additional assisted-living type services beginning around 2029, such as help with medications and personal care. Although the evidence did not justify moving her to the particular Almonte residence she preferred, it supported the conclusion that her support should increase at some point in the future to reflect rising care needs.

Balancing dependant’s relief with testamentary freedom

Applying the statutory factors in section 62 of the SLRA and appellate guidance from cases such as Cummings and Quinn v. Carrigan, the court framed its task as balancing Lise’s strong moral and legal claim for support against the limited scope for interfering with testamentary autonomy and the legitimate expectations of the residuary beneficiaries. Had Lise and Jean-Guy separated during his lifetime, the court considered it highly likely that she would have been awarded significant spousal support based on the length of the relationship, their economic disparity, her age and health and her contributions to his welfare and business. At the same time, the judge stressed that dependant’s relief is not intended to give a dependant an “estate” of her own or to arbitrarily redistribute wealth among family members. The central goal is to ensure “adequate provision for proper support,” which can include more than bare necessities, but must remain proportionate to both needs and estate resources. The court was not prepared to accept Lise’s statistical life expectancy in isolation, because it did not account for her particular medical vulnerabilities. Nor did it accept that a lump sum based on a 13-year horizon would be appropriate; such an award risked overstating her requirements and unduly diminishing the children’s inheritance if she died earlier, or leaving her vulnerable if she outlived the estimated period.

Use of a life annuity with reversionary interest

Seeking a structure that would provide security to Lise while respecting the interests of the children and avoiding ongoing conflict, the judge turned to the idea of a structured annuity. After inviting submissions, the court concluded that it had authority under section 63 of the SLRA to order the estate to fund a life annuity with specified monthly payments and a reversionary interest back to the estate. The annuity would be issued by an appropriate institution, such as a life insurance company, and would pay Lise a fixed sum monthly for life, with payments calibrated to reflect her anticipated changing needs: continuing at one level until late 2028 and increasing from 2029 onward to recognize probable assisted-living costs. Any residual value if she died before actuarial expectations would revert to the estate, ensuring that Jean-Guy’s testamentary scheme was not defeated by over-funding her support based on optimistic assumptions about longevity. Lise preferred a lump sum and argued that an annuity would deprive her of flexibility and control, but the court held that, in her circumstances, a guaranteed monthly payment for life better served the SLRA’s support objectives and reduced the risk that she might outlive a capital award.

Final orders and overall outcome

In the end, the court’s orders blended immediate relief, ongoing monthly support and a structural mechanism to protect all parties’ interests. On the property side, the court held that 4016 Leitrim was held in express trust for Colin and was not an estate asset, while 4048 Leitrim, including the house and business-use land, formed part of the estate and would pass under Jean-Guy’s will. On dependant’s relief, Lise’s requested lump sum of $1,136,000 was rejected as excessive. Instead, the estate was directed to pay her a lump sum of $69,500 for past support from February 2022 to August 2024 and partly to recognize her historic vacation-related lifestyle, net of the $15,000 already advanced by the children. The estate must also continue paying her $2,000 per month until December 2028, with support increasing to $3,000 per month from January 2029 onward, all payments ceasing in the month following her death. To secure these payments, the estate is required to purchase and fund an annuity providing the ordered monthly sums until Lise’s 90th birthday, with a reversionary interest so that any unpaid balance reverts to the estate. The cost of arranging and implementing the annuity, including the reversionary feature, is borne entirely by the estate. Overall, Lise is the successful party on the dependant’s relief issue and Colin succeeds in establishing beneficial ownership of 4016 Leitrim, while the estate prevails on the status of 4048 Leitrim; the precise total monetary benefit to Lise over the remainder of her life cannot be quantified from the decision because it depends on her actual lifespan and the pricing and performance of the annuity, but it is certain that she receives at least $69,500 in lump-sum past support plus $2,000 per month until the end of 2028 and $3,000 per month thereafter for as long as she lives.