Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Core issue is whether the Minister’s June 18, 2025 “Coal Decision” letter is a justiciable exercise of administrative/statutory power or a non-reviewable core policy announcement.
• Applicants seek to characterize the Coal Decision as an administrative direction to SaskPower, subject to judicial review for legality, reasonableness and process under Vavilov and Doré.
• The Government argues the letter has no statutory footing, creates no legal rights or duties, and is instead a broad policy choice on electricity generation and climate strategy, falling outside judicial review.
• Separation of powers and institutional competence are central: the Court considers whether it can, consistent with its role, supervise and effectively redesign climate and energy policy.
• Prior climate litigation (notably Dykstra) and cases on “political questions” and core policy (Operation Dismantle, Imperial Tobacco, Tanudjaja) are applied to assess proximity, justiciability, and the limits of judicial oversight.
• Ultimately, the Court strikes the Originating Application in its entirety as non-justiciable, declining to order production of records or to review the merits of the Coal Decision, and makes no order as to costs.

Factual background

SaskPower is a Crown corporation created by the Government of Saskatchewan to provide electricity generation and related services in the province, operating under the direction of the provincial government. In June 2025, growing electricity demand and climate policy intersected in a high-profile decision regarding coal-fired generation.

On June 18, 2025, Jeremy Harrison, Minister responsible for SaskPower, issued a letter to all SaskPower employees. In that letter, he announced that the Government of Saskatchewan had decided SaskPower’s coal-generating assets would be “life-extended” as the province “bridge[s] to nuclear baseload power generation.” The letter explained that SaskPower projected a massive increase in power demand over the next two decades and that the government had adopted an “all-of-the-above” approach: new renewables, new natural gas plants, biomass, existing hydro, and other assets, together with life-extended coal. The Minister emphasized priorities of reliability, affordability and energy security, and reaffirmed a commitment to a “net zero grid by 2050” to be achieved “responsibly” and based on the deployment of nuclear generating assets, including small modular reactors in cooperation with other provinces. At the same time, he stated the government would be “realistic” in not compromising reliability and affordability while the province was already making “significant contributions to environmental sustainability,” and positioned the decision as part of a strategy to place Saskatchewan at the centre of the North American energy grid with enhanced export and investment opportunities.

This announcement is referred to in the judgment as the “Coal Decision.” The applicants view it as a concrete government directive to extend the operational life of coal-fired generating stations to 2050, with immediate consequences for greenhouse gas emissions, climate impacts and compliance with broader legal obligations. The government, by contrast, characterizes it as a non-binding expression of core policy and political direction rather than a legally operative administrative decision.

The parties and their positions

The applicants are Citizens for Public Justice, a minor (Kiké Dueck, by litigation guardian Kris Dueck), Sherry Olson, Matthew Wiens, and the Saskatchewan Environmental Society Inc. They are described as citizens committed to environmental protection who “take umbrage” with the Coal Decision because coal-powered generation increases greenhouse gas emissions that exacerbate climate change. Each filed affidavits setting out their concerns and environmental perspectives. The Court notes these concerns are not without merit, referencing the Supreme Court of Canada’s detailed description of the reality and severity of climate change in References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11.

The applicants commenced an Originating Application seeking, among other remedies, an order in the nature of certiorari to set aside or quash the Coal Decision. They also sought an order compelling the government to produce any relevant record of proceedings relating to the decision to extend coal-fired generation to 2050, with a view to arguing both justiciability and the merits after disclosure. The application does not anchor the requested relief in any specific statute, treaty, or other defined legal instrument; the Court observes that, at bottom, their complaint is that the Coal Decision is a wrongheaded and harmful climate policy choice.

The Government of Saskatchewan, as respondent, moved to strike or set aside the Originating Application on two main bases: that it fails to raise justiciable issues, and that it does not articulate a matter suitable for judicial review. In its written and oral submissions, the government focuses heavily on the character of the Minister’s letter, the nature of judicial review under the Vavilov framework, and constitutional limits on courts supervising broad executive policy.

Applicants’ legal theory and reliance on administrative law

The applicants frame their case as a conventional application for judicial review of a government decision, not a constitutional challenge to legislation. They stress that they are not advancing a s. 52 Constitution Act, 1982 challenge to the validity of a statute, but seeking review of a specific decision for legality, correctness and reasonableness under administrative law principles.

Relying on Doré v Barreau du Québec and Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, they argue that judicial review of discretionary decision-making is distinct from generalized constitutional evaluation of broad “legislative policies.” In their view, the Coal Decision, including any directions to SaskPower, is administrative in nature when it directs immediate or concrete action, and is therefore subject to judicial oversight for transparency, intelligibility, justification, and consistency with applicable legal constraints.

They contend that the decision is “legally and factually flawed,” undermines federal law and international obligations, and threatens constitutional protections in relation to climate impacts. From their perspective, the core questions for the Court are not about the wisdom of the government’s climate and energy strategy but about whether the Coal Decision is lawful and reasonable in light of the relevant constraints on government action. They suggest that a proper judicial review would focus on the decision-making process and legality rather than the ultimate policy outcome, and they invoke Operation Dismantle to argue that even high-level executive decisions must comply with the Charter and can be scrutinized if they allegedly violate citizens’ rights.

Government’s characterization of the Coal Decision and justiciability

The government’s response starts from the premise that the Supreme Court’s decision in Vavilov provides a framework for reviewing decisions made under delegated statutory authority. It submits that the Minister’s June 18, 2025 letter is not such a decision: no statute is cited as the source of authority, no legislative provision constrains when or how a minister may send such a communication, and the letter creates no immediate legal obligations or rights. In the government’s view, the letter is an announcement of a core policy choice about how Saskatchewan will balance electricity demand, reliability, affordability, energy security and climate goals on the path to a net-zero grid, and therefore lies outside the scope of judicial review.

The government also relies on a broader line of jurisprudence dealing with justiciability and “political questions,” including Operation Dismantle, La Rose v Canada, and other cases emphasizing that courts must be able to identify a sufficiently concrete legal standard and relationship to adjudicate a Charter or public law claim. It underlines that a flood of broadly-pleaded environmental and inequality-based Charter claims has led courts to insist on a “sufficient legal component” and meaningful proximity between government action and the alleged harm.

Drawing on Imperial Tobacco and Tanudjaja, the government stresses that weighing social, economic and political considerations to arrive at an overarching policy course is the proper role of elected governments, not courts. Decisions about the structure of the power grid, the mix of generation sources, timelines for coal phase-out versus nuclear deployment, and the balancing of climate impacts against reliability and affordability are said to be classic “core policy” matters. Subjecting them to judicial management through ongoing review and control would, in the government’s submission, unduly fetter executive and legislative discretion and undermine democratic accountability.

The Court’s approach to climate litigation and separation of powers

Justice R.S. Smith situates this case within a broader context of climate-related litigation, particularly referencing the recent judgment in Dykstra v Saskatchewan Power Corporation, 2025 SKKB 175. In Dykstra, applicants sought far-reaching orders effectively requiring the Court to impose and supervise an exacting “net zero electricity” plan for Saskatchewan by specified dates. Justice Kuski Bassett held that such relief would draw the Court into core legislative and policy design, beyond its institutional capacity and constitutional role.

Adopting and endorsing that analysis, Justice Smith emphasizes that not every dispute is justiciable, even when it arises from pressing and real issues like climate change. The Court accepts the scientific and legal recognition of climate change’s seriousness, drawing again on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act. However, it underscores that the “question is how best to address it,” and that this necessarily involves balancing complex and competing interests including electricity demand, economic considerations and environmental protection.

In this framework, the Court describes its constitutional role as administering justice, resolving legal disputes, and interpreting the Constitution and laws as an independent branch that upholds the rule of law and protects rights. It contrasts that role with the granular, technical and policy-heavy work of designing and implementing climate and energy systems, such as determining the proper mix of generation technologies, timelines for plant closures, or detailed infrastructure upgrades. Those choices, the Court stresses, belong to elected officials and accountable decision-makers who must answer to the electorate for the consequences of their policies.

The Court cautions against judicial attempts to “manipulate the nuts and bolts of government action” in order to achieve desired policy outcomes. It notes that, taken to its logical end, the applicants’ theory would invite courts to intervene in a wide spectrum of day-to-day governmental decisions—from high-level climate strategy to seemingly mundane questions such as where a town dump or bicycle lanes should be placed—contrary to the separation of powers and institutional competence.

No contractual or statutory policy terms at issue

Although the case arises in the context of electricity system planning and climate policy, the decision does not revolve around any discrete contractual policy terms, insurance clauses, or specific statutory provisions defining rights or duties. The applicants do not cite a particular statutory scheme or treaty that commands or forbids the Coal Decision, and the Court notes this absence explicitly. Instead, the dispute centers on whether a general governmental policy announcement can be treated as an administrative decision susceptible to judicial review and potentially constrained by Charter or other public law principles. As a result, there is no detailed analysis of policy wording or clause interpretation; the focus remains on the character of the impugned act and the proper limits of judicial oversight.

Outcome and disposition

After reviewing the parties’ submissions and the relevant authorities, Justice Smith concludes that the applicants’ Originating Application does not raise a justiciable issue and that the Coal Decision, as expressed in the Minister’s letter, is not the kind of administrative decision that can be subjected to judicial review under the Vavilov framework. The decision is characterized as a core policy announcement driven by economic, social, and political considerations, not an exercise of delegated statutory power with a clear legal standard for review.

In light of that conclusion, the Court grants the government’s request under Rule 7-9 of The King’s Bench Rules and orders that the application be struck out and set aside in its entirety. The requested order for production of records is effectively rendered moot, because there will be no further proceeding on the merits.

On costs, the government sought an award in its favour. The Court notes that government counsel are in-house and that no outside legal fees were incurred. Recognizing that the legal issues are somewhat esoteric but that they arise from the universally important problem of climate change, the Court concludes that ordering costs against the applicants “serves no larger good.” Accordingly, each party bears its own costs.

In overall outcome, the Government of Saskatchewan is successful in having the Originating Application dismissed at this preliminary stage. No damages or monetary relief are awarded to any party, and the judgment does not fix any amount in the government’s favour for costs. The precise amount ordered or granted in favour of the successful party cannot be determined, because the Court explicitly declines to award costs and issues no other monetary order.

This summary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.