Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope of admissible evidence where the registrant sought to rely on prior ICRC decisions and whether such screening decisions were relevant and admissible in a discipline hearing.
• Interpretation of “offence against any Act relating to the practice of pharmacy or the sale of drugs” under O. Reg. 130/17, s. 2(1) para. 31, and whether breaches of regulations under the Veterinarians Act qualify.
• Assessment of whether the pharmacist’s use of a veterinarian’s wholesale account and a fictitious contact name amounted to signing or issuing false or misleading documents.
• Evaluation of the pharmacist’s knowledge and role as Designated Manager in permitting, consenting to, or assisting in an offence under s. 33(2)(d) of Regulation 1093 and in unprofessional conduct.
• Application of appellate standards of review (correctness vs. palpable and overriding error) on a statutory appeal from a professional discipline decision.
• Proportionality and fitness of the four-month suspension and related penalty in light of mitigating and aggravating factors, including prior ICRC decisions and lack of College policy guidance.

Background and factual context

Alice Rusli was a pharmacist and the Designated Manager of Glen Shields Pharmacy in Ontario from May 2015. The complaint that led to discipline proceedings arose from Glen Shields Pharmacy’s practice of dispensing veterinary medications, including concerns about the source of the medications and the staff’s knowledge to counsel patients effectively. The pharmacy’s supply route for veterinary drugs was unconventional: it relied on a veterinarian, Dr. Covant, and his account with CDMV, a veterinary drug wholesaler that would not sell directly to pharmacists in Ontario. After November 2015, Regulation 1093 under the Veterinarians Act was amended, and s. 33(2)(d) restricted a veterinarian’s ability to dispense drugs for resale to pharmacists, permitting only reasonably limited quantities to address a temporary shortage experienced by another member or pharmacist. Despite this change, Dr. Covant allowed three pharmacies, including Glen Shields, to order veterinary products directly through sub-accounts on his CDMV portal. CDMV invoiced his company, which in turn invoiced the pharmacies and charged a 5% fee. For Glen Shields, a fictitious name, “Theresa Holdes,” was entered as the required contact person for the sub-account. Orders were placed online through CDMV’s system as though they were being made by Dr. Covant’s operation, even though they were actually being generated directly by Glen Shields using his credentials. In 2020, the College of Veterinarians of Ontario found that Dr. Covant had committed professional misconduct for breaching s. 33(2)(d) of Regulation 1093, failing to maintain the standard of the profession, and engaging in unprofessional conduct, based on this sub-distribution business model.

Discipline proceedings and professional misconduct allegations

Following investigation by the Ontario College of Pharmacists, three allegations of professional misconduct were referred to the Discipline Committee against Ms. Rusli, in her capacities as pharmacist, Designated Manager, and/or shareholder of Glen Shields Pharmacy. The allegations were framed under the Health Professions Procedural Code of the Pharmacy Act and O. Reg. 130/17 (Professional Misconduct and Conflict of Interest). The first allegation was that she signed or issued, in her professional capacity, documents that she knew or ought to have known contained false or misleading statements, namely orders issued to CDMV from around March to June 2019. This engaged s. 51(1)(c) of the Code and para. 17 of s. 2(1) of O. Reg. 130/17, which defines as professional misconduct “signing or issuing, in the member’s professional capacity, a document that the member knows or ought to know contains a false or misleading statement.” The second allegation was that she permitted the commission of an offence against an Act relating to the practice of pharmacy or the sale of drugs, specifically s. 33(2)(d) of Regulation 1093 under the Veterinarians Act, again in or around March–June 2019. This implicated para. 31 of s. 2(1) of O. Reg. 130/17, which deems it professional misconduct to permit, consent to, approve, counsel or assist, expressly or by implication, the commission of such an offence. The third allegation alleged that Ms. Rusli engaged in conduct relevant to the practice of pharmacy that would reasonably be regarded by members as disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional, based on Glen Shields’ system and practices for obtaining veterinary drugs/products from CDMV through Bayview Seven Animal Hospital (Dr. Covant’s company). This drew on para. 39 of s. 2(1) of O. Reg. 130/17, which captures conduct that, having regard to all circumstances, would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional. After a merits hearing, the Discipline Committee found that all three allegations had been proven. It later imposed a penalty including a four-month suspension of Ms. Rusli’s certificate of registration, with one month to be remitted upon completion of specified courses.

Evidence, regulatory framework, and the use of a veterinarian’s wholesale account

The case turned heavily on the regulatory framework for veterinary drug distribution and the evidence of how Glen Shields actually sourced its products. Section 33(2)(d) of Regulation 1093 under the Veterinarians Act prohibits a member from knowingly dispensing a drug for resale, except in reasonably limited quantities to address a temporary shortage for another member or pharmacist. By contrast, CDMV as a veterinary wholesaler would not supply veterinary drugs directly to pharmacists in Ontario. To work around this, Glen Shields used Dr. Covant’s CDMV portal, with sub-accounts for participating pharmacies. Orders were entered on CDMV’s online system by pharmacy staff but presented as if they originated from Dr. Covant’s practice. The fictitious contact name “Theresa Holdes” was used for Glen Shields’ sub-account and appeared in connection with the orders. The Discipline Committee found that the orders were not being issued to Dr. Covant; instead, the pharmacy used his credentials to issue orders directly to CDMV from Glen Shields, which created a misleading appearance that the orders were related to the veterinarian’s practice. The Committee concluded that these orders contained false statements and misrepresented who was actually placing and receiving the orders. In addition, the practice facilitated a sub-distribution of veterinary medication contrary to the narrow exception in s. 33(2)(d). Sales of veterinary drugs increased after the regulatory change, indicating that the business model was expansionary rather than limited to temporary shortages. Guided in part by the earlier decision in Covant v College of Veterinarians of Ontario at the Divisional Court (and later affirmed by the Court of Appeal), the Committee viewed the conduct as an “offence” under the Veterinarians Act for purposes of the pharmacy professional misconduct regulation.

Dispute over admissibility and relevance of prior ICRC decisions

An important procedural and evidentiary issue concerned the admissibility of prior decisions of the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC). Ms. Rusli sought to introduce eight ICRC decisions: three involving herself, three concerning other professionals at Glen Shields, and two involving pharmacists at other pharmacies. Her position was that these prior decisions showed the regulator had previously accepted or at least not challenged Glen Shields’ practices after the regulatory amendments, and that such evidence was relevant to both guilt and penalty. The College objected, and the Discipline Committee refused to admit the ICRC decisions at the merits stage. The Committee held that ICRC decisions are generally confidential and are screening decisions rather than adjudications; the ICRC does not hear witnesses, make credibility findings, or render binding legal interpretations. It also concluded that the decisions were not relevant to whether the acts of professional misconduct occurred. However, during the penalty phase, the parties agreed to an Agreed Statement of Facts that reproduced excerpts from the ICRC decisions involving Ms. Rusli personally, in lieu of admitting the full decisions. On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Committee’s approach was reasonable. It found no error in treating ICRC decisions as inadmissible and irrelevant at the merits stage, given their statutory role and confidentiality regime, while permitting limited reliance on them as background and mitigation at the penalty phase.

Appeal to the Divisional Court and standards of review

Ms. Rusli appealed both the Discipline Committee’s findings (the June 28, 2023 Decision) and its penalty decision (November 20, 2024) to the Divisional Court under ss. 70(1)–(2) of the Code, which allow appeals on questions of law, fact, or mixed fact and law. As this was a statutory appeal, the Court applied the ordinary appellate standards from Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov and Housen v. Nikolaisen: correctness for questions of law and palpable and overriding error for findings of fact and mixed fact and law (absent an extricable legal error). The appellant advanced two main grounds: first, that the Committee erred in excluding the ICRC decisions; and second, that it made legal and factual errors in finding professional misconduct, in particular by misinterpreting “offence against any Act” and in concluding that she had signed false documents and assisted an offence under the Veterinarians Act. She also argued that the resulting penalty was clearly unfit, particularly in light of the ICRC’s prior handling of similar complaints and the evolving interpretation of the veterinary regulation.

Interpretation of “offence against any Act” and application of prior caselaw

On the second allegation (permitting an offence against an Act), the appeal raised an interpretative question about O. Reg. 130/17, s. 2(1) para. 31: whether an offence could arise from breaching a regulation under another statute, such as Regulation 1093 under the Veterinarians Act, or whether it had to involve a statute-level prohibition. The Committee had reasoned that the Act and its regulations function together as “bricks and mortar,” and that an “offence against any Act” encompassed contraventions of its regulations, especially where the regulation itself uses the term “offence.” In reaching its conclusion, the Committee consulted prior Discipline Committee decisions that treated regulatory breaches as offences for the purpose of this misconduct provision, while recognizing that such decisions are not formally binding under horizontal stare decisis. Ms. Rusli argued this was an error, contending that the Committee lacked jurisdiction to find that Dr. Covant had committed an “offence” under the Veterinarians Act because he was not a party and because the statute, not its regulations, should be determinative. The Divisional Court rejected these submissions. It held that the Committee properly understood the non-binding nature of its own prior decisions, and that it was not an error of law to interpret a breach of Regulation 1093 as an offence under the Veterinarians Act for the limited purpose of applying the pharmacy misconduct provision. The Court further endorsed the Committee’s structured three-step analysis: determining whether the relevant provision related to pharmacy practice or sale of drugs; deciding whether an offence was committed by another person (here, Dr. Covant) in the relevant period; and assessing whether the registrant had permitted, consented to, approved, counselled or assisted that offence. The Court found that, based on the evidence and the existing Covant jurisprudence, it was open to the Committee to conclude that Dr. Covant continued to offend s. 33(2)(d) in the 2019 period and that Ms. Rusli’s actions, and inaction, as Designated Manager met the threshold under para. 31.

Findings on false or misleading documents and unprofessional conduct

On the first allegation, Ms. Rusli maintained that because Glen Shields pharmacists ordered through a veterinarian, they were not signing or issuing false documents. The Committee, however, found that the orders were generated directly by Glen Shields within CDMV’s system using the veterinarian’s credentials, and that the use of the fictitious name “Theresa Holdes” as the mandatory account contact was a deliberate misrepresentation. The Divisional Court accepted the Committee’s assessment of the evidence and held there was no palpable and overriding error in finding that the orders were both false and misleading and that Ms. Rusli, as Designated Manager, bore responsibility for them under para. 17. Under the third allegation, the Committee concluded that her conduct was unprofessional, though not necessarily disgraceful or dishonourable. The definition applied was conduct falling below the expectations of appropriate conduct for members of the profession. The Court noted that the appellant had not identified any specific legal error or overriding factual error in this classification and that the conclusion was reasonably grounded in the record, including the opaque supply chain and the risks created by the unorthodox sourcing of medications.

Penalty analysis and proportionality of the suspension

In contesting the four-month suspension, Ms. Rusli argued that the discipline findings and sanction were unfair because they relied on an interpretation of the veterinary regulation that emerged only later in the Covant litigation and, in her view, conflicted with earlier ICRC signals that the existing purchasing practices were acceptable. She submitted that professional standards must be knowable or reasonably ascertainable at the time of the alleged misconduct and that it was inequitable to retroactively apply the later interpretation of s. 33(2)(d). The Committee, however, calibrated the penalty with reference to both mitigating and aggravating factors. On the mitigating side, it considered the ICRC history, her lack of past discipline, her acceptance of responsibility as a Designated Manager, and the continuing absence of a clear policy statement from the College about this specific veterinary supply arrangement. On the aggravating side, it noted that when struggling to interpret the regulatory change, Ms. Rusli consulted only her pharmacist colleague and did not seek guidance from a Practice Consultant or other College resources; that she claimed to have altered purchasing practices without proper documentation; and that she nonetheless continued to purchase from Dr. Covant throughout the relevant period. The Committee also expressed concerns about the inability to reliably track the chain of custody of veterinarian medications from supplier to pet owner under this system. In light of these considerations and comparable cases, the Committee concluded that a four-month suspension, with one month remitted upon completion of courses, was warranted as both specific and general deterrence. The Divisional Court held that substantial deference was owed to the Committee’s choice of remedy and that the suspension fell within a reasonable range. It was neither clearly unfit nor based on irrelevant or improper factors.

Overall outcome and costs in favour of the successful party

The Divisional Court dismissed Ms. Rusli’s appeal in its entirety, upholding both the findings of professional misconduct and the penalty imposed by the Discipline Committee. The Court confirmed that the Committee had not erred in excluding the ICRC decisions at the merits phase, in treating breaches of Regulation 1093 as offences under the Veterinarians Act for the purposes of the pharmacy professional misconduct regulation, or in characterizing the ordering practices and use of a fictitious name as false, misleading, and unprofessional conduct. As a result, the Ontario College of Pharmacists was the successful party on the appeal, and the Court ordered Ms. Rusli to pay costs in the agreed-upon amount of $10,000; no additional damages or monetary awards were made beyond this costs order.