Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Enforceability of Minutes of Settlement from a mandatory mediation as a binding contract between the parties
• Allegations by the self-represented plaintiff that pressure, mediator bias and intensity of the mediation rendered her unable to comprehend or freely agree to the settlement
• Proper limits on affidavit evidence, including exclusion of opinion, speculation, argument and impermissible hearsay from lengthy self-prepared affidavits
• Serious evidentiary and public-policy concerns arising from the plaintiff’s and a co-plaintiff’s surreptitious recording of a confidential mandatory mediation session
• Scope of mediation confidentiality under The King’s Bench Act and the narrow circumstances in which a court may examine what occurred during mediation to assess a challenge to settlement minutes
• Cost consequences following unsuccessful attempts to set aside Minutes of Settlement, including a fixed costs order and set-off against amounts payable under the settlement

Facts of the dispute
The plaintiff, Pamela Michaels, sued the defendant, Jessica Lynn Raycraft, in the King’s Bench for Saskatchewan for defamation and reputational injury. She claimed $75,000 in general damages and $25,000 in aggravated damages arising from an allegedly defamatory Facebook post made by the defendant. A related defamation action had been commenced by another plaintiff, Duane Westgard, against the same defendant, seeking similar relief. Both actions proceeded in the Battleford Judicial Centre.
As required by s. 7-1(2) of The King’s Bench Act, the parties were directed into mandatory mediation. With everyone’s consent, the two actions were mediated together in a joint session on September 10, 2025. During this mediation, Ms. Michaels and Mr. Westgard secretly recorded the entire session, including the private caucus between Ms. Raycraft, her counsel and the mediator, by placing a recording cellphone in Ms. Michaels’ purse and leaving it in the room. This conduct later became a significant evidentiary and public-policy issue in the court’s reasons. At the conclusion of the mediation, the parties executed written Minutes of Settlement resolving both lawsuits. Those Minutes, drafted in straightforward language, contained mutual obligations, including an apology and retraction by the defendant, the taking down of the impugned Facebook post, withdrawal of both court actions, and a payment by the defendant to Ms. Michaels.

The mandatory mediation and settlement terms
The court treated the Minutes of Settlement as a contract arising from the mandatory mediation process. In line with Saskatchewan authority, including Stubbings v Holizki and Neigum v Van Seggelen, Keene J. emphasized that minutes of settlement are generally interpreted and enforced according to orthodox contract principles. The key questions were whether there was a meeting of the minds, whether the document was sufficiently clear, whether the parties signed voluntarily and with understanding, and whether any vitiating factor—such as duress, undue influence, unconscionability or mistake—had been proven.
The Minutes of Settlement expressly stated that they were entered into voluntarily and with full understanding of their nature and effect. They required each of Ms. Michaels and Mr. Westgard to withdraw their respective King’s Bench matters on a without-costs basis, with proof by way of filed notices of withdrawal. The document also included a confidentiality clause stipulating that the contents of the minutes and all information relating to the matters would remain confidential and not be made public. The body of the Minutes (which the court did not reproduce in full to preserve confidentiality) included “give and take,” such as an apology, a retraction of the Facebook post and a monetary payment obligation in favour of Ms. Michaels. Evidence from the defendant’s affidavit detailed that, after discussion, it was agreed that the defendant would have 90 days to pay Ms. Michaels $2,000 under the Minutes, and that the apology and removal of the post would proceed once both plaintiffs had discontinued their actions.

Challenges to the Minutes of Settlement
After the mediation, events in the related Westgard action prompted attempts to revisit what had been agreed. Mr. Westgard applied in his action to set aside the Minutes of Settlement. Anticipating possible instability of the settlement, Ms. Raycraft applied in Ms. Michaels’ action on October 1, 2025, for an order enforcing the Minutes of Settlement as a binding contract; she supported her application with an affidavit sworn September 24, 2025.
Ms. Michaels responded by bringing her own application on November 13, 2025, seeking to set aside the Minutes and to reinstate her defamation claim as if the Minutes had never been signed. She filed two affidavits sworn that day in support of her application, and a further affidavit sworn November 24, 2025, after the defendant’s counsel served notices of objection targeting portions of her affidavit evidence. In substance, Ms. Michaels alleged that she had been overwhelmed by the intensity of the mediation session, by the personalities of the mediator and defence counsel, and by the dynamics in the room. She argued that she had been placed at a disadvantage such that she could not properly comprehend or freely consent to the settlement terms.

Evidentiary rulings and treatment of the secret recording
Before turning to the substantive applications, the court dealt with the defendant’s notices of objection to Ms. Michaels’ affidavits. Applying The King’s Bench Rules and case law on affidavit content, Keene J. systematically struck portions that were speculative, argumentative or opinion rather than factual. Some parts were accepted as facts within the deponent’s knowledge, while others were characterized as impermissible argument or speculation and removed. The court referenced earlier authority emphasizing that affidavits must be confined to facts and, where permitted, limited hearsay—not advocacy in narrative form.
The court then addressed the plaintiffs’ surreptitious recording of the mediation. While the recording and transcript might technically constitute “real evidence,” the judge held that they were obtained in a manner that violated the legislated confidentiality of the mandatory mediation process and offended public policy. Because The King’s Bench Act expressly protects what is said in mediation from later use as evidence, and because the integrity of the mediation system depends on confidentiality, Keene J. ordered that any references to the recording or transcript be struck from any affidavit tendered by Ms. Michaels or Mr. Westgard. The judge stressed that this ruling should not be misconstrued as judicial approval of the recording; on the contrary, the court made clear that such conduct “should not have been done and should never be done.” At the same time, the judge allowed parties to give proper affidavit evidence based on their own recollection of events at the mediation, recognizing that some disclosure of what occurred is unavoidable when a party seeks to set aside minutes of settlement on grounds such as duress, bias or unconscionability.

Mediation confidentiality and the court’s limited inquiry
The decision carefully canvassed the confidentiality provisions governing mandatory mediation. Section 7-2 of The King’s Bench Act renders inadmissible, absent written consent of the mediator and all parties, any evidence of what was said or communicated during mediation, including admissions or communications made in that context. The court reiterated that confidentiality is central to the effectiveness of mediation. Nonetheless, Keene J. acknowledged that when a party attacks the validity of Minutes of Settlement on grounds like undue pressure, mediator bias or unconscionability, the court may have to “open up” the mediation session to a limited degree in order to scrutinize the process and determine whether the written agreement is enforceable. The judge framed this as an exceptional but necessary incursion, tightly constrained by both statute and public policy.

Assessment of capacity, voluntariness and fairness
Turning to the merits of Ms. Michaels’ application, the court contrasted her portrayal of being overwhelmed with the objective evidence from the defendant’s affidavit. The judge found that Ms. Michaels is an intelligent and capable litigant who had already taken on the role of assisting and advising Mr. Westgard in his own case, including reading documents aloud to him due to his literacy challenges. The court was satisfied she possessed a sound intellect and a demonstrated ability to draft documents and present arguments, as shown both in her written materials and in her oral submissions.
The defendant’s affidavit provided a detailed account of the mediation, describing how both plaintiffs engaged with the proposed terms, asked questions and obtained explanations from defence counsel about each key provision. For example, the language and purpose of the apology, the mechanics of removing the Facebook post and providing proof, the conditions for posting the apology in Ms. Michaels’ own publication, and the timing and amount of the $2,000 payment were all discussed. Draft pages of the Minutes were provided to Ms. Michaels and Mr. Westgard as they were written; Ms. Michaels read them aloud to Mr. Westgard and discussed them with him as they reviewed the document.
On this record, the court found the mediation to have been “a productive” session culminating in a reasonable compromise where Ms. Raycraft made “considerable concessions,” including an apology, retraction and payment of money. The judge concluded that there was a clear consensus ad idem, that the Minutes were written in accessible language, and that Ms. Michaels understood what she was signing. The consideration offered was consistent with outcomes in comparable defamation matters, and there was no persuasive evidence that Ms. Michaels had signed under duress or undue influence.

Rulings on the competing applications and financial consequences
Having rejected Ms. Michaels’ allegations that she did not properly understand or voluntarily accept the settlement, Keene J. held that she had signed a binding and enforceable contract and had not established any legal basis to avoid it. Her application to set aside the Minutes of Settlement and reinstate her defamation action was therefore dismissed.
Conversely, the defendant’s application to enforce the Minutes succeeded. The court declared that the Minutes of Settlement dated September 10, 2025, are a binding and enforceable contract between the parties and ordered that they may be entered as a judgment of the court. The parties were directed to complete the terms of the Minutes within ten days of service of the issued order, including Ms. Michaels’ obligation to file and serve a notice of discontinuance of her action.
On costs, the court noted that Ms. Raycraft had been successful on her enforcement application and that Ms. Michaels’ attempt to set aside the Minutes had failed. While expressing strong disapproval of the surreptitious recording of the confidential mediation, the judge concluded that an award of solicitor-client costs was not warranted. Instead, costs were assessed on a global basis, with the court ordering Ms. Michaels to pay Ms. Raycraft fixed costs of $1,500. The judge further ordered that Ms. Raycraft could offset this $1,500 costs award against any payment she was required to make to Ms. Michaels under the Minutes of Settlement, which themselves required Ms. Raycraft to pay Ms. Michaels $2,000. In the result, the defendant, Jessica Lynn Raycraft, emerged as the successful party: she obtained enforcement of the settlement, a judgment confirming that the Minutes are binding, and a $1,500 costs award in her favour (subject to set-off), while the net monetary position between the parties under both the settlement and this judgment leaves Ms. Michaels effectively receiving $500 from Ms. Raycraft.