Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Judicial review was brought to challenge the CHRC’s decision not to deal with a human rights complaint under paragraph 41(1)(d) of the Canadian Human Rights Act after a prior labour arbitration had already addressed the same subject matter.

• Three union grievances (failure to accommodate, harassment and constructive dismissal, and closure of the employment file) were dismissed by an arbitrator, and the CHRC concluded that the Arbitration Decision had already addressed the essence of the applicant’s allegations.

• The Court held it was reasonable for the CHRC to rely on paragraph 41(1)(d), consistent with authority allowing it to treat relitigation of issues already addressed in substance through another appropriate process as “vexatious” in the statutory sense.

• Allegations that the arbitrator was biased, contradicted herself, or failed to adopt a trauma-informed approach were treated as attacks on the merits of the Arbitration Decision rather than on the procedural fairness of the arbitration.

• The CHRC’s view that it is not an appeal body for the Arbitration Decision and that judicial review to the Federal Court is the avenue to challenge alleged arbitral errors was found to be a reasonable position within its paragraph 41(1)(d) screening role.

• The application for judicial review was dismissed and the respondent was awarded costs, to be assessed in accordance with column 2 of Tariff B, with no specific dollar amount fixed in the judgment.

Factual background
The applicant, David Danchilla, worked for the respondent, Canada Pacific Kansas City, for approximately 30 years. After being dismissed, he was reinstated following a labour arbitration in 2017. After returning to work in May 2017, he suffered an off-duty injury in July 2017 and was off duty until he returned to work briefly in June 2018 in an accommodated arrangement of two-hour shifts. He alleged that, after his return, the respondent failed to provide meaningful accommodation, including flexibility to attend physiotherapy. He also alleged mocking, name calling, workplace jokes about his injuries, improper requests for medical information, and pressure to return to work despite his unresolved harassment and discrimination concerns. In 2018, he filed an internal harassment complaint, and in 2019 the respondent provided investigation results that substantiated or partially substantiated some of his allegations.

In June 2018, the respondent received medical information that the applicant was unfit for all work duties, and he did not perform any work for the respondent after June 27, 2018. Over the next four years, the respondent made multiple attempts to engage the applicant in an accommodated process for his return to work, including communication from its Vice-President of Human Resources. The applicant communicated inconsistently with the respondent and did not engage further in the accommodation process. On October 12, 2022, the respondent closed the applicant’s employment file, relying on medical information that he was unfit for work and that recovery was not expected. The applicant disputes the overall fairness and adequacy of how the respondent handled his situation, including the steps that culminated in the closure of his employment file.

Grievances and the Arbitration Decision
The applicant’s union advanced three grievances on his behalf, alleging failure to accommodate, harassment and failure to take remedial action leading to constructive dismissal, and continued failure to accommodate resulting in the closure of his employment file. These grievances proceeded to arbitration before the Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration and Dispute Resolution. On May 9, 2024, the arbitrator dismissed all three grievances.

In its later analysis, the CHRC described how the arbitrator addressed the same subjects that were raised in the human rights complaint. On accommodation, the CHRC noted that the applicant claimed he was denied time off or flexible start times for physiotherapy and that medical restrictions were removed or ignored. The CHRC summarized the arbitrator’s consideration of the doctor’s request for flexibility, the arbitrator’s analysis of the medical basis for flexibility, and the arbitrator’s conclusion that flexibility was not established as a medical requirement and that reasonable accommodation had been provided.

On harassment and a toxic workplace, the CHRC observed that the arbitrator considered the internal harassment investigation findings but did not treat them as binding, assessed the respondent’s remedial steps, and concluded there was no continuing pattern of harassment after remediation. With respect to closure of the employment file, the CHRC referred to the arbitrator’s findings about the applicant’s failure to re-engage with the respondent in the accommodation process, the lack of a reasonable prospect of a return to work, and the arbitrator’s conclusion that it was reasonable for the respondent to close the employment file.

The CHRC complaint and screening decision
Beyond the labour grievances, the applicant filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission. The CHRC invited submissions and received written submissions and reply submissions from both parties. On December 6, 2024, the CHRC issued its decision declining to deal with the complaint and closing the file under paragraph 41(1)(d) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The decision addressed only the preliminary screening issue: whether to “deal with” the complaint by proceeding to investigation or other steps, or to “not deal with” it and close the file.

The CHRC stated that, at the preliminary stage, allegations are presumed true and that the CHRC may only decide not to deal with a complaint if it is “plain and obvious” that a preliminary issue applies, citing Keith v Correctional Service of Canada. It concluded it was “plain and obvious” that paragraph 41(1)(d) applied because the Arbitration Decision had already addressed the essence of the applicant’s allegations.

The CHRC summarized the applicant’s position that the arbitration did not provide a fair or comprehensive resolution and that it demonstrated bias, contradictions, and a lack of a trauma-informed approach. The applicant also urged the CHRC to proceed on public interest grounds. The CHRC summarized the respondent’s position that the same allegations had been raised and determined through the three grievances, each dismissed in the Arbitration Decision, and that it would be unfair to require the respondent to respond to essentially the same allegations in a second process.

Statutory framework and legal principles applied
Paragraph 41(1)(d) of the Canadian Human Rights Act assigns the CHRC a screening function, allowing it to decline to deal with a complaint that is trivial, frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith. The decision records that the CHRC may treat relitigation of issues already addressed in substance through another appropriate process as “vexatious” within the meaning of paragraph 41(1)(d), relying on Exeter v Canada (Attorney General).

The CHRC’s reasons reviewed jurisprudence regarding prior proceedings and finality, including British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Figliola, Penner v Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), and Exeter, which specifically addressed paragraph 41(1)(d). The decision noted that, when another process has addressed the complaint, the CHRC must consider whether barring the complaint would result in unfairness, including by looking at procedural fairness in the first process and differences between the processes. It set out a list of factors (in Appendix A) such as the authority of the other decision-maker to decide human rights issues, whether the issues were essentially the same, whether the complainant had a chance to raise relevant human rights issues, whether reviews or appeals were finished, and whether justice requires dealing with the complaint anyway.

On judicial review, the Federal Court stated that the standard of review of the CHRC’s substantive findings is reasonableness under Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov and Exeter. The Court emphasized that, in performing its screening function under paragraph 41(1)(d), the CHRC is “to be afforded great latitude in exercising its judgment and in assessing the appropriate factors” when considering the application of that provision, citing Miller v Canada (Attorney General) and Bergeron v Canada (Attorney General).

Issues before the Federal Court
The Court identified two issues: first, whether it was reasonable for the CHRC to conclude, under paragraph 41(1)(d), that the Arbitration Decision had addressed the essence of the applicant’s allegations such that the CHRC should not deal with the complaint; and second, whether it was reasonable for the CHRC to conclude that declining to deal with the complaint would not result in unfairness to the applicant, having regard to his submissions about bias, the absence of a trauma-informed approach, and barriers to further recourse.

Assessment of overlap between the complaint and the arbitration
The applicant submitted that the CHRC treated the existence of the Arbitration Decision as dispositive and improperly imported issue estoppel and abuse of process into paragraph 41(1)(d) without the contextual analysis required by the jurisprudence. The respondent submitted that the CHRC conducted the individualized comparison required and that its decision was reasonable on the record.

The Court found that the CHRC’s reasons did not support the characterization that the complaint was dismissed merely because arbitration occurred. Instead, the CHRC reviewed the complaint allegations and set out, in some detail, how the Arbitration Decision dealt with those same subjects across the three grievances. The CHRC’s reasons reflected a recognition that overlap must be assessed, not presumed, and this approach was found to accord with the case law it cited, including Snook v Canada Post Corporation and Khapar v Air Canada.

The Court noted how the CHRC dealt with specific categories of allegations: accommodation and scheduling flexibility, harassment and toxic workplace allegations, and closure of the employment file. In each area, the CHRC identified what the applicant alleged in his complaint and then described how the arbitrator approached and resolved those matters. The Court concluded that the CHRC’s ultimate finding—that the Arbitration Decision addressed the essence of the applicant’s complaint—was justified by the reasoning provided and the links drawn to the grievance issues and outcomes.

The applicant argued that the arbitration process, focused on the collective agreement, was not capable of vindicating quasi-constitutional human rights protections with the “rigour and remedial flexibility” of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The Court held that this submission invited a broad pronouncement about arbitration that was not relevant to the merits of the judicial review. The narrower question was whether the CHRC, in a way that was intelligible and justified in relation to the record and legal constraints, had concluded that the Arbitration Decision addressed the essence of the complaint so that paragraph 41(1)(d) applied. The Court found that the CHRC’s reasons answered that question based on specific overlaps between the complaint and the grievances addressed in the Arbitration Decision.

The applicant also submitted that the complaint included systemic discrimination allegations that were not addressed in arbitration. The decision shows that the CHRC acknowledged this submission and concluded there was no indication that the arbitrator failed to consider broader allegations placed before her. The applicant further argued that there was an absence of a trauma-informed approach in the Arbitration Decision, which the CHRC failed to appreciate. The Court found that the CHRC treated the trauma-informed submission as part of a broader invitation to reassess the merits and quality of the arbitral reasoning, and that it was reasonable for the CHRC to decline to do so. The Court stated that nothing in paragraph 41(1)(d) requires the CHRC to adjudicate the reasonableness of arbitration reasons or to treat disagreement with the arbitrator’s evaluative approach as proof that the arbitration was unfair, and that it is not the CHRC’s task to analyze whether the decision-maker “got it right.”

The applicant further argued that the CHRC’s reliance on “vexatiousness” improperly imported issue estoppel and abuse of process. The Court observed that the CHRC cited authorities connecting relitigation and abuse of process concepts to paragraph 41(1)(d), including Exeter and Federal Court decisions such as Snook and Verhelle v Canada Post Corporation. The Court held that whether the underlying concern is described as relitigation, finality, or vexatiousness in the statutory sense, the CHRC’s task remained to assess the relationship between the prior process and the complaint, and that it had done so.

Procedural fairness, bias, and trauma-informed concerns
The applicant submitted that the CHRC failed to meaningfully assess whether it would be unfair to rely on the arbitration outcome to bar his complaint, pointing to alleged bias, alleged contradictions in the Arbitration Decision, an absence of a trauma-informed approach, and his union’s refusal to pursue judicial review of the Arbitration Decision.

The Court noted that the CHRC identified the correct legal constraints: it had to consider whether the arbitration process was procedurally fair and whether fairness nonetheless required the CHRC to deal with the complaint, invoking Penner and Figliola for the balance between finality and fairness. The CHRC explained why it found no procedural unfairness in the arbitration process, referring to the applicant’s union representation and the arbitrator’s engagement with the union’s case.

The applicant’s submissions about a trauma-informed approach and asserted contradictions largely attacked the quality of the arbitral reasoning and the merits of the Arbitration Decision. The Court found that the CHRC reasonably treated those points as outside its role on a paragraph 41(1)(d) screening decision, distinguishing between a procedural fairness concern about the arbitration process and dissatisfaction with how the arbitrator weighed evidence and reached conclusions.

Regarding the applicant’s assertion of bias, the CHRC expressly addressed this submission and concluded there was no indication that the arbitrator exhibited bias. In its view, the arbitrator considered the allegations related to discrimination and harassment in reaching her conclusions and analyzed the medical evidence in detail, dismissing the applicant’s need for flexible working hours for reasons thoroughly explained in the Arbitration Decision. The Court held that the applicant had not shown that this CHRC conclusion lacked justification.

The Court also addressed the applicant’s submission that the CHRC failed to grapple with the arbitrator’s treatment of the internal harassment investigation findings and systemic discrimination concerns. It noted that the CHRC’s reasons summarized the arbitrator’s reasons for not treating the internal findings as binding and for concluding that the substantiated concerns had been remedied, and that the CHRC treated this as part of the arbitration’s evidentiary assessment. The applicant may disagree with that approach, but the CHRC reasonably treated it as part of the merits and evidentiary assessment undertaken at arbitration, not as demonstrating that the arbitration failed to address the essence of the allegations.

Union’s refusal to seek judicial review and alternative recourse
The applicant submitted that the CHRC effectively told him to seek judicial review of the Arbitration Decision but failed to acknowledge that he could not do so independently and that his union refused to do so based on cost. The respondent disputed the evidentiary basis for this, noting that the union’s refusal appears in the applicant’s memorandum but not elsewhere in the record.

The Court stated that even accepting the applicant’s assertion about the union’s refusal, this did not establish that the CHRC’s screening decision was unreasonable. It observed that the CHRC’s reasons would have been clearer had they addressed this submission directly, but under the reasonableness standard the question is whether any shortcomings are sufficiently central or significant to render the decision unreasonable. The Court was not persuaded that they were.

The Court found that the CHRC did not treat exhaustion of judicial review as a precondition to applying paragraph 41(1)(d). The CHRC’s core reasoning treated the Arbitration Decision as final for the purposes of assessing whether substantially the same issues were addressed and whether the arbitration process was shown to be procedurally fair. The CHRC’s comment that judicial review is the avenue to challenge arbitral errors did not transform the paragraph 41(1)(d) analysis into one dependent on whether judicial review of the prior decision was pursued.

The Court further noted that, to the extent the applicant’s complaint is that the union failed to represent him fairly in deciding whether to pursue judicial review, the labour relations regime provides a dedicated statutory avenue for that dispute, including a duty of fair representation complaint. It referred to Klimkowski v Canadian Pacific Railway and stated that where the CHRC declines to deal with a complaint under paragraph 41(1)(d) on the basis that the essence of the allegations was addressed through a fair and comparable arbitration process, concerns about the adequacy of union representation are properly pursued through a duty of fair representation complaint rather than by seeking to relitigate the arbitral decision through the CHRC.

The applicant relied on White v Canada Post Corporation, Gillespie v Canada (Revenue Agency), and Green v Ontario to support his arguments that the CHRC’s decision was unreasonable. The Court held that those decisions turn on their own facts, which are quite different from this matter, and that they were distinguishable.

Ruling and overall outcome
Considering the CHRC’s reasons as a whole and the screening context, the Court held that the applicant had not met his burden to show that the CHRC’s decision was unreasonable. The application for judicial review was dismissed. Both parties sought costs, and no special circumstances were identified that would justify departing from the usual result that costs follow the event. The respondent, Canada Pacific Kansas City, as the successful party, was awarded its costs, to be assessed in accordance with column 2 of Tariff B. The judgment does not specify a particular dollar amount, so the exact sum awarded in favour of the respondent cannot be determined from the reasons alone.