Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Dispute over an adult child’s conduct as attorney for property and later estate trustee, including entitlement to compensation and handling of estate funds and records.
• Competing positions on a residual beneficiary’s claimed entitlement of $29,417.82 and whether that calculation properly accounted for the trustee’s compensation and a $22,000 loan owing to the deceased.
• Serious but unproven allegations of fraud and forgery directed at the estate trustee, centred on a handwritten note documenting the $22,000 loan.
• Procedural and evidentiary controversy around a late-retained handwriting expert and an improper motion to introduce that expert evidence at the application hearing.
• Costs consequences flowing from formal and informal offers to settle, including application of Rule 49.10 and the scale of costs (partial indemnity vs substantial indemnity vs full indemnity).
• Proportionality and forum selection issues, given the relatively modest monetary value of the claim compared with the expense of litigating in the Superior Court rather than Small Claims Court.

Background and family context
This case arose from a dispute between siblings, Stewart McCorkell and Karen Roos, over the management and distribution of the estate of their late mother, Irene Florence Lavendure. During her lifetime, Ms. Roos acted as her mother’s attorney for property, managing Irene’s financial affairs. After Irene’s death, Ms. Roos became estate trustee under her mother’s will. The relationship between the siblings deteriorated over questions of how the mother’s money had been handled before and after death, and how much remained available to be shared among the beneficiaries.

Estate administration and competing claims
Mr. McCorkell, a residual beneficiary under his mother’s will, took the position that he was owed $29,417.82 as his residual entitlement. He initially sought this relief within the existing estates file that Ms. Roos had commenced to obtain a certificate of appointment of estate trustee, and later brought a fresh application seeking substantially the same relief when the matter did not resolve. His theory was that, after proper accounting, that sum should be paid out to him from the estate.
Ms. Roos did not dispute that her brother was indeed a beneficiary, but she rejected his calculation. Her position was that his math failed to account for (a) compensation properly payable to her in her dual roles as attorney for property and estate trustee, and (b) a $22,000 loan that Mr. McCorkell had received from their mother and not repaid. Once those items were taken into account, she maintained that his claimed residual entitlement was overstated.

Allegations of impropriety and the loan evidence
The litigation escalated beyond a straightforward accounting dispute because Mr. McCorkell advanced broad allegations of impropriety and fraud against his sister. A central point of controversy was a handwritten note that recorded the $22,000 loan said to have been made by Irene to Stewart. Mr. McCorkell alleged that this handwritten note had been forged by Ms. Roos, thereby accusing her of fraud in connection with the estate’s records.
These allegations required Ms. Roos to respond in detail, producing accounts and supporting documentation. The court ultimately found that the allegations of fraud were unfounded. Although the judge commented that the handwriting expert’s report (sought to be introduced by Mr. McCorkell) had problems and might not have helped him even if admitted, the key point was that he did not prove forgery or fraud against his sister.

The handwriting expert and procedural missteps
A significant procedural and evidentiary issue concerned Mr. McCorkell’s late retainer of a handwriting expert. From an early stage, he had been advancing the theory that the loan note was forged, but he did not raise the prospect of a handwriting expert until after cross-examinations had already taken place. He then brought a motion, at the hearing of the application itself, to admit the expert’s report.
The court held that this late step ran contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure and was improper. Approximately half of the first day of the hearing was spent arguing this motion, which the judge found should not have been brought at that stage. The court rejected the suggestion that the impropriety was cured by Mr. McCorkell’s willingness to adjourn the hearing so that Ms. Roos could obtain her own expert; she still had to respond to the ill-timed motion, which added expense and delay. This behaviour became an important factor when the judge later assessed the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

Forum, proportionality, and conduct of the parties
The monetary value actually in dispute was relatively modest, and the judge noted that the case could have been pursued in Small Claims Court. The alternate remedy sought by Mr. McCorkell—an order compelling Ms. Roos to pass accounts—was characterized as unrealistic in circumstances where she had already provided informal accounts, and where he only disputed a handful of transactions rather than the overall numbers.
On the conduct side, the court recognized that Ms. Roos’ late change of counsel and the resulting adjournment of an early attendance did contribute to delay and some unnecessary cost. The judge accepted that this should modestly temper the eventual costs award. At the same time, the court observed that there were multiple “offramps” by which the litigation could have been resolved sooner. Despite suggestions from the court and several offers from Ms. Roos, including offers that were more favourable than the eventual result, those opportunities were not taken. Although, with prompting from the court at the hearing, Mr. McCorkell made some concessions that helped focus the issues, these came too late to avoid substantial litigation expense.

Offers to settle and the governing costs principles
As is typical in modern civil litigation, the costs analysis was anchored in the principle that the successful party is presumptively entitled to recover a portion of their costs from the unsuccessful party under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In estate matters, that general regime has increasingly supplanted the older approach of routinely paying parties’ costs out of the estate.
Here, the court had already determined on the merits (in the 2025 ONSC 6432 decision) that Ms. Roos was successful on the application. In the subsequent costs endorsement, the judge firmly rejected Mr. McCorkell’s primary argument that he should not have to pay any costs, or that all costs should fall on the estate. To grant that relief would, in the judge’s view, improperly insulate him from the consequences of an unsuccessful and disproportionately conducted proceeding.
A key element in the costs assessment was Ms. Roos’ settlement efforts. She had served two formal offers to settle (which attracted Rule 49.10 consequences) and an informal offer made on the first day of the hearing at the judge’s urging. All three offers were more favourable to Mr. McCorkell than the ultimate result. The judge held that the two formal offers triggered substantial indemnity costs from the date of the first offer. The informal offer, while not engaging Rule 49, demonstrated her ongoing attempts to avoid expensive litigation.

Scale of costs and reasonableness of accounts
In light of the unfounded, serious allegations of fraud, Ms. Roos sought full indemnity costs of approximately $79,439.23 (inclusive of HST and disbursements). The court agreed that the seriousness and lack of foundation of the fraud allegations justified an enhanced scale of costs but concluded that full indemnity went too far. Instead, the judge found that substantial indemnity costs were appropriate.
The hourly rates charged by Ms. Roos’ counsel were not challenged by Mr. McCorkell, and the court found them reasonable given counsel’s experience. The court also rejected Mr. McCorkell’s complaint that her hours were excessive or that her reply materials were “overdone”; those materials were viewed as necessary responses to the breadth and gravity of the accusations. By contrast, the judge noted that Mr. McCorkell’s own bill of costs was only filed after the result was known, which made it less useful as a comparative tool.

Costs ruling and overall outcome
Taken together, the two decisions—first on the merits and then on costs—produced a clear outcome. On the substantive application (2025 ONSC 6432), the court found in favour of Ms. Roos, rejecting Mr. McCorkell’s attempt to recover $29,417.82 as his alleged residual entitlement and declining to order a formal passing of accounts in circumstances where informal accounts had been provided and only a few transactions were questioned. In the subsequent costs endorsement (2026 ONSC 536), the judge weighed the parties’ conduct, the disproportionality of the proceedings, the Rule 49 offers, the unfounded fraud allegations, the improper expert motion, and the modest contribution of Ms. Roos’ adjournment request to overall costs. The court ultimately fixed costs at $60,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by Mr. McCorkell to the Estate of Irene Florence Lavendure, with any further legal fees above that amount to be treated as proper expenses of the estate. In practical terms, the successful party is Ms. Roos, and the total monetary award in her favour takes the form of this $60,000 costs order rather than a separate damages award.