Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Validity of the noting in default against the individual parole officials, given defects in personal service and statutory notice requirements for claims against the Crown.
• Scope of the court’s discretion to set aside default under Rule 10-13 of The King’s Bench Rules where defendants act promptly, explain delay, and raise arguable defences.
• Sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings under Rule 7-9(1)(a), particularly whether the statement of claim discloses a reasonable cause of action in wrongful imprisonment and related torts.
• Interaction between the tort of false or wrongful imprisonment and the statutory authority under s. 135 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to suspend a long-term supervision order and issue warrants.
• Effect of statutory good-faith immunity for Parole Board members under s. 154 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and whether “good faith” can be resolved on an application to strike.
• Proper naming of governmental defendants and procedural integrity in litigation against the federal Crown, including the requirement in s. 25 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and the amendment of the style of cause to the Attorney General of Canada.

Background and factual context

The case arises from a civil action brought by Steven Ewanchuk, who represents himself, against several federal actors connected to the administration of his long-term supervision order (LTO) and parole: the Attorney General of Canada and three individuals, Kelly Lato, Amy Macrae and Khayla Crumley, who are parole-related officials. Ewanchuk alleges that decisions made by these officials led to the suspension of his LTO and his resulting incarceration on multiple occasions. According to his statement of claim as described by the court, he says he was wrongfully imprisoned between March 22, 2024 and June 19, 2024, and again between July 16, 2024 and March 16, 2025. He attributes these periods of custody to suspensions of his LTO that he claims were unjustified. He also seeks damages in relation to other LTO suspensions over roughly six and a half years, and claims psychological harm, wrongful arrest and detention, solitary confinement and medical negligence related to an allegedly insufficient supply of catheters. In addition, he asks the court to reduce the length of his LTO, effectively challenging both specific administrative decisions and the ongoing structure of his community supervision. The factual core of his case is that the individual defendants allegedly relied on false or baseless breach allegations to suspend his LTO and return him to custody. He asserts that parole charges were laid on the basis that he failed to report a relationship with a woman to his parole officer, Lato, and that he had deleted two text messages from his phone. In the statement of claim, he states that the “evidence used to justify incarceration was demonstrably false,” and that the officer should not have believed information suggesting he had formed a relationship. He denies that he deleted any messages. He also points to the later withdrawal of the original breach allegations in March 2025 as proof that the earlier suspensions and detentions were wrongful. The decision of Justice McMurtry does not resolve whether those factual allegations are true; instead, it addresses preliminary procedural applications that determine how and on what basis the lawsuit may proceed.

Procedural history and noting in default

A key development early in the action was the plaintiff’s decision to have the individual defendants noted in default when they did not file a defence within the 20-day period following service of the statement of claim. Under Rule 3-21 of The King’s Bench Rules, a plaintiff may ask the local registrar to note a defendant in default when a statement of claim has been properly served and no defence has been delivered. Noting for default is an administrative act: court registry staff, on proof of service and no defence on file, endorse the file and record the default, after which the defendant may not file a defence without leave of the court or the plaintiff’s written consent. Once a default is validly noted, the plaintiff may move for default judgment or other relief available when a defence has not been filed. In this case, the local registrar noted Lato, Macrae and Crumley in default on July 24, 2025. Shortly afterward, on July 28, 2025, defence counsel wrote to the court asserting that the noting in default was improper. At the hearing of the applications, the judge set aside the noting in default, with reasons later provided in this fiat. The court explains that while default may be noted administratively, both the noting itself and any default judgment can be set aside under Rule 10-13, which allows the court to vary or set aside default judgments on terms it considers just. The leading test in Saskatchewan comes from Strange v Saskatchewan, which instructs courts to consider whether the application was made promptly after learning of the default; whether there is a satisfactory explanation for the failure to respond; whether the proposed defence raises arguable issues; and whether setting aside default would seriously prejudice the plaintiff.

Defects in service and Crown-specific notice requirements

The individual defendants argued that service of the statement of claim did not comply with The King’s Bench Rules because a commencement document must be personally served and, in this case, the plaintiff reportedly served only an unnamed person at the office of the Regina Parole Board. On their account, the claim reached the individual defendants only indirectly and belatedly, which explained the delay in filing a defence. A second and distinct problem concerned compliance with the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act. Section 25 of that statute provides that in any proceeding against the Crown, default judgment cannot be entered without leave of the court, following an application made on at least 14 clear days’ notice to the Deputy Attorney General of Canada. Here, no such notice was given before the plaintiff sought to rely on default against the Crown or its officials. Justice McMurtry accepted that the defendants moved within days to address the default once they were aware of it, offered a satisfactory explanation grounded in improper indirect service and lack of notice, and advanced defences that raised arguable issues. The court also emphasized that due to the defendants’ prompt response, the plaintiff suffered no actual prejudice from the delay in filing a defence. Applying Rule 10-13 and the Strange criteria, the judge held that the default should be set aside, granted leave to defend, and, under Rule 12-1(5), extended the time for all defendants to deliver a response to 30 days after receiving the fiat.

Application to strike the statement of claim

Parallel to the request to vacate the noting in default, the defendants applied under Rule 7-9(1)(a) of The King’s Bench Rules to strike the claim, arguing that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Rule 7-9 permits the court, where specified conditions are met, to strike or amend pleadings, enter judgment, or stay or dismiss proceedings. Under Rule 7-9(2)(a), one such condition is that a pleading discloses no reasonable claim or defence. Critically, Rule 7-9(3) bars the admission of evidence on such an application; the court must look only at the statement of claim, any particulars furnished, and any documents referred to in the pleading that are essential to the claim. The Court of Appeal’s guidance in Harpold v Saskatchewan (Corrections and Policing), building on cases such as Swift Current v Saskatchewan Power Corporation and Sagon v Royal Bank of Canada, underscores that a claim may be struck only where, assuming the truth of the material facts pleaded, there is no reasonable chance of success. The jurisdiction to strike is to be used only in plain and obvious cases, and the plaintiff must plead sufficient material facts, not just conclusions or speculation, to support each element of a recognized cause of action. Justice McMurtry applies these principles and emphasizes the purposes of pleadings: to clarify the real issues, give fair notice of the case to be met, assist the court in assessing the allegations, and create a record that prevents future relitigation of matters already decided. The foundational Rule 1-3 is cited to reinforce that the rules aim to identify real issues and resolve claims in the most timely and cost-effective manner.

Nature of the plaintiff’s legal claims

From the face of the statement of claim, the court identifies several strands in the plaintiff’s case. First, Ewanchuk alleges that the defendants are responsible for the wrongful suspension of his LTO and the resulting wrongful imprisonment over specific time periods. This framing aligns with the tort of false or wrongful imprisonment, which requires the plaintiff to show total deprivation of liberty against his will caused by the defendant, after which the onus shifts to the defendant to justify the detention under lawful authority. Second, he asserts that the individual defendants misused their authority, acted in gross negligence, and committed a miscarriage of justice when they suspended his LTO. Although the decision does not explicitly classify this as misfeasance in public office, the court later references Harpold’s warning that pleading such a tort is not the same as proving it, suggesting that public-office-based liability is in the background. Third, Ewanchuk pleads ancillary claims such as psychological harm, wrongful arrest and detention, solitary confinement, medical negligence related to catheter provision, and a request that the court reduce his LTO. The judge notes that the statement of claim contains “far more opinion than fact” and that many passages simply offer commentary on the law or refer to other incidents with no factual underpinning. Still, stripped down to its essentials, the pleading asserts that the individual defendants pursued parole breaches and suspensions on the basis of allegations they either knew, or should have known, were false—particularly with respect to his alleged relationship with a woman and the supposed deletion of text messages.

Statutory framework for LTO suspension and detention

The legal structure that governs these events is the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA). Section 135 authorizes a Parole Board member or a designated person, where an offender breaches a condition of parole or statutory release, or where suspension is considered necessary and reasonable to prevent a breach or protect society, to issue a warrant suspending parole, authorizing apprehension, and permitting recommitment to custody until the suspension is lifted, the release is terminated or revoked, or the sentence expires. In other words, when properly invoked, s. 135 gives legal authority for both the suspension of conditional release and the resulting detention. To counter a claim of wrongful imprisonment, defendants can rely on such statutory power to justify what would otherwise be an unlawful deprivation of liberty. The defendants also invoke s. 154 of the CCRA, which grants Parole Board members immunity from civil or criminal proceedings for anything done or said in good faith in the exercise or purported exercise of their functions. “Good faith,” as explained by the Federal Court in Archer v Canada and earlier Supreme Court authority, is linked to exercising discretion honestly, for proper purposes, in accordance with natural justice, and without relying on irrelevant considerations. If good-faith immunity applies, it can bar civil claims even where decisions are controversial or later reversed. However, Justice McMurtry stresses that whether officials acted in good faith is a factual question that cannot be resolved at the pleadings stage on a Rule 7-9 application, which must assume the truth of material allegations and may not conduct fact-finding.

Decision on the striking application

On the application to strike, the court draws a sharp distinction between the viable core of the claim and its extraneous or speculative components. The judge accepts that Ewanchuk does not dispute that his incarcerations during the specified periods were in fact pursuant to warrants issued under the CCRA. His theory is that the process leading to those warrants—namely, the suspensions of his LTO and the underlying breach allegations—was tainted by bad faith or reliance on “demonstrably false” evidence. He also highlights that the breach allegations were later withdrawn in March 2025, which he views as retrospectively undermining the basis for his earlier detention. Justice McMurtry holds that the mere withdrawal of breach allegations does not, by itself, prove wrongful imprisonment; it may simply reflect an exercise of prosecutorial or administrative discretion at a later point. More importantly, the judge rejects the defendants’ argument that the claim must fail outright because of statutory authority and good-faith immunity. Following Harpold, the court notes that assertions of good faith, or conformity with statutory duties, are generally based on evidence, pleadings in defence, and inferences that cannot be evaluated on a pure pleadings motion. To strike a claim now on the assumption that the officers acted in good faith would improperly short-circuit the fact-finding process. The court therefore concludes that paragraphs 1-22, 25 and 26 of the statement of claim, which relate to the alleged conduct of the individual defendants in suspending the LTO and causing detention, set out a sufficiently intelligible case to let the defendants know what is alleged. These passages, together with paragraphs 1-4 under the “Compensation Breakdown,” articulate the kinds of damages the plaintiff says he suffered as a result of the alleged wrongful conduct. Although the pleading is imperfect and lacks clarity and precision, it is enough to survive a Rule 7-9(2)(a) challenge for now. By contrast, the remainder of the statement of claim—specifically paragraphs 27 and 28, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Compensation Breakdown, and various additional passages—is struck. Those parts consist largely of legal argument, unfounded opinions and references to incidents unsupported by factual detail, and therefore do not advance any viable cause of action. The court reiterates the warning from Harpold: properly pleaded material facts are only the first step; surviving a motion to strike does not guarantee success at summary judgment or trial. The plaintiff still faces the burden of proving wrongful imprisonment or misfeasance on the evidence, and his current factual allegations provide limited support for his sweeping assertions.

Amendment of the style of cause and costs

The defendants also asked the court to amend the style of cause to replace two institutional defendants—Correctional Services of Canada and the National Parole Board—with the Attorney General of Canada, in line with how suits against federal entities are typically structured. Justice McMurtry grants this request, noting that it does not prejudice the plaintiff and is procedurally appropriate. Going forward, the Attorney General of Canada stands as the governmental defendant representing those institutions, alongside the individually named officials. On the issue of costs, neither side sought costs in relation to the applications, and the court accordingly makes no order as to costs.

Overall outcome and successful party

In this interlocutory decision, the court balances competing procedural and substantive interests. On one hand, it protects the defendants from an improperly obtained default by setting aside the noting in default and giving all defendants 30 days from receipt of the fiat to defend. The court also significantly trims the plaintiff’s pleading, striking out large sections that do not meet the standard of material-fact pleading under Rule 7-9(2)(a), and regularizes the case caption by substituting the Attorney General of Canada for the institutional defendants. On the other hand, it preserves the core of the plaintiff’s wrongful imprisonment-type allegations and associated damages claim, allowing him to proceed to the next stages of litigation, where evidence and legal argument will be tested more rigorously. Evaluated as a whole, the defendants emerge as the more successful party in this decision: they obtain the orders vacating default, striking substantial parts of the claim, and amending the style of cause, while the plaintiff’s victory is limited to keeping a narrowed version of his claim alive. The court does not award any damages, costs, or other monetary relief to either side at this stage, and no total monetary award in favour of any party can be determined from this decision.