Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Dispute over whether three jointly owned multi-residential properties should be sold under the Partition Act and the sale proceeds divided equally between co-owning cousins.
• Respondents’ attempt to enforce an alleged out-of-court settlement (and related minutes of settlement) failed due to lack of proof of a binding agreement.
• Alleged agency of family members (mother and spouse) was rejected because there was no representation by the registered owners granting them ostensible authority to settle on their behalf.
• Email correspondence, including the October 16, 2023 “proposal,” was interpreted as ongoing negotiations rather than a concluded, enforceable contract.
• The court refused to convert the applications into an action, finding that the issues could be determined on affidavits and cross-examinations without a full trial.
• With no binding settlement and insufficient basis for unequal division, the court ordered sale of the properties and equal distribution of net proceeds between the registered co-owners.

Background and relationships between the parties

The case arises from a family dispute over three multi-residential properties in Ontario, co-owned by two branches of an extended family. The applicants, brothers Sarbjit Dhillon and Rajinder Singh Dhillon, are cousins of the respondents, brothers Amanveer and Amarinder (also referred to as Amarinder Singh) Janda. The Dhillon brothers and the Janda brothers each hold 50% interests, as tenants in common, in different properties.
In 2017, 2018 and 2019, the parties acquired three investment properties: 61 Wood Street in Kitchener (co-owned by Sarbjit Dhillon and Amanveer Janda), 22 James Street in Waterloo, and 907 North Service Road in Mississauga (the latter two co-owned by Rajinder Dhillon and Amarinder Janda). Each pair of family members held an undivided 50% tenant-in-common interest in each property. Over time, conflict developed between the families over the management of the properties, responsibility for expenses, and the handling of rental income and property-related bank accounts.

Acquisition of the properties and emerging conflict

The three properties were purchased as multi-residential investments, with each Dhillon-Janda pair holding equal legal title as tenants in common. 61 Wood Street was purchased in 2018 by Sarbjit and Amanveer, each with a 50% interest. 22 James Street (in 2017) and 907 North Service Road (in 2019) were acquired by Rajinder and Amarinder, again on a 50–50 tenants-in-common basis.
By 2022, disputes intensified. The Janda respondents claimed they had managed and improved the properties at their own expense, increasing both rental revenue and resale value, and they sought compensation or credit for this contribution. Both sides also accused the other of misusing or improperly withdrawing funds from the bank accounts associated with the properties. These disagreements led to litigation and multiple efforts to settle the matter informally.

Earlier litigation and attempts to settle

In 2023, the applicants commenced an application in Brampton under the Ontario Partition Act seeking sale of the three properties and division of the proceeds. The Janda brothers responded with a counter-application. Those proceedings were abandoned in October 2023 when the parties agreed to attempt an out-of-court settlement.
Negotiations then continued primarily through older family members rather than the registered owners themselves. On the Dhillon side, the applicants’ mother, Parmjit Dhillon, and Rajinder’s spouse, Meenu Dhillon, engaged in direct discussions. On the Janda side, their father, Jaswinder Janda, led negotiations. The respondents later asserted they believed Parmjit and Meenu had authority to negotiate and bind the applicants, and they claimed that after many hours of discussion, a settlement was reached in October 2023 and then reflected in minutes of settlement.
Draft minutes were prepared and sent, but the applicants never signed them. They instead sought changes, including to significant terms such as legal costs. The respondents refused those amendments, contending a binding settlement already existed and should be enforced. When the Dhillons ultimately brought fresh applications in March 2024 in Brantford, the Janda respondents argued that the court should enforce the alleged settlement or, at minimum, convert the application to an action so that all issues could proceed to a full trial.

The alleged settlement and the October 16, 2023 email

The respondents relied heavily on an October 16, 2023 email from Jaswinder to Meenu and others, titled “FINAL OPTIONS for RESOLUTION OF PROPERTIES.” This email summarized proposed terms for resolving the parties’ interests in the three properties and anticipated that the proposal would be forwarded to counsel, reduced to a formal agreement, and then finalized.
Critically, the wording of the email treated the content as a “proposal” and “options,” not a concluded deal. It expressly stated that Parmjit and Meenu would “ensure” that Sarbjit and Rajinder would follow and agree to the terms, and that the applicants “will not intervene” in the resolution once it was agreed. It also referenced that lawyers could add clauses and that some amounts might still be adjusted. In subsequent emails, Meenu even asked that the draft agreement not be sent to the applicants’ then-lawyer, which suggested an effort to keep formal legal review or direct applicant input limited or delayed.
Thereafter, draft minutes of settlement were prepared and delivered to Meenu on November 8, 2023. The applicants did not sign or formally accept them. Correspondence from Jaswinder in February 2024 shows him pressing Meenu to honour what he viewed as a verbally agreed set of terms, and urging her family to “stand on” their past “verbal insurances” to sign. Nonetheless, no executed agreement ever emerged. Instead, the Dhillon applicants filed the current applications for partition and sale.

Agency and ostensible authority: Did the family negotiators bind the owners?

A central evidentiary issue was whether Parmjit (the applicants’ mother) and Meenu (Rajinder’s spouse) had ostensible authority to act as agents for the applicants and bind them to a settlement. The court applied the classic principles on ostensible authority drawn from the English House of Lords decision in Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties, as adopted in Canadian law. Under those principles, a party seeking to enforce a contract based on ostensible authority must show that:

• The principal (here, the applicants) made a representation that the alleged agent had authority to enter into such an agreement;
• The representation was made by someone with actual authority;
• The other party relied on that representation in entering the contract; and
• The principal had the capacity to enter such a contract and to delegate that authority.
  On the evidence, the court found that none of these requirements was met. There was no documentary proof and no conduct by the applicants suggesting that they had authorized Parmjit or Meenu to settle the property dispute or to bind them to specific settlement terms. The only direct evidence of “authority” came from Jaswinder’s statement that Parmjit had told him she was authorized; the court held that such self-assertion by an alleged agent was not enough to create ostensible authority.
  The respondents further argued that in the Indian community, disputes are commonly resolved through family elders and that such resolutions are understood to be binding. The judge declined to accept this as a legal basis for ostensible authority: there was no expert evidence on custom, the applicants themselves denied being so bound, and, in any event, cultural practices could not displace the legal requirement that the principals must themselves hold out the alleged agents as having authority. The evidence also showed the applicants were, at least at times, kept out of the negotiations, and that their lawyer’s involvement was viewed by Jaswinder as “interference,” reinforcing the conclusion that the applicants had not endorsed or ratified the family-led process as binding on them.

No concluded agreement on key terms

Apart from the lack of ostensible authority, the judge also held that there was, on the facts, no concluded settlement agreement. The October 16 email was clearly couched as “options” and “a proposal” and expressly contemplated further review by lawyers. It also required that Parmjit and Meenu “ensure” that the applicants would ultimately agree, which confirmed that the applicants themselves had not yet consented.
When the applicants’ then-lawyer, Mr. Alter, later intervened in October 2023, his correspondence made clear that alternative settlement proposals were still under discussion. Jaswinder’s complaint that Sarbjit was “interfering” by involving his lawyer underscored that the applicants had not confirmed the terms. The draft minutes of settlement sent in November remained unsigned, and correspondence showed that at least one significant provision—legal costs—was disputed, with Parmjit requesting changes and Jaswinder refusing them. Since this was a fundamental term and no consensus was reached, the court concluded that the parties had not formed an enforceable contract, either in October or afterwards.

The request to convert the application into an action

The respondents asked that the applications be converted into a full action, with pleadings and trial, arguing that the issues were too complex or fact-intensive to be resolved on affidavit evidence alone. The court refused. It noted that the applicants’ claim was a straightforward application under the Partition Act for sale and equal division of proceeds, while the respondents’ cross-application hinged on enforcing an alleged settlement.
The judge held that, even taking the respondents’ evidence at its highest, they failed to establish either that Parmjit and Meenu had ostensible authority or that a binding settlement had been concluded. Because the determinative factual issues could be fairly addressed on the affidavits and cross-examinations already conducted, there was no need for a trial. The matter could properly be decided as an application in accordance with established Ontario civil procedure.

Application under the Partition Act and the order for sale

The parties agreed that the three properties could not be physically partitioned or severed between the co-owners. The applicants therefore sought relief under the Partition Act, which allows a court to order the sale of property co-owned by tenants in common where partition is not feasible, subject to narrow exceptions such as malice, oppression, or vexatious intent.
The court cited authority that, absent such exceptional circumstances, a co-owner is generally entitled as of right to an order for sale. The respondents no longer alleged malice or abuse of process (having abandoned that argument), and no oppression or vexatious intent was found. Accordingly, the judge ordered that the three properties be sold.

Division of proceeds and unresolved financial disputes

The respondents argued that the net proceeds of sale should be divided unequally, primarily because they claimed to have contributed more labour and funds to the management and improvement of the properties. They also alleged that some funds had been wrongly withdrawn or misapplied from the property-related bank accounts, and that they should be compensated or otherwise credited when the proceeds of sale were distributed.
However, the applicants’ applications and the respondents’ counter-application were framed around two issues only: the applicants’ request for sale and equal division, and the respondents’ claim that there was an enforceable settlement dictating an unequal division. Once the court rejected the existence of a binding settlement, there remained no proper basis on the existing record to determine or quantify any unequal division. The evidence on management costs, improvements, and alleged misappropriations was incomplete and contested, and counsel for the respondents conceded that the record was not adequate to resolve those disputes.
Given the limited scope of the issues properly before it, the court held that it could not adjudicate those broader accounting disputes. With no enforceable agreement altering the 50–50 ownership structure, the only lawful basis for distribution was equal division of the net sale proceeds (after any transaction costs and any costs ordered by the court).

Outcome of the case and status of monetary relief

In the result, the court dismissed the respondents’ counter-application in its entirety and granted the relief sought by the applicants. It ordered that the three properties be sold and that, subject to routine transaction expenses and any later award of legal costs, the proceeds be divided equally between the registered co-owners. The judge also set a timetable for costs submissions, permitting the applicants to seek their costs and the respondents to respond, with a reply permitted from the applicants; however, no specific dollar figure for costs, damages, or other monetary relief was set in this reasons decision.
Overall, the successful parties are the applicants, Sarbjit Dhillon and Rajinder Singh Dhillon. They obtained the key relief they requested: court-ordered sale of all three co-owned properties and equal sharing of net proceeds, while the respondents’ effort to enforce an alleged settlement and to obtain unequal division of the proceeds was rejected. The judgment does not fix any exact monetary amount for sale proceeds, damages, or costs. The total financial benefit to the applicants therefore cannot yet be determined, as it depends on future sale prices of the properties and on a separate costs decision to be made after written submissions.