Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Motion to disqualify the lawyers for Agence du revenu du Québec (ARQ) failed because the taxpayers did not prove any “grave and compelling” reasons under article 193 C.p.c. or any real appearance of lack of integrity, independence or distanciation.
• The court found the factual basis of the disqualification motion to be largely subjective interpretations and exaggerations of ordinary adversarial conduct, rather than clear, convincing evidence of misconduct or ethical breaches.
• Allegations that ARQ’s counsel abused their status, intimidated the taxpayers, challenged medical evidence in bad faith, and violated the “unicity of representation” rule were rejected on the evidence and on the governing procedural and ethical standards.
• The court held that criticisms of the taxpayers’ diligence, arguments about the sufficiency of medical proof for adjournment, and reference to comparable case law were legitimate advocacy, not evidence of bias, bad faith, or harassment.
• In contrast, the inhabilité motion itself was characterized as abusive: a strategic, vexatious attempt to destabilize ARQ by attacking its lawyers personally, through inflammatory language and accusations untethered to the record.
• The court therefore dismissed the disqualification motion, granted ARQ’s application for a declaration of abuse, formally declared the inhabilité motion abusive, and awarded ARQ its costs, with the specific monetary amount of costs not stated in the judgment.

Background and underlying tax dispute

The case arises out of a long-running tax dispute between two taxpayers, Sarto Landry and Guylaine Gauthier, and the Agence du revenu du Québec (ARQ). The taxpayers filed proceedings on 16 July 2018 to contest tax assessments issued under the Loi sur les impôts and the Loi sur la taxe de vente du Québec. These assessments had already been paid “sous protêt” (under protest), but the taxpayers continued to challenge their validity through litigation. The two taxpayers are a couple. Importantly, Me Sarto Landry is both a party to the litigation and the lawyer representing his spouse, Ms. Gauthier. Ms. Gauthier is a former lawyer and actuary; she was later struck from the Roll of the Barreau du Québec following disciplinary decisions. This personal and professional overlap between the parties and counsel forms part of the context in which the court evaluates their conduct and the procedural motions.

Procedural history and motions filed

The files were declared complete and ready for hearing in April 2021, and from April 2024, Judge Dominique Gibbens, J.C.Q., was assigned to manage the cases. She held numerous case management and pre-trial conferences and ruled on various interlocutory issues. A ten-day trial was scheduled for September 2025. In late July 2025, however, the taxpayers sought an adjournment on the basis of Ms. Gauthier’s health, supported by medical notes; this resulted in a contested adjournment hearing on 5–6 August 2025. Around the same time, they also brought a motion to recuse Judge Gibbens, which was dismissed, with the judge describing their allegations as grossly exaggerated or imagined. Shortly after the recusal motion was rejected and while the adjournment request was under deliberation, the taxpayers filed a detailed motion seeking to have both of ARQ’s lawyers, Me Drolet and Me Bijou-Tremblay, declared unable to act (Demande en inhabilité) under article 193 of the Code de procédure civile (C.p.c.). ARQ responded on 28 August 2025 with a motion for a declaration of abuse of procedure (Demande d’abus) under articles 51–54 C.p.c., alleging the disqualification motion was manifestly ill-founded, dilatory, frivolous, vexatious, and strategically aimed at destabilizing the defence and derailing the trial.

Legal framework: Disqualification and abuse of procedure

On the disqualification issue, the court applied article 193 C.p.c., which allows a court to declare a lawyer unable to act, notably in situations of unresolved conflicts of interest, risks of disclosure of confidential information, or where the lawyer will be a witness on essential facts—though even then, only for “motifs graves.” The judge also noted that inhabilité can stem from other serious ethical or systemic concerns, such as protecting public confidence in the administration of justice and the integrity of the legal profession. Quebec and Supreme Court jurisprudence emphasize that disqualification pits two core principles against each other: the integrity of the justice system and a party’s fundamental right to be represented by counsel of their choice. Disqualification is a drastic remedy that requires “reasons grave and compelling,” assessed from the vantage point of a neutral, reasonable, well-informed observer, and cannot be used for mere tactical advantage. The court also referred to duties set out in the Code de déontologie des avocats (honour, dignity, integrity, respect, moderation, courtesy, cooperation, and good faith) and reminded that even a breach of a deontology rule does not automatically lead to disqualification. The burden of proof lies squarely on the party seeking inhabilité, who must provide clear, convincing, preponderant evidence.

On abuse of procedure, the court relied on article 51 C.p.c. and appellate case law defining abusive proceedings as conduct contrary to the purposes of the judicial system, marked by temerity, lack of objective legal foundation, allegations that fail under careful scrutiny, and a disproportionate escalation compared to the real dispute. The system aims to sanction conduct that weaponizes procedure, without requiring proof of subjective bad faith, while maintaining a high threshold to avoid chilling legitimate access to justice.

Allegations in the disqualification motion

The taxpayers’ inhabilité motion levelled an array of serious accusations at ARQ’s counsel. They described the two lawyers as disrespectful, impolite, arrogant, mocking, contemptuous, and intimidating, allegedly portraying the taxpayers as acting in bad faith and implying they had no right to challenge the assessments. They accused counsel of being biased, gravely unreasonable, arbitrary, abusive, and frightening to taxpayers, determined to win “at all costs” without discernment, lacking restraint, moderation, distanciation, integrity and independence, and acting against the proper administration of justice. The motion further asserted that their conduct tarnished the image of justice, violated their status as officers of the court, and raised ethical concerns under the Code de déontologie. In one particularly inflammatory passage, the taxpayers wrote that these lawyers were unworthy to represent the Government of Quebec and “should” instead represent countries such as Russia, Syria, or a “banana republic.” They also invoked an alleged breach of the “unicity of representation” rule, on the basis that ARQ was repeatedly represented by two lawyers, sometimes both speaking in the same hearing. Finally, they criticized the lawyers for having researched Ms. Gauthier’s public disciplinary record at the Barreau du Québec, asserting that this was improper and evidence of lack of distanciation. When pressed by the court, Me Landry struggled to isolate concrete, observable facts behind the rhetoric. Much of what was advanced consisted of characterizations and inferences drawn from ordinary procedural or adversarial steps.

Court’s analysis of key factual complaints

The judgment walks through each alleged factual basis for disqualification. Concerning the 1 August 2024 hearing, the taxpayers said Me Bijou-Tremblay misled the court by stating the plaintiffs’ documentary exhibits were not bound and were badly labeled, supposedly to make them look incompetent. The evidence instead showed that at one stage ARQ indeed received unbound documents in a box with confusing dual numbering, which ARQ later had bound internally; it remained unclear whether bound versions had been delivered before that hearing. The judge concluded that, at worst, Me Bijou-Tremblay’s recollection about binding could have been mistaken but there was no proof of a deliberate attempt to mislead, and Me Landry could easily have corrected any misunderstanding on the record. With respect to the 19 November 2024 hearing on an expert challenge, the taxpayers claimed that Me Bijou-Tremblay had “admitted” going too far in disrespecting Me Landry and apologized to him. The recording, however, showed that she complained about unsupported assertions, noted past missed deadlines, and, while acknowledging she was “going too far” in the sense of straying into the merits during a case-management context, she apologized to the judge—not to opposing counsel—and did not insult or demean him. The court thus viewed Me Landry’s reading as a tendentious misinterpretation. A major focus of the disqualification motion was the August 2025 adjournment hearing, where Ms. Gauthier’s physician, Dr. Ferland, testified. The judge found ARQ’s stance—that it did not dispute the doctor’s good faith but questioned the completeness of the information underlying her conclusions—entirely legitimate advocacy, especially given the long delays, the late timing of the adjournment request, the absence of sworn statements from either the doctor or Ms. Gauthier in support of the motion, and the involvement of a relatively new treating physician. The court noted that Judge Gibbens herself had expressed perplexity over elements raised by ARQ and cited a prior case, Québec (Procureure générale) c. Gingras, to illustrate the need for sufficiently detailed medical proof for last-minute adjournments. The taxpayers took umbrage at the analogy to Gingras, but the present court held that the case was invoked for its reasoning on evidentiary sufficiency, not to label them as manipulative. The court similarly discounted a sworn statement by Dr. Ferland, who, unfamiliar with court proceedings, felt personally attacked by questioning aimed at clarifying her brief and cryptic clinical notes. The judge held that probing such notes is a normal and appropriate part of testing evidence. Another episode involved a virtual hearing where Me Drolet pointed out that Me Landry was vaping during the session. The judge agreed that the same decorum rules apply online as in court, and viewed the comment as justified and factual rather than a calculated effort to smear his image. Even a later “sharp” remark by Me Bijou-Tremblay about the vaping incident, made while she was under emotionally charged examination on the disqualification motion, was treated as an isolated reaction in the face of extraordinary provocation—namely, a public motion filled with harsh personal attacks and repeated threats by Me Landry to initiate punitive steps (outrage, professional complaints, abuse motions) whenever he disagreed with opposing counsel or the court. On the “unicity of representation” point, the judge confirmed that although two ARQ lawyers appeared, only one argued any given application, with the other sometimes offering limited clarifications on documentary organization. This division of labor within one legal team did not breach the principle that a party has only one procureur ad litem. As for the research into Ms. Gauthier’s disciplinary history, the court held that it was proper for government counsel to review public, relevant proceedings involving an opposing party, and pointed out the inconsistency in the taxpayers’ complaint: they had themselves faulted ARQ’s lawyers earlier for allegedly not knowing that disciplinary history, then criticized them when they did verify it.

Evaluation of integrity, independence and distanciation

Stepping back from the itemized complaints, the court evaluated whether the taxpayers had demonstrated any genuine deficiency in the integrity, independence or distanciation of ARQ’s counsel, as required to justify disqualification. It concluded that the record was “more than lacunary” on actual facts supporting those assertions. The alleged slights and supposed intimidation were grounded largely in the taxpayers’ subjective, sometimes exaggerated perceptions, not in objectively troubling behavior. The judge emphasized that advocacy may legitimately include assertions about an opposing party’s diligence, the strength or weakness of their evidence, and the implications of their procedural conduct—including, where supported, arguments that conduct is dilatory or inconsistent with presumed good faith. Such arguments, if ultimately unfounded, can be rejected on the merits or even sanctioned, but they are not inherently evidence of ethical breach or bias. The court also noted that the taxpayers themselves repeatedly accused ARQ counsel, an ARQ agent, and even Judge Gibbens of bad faith, while misconstruing the nature of ARQ’s allegations in its defensive pleadings. Under the Income Tax Act provisions invoked (specifically article 1010(2)(b)(i) of the Loi sur les impôts), ARQ did not need to prove subjective bad faith or fraud; a negligent or careless misrepresentation could suffice, and ARQ’s pleadings reflected that standard. Judge Gibbens had even told them explicitly that ARQ did not consider Me Landry a “fraudster,” yet they persisted in reading the defence as an attack on their personal honesty. Finally, the judge observed that Me Bijou-Tremblay’s emotional reaction while testifying under the weight of the public inhabilité motion, constant accusations, and the looming threat of contempt and disciplinary measures did not reveal lack of distanciation but rather a human response to extraordinary pressure. Across multiple prior hearings, her courtroom comportment had been measured and professional. On an objective view, there was no real appearance of bias, loss of independence, or improper partisanship on the part of either ARQ lawyer.

Finding of abuse of procedure and consequences

After dismissing the inhabilité motion on the merits, the court turned to ARQ’s request for a declaration of abuse. It examined the entire procedural history, the language and structure of the disqualification motion, and the taxpayers’ broader litigation conduct. The judge found that very few actual facts underpinned the motion, and those that did were warped into “doubtful and tendentious interpretations” of normal litigation activity. Virtually every statement or step by ARQ’s counsel was reframed as a personal attack. This led the court to conclude that the motion exhibited temerity, a lack of any objectively identifiable legal foundation, and allegations that could not withstand close analysis. The timing and strategic context reinforced this assessment: the motion was filed immediately after the recusal motion was denied and while the adjournment request was pending, in circumstances where, had the adjournment been refused, the trial could still have been delayed or derailed because the court would first have had to hear and decide the disqualification issue. If the inhabilité motion had been granted, the trial might have had to be abandoned altogether pending replacement counsel for ARQ. The judge thus characterized the motion as part of an “open war” the taxpayers had been waging against ARQ for seven years, driven by a determination to continue the contest at almost any cost, and now channelled into an attempt to remove opposing counsel themselves. The wording of the motion—laden with insults, aggressive comparisons to authoritarian regimes and “banana republics,” and sweeping attacks on the lawyers’ dignity and worthiness—was found to be vexatious and unnecessary to any legitimate legal argument. In contrast, ARQ’s own pleadings and submissions, while firm, contained none of the gratuitous invective seen in the taxpayers’ materials. In light of these elements, the court held that all the ingredients of an abuse of procedure were present. It formally dismissed the motion for disqualification, granted ARQ’s application for a declaration of abuse, declared the inhabilité motion abusive, and ordered costs against the taxpayers in favour of ARQ. The judgment does not specify a numerical amount for these costs or any damages; the monetary consequences are therefore limited to an award of costs whose precise dollar value cannot be determined from this decision alone, though the clearly successful party on both the disqualification and abuse issues is the defendant, Agence du revenu du Québec.