Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Jurisdictional issue over whether an appeal from a solicitor–client costs assessment lies to the Court of Appeal or the Divisional Court when the final order is for a single monetary payment.
• Interpretation of ss. 6(1)(b) and 19(1)(a), (1.2)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act in the context of a costs assessment under the Solicitors Act.
• Determination that the “amount of the judgment” is the single payment ordered, not the amount originally billed or the difference between the bill and the assessment.
• Clarification that in solicitor–client assessments, jurisdiction turns on what is payable or repayable after accounting for amounts already paid, whether to the solicitor or back to the client.
• Reconciliation of prior Ontario appellate and Divisional Court authorities on costs assessments, distinguishing cases where additional final relief (e.g., on contingency fee or fee agreements) justified Court of Appeal jurisdiction.
• Application of the monetary threshold ($50,000 single payment exclusive of costs) leading to transfer of the appeal to the Divisional Court and a costs award in favour of the clients.

Facts of the case

Todd Powell, Tracy Powell, Joseph Carapella, 1307839 Ontario Ltd., and Tricar Developments Inc. were former clients of the law firm Ledroit Sabo Litigation and lawyer Paul Ledroit. After their retainer ended, a dispute arose over the legal fees charged by the solicitors, which totaled $105,883.50. The clients had already paid $24,453.86 toward these accounts. They then exercised their right under the Solicitors Act to have the solicitors’ accounts assessed, seeking independent scrutiny of the reasonableness of the fees.

An assessment officer conducted a solicitor–client assessment of the lawyers’ accounts. The assessment officer substantially reduced the total fees claimed, certifying that the proper amount of the solicitors’ accounts was $50,000, down from the original $105,883.50. Given that the clients had already paid $24,453.86, the assessment result meant that an additional $25,546.14 remained payable by the clients to the solicitors.

Ledroit Sabo Litigation and Paul Ledroit, disagreeing with the assessment officer’s reductions, moved before a judge of the Superior Court of Justice to oppose confirmation of the assessment officer’s report and certificate. The clients, as moving parties in the later appellate motion, sought to uphold the reduced assessment.

On March 19, 2025, Justice L.B. Stewart of the Superior Court of Justice dismissed the solicitors’ motion to oppose confirmation of the assessment certificate. The motion judge confirmed the assessed amount of $50,000 as the correct figure for the solicitors’ accounts and ordered that the clients pay the remaining $25,546.14 (after crediting sums already paid). Justice Stewart also ordered the solicitors to pay the clients $8,000 in costs of the motion. This order was a final order of a single judge of the Superior Court, involving a single payment obligation flowing from the assessment.

Legal framework and procedure for assessments

The assessment process was governed by the Solicitors Act. Where the retainer is not in dispute and there are no special circumstances, either a solicitor or a client may seek an order for assessment of the solicitor’s bill under s. 3 of the Act. An assessment officer then reviews the account line by line and issues a certificate fixing the amount that is properly due.

Under s. 6(5) of the Solicitors Act, the amount certified as due becomes payable upon confirmation of the certificate, in the same way that a referee’s report is confirmed under the Rules of Civil Procedure. If a party objects to confirmation of the assessment certificate, s. 6(9) provides that the motion must be made to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice. The judge’s disposition—confirming, varying, or otherwise dealing with the certificate—results in a final order that fixes either an amount payable to the solicitor or, in some cases, a refund payable to the client.

In this matter, that procedural path was followed. The assessment officer reduced the overall accounts; a motion to oppose confirmation was brought; and Justice Stewart, as the motion judge, rendered a final order confirming the $50,000 assessment and awarding costs to the clients.

Appeal route and the Courts of Justice Act

The central issue before the Court of Appeal was not the correctness of the fee assessment itself, but the proper appeal route from Justice Stewart’s final order. The solicitors filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. The clients, as moving parties, brought a motion to quash that appeal, arguing that jurisdiction lay instead with the Divisional Court because the final order involved a single payment that fell within the Divisional Court’s monetary limit.

The question required close reading of the Courts of Justice Act, in particular:

• Section 6(1)(b), which provides that an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from a final order of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice, except where the order falls within the specific exceptions in s. 19.
• Section 19(1)(a), which directs that an appeal lies to the Divisional Court from certain final orders described in s. 19(1.2).
• Section 19(1.2)(a), which specifies that, where the notice of appeal is filed on or after October 1, 2007, this Divisional Court jurisdiction includes a final order “for a single payment of not more than $50,000 exclusive of costs.”

The statutory scheme effectively divides appeals from final orders of a single Superior Court judge based on the monetary amount of the single payment ordered. Where the order is for a single payment of $50,000 or less (exclusive of costs), jurisdiction is assigned to the Divisional Court; where the single payment exceeds $50,000, the appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

Principles for determining the monetary amount in assessment appeals

The Court of Appeal framed the key question in jurisdictional terms: when a Superior Court judge confirms or varies a solicitor’s account after an assessment officer’s decision, what is the relevant “amount” for determining the proper appeal route?

The court held that it is the amount of the single payment ordered by the final judgment—whether payable by the client to the solicitor or by the solicitor back to the client—not the original billed amount, the amount claimed, or the mathematical difference between the initial accounts and the assessed figure. Borrowing from and reaffirming earlier appellate authority, the court emphasized that:

• Jurisdiction under s. 19(1)(a) and 19(1.2)(a) turns on “the amount of the payment ordered by the judgment sought to be appealed,” not on the quantum originally claimed or the amount “in issue” on appeal.
• This principle applies in the assessment context just as it does in ordinary civil actions where damages are fixed or assessed at zero.

The reasons then outlined three typical scenarios in solicitor–client assessments:

1. Where the final order results in a single payment from clients to solicitors (e.g., an unpaid account reduced to a specific amount still owed), the single payment figure dictates the appeal route.
2. Where the final order results in a single payment from solicitors back to clients (e.g., clients have overpaid and the assessment leads to a refund), the amount of that refund governs jurisdiction.
3. Where the clients have already paid the amount assessed and confirmed, the effective order may be for $0, in which case the appeal route is still determined as if the order were for a single payment within the Divisional Court’s monetary jurisdiction.

In all of these settings, the focus is on what the final Superior Court order actually commands to be paid or repaid after taking into account all prior payments.

Treatment of prior case law on jurisdiction and solicitor assessments

To clarify the law, the Court of Appeal reviewed a number of earlier decisions dealing with appeal routes in assessment contexts. It distinguished or reconciled them according to whether the final order was simply for a single payment or whether it also dealt with other substantive issues of final relief.

Some earlier Court of Appeal cases, such as Evans, Sweeny Bordin LLP v. Zawadski and Ares Law Professional Corporation v. Rock, were consistent with the court’s current approach because in each, the single payment ordered after the assessment exceeded $50,000, properly engaging the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction.

The court noted that certain decisions might appear at first glance to be outliers—for instance, where the Court of Appeal had heard appeals involving relatively modest assessed amounts or where jurisdiction was not challenged or addressed. It explained that in some of those cases, the final order was not limited to a single payment: it also decided issues such as the validity or reasonableness of a contingency fee agreement or other aspects of the fee arrangement. In those situations, the appeal lay to the Court of Appeal under s. 6(1)(b) because the order had final consequences beyond a simple monetary award.

The court also observed that the Divisional Court has generally used the same “single payment” approach in its own jurisdictional analyses, looking to the amount payable or repayable following the assessment and post-assessment motions. Cases in which the Divisional Court heard appeals from assessments involving payments under $50,000 were aligned with the statutory scheme, especially where the final order concerned only the amount of the solicitor’s account and not additional substantive issues.

Application to Powell v. Ledroit Sabo Litigation

Turning to the present case, the Court of Appeal identified the relevant final order as Justice Stewart’s March 19, 2025 order, which:

• Confirmed the assessment officer’s certificate in the amount of $50,000 as the correct figure for the solicitors’ accounts;
• Dismissed the solicitors’ motion to oppose confirmation; and
• Awarded the clients $8,000 in costs of that motion.

Although the order did not set out the precise remaining payment figure within its text, the legal effect was clear: the clients had already paid $24,453.86, so they were required to pay a further $25,546.14 to the solicitors to bring total payments up to the assessed $50,000. The “single payment” determined by the final order was therefore $25,546.14, a sum that falls under the $50,000 statutory threshold.

On this basis, the Court of Appeal held that the appeal did not properly lie to it under s. 6(1)(b). Instead, s. 19(1)(a) and 19(1.2)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act mandated that the appeal route was to the Divisional Court, because the final order was a final order of a Superior Court judge for a single payment of not more than $50,000, exclusive of costs.

Given this conclusion, the court allowed the clients’ motion to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction. However, exercising its discretion under s. 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, it determined that it was just to transfer the solicitors’ appeal to the Divisional Court rather than terminate it entirely. The court noted that this was the first time the Court of Appeal had been expressly asked to decide this particular jurisdictional question in the solicitor-assessment context, and it was reasonable for the solicitors to have commenced their appeal there.

Outcome and financial consequences

In result, the Court of Appeal ordered that:

• The motion to quash was allowed;
• The solicitors’ appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court; and
• The clients, as moving parties, were awarded their costs of the motion to quash in the Court of Appeal in the agreed amount of $4,500, inclusive of all amounts.

When this is viewed together with the earlier Superior Court order of Justice Stewart, the financial picture is as follows. First, on the merits of the fee assessment, the clients remain obliged to pay the solicitors an additional $25,546.14 so that the total fees come to $50,000. Second, and importantly for the clients as the ultimately successful party on the jurisdictional motion and at first instance, they have secured two costs awards in their favour: $8,000 in costs from the solicitors on the motion before the Superior Court and a further $4,500 in costs on the motion to quash in the Court of Appeal. In total, therefore, the successful parties—the clients, Todd Powell, Tracy Powell, Joseph Carapella, 1307839 Ontario Ltd. and Tricar Developments Inc.—have been awarded $12,500 in costs in their favour, while no additional damages beyond the assessed legal fee obligation and these costs awards were determined in this decision.