Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Compliance with section 7.1 of the Customs Act is central, focusing on whether the applicant failed to declare the true value of her imported electric vehicle and justified its seizure under paragraph 110(a).
• The motion turns on the heightened test for a mandatory interlocutory injunction, requiring a strong prima facie case rather than a mere serious issue to be tried.
• The applicant provided only broad, largely unsupported allegations of procedural unfairness and unreasonableness in the CBSA Recourse Directorate decision, with limited particulars.
• Assertions of irreparable harm from potential electric vehicle battery damage rested on the applicant’s lay understanding, without independent or technical evidence to support permanent, non-compensable loss.
• The court emphasized that harm was avoidable because the applicant could pay the reduced release amount to recover and maintain the vehicle, with the prospect of a refund if successful on judicial review.
• As a result, the Attorney General of Canada succeeded on the motion; no monetary award, damages, or costs were ordered in favour of any party, and the exact total amount in dispute remains undetermined at the court level.

Facts of the case

The case arises from the seizure of an electric vehicle at the Pacific Highway – Traffic port of entry in March 2025. The applicant, Jing Jing He, attempted to import the vehicle into Canada but failed to declare its full value as required by customs law. This non-disclosure was treated as a violation of section 7.1 of the Customs Act, which obliges importers to provide true, accurate and complete information when bringing goods into the country. Because of this under-declaration, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) seized the vehicle, and it has remained in CBSA custody since that time. After the seizure, the applicant pursued CBSA’s internal review process, appealing the enforcement action to the CBSA Recourse Directorate. On January 16, 2026, a Senior Appeals Officer issued a decision confirming that the applicant had contravened the Customs Act by failing to accurately declare the vehicle’s value. The Officer also found that the seizure was lawful under paragraph 110(a) of the Customs Act, which authorizes seizure where there has been such a contravention. However, as part of that decision, the Officer reduced the original terms of release and set a payment amount of $9,558.55 as the sum the applicant would need to pay to recover the vehicle, subject to any applicable provincial sales tax and other duties or taxes on importation. Dissatisfied with that outcome, the applicant commenced a judicial review in the Federal Court, challenging the CBSA Recourse Directorate decision on grounds including alleged procedural unfairness and unreasonableness. While that judicial review remains pending, the applicant brought a separate motion seeking urgent injunctive relief relating to the condition and maintenance of her electric vehicle.

The motion for injunctive relief

The main relief sought on the motion was a mandatory interlocutory injunction. The applicant asked the Court to order the CBSA either to charge the vehicle periodically and keep records of every charging session, or alternatively to provide her or an authorized third party with supervised access to the vehicle so that the battery could be charged and maintained while the vehicle stayed in CBSA’s custody. In addition, the applicant initially sought a prohibitive injunction restraining the CBSA from selling, dismantling, disposing of, or otherwise altering the condition of the vehicle while the judicial review was ongoing. At the hearing, however, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada confirmed that CBSA would not sell, dismantle, dispose of or alter the vehicle while the underlying litigation remained before the Court. On that assurance, the applicant agreed that a prohibitive injunction was unnecessary and chose not to pursue that branch of relief. As a result, the motion before the Court was confined to the request for a mandatory injunction concerning charging and maintaining the vehicle’s battery.

Legal framework for mandatory interlocutory injunctions

In deciding the motion, the Federal Court applied the familiar three-part test for interlocutory injunctive relief: (1) the existence of a serious issue; (2) the risk of irreparable harm if relief is refused; and (3) the balance of convenience between the parties. However, because the applicant sought a mandatory injunction—an order requiring the respondent to take positive steps—the Court applied the stricter standard outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald and, more specifically, in R v Canadian Broadcasting Corp (CBC). Under that approach, a party seeking a mandatory interlocutory injunction must demonstrate a strong prima facie case at the first stage, meaning a strong likelihood on the law and the available evidence that they will ultimately succeed in the underlying proceeding. This is a higher threshold than the usual “serious issue to be tried” standard used for prohibitive injunctions, reflecting the more burdensome nature of orders that compel action rather than merely restrain it.

Assessment of the merits: serious issue and strong prima facie case

The Court first examined whether the applicant had shown a strong prima facie case in support of her pending judicial review of the CBSA Recourse Directorate decision. On the record before it, the Court found she had not. In her written submissions on the motion, the applicant stated only that the judicial review raised “arguable issues” regarding the legality of the seizure, but she did not provide detailed submissions or evidence explaining what specific errors the CBSA Officer allegedly made. Although the applicant was self-represented, the Court noted that the burden remained on her to show, with some particularity, why she had a strong likelihood of success. The Court reviewed the Notice of Application filed in the judicial review and observed that the grounds listed there were very broad and general, alleging procedural unfairness and unreasonableness in a conclusory way and with limited detail. For example, the applicant claimed that the decision-maker did not meaningfully engage with “central submissions” and “key evidence” but did not clearly identify what those submissions or evidence were and how they were overlooked. The Court contrasted those broad allegations with the contents of the Officer’s decision, which documented that the applicant had been informed of the “case to meet” through a Notice of Reasons for Action, had been provided with additional information, and had made multiple sets of representations to the CBSA over several months. On that record, and without more specific material from the applicant, the Court could not conclude that there was a strong likelihood she would succeed in setting aside the CBSA decision on judicial review. That shortfall at the first branch of the test was, in itself, sufficient to dispose of the motion.

Irreparable harm and the condition of the vehicle’s battery

Despite finding that the applicant failed on the strong prima facie case requirement, the Court went on to consider the issue of irreparable harm. The applicant argued that if the CBSA did not periodically charge the vehicle, or allow her to do so, the lithium-ion battery might be left in a discharged state for an extended period, causing irreversible damage, a drastic reduction in the vehicle’s value, or even safety issues. In her affidavit, the applicant stated that, based on Rivian documentation and her general understanding of electric vehicle batteries, failure to charge the battery regularly could render the vehicle inoperable within days or weeks. The Court emphasized that to establish irreparable harm, an applicant must provide clear, convincing and non-speculative evidence showing a real probability of harm that cannot be adequately compensated in money or otherwise remedied later. On the record provided, the judge found that this threshold was not met. The assertions about battery damage rested on the applicant’s general understanding and did not include expert evidence, technical reports, or objective documentation showing that the harm described was both likely and truly irreversible. The affidavit language—stating that the vehicle “may become permanently damaged”—was viewed as speculative. In addition, the applicant did not explain why any damage to the battery could not be addressed through repair or replacement, or why any resulting loss in value could not be compensated in monetary terms. Without specific, independent evidence of truly irreparable harm, the Court concluded that this part of the test was also not satisfied.

Avoidable harm and the option to secure release of the vehicle

A further and important factor for the Court was that the alleged harm was, in its view, avoidable. The CBSA decision set terms of release for the vehicle, which included payment of $9,558.55 plus any applicable taxes and import charges. The judge pointed out that the applicant could choose to pay this amount, secure release of the vehicle, and then take immediate steps to charge and maintain the battery herself. Should she later prevail on the judicial review, the release amount could be refunded to her, effectively undoing the financial outlay. The Court noted that there was no evidence before it that the applicant was unable to pay the release amount or that this option was practically unavailable. This available route to mitigate or prevent harm weighed heavily against a finding of irreparable harm. It also supported the view that a mandatory injunction forcing CBSA to undertake charging or provide supervised access was not necessary at this interlocutory stage.

Outcome, successful party and monetary consequences

In the end, the Court held that the applicant had not met the legal requirements for a mandatory interlocutory injunction. She failed to demonstrate a strong prima facie case on the merits of her judicial review, and she did not provide the level of objective, non-speculative evidence required to prove irreparable harm to the vehicle if no mandatory order was granted. In light of these findings, the Court did not need to engage in a detailed analysis of the balance of convenience. The motion was dismissed, and the Attorney General of Canada, representing the CBSA, was the successful party on this interlocutory motion. However, the Court recorded that the respondent was not seeking costs and agreed that, in the circumstances, there should be no order as to costs. No damages, compensation or other monetary awards were ordered by the Court in this decision. The only specific figure in the record—the $9,558.55 release amount—is an administrative condition set by CBSA, not a judicial award. Because the Court did not order payment of that sum, nor any other money amount as damages, costs or compensation, the total monetary award in favour of the successful party cannot be quantified from this decision and must be regarded as undetermined at this stage.