Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Narrow grounds for reconsideration under Rule 397 of the Federal Courts Rules, limited to mismatch between reasons and order or matters overlooked, with no scope to re-argue or add new evidence.
• Dispute over the handling of the bank’s late filing, the sequencing of the motion to strike versus default judgment, and whether those procedural choices could justify reconsideration.
• Reliance on alleged PIPEDA complaints, including whether a letter to the Privacy Commissioner was properly before the Court and the need for a Commissioner’s report before Federal Court jurisdiction is engaged.
• Concerns about curing defects in the struck statement of claim by amendment, contrasted with the Court’s earlier decision to strike without leave and the limits of Rule 397 as a vehicle to repair pleadings.
• Consideration of the plaintiff’s self-represented status and alleged hardship, set against the Court’s inability to provide legal advice or rectify substantive legal deficiencies for a litigant.
• Serious issues of courtroom decorum and institutional protection, arising from abusive communications directed at Registry staff and resulting in final orders closing the file and barring further filings or contacts in this proceeding.

Background and facts of the dispute

The case arises from a dispute between the plaintiff, Marie Pia Fazio, and the defendant, Toronto-Dominion Bank, which originated in the parties’ banking relationship. On September 26, 2025, Ms. Fazio filed a statement of claim in the Federal Court alleging various grievances against the bank linked to that banking relationship. These underlying claims are not elaborated in detail in the reconsideration decision, because the focus of the later ruling is procedural rather than substantive.

After the claim was filed, the bank responded procedurally. On November 5, 2025, Toronto-Dominion Bank filed a notice of intent to respond, which the Court accepted. Ms. Fazio then brought an ex parte motion for default judgment, arguing that the bank’s materials were late and that default judgment should be granted in her favour. Before that default judgment motion was heard, the bank filed a motion to strike the statement of claim on November 20, 2025. The Court determined that it was more efficient to deal with the bank’s motion to strike first, rather than proceeding with the plaintiff’s default judgment motion.

On December 16, 2025, the Court issued an order striking Ms. Fazio’s statement of claim in its entirety, and importantly, did so without granting her leave to amend. That order effectively ended the action at first instance, unless successfully appealed or reconsidered. Dissatisfied with the outcome and process, Ms. Fazio sought to challenge that order within the Federal Court itself by way of a motion for reconsideration.

Following an extension of time, Ms. Fazio filed her motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2026. She advanced several arguments, including concerns about the bank’s late filing, the Court’s decision to hear the motion to strike first, and how the Court had characterized or treated her asserted bases for federal jurisdiction. She also emphasized her position as a self-represented litigant facing hardship and pointed to what she described as a complaint she had made to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada.

The motion for reconsideration and Rule 397

The central legal framework in this decision is Rule 397 of the Federal Courts Rules, which tightly confines when an order may be reconsidered. Under Rule 397, reconsideration is limited to situations where an order does not accord with the reasons that support it, or where the Court has overlooked or accidentally omitted a matter it should have addressed. These are deliberately narrow grounds and do not permit the Court to revisit a decision simply because a party is disappointed with the result, wishes to re-argue previous points, or wants to add new facts or arguments after the fact.

In its reasons, the Court emphasizes that Rule 397 does not open the door to new evidence or new legal theories that were not properly before the Court when the original order was made. Nor does it provide an avenue to relitigate issues already addressed, such as the bank’s late filing or the order of hearing the motions. The Court cites appellate authority confirming that reconsideration is not a vehicle for re-argument or for expanding the original record.

Against this strict legal backdrop, the Court assesses Ms. Fazio’s motion and concludes that her submissions largely seek to revisit matters already determined or to introduce new complaints that were not properly before the Court at the earlier motion to strike. As a result, they do not fit within the narrow categories recognized under Rule 397.

Procedural issues: default judgment, motion to strike, and jurisdiction

A significant part of the plaintiff’s grievance concerned timing and sequencing. She argued that the Court should have prioritized her ex parte motion for default judgment due to the bank’s late filing, instead of hearing the motion to strike first. The Court notes that this issue had already been dealt with both in directions from an Associate Judge and in the earlier order, and that it had been found more efficient and appropriate to resolve the strike motion before turning to default judgment. In the reconsideration ruling, the judge reiterates that such procedural determinations had been made and explained, and that a motion for reconsideration is not the proper mechanism to contest them again.

The plaintiff also argued that the Court improperly “collapsed” her various references to federal statutes into a single, indivisible ground for jurisdiction. The Court characterizes this as a new argument, not previously advanced in this form, and emphasizes that each of her previously asserted jurisdictional grounds had been expressly addressed in the original order striking the claim. Because Rule 397 does not authorize reconsideration on the basis of new legal theories, this fresh contention cannot support reopening the decision.

PIPEDA, the Privacy Commissioner, and jurisdictional pre-conditions

An important legal point in the decision involves the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). Ms. Fazio argued that the Court had overlooked her alleged complaint to the Privacy Commissioner in assessing jurisdiction under PIPEDA. In the earlier order, the Court had stated that she had not pleaded that she had submitted a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner. In the reconsideration motion, she pointed to a letter dated August 12, 2025, which she said was a complaint and had been included in her materials for the separate default judgment motion.

The Court accepts that she alleges such a letter exists but holds that this does not qualify as an overlooked matter under Rule 397. The critical problem is procedural: that August 12 letter was not properly part of the record on the motion to strike. Under Rule 365(2)(e), a party responding to a motion must include in its motion materials any documents it wishes the Court to consider, unless those documents already appear in the moving party’s record. The bank’s motion record did not contain the letter, and the plaintiff did not attach it to her own response on the strike motion. Merely placing the letter in the separate default judgment motion record did not put it before the Court for the purposes of the motion to strike, nor does it retroactively cure that omission for reconsideration.

Further, even on the plaintiff’s own account, the existence of the letter does not overcome a jurisdictional barrier under PIPEDA. The order on the strike motion had stressed that a complainant may only apply to the Federal Court “after receiving the Commissioner’s report.” A Privacy Commissioner’s report is a statutory pre-condition for this Court to entertain a PIPEDA claim. The plaintiff did not provide or refer to any such report in connection with the motion to strike. The reconsideration judge notes that, even if the August 12 letter were considered, the absence of a Commissioner’s report under subsections 11(1) and 14(1) of PIPEDA means the jurisdictional defect remains. Accordingly, the Court finds there is no overlooked fact or legal error related to PIPEDA that would justify reconsidering the order.

The plaintiff also requested, in the alternative, that the earlier order be modified to allow her to amend her claim to plead her purported complaint to the Privacy Commissioner. The Court rejects this request as incompatible with Rule 397. The previous order had deliberately refused leave to amend, and that refusal aligned with the reasons given. Since no qualifying oversight under Rule 397 is found, the Court cannot use reconsideration as a vehicle to reopen the pleading and permit amendments. Additionally, the judge explains that if the plaintiff were to file a proper complaint, obtain a Commissioner’s report, and then seek review, that would constitute an entirely different proceeding—likely an application rather than an action—with different parties and a fundamentally altered nature. This reinforces the conclusion that reconsideration of the existing action is not appropriate.

Self-represented status, hardship, and the limits of the Court’s role

In her submissions, Ms. Fazio relied on her status as a self-represented litigant and the hardship she said she had experienced, suggesting that the interests of justice warranted altering the order. The Court acknowledges these concerns and recognizes that some procedural latitude is sometimes afforded to self-represented parties. However, the judge stresses that neither the Court nor the Registry can provide legal advice or step into the shoes of a litigant to correct substantive legal problems or pleading defects.

The decision refers to authority confirming that the Court’s role is adjudicative, not advisory. While judges may strive to ensure that self-represented parties understand process to a reasonable degree, they cannot bend statutory requirements or ignore jurisdictional limits out of sympathy. In this case, the plaintiff’s position as a self-represented person and her asserted hardship do not create a ground for reconsideration under Rule 397 and cannot overcome the requirements for properly framed claims, complete motion records, or statutory pre-conditions such as a Privacy Commissioner’s report under PIPEDA.

Conduct toward Registry staff and institutional protection

Beyond the strict reconsideration issues, the Court addresses a serious collateral matter: the plaintiff’s conduct toward the Court’s Registry staff. After the December 16, 2025 order, Ms. Fazio repeatedly went to the Registry and attempted to file numerous letters that contained abusive language directed at Registry personnel. She alleged procedural unfairness in relation to the order and expressed dissatisfaction with the judge’s decision not to hold an oral hearing on her motion for reconsideration.

The judge takes this opportunity to explain the distinct role of the Registry. Registry officers have no part in deciding whether hearings are scheduled, what directions or orders are issued, or how motions are resolved. Their responsibility is administrative: to receive and process documents, communicate the Court’s directions and decisions, and provide limited procedural information. The Court emphasizes, with reference to guidance set out on the Federal Court’s website and earlier case law, that Registry staff cannot offer legal advice, cannot interpret or explain the substance of orders and judgments, and cannot influence judicial decision-making.

The decision firmly states that while litigants have every right to appeal or seek review of Court orders through proper legal channels, no one has the right to threaten or abuse Registry staff. This point is made without diminishing the plaintiff’s personal circumstances; instead, it underlines that maintaining respect for court personnel is an essential aspect of the administration of justice.

Final orders, outcome, and successful party

Having determined that there are no valid grounds for reconsideration under Rule 397—because the plaintiff primarily attempted to re-argue previously rejected positions, introduce material that was not properly before the Court on the original motion, and circumvent jurisdictional pre-conditions under PIPEDA—the Court dismisses the motion for reconsideration in its entirety. The order specifies that this dismissal is “without costs,” meaning that no party receives a monetary award of legal costs in connection with the reconsideration motion.

To bring the litigation fully to an end at the trial-court level, the Court goes further. It orders the Registry to close file number T-3726-25 and directs that the Registry must not accept or file any further documents from the parties in that file. It also instructs that the Registry is not to respond to any further requests or communications from the plaintiff regarding this file, whether by email, other written communication, telephone, or in-person contact. These measures are designed to finalize the proceedings and protect Registry staff from further abusive interactions relating to this matter.

In the overall result, Toronto-Dominion Bank emerges as the successful party. The plaintiff’s statement of claim remains struck without leave to amend, her motion for reconsideration is dismissed, and the file is ordered closed. However, the Court awards no damages and no costs: there is no monetary judgment in favour of the bank or against the plaintiff in this decision, and the total amount granted or ordered in favour of the successful party is zero, as no quantifiable monetary award or costs figure is specified.