Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Validity and interpretation of condominium short-term rental rules and by-law no. 12, including the prohibition of renting all or part of a unit for periods under 365 days.
• Evidence of repeated short-term and student rentals by the unit owner despite the corporation’s rules and an existing interim court order.
• Application of section 98 of the Condominium Act, 1998 to the unauthorized installation of a Ring surveillance camera on common elements without written board approval.
• Proof of harassing and disruptive conduct by the owner towards board members and residents, including excessive communications, late-night contact, horn honking, and disparaging signage.
• Impact of the owner’s conduct on the peaceful enjoyment of the property, including blocking access to the condominium parking and smoking on an exclusive-use balcony.
• Assessment of costs under section 134(5) of the Condominium Act, including a partial indemnity costs order and the possibility of additional compliance-related charges being added to common expenses.

Facts of the case

Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 306 (CCC 306) applied to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice under section 134 of the Condominium Act, 1998 for compliance orders against unit owner Philippe Saint-Pierre. The corporation alleged that Mr. Saint-Pierre was breaching its declaration, by-laws and rules relating to short-term rentals, had altered common elements by installing a surveillance camera without approval, and was engaging in harassing and disruptive conduct toward other residents and the board. The matter came before Justice Owen Rees after an earlier interim order had already been made by another judge in November 2025. CCC 306 had adopted a “Short-Term Rental Rule” effective 1 May 2023 and by-law no. 12 on short-term rentals, registered on 9 August 2024. These instruments prohibited short-term rental use within the condominium and specified that “short-term rental” meant a rental of less than 365 days, as well as banning uses such as hotel, boarding or lodging house, transient use, time-sharing, short-term rental or dormitory use. Mr. Saint-Pierre did not dispute that he had advertised his unit on Airbnb, had entered into short-term rental arrangements, and had more recently allowed students to stay in his unit. He argued, however, that the condominium’s rule and by-law only prohibited the short-term rental of the entire unit, not of single rooms within the unit.

Short-term rental restrictions and use of the unit

The central legal issue on use of the unit concerned the proper interpretation and scope of the condominium’s short-term rental rule and by-law no. 12. Justice Rees rejected Mr. Saint-Pierre’s interpretation, finding that both the rule and the by-law clearly prohibit the short-term rental of any part of a unit, not just the whole unit. A “short-term rental” was defined as any tenancy of less than 365 days, and the prohibition on hotel, boarding house, lodging house, transient use, time-sharing, short-term rental or dormitory use applied to each residential unit. In practice, this prevented any owner from renting even one bedroom for a term below 365 days. On the evidentiary record before the court, including Mr. Saint-Pierre’s admissions during the hearing, the judge was satisfied that he had repeatedly breached the rule and by-law no. 12 by renting part of his unit for less than 365 days and by using the premises as a boarding or dormitory-style arrangement for students and academics. The court was particularly troubled that this conduct continued despite an existing interim order of Justice R. Smith dated 4 November 2025, under which Mr. Saint-Pierre had already been told to stop these practices. The judge noted medical and psychological evidence that social contact and companionship were important to Mr. Saint-Pierre’s mental health, and that he felt hosting students supported his sobriety and stability. However, the decision emphasized that the condominium’s rule and by-law did not prevent him from having friends or family as guests, nor from entering into longer-term leases of 365 days or more. In other words, there were lawful ways for him to maintain social contact and companionship without breaching the condominium’s regulatory framework.

Surveillance camera and modification of common elements

A separate issue concerned a Ring surveillance camera that Mr. Saint-Pierre had installed on the door of his unit. The court found that this installation was a modification of the common elements, because the door formed part of the condominium’s common property, even though it was associated with his unit. Under section 98 of the Condominium Act, any such modification requires the written approval of the condominium’s board and, generally, a formal agreement setting out responsibilities and conditions. Mr. Saint-Pierre admitted installing the camera and claimed he had done so to protect himself in light of heightened tensions and allegedly threatening behaviour from other residents. However, the court held that the evidentiary record did not support any exemption from the statutory requirements. The alleged threatening behaviour was either not proven by admissible evidence or, even if considered, did not displace the need to comply with section 98. As a result, Justice Rees concluded that Mr. Saint-Pierre had breached section 98 of the Condominium Act by installing the camera without the necessary written approval, and the corporation was entitled to an order requiring him to remove it.

Harassment, interference with peaceful enjoyment and balcony smoking

CCC 306 further alleged that Mr. Saint-Pierre had engaged in harassing and threatening behaviour that endangered the health and safety of residents and interfered with their peaceful enjoyment of the property. The pleaded conduct included a pattern of excessive communications and direct confrontations with board members. Mr. Saint-Pierre did not specifically deny many of the behaviours alleged; instead, he suggested that some incidents were exaggerated and responded with his own complaints about other residents. The court found that several aspects of his conduct met the threshold for harassment and interference with enjoyment. First, he communicated frequently and excessively with directors at their personal email addresses, contrary to rule 11 of CCC 306, which regulated how owners were to contact the board. Second, he knocked on the directors’ doors late at night and early in the morning and made repeated calls to their personal phones. Third, he parked his vehicle directly below the unit of the board president and sounded his horn loudly, contributing to a hostile atmosphere. Fourth, he displayed signs on his windshield visible to other residents, containing disparaging allegations about the board, such as statements that the directors were running an authoritarian building and describing a named director, Mr. Leroux, as “the malignment narcissistic and cult leader will bring down CCC306.” The court also accepted evidence that, on two occasions, Mr. Saint-Pierre blocked the entry and exit of the condominium parking lot for a significant period of time with his vehicle. Justice Rees held that this behaviour interfered with other owners’ comfort and peaceful enjoyment of the property. In addition, smoking presented a separate nuisance issue. While Mr. Saint-Pierre was covered by a “grandfather” clause allowing him to smoke inside his unit, the court found that this did not extend to his balcony, which is an exclusive-use common element. Smoking on the balcony was found to adversely affect neighbouring owners’ comfort and enjoyment, and therefore to breach the condominium’s rules and obligations concerning the use of common elements.

Treatment of counter-allegations and overall building tension

During the hearing, Mr. Saint-Pierre raised his own allegations regarding misconduct by other residents and board members, attempting to paint a broader picture of mutual hostility. However, he had not brought a counter-application, and the evidence presented in support of his allegations was not admissible in the form required for the court to make findings against others. Justice Rees therefore declined to reach any adverse conclusions about the behaviour of other residents or the board. The decision recognizes that the situation in the building had become tense, but attributes the core of that tension to Mr. Saint-Pierre’s own conduct, including the pattern of harassment, obstruction and non-compliance.

Costs, outcome and financial consequences

On the issue of costs, Justice Rees applied section 134(5) of the Condominium Act, which allows a condominium corporation that obtains a compliance order to have its costs against a unit owner added to that unit’s common expenses and also to seek recovery of additional, actual compliance-related costs beyond the court’s formal costs award. Guided by the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 1385 v. Skyline Executive Properties Inc., the judge assessed costs using the ordinary principles for costs awards and left the question of any further actual compliance expenses to be dealt with by the corporation through the common expenses mechanism. CCC 306 sought recovery of its actual legal costs, which totaled 36,482.43 $ including disbursements and HST. The court noted that the materials were generally well-prepared and included ten affidavits and a factum, but commented that not all affidavits were strictly necessary and some were redundant. To ensure overall reasonableness and proportionality, Justice Rees awarded partial indemnity costs in the amount of 18,000 $, all-inclusive, in favour of CCC 306. There is no separate quantified award of damages beyond this costs award, and any additional legal or compliance expenses potentially recoverable under section 134(5) are not specified in a particular dollar amount. In result, CCC 306 was the successful party, obtaining compliance relief in respect of the short-term rental violations, the unauthorized surveillance camera and the harassing and disruptive conduct, together with a monetary award of 18,000 $ in costs, with no further exact sum determinable from the decision for any additional charges that may later be added to the unit’s common expenses.