Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) over discrimination complaints against Meta was central, turning on whether Meta is a federally regulated telecommunications/Internet undertaking.
• The timeliness and good-faith nature of the applicant’s delayed request for reconsideration at the HRTO, including his decision to first approach the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC), was scrutinized.
• Evidentiary weight of the CHRC’s brief, unsigned email—stating it “did not appear” Meta was federally regulated—was assessed against established constitutional and tribunal jurisprudence.
• Application of constitutional division-of-powers principles and interjurisdictional immunity to determine whether a provincial human rights body can adjudicate complaints involving national and international Internet platforms.
• Reliance on prior HRTO and British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal decisions, as well as appellate and Supreme Court authority, to classify Internet services as telecommunications undertakings extending beyond provincial boundaries.
• Discretionary treatment of the motion to adduce fresh evidence on judicial review, which became moot once the court concluded the HRTO’s jurisdictional decision was correct and dismissed the application without costs.

Background and parties

The case arises from a human rights complaint brought by Gigi Trudel against Meta Platforms Inc., the operator of Facebook and Instagram. The applicant alleged that Meta improperly disabled his social media accounts on the basis of prohibited grounds under the Ontario Human Rights Code, namely gender expression, gender identity, sex, and sexual orientation. He filed his application with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) in March 2022 and sought to have Meta’s conduct examined as discriminatory under provincial human rights law. Meta opposed the complaint and later opposed the subsequent judicial review.

The initial HRTO process and jurisdictional issue

In January 2023, the HRTO issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the complaint. Among other points, the Tribunal flagged a key jurisdictional concern: Meta appeared to be a federally regulated entity. If Meta fell under federal jurisdiction as a telecommunications or similar undertaking, the HRTO, as a provincial tribunal, would lack subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the complaint. The HRTO invited written submissions focused specifically on this jurisdictional question, but the applicant’s February 2023 submissions largely addressed the merits of his discrimination allegations rather than the constitutional or institutional jurisdiction issue identified by the Tribunal.

In January 2024, Meta formalized the jurisdictional challenge and asked the HRTO to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The applicant replied in early February 2024, arguing that the HRTO did have jurisdiction because, in his view, Meta was a technology company, not a telecommunications company. The jurisdictional contest therefore centred on how Meta’s core activities should be characterized in constitutional terms: purely technological services or telecommunications/Internet undertakings crossing provincial borders.

The HRTO’s jurisdiction decision

On November 8, 2024, the HRTO issued a jurisdiction decision dismissing the complaint. It relied on its own prior jurisprudence in similar cases against Meta and Facebook to conclude that Meta’s services—delivered over the Internet and extending beyond provincial boundaries—placed Meta within federal jurisdiction and outside the HRTO’s statutory reach. From that point onward, the applicant’s recourse within the provincial human rights system was effectively foreclosed, triggering his efforts to find a different avenue for redress.

The applicant’s approach to the Canadian Human Rights Commission

Following the HRTO’s jurisdiction ruling, the applicant sought to engage the federal human rights regime. On January 7, 2025, he contacted the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC), alleging that Meta had violated his rights under the Canadian Human Rights Act. On February 20, 2024 (notably earlier in time than the HRTO’s reconsideration refusal but central to his later argument), the CHRC’s “complaint services” unit responded by email. The CHRC explained that its jurisdiction extends to organizations under federal authority and stated that it “did not appear” that the matters raised by the applicant involved a federally regulated body. On that basis, the CHRC concluded it was not the appropriate forum for his complaint.

This brief and unsigned email, which did not provide detailed legal analysis or authority, later became the cornerstone of the applicant’s attempt to have the HRTO revisit its jurisdictional ruling and was central to the Divisional Court’s assessment of the evidentiary record.

The HRTO reconsideration request and denial

After receiving the CHRC’s message, the applicant returned to the HRTO. On February 21, 2024, he requested reconsideration of the jurisdiction decision. He argued that the CHRC email constituted new and significant evidence showing that Meta was not under federal jurisdiction, and therefore that the HRTO had erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction.

The HRTO treated this reconsideration request through the lens of its Rules of Procedure. Under Rule 25.5.1, a reconsideration request filed more than 30 days after a decision can only be granted if the delay was incurred in good faith and there is no substantial prejudice. The applicant explained that he had first attempted to pursue his rights with the CHRC after the HRTO’s jurisdiction ruling, and that he brought his reconsideration request promptly once he received the CHRC’s negative response. He submitted that this sequence reflected good faith and that Meta would suffer no prejudice from the late reconsideration.

On June 9, 2025, the HRTO refused to reconsider its jurisdiction decision. The Tribunal emphasized that the applicant had known about the jurisdictional problem since at least January 31, 2024 (when Meta requested dismissal for lack of jurisdiction), but only contacted the CHRC on January 7, 2025—approximately 60 days after the November 8, 2024 jurisdiction decision. The HRTO concluded that he could have approached the CHRC earlier, that he had not pursued confirmation of jurisdiction with sufficient diligence, and that the delay was not shown to have been incurred in good faith. As a result, the HRTO declined to extend time and refused reconsideration.

The motion to adduce fresh evidence on judicial review

When the matter reached the Ontario Divisional Court, the applicant brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence in the judicial review proceeding. The proposed additional material included: a document asserting that Meta is not a telecommunications undertaking; the CHRC’s February 20 email (already in the HRTO record); and materials relating to the merits of his discrimination complaint against Meta.

Because judicial review is generally confined to the evidentiary record that was before the tribunal, the Court had to determine whether it should admit new material. However, as the panel ultimately decided the case on the correctness of the HRTO’s jurisdictional analysis, it found it unnecessary to rule substantively on the motion: once jurisdiction was resolved against the applicant, the additional materials would not alter the outcome.

The Divisional Court’s jurisdiction and issues

The Divisional Court confirmed its authority to hear the case under sections 2(1) and 6(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act. The panel structured its analysis around two central issues: whether the HRTO’s refusal to reconsider its jurisdiction decision—specifically its finding that the delay was not incurred in good faith—was reasonable; and whether the motion to adduce fresh evidence in the judicial review should be granted.

A threshold analytical step was determining the proper standard of review. On the question of delay and good faith in bringing a reconsideration request, the Court identified this as a question of mixed fact and law, to be reviewed for reasonableness. On the broader and more fundamental question of whether the HRTO had jurisdiction over complaints against Meta, however, the panel held that the standard was correctness. That conclusion rested on two factors: the decision implicated the jurisdictional boundaries between two tribunals (the HRTO and the CHRC) and raised a constitutional division-of-powers question about federal versus provincial authority over telecommunications and Internet undertakings.

Assessment of the delay and good faith in seeking reconsideration

The Court acknowledged that the applicant’s explanation for delay had merit. From the applicant’s perspective, once the HRTO held that it lacked jurisdiction, it was reasonable to explore whether the CHRC could hear his complaint instead. The 60-day gap between the HRTO’s jurisdiction decision and his contact with the CHRC did not, in the Court’s view, clearly demonstrate that he had abandoned or failed to pursue his rights. Rather, it could be seen as an understandable period of accepting the HRTO’s ruling and then turning to another forum. Once the CHRC advised that it, too, lacked jurisdiction, the applicant promptly sought reconsideration at the HRTO, which supported a good-faith narrative.

Despite recognizing the strength of this argument, the Divisional Court ultimately concluded that it need not decide whether the HRTO’s refusal to extend time for reconsideration was unreasonable. This is because, even if the applicant had met the standard for a late reconsideration request, the HRTO’s underlying jurisdictional ruling was, in the Court’s view, correct as a matter of constitutional law.

Constitutional and jurisdictional analysis

The Divisional Court turned to the more fundamental question: whether the HRTO had jurisdiction over the complaint, or whether Meta, given the nature of its Internet-based services, falls under exclusive federal jurisdiction.

The Court first noted that the HRTO’s powers are confined to those conferred by the Ontario Human Rights Code. While the Code itself does not expressly limit the HRTO’s authority to matters within provincial legislative competence, it is nonetheless a provincial statute. Under the Constitution Act, 1867 and the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, a provincial law—even one of general application—cannot impair the core of a federal head of power. That means a provincial human rights tribunal cannot extend its regulatory reach into areas that belong exclusively to Parliament, such as certain “works and undertakings” that operate across provincial or national boundaries.

Section 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives provinces authority over “Local Works and Undertakings” but carves out exceptions for those that connect multiple provinces or extend beyond provincial boundaries, including telegraphs and other works and undertakings that similarly cross borders. The jurisprudence has developed this concept to include broadcasting and telecommunications, including Internet signal transmission.

Drawing on a recent Quebec Court of Appeal decision, the panel observed that federal jurisdiction over telecommunications developed in cases involving transmission of radio signals, images, and Hertzian or other waves and logically extends to the emission, reception, and retransmission of Internet signals. The Supreme Court of Canada has also held that information transmitted over the Internet constitutes a telecommunication. Building on these authorities, the Court applied those principles to Meta’s services, which are provided over the Internet to users across provincial and national borders.

Meta as a federal Internet undertaking and effect on HRTO jurisdiction

On the basis of this constitutional and jurisprudential framework, the Divisional Court concluded that Meta provides services over the Internet that inherently extend beyond the territorial limits of Ontario. As such, Meta is an undertaking that falls within federal jurisdiction, not a “local work or undertaking” within provincial competence. This classification aligned with prior HRTO decisions—Liu v. Meta Platforms Inc., Hutcheson v. Meta Platforms Inc., and Libera v. Meta Platforms Inc.—and with the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal’s approach in Elson v. Facebook, Inc.

The Court also considered the broader legislative context. One of the stated purposes of the Canadian Human Rights Act is to prevent discrimination “within the purview of matters coming within the legislative authority of Parliament.” Parliament has in recent years enacted or proposed federal legislation aimed at regulating social media platforms, including the Online News Act and the proposed but not enacted Online Harms Act. This pattern reinforced the conclusion that social media platforms like Meta are to be considered within federal, not provincial, regulatory space.

Against this background, the CHRC’s brief email saying it “did not appear” that the complaint concerned a federally regulated body carried little persuasive value. It was unsigned, conclusory, and unsupported by reasons or references to law. It could not, in the Court’s view, outweigh the clear constitutional framework and the existing tribunal and appellate jurisprudence recognizing Internet-based communications services as telecommunications undertakings within federal jurisdiction. Consequently, the HRTO’s jurisdictional decision dismissing the complaint was correct.

Policy terms or contractual clauses

The decision does not revolve around specific contractual clauses or detailed policy wording, such as insurance or indemnity provisions. While the underlying dispute involved the disabling of Facebook and Instagram accounts, the Court’s reasoning does not analyze Meta’s platform terms of use or specific contractual language. Instead, the case turns on constitutional classification of Meta’s activities and the institutional jurisdiction of human rights bodies, rather than on interpretation of any particular policy term or clause governing the user–platform relationship.

Disposition, fresh evidence motion, and overall outcome

Having concluded that the HRTO correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction over the applicant’s complaint, the Divisional Court found it unnecessary to rule in detail on the motion to adduce fresh evidence. Even if some or all of the proposed materials were admitted, they could not change the key conclusion that Meta is a federal Internet undertaking, and therefore that the HRTO, as a provincial tribunal, could not adjudicate the complaint.

The application for judicial review was accordingly dismissed. The Court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs despite Meta’s success, meaning there was no award of costs or damages in favour of any party. In practical terms, Meta Platforms Inc. emerged as the successful party, and the total monetary amount granted or ordered in its favour was zero, as no damages, compensation, or costs were awarded and no precise monetary amount can be identified from the decision.