Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Corporate borrower’s repeated payment defaults under a third mortgage, including dishonoured cheques and missed interest and renewal fee instalments, triggered the lender’s contractual rights to accelerate the debt and seek possession.
• The mortgage’s standard charge terms and added fee provisions (renewal fee, NSF and administration fees, and advances to protect prior encumbrances) were central to quantifying the secured debt and enforcing remedies.
• The corporate defendant failed to deliver any responding materials or appear through counsel, resulting in deemed admissions of the pleaded facts and leaving the plaintiff’s evidence uncontradicted.
• The court applied Rule 20 summary judgment principles and found no genuine issue requiring a trial on liability or quantum, especially in light of the defendants’ delay and absence of a substantive defence.
• Evidence of payments made by the plaintiff to the first mortgagee and for condominium common expenses supported adding those amounts (with contractual interest) to the mortgage debt.
• The court concluded that the plaintiff met the test for summary judgment and was entitled to a money judgment, possession of the property, and full indemnity for its reasonable costs.

Background and parties

This case arises from a mortgage enforcement dispute in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice between a private lender and a corporate borrower over a condominium unit at 33 Shore Breeze Drive, Unit 2605, in Toronto. The plaintiff, 923944 Ontario Ltd., is an Ontario corporation based in Vaughan and engaged in mortgage lending through itself and a related company. Its president is Jasvir Dhillon. The defendant, 2466826 Ontario Inc. (referred to in the reasons as “246 ON”), is an Ontario corporation with its head office in Brampton. Its directing mind is Dwayne Linton, who also guaranteed the corporation’s obligations under the mortgage. A claim was initially brought under the name of a related lending corporation by mistake; once that error was discovered, that earlier action was discontinued and this new action was commenced in the correct plaintiff’s name.

The loan, mortgage and key terms

On or about February 27, 2024, the plaintiff advanced a $150,000 loan to 246 ON, secured by a third mortgage over the Shore Breeze Drive condominium unit. The mortgage was registered the same day. The payment structure was straightforward: monthly interest-only payments of $1,500 due on the first day of each month, with the first payment due April 1, 2024, the last regular payment due March 1, 2025, and the balance due in full on March 1, 2025. The standard charge terms of the mortgage were significant. Paragraph 10 provided that, upon default in payment of principal or interest, or in performance of any terms or conditions, the chargee (the lender) could enter and take possession of the mortgaged land. Beyond the basic payment terms, the mortgage also contained a schedule of additional fees and protective advances: an administrative fee of $250 for each cheque not honoured by the bank; a renewal fee of $7,000; an administrative fee of $1,000 for any payment the lender was required to make to another entity on behalf of the borrower; and a clause allowing the lender, in case of default, to pay insurance premiums, taxes, utilities and other charges, and to add those amounts to the principal with interest at the mortgage rate, making them immediately due and payable. After the initial term matured on March 1, 2025, the parties agreed to extend the mortgage for one year. That extension triggered the contractual renewal fee of $7,000, amortized as twelve monthly instalments of $625 payable on the first day of each month from April 1, 2025 to March 1, 2026.

Default and enforcement steps taken by the lender

The defendant quickly fell into arrears under both the mortgage and the renewal fee. It presented three cheques that the bank did not honour, resulting in defaults on the April 1 and May 1, 2025 monthly interest payments and on the May 1, 2025 instalment of the $625 renewal fee. Those dishonoured cheques in turn triggered the contractual NSF administration fee: the plaintiff sought $750, representing three $250 charges. Because of the partial non-payment, the defendant was left with an outstanding renewal fee balance of $6,375, and it did not make any further interest payments on the mortgage after March 1, 2025. On May 1, 2025, the plaintiff sent a demand letter. When the defendants did not cure the defaults or bring the account into good standing, the plaintiff commenced this action in May 2025. The lender also had to step in to protect the security and prevent further enforcement by prior-ranking creditors. After an additional default by the borrower on April 29, 2025, the plaintiff paid $3,173.56 to the first mortgagee, Equitable Bank. It added that amount to the mortgage debt with interest at 12% per annum from April 29, 2025, as contemplated by the protective advances clause of the mortgage, and also claimed the $1,000 administration fee for having to make this payment on the borrower’s behalf. Subsequently, the plaintiff made two further payments of $1,555.02 each to the first mortgagee on June 3 and June 27, 2025, to prevent default proceedings on the first mortgage. The borrower also failed to keep up with its condominium obligations: as of July 31, 2025, it was in default of common expense payments totalling $4,140.96. By the time the Statement of Claim was issued, the plaintiff calculated the amount owing under the mortgage at $165,832. As of December 1, 2025, accrued interest totalled $9,949.98, further increasing the debt.

Procedural history and the summary judgment motion

The claim was brought against both the corporate borrower and the personal guarantor, Mr. Linton. On June 27, 2025, Mr. Linton, acting personally, served a Statement of Defence. The record made clear that he understood a corporation must appear by counsel under the Rules of Civil Procedure unless the court grants leave; no such leave was obtained, and 246 ON never retained a lawyer. At a Civil Practice Court appearance on October 14, 2025, Justice Callaghan set an extended timetable for the delivery of motion materials, in part to give the defendants time to obtain counsel. The deadline for the defendants’ material was November 14, 2025, but nothing was filed. At a subsequent Civil Practice Court appearance on January 7, 2026, the defendants still had filed no motion materials. Mr. Linton advised the court he had made an assignment in bankruptcy on January 6, 2026, and the presiding judge, Justice Merritt, recorded that Mr. Linton was not making submissions on behalf of the company. The summary judgment motion was ordered to proceed as an opposed motion in writing. By the time the motion was argued, the plaintiff advised it was no longer proceeding against Mr. Linton personally and would continue only against the corporation. In the summary judgment reasons, the court therefore used “Defendant” to refer to 246 ON alone. The legal framework applied was Rule 20.04(2)(a), under which the court must grant summary judgment where there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence. The judge reiterated that the plaintiff, as moving party, had to first show there was no genuine issue for trial regarding enforcement of the mortgage and associated relief, at which point the onus would shift to the defendant to demonstrate a real chance of success. The court relied on the established authorities that require a judge to take a “hard look” at the record, and that emphasize that, on a summary judgment motion, a party opposing judgment “must lead trump or risk losing.” The modern approach, shaped by Hryniak v. Mauldin, focuses on whether summary judgment allows a fair and just determination on the merits in a proportionate, timely and cost-effective way, and recognizes the expanded fact-finding powers under Rule 20, including weighing evidence and drawing inferences on a paper record.

Assessment of the evidence and lack of defence

Justice Mathen found this case to be a straightforward matter of mortgage default, well suited to resolution by summary judgment on the written record. The plaintiff’s affidavits and exhibits provided a complete evidentiary basis to make the necessary findings of fact and apply the law, and there was no realistic prospect that a trial would add anything material. Critically, the corporate defendant filed no responding evidence at all, despite the extended deadline granted to allow it to retain counsel. Where a party fails to respond to a summary judgment motion with an affidavit, the court is entitled to infer that it cannot attest to facts necessary to support its position. In addition, the only pleading from the defence side was Mr. Linton’s personal Statement of Defence. That document contained only general denials and non-particularized assertions that the mortgage was “predatory” and that the initial misnaming of the corporate plaintiff showed bad faith, even though Mr. Linton had been represented by counsel at the time of the loan. The defence did not meaningfully engage with the specific defaults, the dishonoured cheques, or the amounts advanced by the lender to protect the property. The judge concluded that the defendants’ conduct, including delays, failure to file materials, and reliance on bare denials, indicated a strategy of avoiding the proceedings rather than mounting a bona fide defence. This behaviour further supported the conclusion that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Relief granted and outcome

In determining whether to grant the remedies sought, the court considered both the right to a money judgment on the mortgage covenant and the right to possession of the property. Under Rule 60.10, a writ of possession may only issue if all persons in actual possession of the land have received sufficient notice of the proceeding to allow them to seek relief from the court. The judge was satisfied on the record that proper notice had been provided. The corporate defendant, never having retained counsel, had effectively placed no defence before the court to answer the plaintiff’s detailed evidence. Justice Mathen treated the allegations in the Statement of Claim as deemed admissions by the corporation, buttressed by the affidavit of Mr. Dhillon. On that basis, the court found that the parties had entered into an initial mortgage for $150,000 containing an express right of possession upon default; that they had agreed to a one-year extension incorporating a $7,000 renewal fee; that the defendant had defaulted on both the mortgage payments and the renewal fee; that the plaintiff had been compelled to cover missed payments and other expenses, including payments to the first mortgagee and condominium arrears; and that the plaintiff had provided notice of its intention to seek possession. Those facts supported an order requiring payment of the monies owing of $178,889.62 together with interest at 12% per annum, and an order for possession of the mortgaged property. The plaintiff also sought its costs of the action. It filed a bill of costs showing 12.5 hours of work by counsel with 50 years’ experience at an hourly rate of $675, totalling $8,437.50 plus HST for a final figure of $9,534.37. The court reviewed the work, which included three Civil Practice Court attendances, preparation of the motion record and the factum, and found the costs reasonable. Justice Mathen therefore granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against 2466826 Ontario Inc., ordered the defendant to pay costs of $9,534.37 within 30 days, and directed that the plaintiff’s draft order issue subject to those terms. In result, the successful party was the lender, 923944 Ontario Ltd., in whose favour the court ordered a money judgment of $178,889.62, plus pre- and post-judgment interest at 12% per annum (the exact total interest cannot be determined from the reasons), and an additional $9,534.37 in costs, along with an order for possession of the mortgaged property.