Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Interpretation of Rule 4.04(2) and whether a plaintiff seeking renewal within 14 months must still prove reasonable efforts to notify or serve the defendant
• Adequacy of affidavit evidence describing attempts at personal service on the unserved defendant, Gregory Lee Hennigar
• Tension between timely notice to defendants and plaintiffs’ access to justice where an action has technically expired under Rule 4.04(1)
• Interaction between renewal inside 14 months (Rule 4.04(2)) and renewal after 14 months (Rule 4.04(6)), including differing evidentiary burdens and fairness considerations
• The extent to which inaction or minimal efforts by a plaintiff may amount to “inadvertence” and justify relief from expiry of an action
• Procedural use of motions by correspondence under Rule 27.03(1)(g) for routine renewal/extension applications

Factual background

Ural Link Ltd., operating as 2M7 Financial Solutions, commenced a civil action in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia under Rule 57 (Action for Damages Under $150,000). The plaintiff sought to recover a debt in the amount of $28,778.00 plus interest and costs from Hennigar Trucking Limited and two individual defendants, Drew Hennigar and Gregory Lee Hennigar. The claim is a commercial debt collection proceeding in which 2M7 Financial, acting as a creditor, sued a trucking company and its principals to recover unpaid sums. The action was filed on September 20, 2024. Within the first twelve months after filing, the plaintiff was able to personally serve two of the three defendants. Drew Hennigar was served on September 30, 2025, and Hennigar Trucking Limited was served on October 12, 2024. However, the third defendant, Gregory Lee Hennigar, was never personally served during that period. The file materials suggested that efforts may have been made to locate and serve Gregory on the same days as the other defendants, but this was never clearly established on the evidentiary record. The plaintiff later obtained default judgment against Hennigar Trucking Limited and Drew Hennigar on January 23, 2025, followed by an execution order against those same defendants on September 12, 2025. Those steps proceeded only against the two served defendants, leaving the claim against Gregory Lee Hennigar procedurally unresolved because of the absence of effective service.

Procedural history and expiry of the claim against Gregory Lee Hennigar

Under Rule 4.04(1) of the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules, an action expires one year after it is filed if no defendant has been notified of the proceeding in accordance with the service rules in Rule 31. Applying that provision, the claim against Gregory Lee Hennigar was deemed to have expired on September 20, 2025, one year after the action’s commencement, because he had not been personally served. Rule 4.04(2) permits a plaintiff to move to renew a notice of action for a second year “by filing a notice of motion no more than fourteen months after the day the notice of action is filed.” Relying on this provision, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion on October 1, 2025—within the permitted fourteen-month window—seeking to renew and extend the time for serving Gregory Lee Hennigar. To support the motion, counsel for the plaintiff swore an affidavit dated September 29, 2025. The affidavit stated only that “[a]ttempts were made to serve [the Defendant] Gregory Lee Hennigar between September 30, 2024 and October 12, 2024. Mr. Hennigar was not located. The Defendant Gregory Lee Hennigar has therefore not been served in this action.” No further details were provided as to the nature, frequency, or seriousness of the attempts to serve him, the addresses or locations checked, the process servers used, or any follow-up efforts after October 2024. On the court’s review of the file, it could be inferred—but not confirmed—that any attempts to serve Gregory may have coincided with the dates on which the other two defendants were successfully served. The court found that the affidavit did not adequately set out the factual foundation for the renewal relief sought.

Motion by correspondence and the use of Rule 27.03(1)(g)

The plaintiff also requested that the motion be determined by correspondence under Rule 27.03(1)(g). That rule permits motions to be made through written submissions where a judge allows it, and it is often used to handle routine or straightforward procedural matters in an efficient and cost-effective way. Justice Keith accepted that this type of motion—an application to extend time to serve or to renew an action—is generally suitable for determination by correspondence. He noted that such motions are common, can usually be resolved more effectively and inexpensively on the written record, and do not ordinarily require a full oral hearing. Accordingly, the court granted permission to proceed by correspondence in this case, recognizing that nothing in the circumstances justified departing from the usual practice for these types of procedural applications.

The plaintiff’s position on Rule 4.04(2)

The key legal dispute centred on how Rule 4.04(2) should be interpreted when a plaintiff seeks renewal within the fourteen-month period after filing. The plaintiff argued that where a motion is brought within that time frame, there is effectively no onus on the plaintiff to demonstrate reasonable efforts at personal service or to show that the action was diligently pursued in the first twelve months. In its written submissions, the plaintiff contended that Rule 4.04 draws a clear line between motions to renew inside the fourteen-month window and motions brought after that period. On the plaintiff’s view, the more demanding preconditions in Rule 4.04(6)—such as the requirement to show reasonable but unsuccessful efforts at personal service or to explain inadvertence and prejudice—apply only where the action has been allowed to remain expired for more than fourteen months. As long as the motion is filed within fourteen months, the plaintiff suggested that the court’s discretion is almost automatic or routine, such that minimal or even no evidence of efforts to notify the defendant would be sufficient. Under this approach, the plaintiff proposed that renewal within fourteen months should be granted virtually as of right.

The court’s interpretation of Rule 4.04 and the obligation to act

Justice Keith rejected the plaintiff’s interpretation and held that it was inconsistent with both the text and purpose of Rule 4.04, as well as broader principles of civil procedure. He emphasized that commencing a civil action is a serious matter: it involves leveling allegations against a defendant and may ultimately lead to a court order enforceable with the assistance of the state. Because of these serious consequences, a defendant is entitled to timely knowledge of the claim through reasonable efforts at service. The court underlined that the twelve-month expiry rule in Rule 4.04(1) exists to prevent actions from languishing without the defendant having any notice. It thereby encourages diligence on the plaintiff’s part and protects the integrity of evidence and full disclosure obligations, as documents and witnesses are less likely to be lost or compromised when defendants know about proceedings in a timely manner. At the same time, the judge recognized that plaintiffs should not be held to an unduly harsh standard: the rules must strike a balance between requiring reasonably prompt notice and preserving access to justice. In that light, Justice Keith found that Rule 4.04(2) does not create a no-questions-asked renewal for plaintiffs who happen to apply within fourteen months. Rather, plaintiffs must present at least some evidence that they took reasonable steps to advance the action within the first year, such as attempting personal service under Rule 31, demonstrating that the defendant was otherwise made aware of the action, or showing reasonable efforts to engage with the defendant or its insurer for possible resolution. The judge described the threshold as “low but not nothing.” A plaintiff may not have to do much to satisfy the rule, but it cannot do literally nothing and still expect renewal.

Relationship between renewal within fourteen months and renewal after fourteen months

The decision also situates Rule 4.04(2) within the broader structure of Rule 4.04. Under Rule 4.04(6), a plaintiff seeking renewal more than fourteen months after filing faces more stringent preconditions. Paragraph 4.04(6)(a) requires proof of reasonable but unsuccessful efforts at personal service and a commitment to promptly seek substituted service, while paragraph 4.04(6)(b) requires a showing of inadvertence, serious prejudice to the plaintiff if the claim is terminated, and absence of uncompensable serious prejudice to the defendant. Justice Keith observed that these stricter requirements reflect the greater passage of time and the heightened risk of prejudice to defendants after an extended delay. They are intended for cases where efforts at service have not been sufficient even to support substituted service. If Rule 4.04(2) were read as placing no obligation on a plaintiff to show any efforts within the first twelve months, the overall scheme of Rule 4.04 would become incoherent and unfair. It would allow plaintiffs to file a claim, take virtually no steps for up to two years, and then resuscitate the action by filing a perfunctory motion while offering no explanation for the delay. The court pointed out that such an interpretation would reward inaction for some plaintiffs but not others, depending purely on when they bring their motion. Instead, the judge held that all plaintiffs are subject to a baseline expectation of reasonable efforts during the first twelve months, and that Rule 4.04(2) must be applied in a manner that promotes efficient, proportionate proceedings consistent with Rule 1.01 and the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in Hyrniak v. Mauldin.

Evidentiary standards and the treatment of inadvertence

Justice Keith further clarified how inadvertence and renewed actions should be approached when a plaintiff seeks relief promptly after expiry but within the fourteen-month window. In his view, Rule 4.04(2) relief remains available even where a plaintiff has failed to take reasonable steps before the claim expired, provided that the plaintiff moves quickly once the expiry is recognized. However, if a plaintiff comes to the court in that situation, the evidentiary burden is somewhat higher than in a case where there is at least some evidence of efforts to serve. The court may examine whether there is a credible explanation for the inadvertence, whether the action has otherwise been moved forward (so it did not simply lie dormant), and what the plaintiff’s concrete plan is for advancing the matter if renewal is granted. This approach is less onerous than the full prejudice analysis required under Rule 4.04(6), but it serves to remind delinquent plaintiffs that expiry is a serious procedural consequence and that they bear responsibility for the pace of the litigation. By structuring the analysis this way, the court aims to maintain fairness to defendants while providing limited, proportionate relief to plaintiffs who act relatively promptly after realizing their mistake.

Application to 2M7 Financial’s motion and the outcome

When these principles were applied to 2M7 Financial’s motion, the court concluded that the existing evidentiary record was insufficient to properly assess the request to renew the action against Gregory Lee Hennigar. The single, bare assertion that attempts were made to serve him between two specified dates, without any supporting particulars, did not allow the court to determine whether reasonable efforts had actually been made or whether any inaction was excusable. Nonetheless, Justice Keith recognized that case law on Rule 4.04(2) is sparse and that further clarification of its operation is important. In the circumstances, rather than dismissing the motion outright, the court took an exceptional step. It granted the plaintiff leave to file additional affidavits and written submissions providing fuller details of its efforts to serve or otherwise engage with Gregory Lee Hennigar, or explaining what was done and why. The judge set a deadline of October 22, 2025, for this further material and indicated that he would remain seized of the motion to decide it once a complete record was before the court.

Successful party and monetary result

In this interlocutory ruling, there is no clearly defined successful party on the central issue of renewing the action against Gregory Lee Hennigar. The plaintiff, Ural Link Ltd. (2M7 Financial), obtained procedural relief in two respects: permission to have its motion proceed by correspondence and leave to supplement the evidentiary record. However, it did not secure an order actually granting renewal or extending time to serve Gregory, and the substantive outcome of the renewal motion remains undecided. The decision does not grant or quantify any monetary award, damages, or costs; the only specific amount mentioned is the underlying claim for $28,778.00 plus interest and costs, which reflects what the plaintiff is seeking, not what has been ordered in this particular ruling. While default judgment and an execution order were previously obtained against Hennigar Trucking Limited and Drew Hennigar, this decision does not state the exact amounts obtained under those earlier steps. Accordingly, based on this judgment alone, the total monetary award, damages, and costs in favour of any successful party cannot be determined, and no new monetary relief is ordered in this decision.