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Plaintiff Kathryn Eaton sought certification of a proposed class action alleging an industry-wide conspiracy among generic drug manufacturers to fix prices and allocate the market in Canada, seeking $5 billion in damages under sections 45 and 46 of the Competition Act.
The Statement of Claim, amended four times and exceeding 700 paragraphs, failed to plead with sufficient particularity the acts of each alleged co-conspirator, relying instead on bald assertions and vague generalizations.
Evidence from U.S. deferred prosecution agreements and litigation was found insufficient to establish that the alleged conspiracy extended into Canada, given the distinct regulatory frameworks governing generic drug markets in each country.
Expert evidence from Dr. Pakes opined only that the Canadian market was "conducive to collusion," falling short of providing some basis in fact that a conspiracy actually occurred in Canada.
Defendants demonstrated that Canada's regulatory framework—including provincially-set formulary prices and the pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance pricing regime—independently explains why manufacturers price at the maximum formulary level and compete through off-invoice discounts to pharmacies.
The Court dismissed the certification motion without leave to amend, finding the Plaintiff failed four of five certification criteria: reasonable cause of action, common issues, preferable procedure, and suitable representative plaintiff.
The facts of the case
Kathryn Eaton, a resident of Toronto, Ontario who worked as a director of operations and human resources for a digital marketing company, filed a proposed class action in the Federal Court of Canada on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased generic drugs out-of-pocket or through private drug plans in Canada from January 1, 2012 onward. She named a very large number of generic drug companies as defendants, encompassing several distinct corporate groups operating across North America. Ms. Eaton alleged that the defendants conspired to allocate the market and fix the prices of generic drugs throughout Canada and the United States, contrary to sections 45 and 46 of the Competition Act. She sought $5,000,000,000 in damages for the proposed class.
The alleged conspiracy and its mechanisms
According to the plaintiff, the defendants conspired to fix drug prices in Canada at the maximum formulary price—the highest amount that public and private insurers would reimburse. The conspiracy was allegedly facilitated through off-invoice discounts, which the plaintiff described as illegal and anti-competitive "kickbacks" to pharmacies and wholesalers. She claimed that some defendants agreed not to sell a particular drug in exchange for a larger market share of another drug, or to sell fewer pharmaceutical products in Canada in exchange for a larger market share in the United States. The plaintiff asserted the conspiracy was maintained through oral agreements, two-way communications, and regular attendance by executives and employees at conferences, dinners, and golf outings. She noted that in the United States, several parent companies of the defendants—including Taro Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc., Sandoz Inc., Apotex Corp., Heritage Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.—had entered into deferred prosecution agreements and admitted to anti-competitive price fixing and market allocation in that country. However, none of the U.S. deferred prosecution agreements mentioned Canada.
The plaintiff's evidence
The plaintiff's evidence consisted of her own brief affidavit, the affidavits of Laurie Graham and Alexander Mulligan, and the expert reports of Dr. Michael Law and Dr. Ariel Pakes. Dr. Law, a Professor at the Centre for Health Services and Policy Research, School of Population and Public Health, University of British Columbia, opined that the Canadian generic drug market was concentrated among a few large companies and that list prices tended to be set at the maximum allowable ceiling despite manufacturers' ability to price lower. Dr. Pakes, a Professor of Economics at Harvard University, concluded that the Canadian generic drug market was "conducive to collusion" due to characteristics such as inelastic pricing, little to no differentiation in quality or features across manufacturers, and the ability of manufacturers to monitor quantities and prices. Notably, Dr. Pakes confirmed during cross-examination that he was not asked to determine whether generic drug companies in Canada did in fact collude to fix prices or allocate the market.
The defendants' evidence and the Canadian regulatory framework
The defendants presented extensive evidence through industry witnesses and their own experts—Dr. Aidan Hollis, Dr. Gregory Bell, and Dr. James Levinsohn—demonstrating that Canada's regulatory framework independently explained the pricing behaviour the plaintiff characterized as conspiratorial. Witnesses Barbara Pimentel of Taro Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Eric Vincent of Pharmascience Inc. described a highly regulated market in which generic drugs required separate Health Canada approval, with no reciprocity between the Canadian and U.S. drug approval processes. Generic products produced for the U.S. market could not generally be sold in Canada, and vice versa. Since 2014, the provinces collaborated through the pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance to establish a collective generic drug pricing framework. List prices were effectively capped at the regulated formulary price, and manufacturers competed for pharmacy business by offering off-invoice discounts, competitive customer service, and other incentive arrangements. The defendants' experts explained that lowering list prices below the formulary maximum would actually harm pharmacies—since reimbursement levels would drop correspondingly—and thus reduce a manufacturer's competitiveness. This meant generic manufacturers had rational, non-collusive reasons to price at the maximum formulary level. The Competition Bureau's own 2007 study had confirmed that off-invoice discounts were the critical feature of competition in generic drug markets, and a 2018 Conference Board of Canada study reached similar conclusions.
The court's analysis of certification criteria
The Honourable Mr. Justice Fothergill assessed the plaintiff's motion against the five certification criteria under Rule 334.16(1) of the Federal Courts Rules. On the question of reasonable cause of action, the Court found that despite the Statement of Claim exceeding 700 paragraphs, it did not contain sufficient particulars of the acts of each alleged co-conspirator. The pleading failed to identify which specific defendants participated in which aspects of the conspiracy, relying instead on broad, undifferentiated allegations. Many of the allegations appeared to have been derived from U.S. legal proceedings, with no material facts supporting the assertion that the conspiracy extended into Canada. The plaintiff also failed to adequately plead that all defendants were competitors with respect to the same products, as required by section 45 of the Competition Act. Similarly, the claim under section 46 regarding foreign directives merely repeated the statutory language without pleading any material facts. The Court also found that numerous defendants had been improperly named, as no material facts supported the assertion that they ever sold generic drugs in Canada.
Common issues, preferable procedure, and representative plaintiff
Turning to common issues, the Court held that the plaintiff's evidence failed to establish some basis in fact for the alleged conspiracy. Documentation from U.S. litigation did not suggest the conspiracy extended into Canada, and expert evidence that the market was merely "conducive to collusion" could not constitute evidence that collusion actually occurred. Regarding preferable procedure, the Court found that absent certifiable common issues, a class action could not be the preferable procedure. On the question of suitable representative plaintiff, the Court noted the litigation plan was boilerplate and superficial, failing to grapple with the foreseeable difficulties of an action of this scale and complexity.
The ruling and outcome
The Federal Court dismissed the motion to certify the proceeding as a class action without leave to amend, finding that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy four of the five certification criteria. The defendants prevailed entirely in resisting certification. Consistent with the plaintiff's own concession during oral submissions, the action was also dismissed with prejudice against sixteen specifically named defendants—including several Bausch Health, Valeant, Lannett, Upsher-Smith, and Perrigo entities—for whom no cause of action had been established. Consistent with Rule 334.39, the Court made no order as to costs against any party. No exact monetary amount was awarded, as the action was dismissed in its entirety and the plaintiff's claim of $5 billion in damages was not adjudicated on the merits.
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Plaintiff
Defendant
Court
Federal CourtCase Number
T-607-20Practice Area
Competition lawAmount
Not specified/UnspecifiedWinner
DefendantTrial Start Date
04 June 2020