Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Municipal drafting error in zoning by-law 371-2019 and whether that mistake could deprive the owner of her intended right to build two trifamilial buildings in zone H-19.
• Extent of the municipality’s duty of diligence and information in processing a construction and subdivision permit, including failures to warn the applicant of non-conformity, procedural steps, and risks.
• Evidence of bad faith and procedural unfairness in the council’s urgent repeal and replacement of the prior zoning regime (by-law 412-2021) in response to neighbor opposition to a specific project.
• Application of the doctrine of substantially complete and conforming permit applications, rights crystallized before a new zoning measure, and the relevance of legitimate expectations.
• Proof of multiple administrative faults by municipal officials (misleading reassurances, sewer-connection agreement and costly works before clarifying zoning) engaging civil liability.
• Determination that the new by-law is inopposable to the applicant, recognition of her right to proceed under the earlier regime, and reservation of a separate phase to quantify damages and monetary relief.

Factual background and the development proposal

Isabelle Jean and her partner, recent residents of the municipality of Saint-Stanislas-de-Kostka, identified a property on Chemin du Canal (the “Lot”) in 2019 and envisioned a modest residential development intended to provide affordable housing for families near the local waterfront. At that time, the Lot, located in zone H-19, was governed by zoning by-law 330-2018, which allowed only “habitations unifamiliales” (single-family dwellings) and “bâtiments isolés” (isolated buildings). To proceed, Ms. Jean retained an architect, Colin Fraser, to design two “maisons de ville” (townhouse-style) buildings, each containing three units—one building per subdivided lot. While “maison de ville” was not a defined term in the zoning by-law, the contemplated structures functionally corresponded to what the regulation called a “bâtiment en rangée”: a principal building joined to at least two others, forming a set of three or more, with shared or contacting walls and each building on one or more lots. Ms. Jean then filed a formal zoning amendment request (May 2019), attaching Fraser’s sketches and a site plan that clearly showed two three-unit buildings in row form after subdivision. She paid a $1,500 fee for this rezoning request, which was never reimbursed. The municipality’s planning director, Julie Rivard, prepared draft by-law 371-2019 to modify zoning by-law 330-2018 so that “habitations trifamiliales” would be permitted uses in zone H-19. The intent, as later confirmed in testimony by municipal officials, was explicitly to allow Ms. Jean’s two three-unit buildings. Council members reviewed Fraser’s drawings in caucus and, believing they were authorizing row-type trifamilial units to meet local housing needs, unanimously advanced the draft. After a public participation process—held under the municipality’s then-existing public participation policy adopted pursuant to the Act respecting land use planning and development (LAU)—council adopted by-law 371-2019 in November 2019. A certificate of conformity from the regional county municipality followed, and the by-law came into force in December 2019. However, unintentionally, the definitional section of by-law 330-2018 was not amended. The only operative definition remained “habitation trifamiliale isolée”: a three-unit building on a single lot, with at least two units stacked vertically and the building itself isolated from neighboring principal buildings. This drafting omission later became the technical basis for the municipality’s refusal.

Permit applications, municipal requirements and early steps

In February 2020, Ms. Jean filed a construction permit application, including detailed building plans prepared by Fraser. These plans matched the earlier concept: two three-unit townhouse-style buildings in row form, one per future lot. The municipality’s internal checklist identified several required elements: the construction permit form, architect-signed plans and specifications, subdivision of the Lot so there would not be two principal buildings on a single parcel, a site plan by a land surveyor, as well as forms for sewer connection and for the wells to serve the buildings. In March 2020, Ms. Rivard wrote to Ms. Jean explaining that the Lot had to be subdivided, that a surveyor-signed implantation plan was required, and that additional forms had to be completed regarding sewer connection (with a 50% contribution to public works) and wells. The pandemic then slowed matters, and initial attempts to retain a surveyor failed. In October 2020, Ms. Jean retained surveyor Éric Coulombe to prepare the subdivision and implantation plans. By late October and early November 2020, the surveyor submitted subdivision documentation to the municipality and Ms. Jean personally delivered: the replacement cadastral plan, the lot subdivision permit form, the well form (later lost in the municipality’s deficient records system), and the sewer connection agreement form. The court noted broader systemic record-keeping failures: missing forms, partial internal files, and late discovery of key documents, all of which supported a more flexible approach to proof (including reliance on testimonial evidence under article 2860 C.c.Q.).

Minor variance request and early internal doubts

An interim inspector, Lienza Tagliabracci, advised Ms. Jean that there might be an issue involving a nearby watercourse and proposed a minor variance (dérogation mineure) to allow subdivision and building close to that purported feature. Ms. Jean filed a general minor variance application in November 2020, paid a $100 fee, and explained her project in broad terms. The planning advisory committee (CCU) reviewed the request in December 2020. The committee’s minutes focused on subdivision and the construction of “unifamiliales jumelées” (semi-detached single-family homes) in a sector where only isolated single-family dwellings were said to be permitted, and it recommended refusal, on the basis that such development would be disharmonious with the surrounding area. The watercourse issue itself was not addressed; later, it would be determined that no such adjacency existed and that no variance on that point was necessary. Ms. Jean was never informed of the CCU’s negative recommendation, and her $100 fee was never refunded. Around this time, Ms. Tagliabracci realized that, under the unchanged definitions in by-law 330-2018, trifamilial buildings in row form (comme en rangée) were not actually authorized. She told interim director general Jean Robidoux that Ms. Jean believed her zoning issue had been resolved, but neither she nor he informed Ms. Jean of the discovery. Instead, Mr. Robidoux prepared a draft amending by-law to correct the definition so that row-type unifamilial dwellings in row (habitations unifamiliales en rangée) would be explicitly allowed in zone H-19, matching council’s original intention.

Communications with professionals and ongoing reassurances

In early 2021, contract inspector Mathieu Senécal informed surveyor Coulombe that row-type trifamilial buildings were not permitted under the current zoning text. Coulombe considered this an interpretation issue that could be solved by redesigning the buildings so that at least two units would be vertically stacked, thereby fitting the “trifamiliale isolée” definition. He believed such revisions were feasible within about a week, but his later attempts to confirm acceptability and obtain direction from the municipality went unanswered. Meanwhile, Fraser’s original house-type remained the guiding design. Throughout this period, councillor Jean-François Gendron repeatedly reassured Ms. Jean and her partner that the project was aligned with council’s vision and was progressing; they were told that “the project will go ahead” and that the municipality was working to regularize any technical issues. These reassurances, coming from municipal decision-makers and professional staff, solidified Ms. Jean’s reliance on the regulatory path being pursued.

Sewer connection agreement and substantial expenditures

In March 2021, the municipality’s interim director general, Mr. Robidoux, sent Ms. Jean’s partner a draft agreement for connecting the Lot to the municipal sewer system. Rather than relying on septic installations—which remained technically possible in the zone but were politically unpopular and problematic given a prior case on a neighboring lot—the municipality insisted on connection to the nearby municipal sewer line, facilitated by existing engineering plans from the prior owner. The agreement was signed on March 23, 2021, accompanied by a security deposit of $13,443, payable to the municipality and refundable upon successful completion and approval of the works. On March 29, 2021, council unanimously approved the agreement by resolution. Shortly thereafter, substantial works—approximately $100,000 in costs borne by a company owned by Ms. Jean’s partner in partnership with a licensed contractor—were carried out to physically connect the property to the municipal network. As the court later underscored, the usual best practice is to finalize sewer connection agreements only after the construction permit has been issued, to avoid the exact scenario that unfolded: sunk infrastructure costs for a project whose permitting was still uncertain.

Regulatory shift: Abrogation of participation policy and new draft by-law

Also in March 2021, the municipality adopted by-law 402-2021, which repealed its 2018 public participation policy in land-use matters. Council members stated they had not fully appreciated that, under that policy and LAU articles 80.1 and 80.2, certain amendments were shielded from referendary approval. With the repeal, referendary mechanisms were effectively revived for future urban planning measures. Ms. Jean was never informed of the abrogation or its implications for her project. On March 29, 2021—the same day it approved the sewer agreement—council also tabled a notice of motion and draft by-law 407-2021. This draft by-law would formally amend the zoning definitions to allow unifamilial dwellings in row in zone H-19, thereby correcting the earlier drafting gap and regularizing Ms. Jean’s planned row-type structures. The stated intent in the draft preamble was to adjust the use grid in zone H-19 so that unifamilial row dwellings would be a permitted category and to add a specific definition for “habitation unifamiliale en rangée.” This measure was designed to align the text with the practical vision already promoted to Ms. Jean and to the community.

Extraordinary meeting, neighbor opposition and blocking regulation

In late April and early May 2021, neighbors expressed their opposition to Ms. Jean’s project. Councillor Gendron forwarded written comments from the public to Ms. Jean on May 1, but he did not inform her of the full procedural stakes. Unbeknownst to her, an extraordinary council meeting was convened for May 3, 2021, with the statutory minimum of three days’ notice. The agenda included two key items: withdrawal of draft by-law 407-2021 and adoption of a new draft, by-law 412-2021, amending the zoning grid and definitions to restrict development in zone H-19 more tightly and effectively block Ms. Jean’s project. The court later found that Mr. Robidoux candidly acknowledged the purpose of the extraordinary meeting when asked at trial: it was “to block Ms. Jean’s project.” At the May 3 meeting, council withdrew the corrective 407-2021 and adopted the first draft of 412-2021. The mayor, when asked why an urgent extraordinary session had been called, answered that the law allowed such a step and it was necessary to react quickly to neighbor opposition. She also took care to state publicly that the notice of motion accompanying 412-2021 froze all pending permit applications, including Ms. Jean’s. Ms. Jean, her architect, and her surveyor were not notified of the meeting, its purpose, or its potential impact; she learned of the outcome only the next morning when a neighbor sent her the video recording. Earlier that same day (May 3, at 10:21 a.m.), architect Fraser had emailed inspector Senécal with a sketch proposing a revised design: one unit on two floors, and the other two units stacked vertically, structured to match the existing “habitation trifamiliale isolée” definition. He asked if he could modify the plans accordingly. The municipality never answered his email.

Litigation: relief sought and procedural steps

Alarmed by the unexpected regulatory pivot and the effective freezing of her permit application, Ms. Jean instructed counsel to send a formal demand letter to the municipality, asking it to issue the construction permit on the basis that her application was substantively complete. Her partner sought a meeting with Mr. Robidoux to resolve the matter amicably; the director general replied that council would decide whether to meet in light of the demand letter. The next day, he advised that council had instead referred the file to external counsel and that there would be no meeting. On May 25, 2021, municipal counsel responded formally, stating that Ms. Jean’s permit application had never been conforming under the applicable zoning. Separately, inspector Senécal had been instructed not to issue the subdivision permit, even though there was ultimately no legal impediment to subdivision. In June 2021, Ms. Jean filed proceedings in the Superior Court of Québec seeking: a declaration that the notice of motion for 412-2021 was inopposable to her; an order to issue the construction permit; and related declaratory and mandamus-type relief. In July 2021, she amended to add a claim for damages, ultimately quantified at $788,500, “to be perfected.” In December 2023, by consent, the court ordered the damages portion of the proceeding severed (scinded), so that the trial now addressed only her right to build, the lawfulness of the regulations, and the municipality’s liability, with the quantum of damages to follow in a separate phase. Additional amendments to the pleading were authorized to respond to defenses, including late-raised arguments about unpaid permit fees, missing authorizations, and environmental certificates.

Legal framework: prescription, municipal liability and permit rights

On prescription, the municipality invoked article 1112.1 of the Code municipal, which imposes a six-month limitation period for actions in damages against a municipality, subject to a prior written notice. The court held that the cause of action did not arise at the time of the erroneous adoption of by-law 371-2019, because that event alone created no immediate damage to Ms. Jean. Instead, damage manifested when the municipality formally refused to issue the construction permit through counsel’s letter of May 25, 2021, which served as the triggering date for prescription. In addition, Ms. Jean had sent two prior demand letters, satisfying the notice requirement, and the damages claim was added within six months of that manifest injury. The court further held that her initial mandamus-type recourse interrupted prescription for all rights arising from the same source (art. 2896 C.c.Q.), following established appellate precedents. Turning to municipal liability, the court distinguished between legislative (regulatory) and operational (administrative) functions. Under Canadian and Québec case law (including Sibeca and Mackin), a municipality enjoys a relative immunity regarding the mere adoption of regulations, being liable only for bad faith or irrationality. However, in its operational sphere—issuing permits, giving advice, processing applications—it is bound by the general duty of care under article 1457 C.c.Q. Municipal officials must act diligently, provide accurate and complete information, and apply the by-law with reasonable competence. In this case, the court found: a clear drafting error in 371-2019 that failed to implement council’s actual intent; a failure by staff to detect and communicate that error in a timely manner; continued reassurances to Ms. Jean that her project was feasible and compatible with policy goals; the unusual and risky decision to sign and implement a sewer connection agreement (involving substantial construction works) before issuance of the construction permit; and long delays and omissions in formally notifying her of any alleged incompleteness or non-conformity of her application, contrary to the municipality’s own permit by-law, which required that an applicant be informed within 30 days whether a complete application was conforming or refused, with written reasons.

Bad faith, procedural fairness and the impugned regulation

On the legislative side, the court examined whether the adoption of by-law 412-2021—in tandem with withdrawal of 407-2021—was done in good faith and for legitimate public-interest reasons, or whether it was an improper, targeted use of regulatory power to defeat a specific individual’s project in response to neighbor pressure. Drawing on Supreme Court and Québec Court of Appeal jurisprudence concerning quasi-judicial uses of by-law powers, procedural fairness in such contexts, and misuse of zoning to resolve individual disputes, the court held that, in this situation, council’s function had shifted from a broad legislative role to something more akin to an adjudicative or quasi-judicial one. The evidence was that the extraordinary May 3 meeting was convened specifically “to block Ms. Jean’s project,” that neighbor complaints triggered the reversal of position, and that Ms. Jean was not given any meaningful opportunity to be heard, despite extensive prior reassurance and involvement by municipal officials. The municipality complied with the minimum statutory notice for an extraordinary session, but did not attempt to ensure that Ms. Jean, her counsel, or her professionals were even aware of the measures that would directly and uniquely affect her property. Council did not openly ground its change of course in broader planning concerns; rather, the timing, the content of the new by-law, and the abrupt withdrawal of the corrective measure suggested a reaction to neighborhood opposition to one identified project. The court concluded that these circumstances rebutted any presumption of good faith and demonstrated bad faith in the adoption of 412-2021. As a result, the by-law was declared inopposable to Ms. Jean’s project.

Completeness and conformity of the permit application

The court then considered whether Ms. Jean’s construction permit application was sufficiently complete and conforming at the relevant time to crystallize her rights against later zoning changes. Relying on the Boyd Builders line of authority, as developed in Québec case law, the court reiterated that an owner has a prima facie right to use their property consistent with the law in force when a substantially complete and conforming permit application is filed. Later rezonings cannot defeat that right unless three conditions are met: (a) a clear intent to restrict or rezone exists before the permit application; (b) council acts in good faith; and (c) council proceeds with reasonable dispatch. Here, before Ms. Jean’s application, there was no such restrictive intent; the council’s intention was, in fact, to enable her development. Good faith, as already found, was lacking in the subsequent regulatory maneuvers. While council acted quickly to adopt the new by-law, speed alone was not enough; all three conditions had to be met, and they were not. On completeness, the municipality argued that Ms. Jean had not paid the $75 permit fee, had not obtained a tree-cutting permit, and had not yet secured an environmental certificate of authorization (CA) under the Environment Quality Act. The court considered these objections pretextual. The payment of the modest fee was normally made at the time of permit issuance, not application; Ms. Jean had never been asked to pay it and had already paid more significant sums (including the $100 minor-variance fee and the sewer deposit). The CA fell within provincial jurisdiction: its absence at this stage did not prevent the municipality from issuing a building permit, especially given ongoing environmental characterization efforts and the prospect of a positive decision from the Ministry. The tree-cutting permit was an ancillary local measure; there was no indication it would be refused, and the municipality had long known the Lot was wooded and had even reviewed revised plans minimizing tree clearing. The court characterized these alleged defects as minor irregularities or red herrings—issues that could and should have been addressed through normal iterative processing rather than as grounds for blocking the project. On strict conformity, however, the court acknowledged that the original plans were not textually compatible with the uncorrected definition in by-law 330-2018: they depicted row-type trifamilial buildings, not “isolated” ones with vertically stacked units. Moreover, Fraser’s late May 3 sketch, while conceptually aligned with the definition, lacked the level of detail required of fully execution-ready plans. Strictly speaking, the application was therefore not yet both fully complete and conforming at the critical moment.

Legitimate expectations and remedial approach

At this juncture, the court turned to the doctrine of legitimate expectations and analogous reasoning from prior cases. Ms. Jean had been consistently reassured by municipal officers and an elected councillor that her project was aligned with the intent of the regulatory environment, that necessary amendments were being advanced specifically to allow her townhouses, and that the project was moving forward. She had invested significantly in architectural plans, surveying, and, crucially, in sewer infrastructure works explicitly required and authorized by the municipality before any final permit. Her surveyor and architect attempted in good faith to adjust their plans to fit the existing definitions and sought guidance from inspectors who either did not respond or were instructed not to engage. In these circumstances, the court held that it would be a denial of justice to allow the municipality’s own drafting negligence and subsequent bad-faith regulatory maneuvering to extinguish Ms. Jean’s ability to realize her project under the earlier, intended framework. Drawing inspiration from decisions such as Blackwell v. Barkmere, where a municipality’s conduct had created a reasonable expectation that the old by-law would apply, the court concluded that Ms. Jean was entitled to proceed under the regime that prevailed before the May 3, 2021 notice of motion for 412-2021, even though a perfect mandamus for the original row-housing plans was not possible because the definition had never been formally corrected in that manner.

Policy terms and relevant regulatory clauses

The key regulatory and policy instruments at issue were: zoning by-law 330-2018, including the definitional clause for “habitation trifamiliale isolée” (three-unit building on a single lot, at least two units vertically stacked, with separate or common entrances and isolated from neighboring principal buildings); zoning amending by-law 371-2019, which adjusted the use grid in zone H-19 to allow “habitations trifamiliales” but failed to update the core definition to reflect row-type typology; the municipality’s public participation policy by-law (352-2018) adopted under LAU articles 80.1 and 80.2, which removed certain amendments from referendary approval in exchange for robust participatory mechanisms; and its later repeal in 402-2021, restoring the possibility of referendary approvals and thereby changing the political risk landscape for Ms. Jean’s corrective amendment. Additionally, the municipal permit and certificate by-law set out the process and timeline for examining compliance and required the designated officer to notify the applicant within 30 days of a complete application whether it was conforming or refused, and, in case of refusal, to provide written reasons. Zoning by-law 412-2021, whose specific text is less central than its effect and the circumstances of its adoption, reset the rules in zone H-19 to a more restrictive regime, targeting, in practice, the very type of multifamily development Ms. Jean sought to build.

Final orders and outcome

The court allowed Ms. Jean’s action in part and issued a set of structured declaratory and mandatory orders: it declared that zoning by-law 412-2021 was adopted in bad faith and is inopposable to Ms. Jean; it declared that she has the right to erect two trifamilial units on the subdivided Lot in conformity with by-law 371-2019 as it stood before May 3, 2021; it authorized her to file, within 90 days of judgment, building plans substantially similar to architect Fraser’s revised trifamilial designs (P-47), along with an implantation plan respecting setback and driveway rules; it ordered the municipality to examine those plans and respond regarding conformity within 30 days, after which Ms. Jean would have 90 days to make any required corrections; it directed the municipality to apply the previously paid $100 minor-variance fee to the construction permit cost and to refund any balance within 15 days of the new permit application; and it ordered the municipality to issue the subdivision permit within 30 days of the judgment. The court also expressly declared that the municipality had committed faults engaging its civil responsibility toward Ms. Jean and awarded her costs, including the fees of her urban-planning expert. However, the quantification of her claimed damages was deferred to the scinded damages phase and is to be determined later by another judge. Accordingly, the successful party in this decision is Isabelle Jean, who obtained key declarations, preserved her right to develop the property under the pre-May 2021 zoning framework, and secured an enforceable pathway to building her project, along with a finding of municipal liability and an award of costs. The total monetary amount of damages, beyond costs and fee credits, was not fixed in this judgment and therefore cannot presently be determined.