Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope of the Superior Court’s discretion to suspend civil proceedings under article 156 C.p.c. in light of a pending but not yet enacted statute.
• Impact of a proposed laicity statute (Bill 9, Loi sur le renforcement de la laïcité au Québec) on a university’s obligations to accommodate religious practice on campus.
• Tension between plaintiffs’ rights to timely access to justice and the defendant university’s request to await possible legislative change.
• Continuing relevance of claimed violations of fundamental rights and alleged failures of reasonable accommodation in 2024–2025, regardless of future legal reforms.
• Assessment of potential prejudice to the plaintiffs versus the procedural burden on the university if the action proceeds without a suspension.
• Award of costs in favor of the plaintiffs following rejection of the university’s motion to suspend, with no damages yet adjudicated or quantified.

Factual background and parties
The case arises from a dispute between the Association des étudiants musulmans de l’Université de Montréal and an individual student, Amine Harfouche, on one side, and the Université de Montréal on the other. The student association and Mr. Harfouche allege that the University’s decisions in 2024 and 2025 concerning collective Muslim prayers on campus infringed their rights. They complain that, whereas reserving rooms for collective prayers had been permitted for many years, the University’s subsequent stance, including an “interdiction de prières collectives sur le campus,” prevented them from organizing their usual activities from the start of the fall 2024 term. They claim that the solutions the University proposed in 2024 and 2025—various pilot projects and action plans—did not meet its obligation of reasonable accommodation and violated their fundamental rights. As a result, they commenced proceedings in the Superior Court of Québec. Their initiating application seeks interlocutory and permanent injunctions to allow them to continue reserving premises for collective prayers, an order compelling the University to comply with its duty of reasonable accommodation toward the Muslim student community’s needs for prayer space, and monetary compensation. Specifically, they claim 25,000 dollars in moral damages and 50,000 dollars each in punitive damages for alleged infringements of their fundamental rights. The case is therefore situated at the intersection of religious freedom, reasonable accommodation, and university governance, framed within an ordinary civil action in the Superior Court.

Procedural history and progress of the action
The plaintiffs filed their originating application on 5 February 2025, combining claims for injunctive relief and damages. The case then progressed procedurally. Examinations on discovery took place on both sides between 22 May 2025 and 15 September 2025. On 24 November 2025, the plaintiffs transmitted the undertakings given during the examination of Mr. Harfouche. On 5 December 2025, the parties produced a new case protocol and fixed the inscription for hearing deadline at 27 February 2026, later extended by consent to 10 April 2026. At this stage, the matter was heading toward being ready for trial on the merits. It is against this background of an advancing file that the University sought to suspend the proceedings.

The university’s motion to suspend and the proposed legislation
In parallel with the civil proceedings, the Minister responsible for laicity introduced Bill 9, the Loi sur le renforcement de la laïcité au Québec. According to its explanatory notes, the bill aims to “reinforce laicity in Québec” and “interdit la pratique religieuse dans un lieu sous l’autorité d’une institution ou d’un organisme assujetti à l’exigence de respecter les principes sur lesquels repose la laïcité de l’État, sous réserve de certaines exceptions.” In particular, the University relied on proposed article 10.1, which states that “toute pratique religieuse est interdite dans un lieu, tel un immeuble ou un local, sous l’autorité d’une institution ou d’un organisme visé à l’article 3.” The University argued that the adoption of Bill 9, scheduled to come into force on 1 September 2026, would fundamentally alter the legal framework governing its obligations toward religious practices on campus. In its view, the measures challenged by the plaintiffs would then flow from the application of a government decision embodied in the statute, rather than solely from the University’s own policies. On this basis, the University applied to have the action suspended, invoking article 156 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows the court to suspend a proceeding for such period as it determines.

Legal framework for suspension of proceedings
The Court recalled that article 156 C.p.c. confers a discretionary power to suspend. In exercising this discretion, the judge must consider factors such as the conservatory nature of the request, whether continuing preparations for trial would be useless or disproportionate, and the seriousness of any settlement efforts. The Court also referred to Court of Appeal authority, including Lavigne c. 6040993 Canada inc., which instructs that motions to suspend must be evaluated in light of the Code’s guiding principles, notably delay and the prejudice that may result from stalling an action. Prior case law has, in some circumstances, permitted suspensions while a bill is under consideration in the legislature. The University therefore argued that, in anticipation of a statute that would directly govern religious practice in public institutions, it was appropriate to pause the litigation until Bill 9 was enacted and its final content known.

Court’s analysis of the impact of Bill 9
The Superior Court acknowledged that, in its present form, Bill 9 might eventually affect the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs, since it would impose a general statutory prohibition on religious practice in premises under the authority of covered institutions, including universities, subject to exceptions. However, the key point for the judge was that, at the time of the motion, Bill 9 was still under detailed study and had not yet been adopted. Its precise wording and scope remained subject to change, a possibility that the University’s own counsel candidly conceded. Given this legislative uncertainty, the Court found it premature to suspend an ongoing civil action solely on the basis of a bill that may be amended or even fail to pass. While the projected coming into force date of 1 September 2026 was noted, it did not override the current procedural posture of the case or the plaintiffs’ rights to move forward under the existing legal framework.

Continuing relevance of the damages claims
A central element in the Court’s reasoning was that the plaintiffs’ claims extended well beyond prospective injunctive orders. They specifically alleged that the University’s decisions and practices in 2024 and 2025 failed to satisfy its duty of reasonable accommodation and infringed their fundamental rights already. On their case, the ban on collective prayers and the replacement solutions offered—such as pilot projects and action plans—caused harm from the beginning of the fall 2024 term, by preventing them from organizing long-standing prayer activities. These allegations underpin claims for moral damages as compensation for past rights violations, and for punitive damages to sanction what they characterize as unlawful conduct. The Court highlighted that, even if Bill 9 were eventually adopted in its current form and affected future injunctive relief, there would still remain a live controversy as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to moral and punitive damages for the University’s prior conduct. In other words, the damages component of the action concerned past events under the law as it currently stands, independent of any forthcoming statutory reforms.

Assessment of prejudice and proportionality
Applying the procedural principles of sound case management, the Court examined the potential prejudice that a suspension would cause to the plaintiffs. It concluded that halting the case at this stage, when examinations had been completed and undertakings delivered, would unjustifiably delay their access to a determination of their rights. This would run counter to the Code’s emphasis on timely and efficient resolution of disputes. By contrast, the Court found that the burden on the University of continuing the proceedings—filing its defence, fulfilling undertakings, and preparing the case—was not “significativement disproportionné,” even allowing for the chance that part of the injunctive relief might later be affected by Bill 9 if and when adopted. The judge thus viewed the University’s procedural obligations as manageable and proportionate, especially in comparison to the prejudice that a suspension would visit on the plaintiffs.

Outcome and consequences for the parties
Ultimately, the Superior Court held that it was at least premature to suspend the proceedings pending the fate of Bill 9, and that doing so would be difficult to reconcile with the Code’s guiding principles on proper case management and the smooth conduct of proceedings. The University’s motion to suspend, dated 13 January 2026, was therefore rejected. The Court granted costs (“avec frais de justice”) in favor of the plaintiffs, the Association des étudiants musulmans de l’Université de Montréal and Amine Harfouche, as the successful party on this interlocutory motion. No damages—whether moral or punitive—were adjudicated or awarded at this stage, and the judgment does not specify any exact monetary amount for the costs. Accordingly, while the plaintiffs succeeded procedurally, the total financial amount ordered in their favor in this decision cannot be determined from the text, beyond the fact that they are entitled to their legal costs, whose quantum is not stated.