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Craig v. Weidhaas et al.

Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

  • Dispute over whether a $100,000 contribution by the plaintiff toward the purchase of a matrimonial home created a 40% equitable/beneficial ownership interest in the property.
  • Characterization of the $100,000 payment as either a gift (as asserted by Carl Weidhaas) or an investment giving rise to a trust or beneficial interest (as asserted by the plaintiff and supported by Sherri Weidhaas).
  • Impact of offer to settle terms and acceptance dates on the allocation of litigation costs between co-defendants, including the consequences of failing to accept the offer by the specified deadline.
  • Treatment of a crossclaim between spouses as a separate proceeding for costs purposes, and whether Sherri’s alignment with the plaintiff’s position entitled her to costs from her co-defendant husband.
  • Application of the modern Ontario costs regime (Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01) focusing on fairness, reasonableness, proportionality, and the party whose conduct necessitated the litigation.
  • Determination that Carl’s insistence that the $100,000 was a gift, and his late acceptance of the offer, triggered adverse costs consequences in favour of Sherri on a partial indemnity basis.

Background and family property arrangements

The case arises out of a family dispute over a residential property located at 88 Lynden Hill Crescent in Ontario. The defendants, spouses Carl Heinz Weidhaas and Sherri Lynn Weidhaas, purchased the property on May 21, 2002 for $240,000. Title was taken in their names as joint tenants. The plaintiff, Anne Louise Craig, is Sherri’s mother. She and her late husband contributed $100,000 toward the purchase price, representing approximately 40% of the acquisition cost. After the purchase, the plaintiff and her husband moved into the property and paid a monthly amount to the defendants toward carrying costs such as utilities, insurance, and cable. The plaintiff’s husband passed away on June 12, 2020, and the plaintiff continued living in the property. As the relationship between Carl and Sherri later deteriorated and they separated, the plaintiff became anxious that the property might be sold or encumbered without recognizing her claimed interest.

The plaintiff’s claim and competing characterizations of the $100,000 payment

The central factual and legal dispute concerned the nature of the $100,000 contribution. The plaintiff pleaded that all parties agreed, at the time of purchase, that she and her late husband would receive a 40% equitable ownership interest in the property in exchange for the payment. On that basis, she claimed an equitable or beneficial interest in the home. Carl, by contrast, defended the action on the footing that the $100,000 was simply a gift from the plaintiff and her husband to the married couple, and that no beneficial interest or trust in favour of the plaintiff had been created. Sherri’s position, however, aligned with the plaintiff’s. She maintained that her parents’ contribution was intended to give them an ownership interest proportionate to the sum advanced. This alignment of positions between plaintiff and Sherri, on one side, and Carl, on the other, framed both the main action and the later costs analysis.

Commencement of proceedings and pleadings, including the crossclaim

When the defendants would not recognize the plaintiff’s claimed 40% interest, she commenced an action on July 10, 2020. Her claim sought a vesting order granting her a 40% interest in the property or, in the alternative, a declaration of beneficial ownership, or, further in the alternative, repayment of the $100,000 from the defendants. Carl served a statement of defence on August 17, 2020 but did not crossclaim against Sherri. Sherri subsequently served a statement of defence and crossclaim on January 10, 2024. In that crossclaim she sought, among other relief, her costs of the proceeding as between herself and Carl. The parties proceeded through examinations for discovery and a pre-trial conference, and the dispute over the plaintiff’s interest in the matrimonial home interacted with the parties’ ongoing family law proceeding regarding the breakdown of the marriage.

The offer to settle and differing responses by the defendants

As trial approached, the plaintiff served an offer to settle dated September 22, 2025. The offer set out three alternative options: vesting the plaintiff with a 40% interest in the property as a tenant-in-common; listing and selling the property with the plaintiff to receive 40% of the net sale proceeds; or listing and selling the property with the plaintiff to receive a fixed $125,000 from the net sale proceeds. The offer also contained a key timing provision on costs. If accepted by October 6, 2025, no party would pay costs. If accepted after that date, costs would be payable on a partial indemnity basis in an amount to be agreed or set by the court on motion. The offer remained open until revoked in writing and would expire one minute after trial commenced. On October 1, 2025, before the deadline, Sherri accepted all three options in the offer, on the condition that no costs be sought against her. The plaintiff’s Request to Admit was later served on October 16, 2025. Carl did not accept the offer by the October 6 deadline. On October 20, 2025, by letter and a signed Acceptance of Offer to Settle, he accepted Option C—the sale of the property with $125,000 to be paid to the plaintiff from the net sale proceeds.

Resolution of the main action and remaining costs disputes

The acceptance of the plaintiff’s offer to settle by both defendants resolved the main action, substantively granting the plaintiff priority to receive $125,000 from the net sale proceeds of the property ahead of the defendants once the property is sold. Separately, counsel advised that costs as between the plaintiff and Carl had been resolved by agreement: Carl would pay costs to the plaintiff in the amount of $15,403.44 in respect of the action, payable from his share of the net sale proceeds. The crossclaim between Sherri and Carl, however, remained live, though Sherri was no longer pursuing contribution or indemnity in respect of the $125,000 settlement itself. Instead, the only remaining issue was entitlement to, and quantum of, costs between the co-defendants. Sherri sought her partial indemnity costs of both the action and the crossclaim from Carl in the amount of $28,160.50, including $1,833.42 in disbursements. She argued that she had been aligned with the plaintiff throughout, had incurred fees over several years for pleadings, discoveries, the pre-trial, and trial preparation, and that Carl’s refusal to acknowledge the plaintiff’s interest and his late acceptance of the offer forced her to stay in the litigation. Carl, for his part, argued that he should only be responsible for any incremental costs incurred in the short period between Sherri’s acceptance of the offer on October 1, 2025 and his own acceptance on October 20, 2025. He contended that the fees claimed were excessive given Sherri’s essentially supportive role to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff had been the party “carrying the water,” and that no separate court order had been obtained by Sherri against him.

The court’s approach to costs and assessment of success

In addressing the costs dispute, the court emphasized that costs are discretionary under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and must be fixed in accordance with Rule 57.01 and the Tariffs. The judge reviewed the non-exhaustive factors in Rule 57.01(1), including the result, any written offers to settle, the principle of indemnity, reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the amount involved, complexity, importance of the issues, and the parties’ conduct throughout the proceeding. The modern purposes of costs—indemnification of successful parties (though not completely), facilitating access to justice, discouraging frivolous positions and inappropriate conduct, and encouraging settlement—were also highlighted. The court noted that a crossclaim is a separate proceeding and referred to older and more recent authorities underscoring that costs are incidental to the determination of the parties’ rights and should not themselves become a fresh battleground divorced from the merits. In this case, while the merits had been resolved by settlement, the judge found it was still possible, and appropriate, to identify the relatively successful and unsuccessful parties without conducting a full-scale re-litigation, and to apply the Rule 57.01 factors in a summary fashion. The court concluded that Carl’s conduct had effectively necessitated the litigation: it was his insistence that the $100,000 was a gift, and his failure to accept the plaintiff’s offer by the deadline, that prompted the plaintiff’s claim and required Sherri to defend the action and advance her crossclaim. The settlement outcome—under which the plaintiff secured a $125,000 priority interest from sale proceeds—aligned with the positions of both the plaintiff and Sherri, and not with Carl’s “gift” theory.

Final determination of costs and overall outcome

Balancing all of the circumstances, the court held that Sherri should be considered successful in both the action and the crossclaim as against Carl, even though she was not the party prosecuting the main claim and did not obtain a separate judgment on the merits. The judge considered, among other things, Carl’s failure to accept the offer by its deadline, the need for both defendants’ acceptance to settle the action, the fact that Sherri would have been content with a global no-costs resolution if Carl had accepted on time, the additional trial-preparation costs she incurred as a result, the absence of any requirement for Sherri to pay costs to her mother, and the reasonableness of most of Sherri’s disbursements (with limited exceptions for unexplained administrative charges). Applying the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, the court fixed Sherri’s recoverable costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, at $15,000. This sum was ordered payable by Carl within 30 days of release of the reasons. In the broader litigation, the plaintiff mother achieved a settlement entitling her to a $125,000 priority payment from the property’s sale plus $15,403.44 in costs from Carl, while Sherri prevailed in this costs dispute and was awarded $15,000 against Carl. For purposes of this decision, the successful party is Sherri Lynn Weidhaas, and the total monetary amount ordered in her favour under the costs ruling is $15,000.

Anne Louise Craig
Law Firm / Organization
Not specified
Carl Heinz Weidhaas
Law Firm / Organization
Waterous Holden Amey Hitchon LLP
Lawyer(s)

Dennis Touesnard

Sherri Lynn Weidhaas
Law Firm / Organization
Hospodar Davies Goold & Culp LLP
Lawyer(s)

Birkin J. Culp

Superior Court of Justice - Ontario
CV-20-145
Civil litigation
$ 15,000
Defendant