Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Reasonableness of a six-month common law notice period for a wrongfully dismissed employee and related compensation for RSUs and stock options during that period.

• Allocation of costs on a partial indemnity basis, including whether $58,110.13 was fair and within the defendants’ reasonable expectations.

• Application of Courts of Justice Act ss. 128, 130 and Rule 57.01 to determine costs and pre-judgment interest entitlements.

• Debate over using the statutory presumptive prejudgment interest rate versus a higher market-based TD average quarterly rate for RSUs and stock options.

• Interpretation of appellate guidance in Aubin and Henry on when “unusual or special circumstances” justify departure from presumptive prejudgment interest rates.

• Assessment of evidentiary burden on the plaintiff to prove his actual or likely investment returns to support a higher prejudgment interest rate.

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Facts of the employment dispute

Kevin Liggett brought a wrongful dismissal claim against his former employer, Veeva Software Systems Inc. and Veeva Systems Inc., in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The dispute arose from the termination of his employment and the employer’s position on the extent of his entitlements on dismissal. At the time he commenced the action, Mr. Liggett was out of work and using his savings to fund the litigation, which underscored the personal significance of the case for him. The defendants, for their part, viewed the case as important because the termination provisions and equity-based compensation at issue also applied to other employees.

In an earlier summary judgment decision, the court determined that Mr. Liggett had been wrongfully dismissed and was entitled to damages in lieu of reasonable notice. Specifically, the judge fixed the notice period at six months and held that his compensation included Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) and stock options that would have vested during that notice period. Those underlying damages were to be calculated based on the value of the salary and equity that would have accrued over the six-month window, but the precise dollar figures are not set out in the costs endorsement.

Issues relating to costs

After the October 7, 2025 summary judgment ruling, most monetary issues between the parties were resolved, leaving two questions for the court: the proper amount of costs to be awarded to the successful plaintiff, and the calculation of prejudgment interest on the RSU and stock-option component of the award. Mr. Liggett sought costs of $58,110.13 on a partial indemnity basis, inclusive of HST and disbursements, whereas the defendants argued that $45,000 would be a more reasonable figure.

The court approached the costs analysis under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The judge accepted that the purpose of a costs award is to indemnify a party, at least in part, for the expense of prosecuting or defending litigation. She examined the parties’ bills of costs and found the time spent and hourly rates to be reasonable in view of counsel’s experience and the work performed. Although the matter was not exceptionally complex, it required argument on several discrete questions: the validity of the termination clause, the proper notice period, and whether RSUs and stock options were contractually available during that period.

The degree of success was also a central factor. The plaintiff achieved substantial success on his wrongful dismissal claim, even though he did not obtain every element of relief he had sought. The issues were of importance to both sides: for the plaintiff, whose livelihood and savings were affected, and for the corporate defendants, who sought clarity on the enforceability of their standard termination language and equity-based compensation treatment. Taking into account all the Rule 57.01 considerations, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s claimed amount of $58,110.13 was within the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful defendants and therefore fixed costs in that amount on a partial indemnity basis.

Prejudgment interest and policy considerations

The remaining dispute concerned prejudgment interest on the RSU and stock-option component of the judgment. Section 128 of the Courts of Justice Act establishes a presumptive regime for prejudgment interest running from the date the cause of action arose, while section 130 permits the court, in its discretion, to award a higher or lower rate having regard to specified statutory factors.

Mr. Liggett asked the court to depart from the statutory presumptive rate and to instead apply the TD average quarterly interest rate, which was higher over the relevant period. He advanced three main arguments: first, that market interest rates materially exceeded the default CJA rate during the relevant timeframe; second, that because RSUs are based on market share price, a market-based interest rate was a more logical measure of his lost time-value of money; and third, that RSUs are inherently investment-oriented, aimed at capital growth and market appreciation.

The defendants took the opposite view. They calculated prejudgment interest using the standard rate under section 128(1), which generated an interest amount of $14,705.80 on the RSUs and stock options. By contrast, the plaintiff’s calculation, using the TD average quarterly rate, produced a higher figure of $20,285.55. The parties jointly relied on recent Court of Appeal authorities—Aubin v. Synagogue and Jewish Community Centre of Ottawa (Soloway Jewish Community Centre) and its companion decision Henry v. Zaitlen—which considered when courts may deviate from the presumptive prejudgment interest regime in the context of non-pecuniary personal injury damages.

Guidance from appellate authorities

In Aubin, the Court of Appeal clarified that the CJA establishes a rebuttable presumption in favour of the statutory prejudgment interest rate. A party seeking departure from that rate—whether upwards or downwards—must show “unusual or special circumstances” and must satisfy the criteria set out in section 130(2). Those criteria include changes in market rates, the circumstances of the case, any advance payments, the quantum claimed and recovered, conduct affecting the duration of the proceeding, and any other relevant consideration. The appellate court also emphasized that the statutory scheme reflects a legislative policy choice favouring consistency and certainty over perfect tailoring to individual investment histories.

Drawing from that guidance, the trial judge distilled several principles. First, the Legislature deliberately chose a presumptive interest rate to minimize the need for detailed investment evidence and to enhance predictability. Second, a court must take all of the section 130(2) factors into account before exercising its discretion. Third, a claimant who seeks a departure from the presumptive rate bears the burden of presenting evidence about what rate of return he or she would likely have earned.

Application to the plaintiff’s claim for a higher rate

Applying these principles, the court held that Mr. Liggett had not met his evidentiary burden. Unlike in Aubin, where the court had evidence of the actual rates of return achieved by both the plaintiff and the defendant, there was no comparable evidence here about Mr. Liggett’s investment strategy or expected returns. Without such proof, the court could not confidently conclude that his investments would have produced a higher yield than the statutory rate.

The judge also observed that the legislative preference for certainty helped avoid the cost and complexity of mini-trials on hypothetical investment performance. In this case, the dollar difference between the competing positions on prejudgment interest—approximately $6,000—was modest compared to the likely expense of obtaining and presenting expert evidence on market returns or personalized investment strategies. Requiring such evidence in a case of this scale would undercut the accessibility and efficiency objectives that underlie the presumptive rate scheme.

After considering all of the section 130(2) factors, the court found no unusual or special circumstances warranting a departure from the standard rate. The policy choice made by the Legislature—to prioritize consistency and relieve parties of an additional evidentiary burden—was particularly apt in this wrongful dismissal context. The court therefore declined to apply the TD average quarterly rate and instead used the presumptive Courts of Justice Act rate, resulting in a prejudgment interest award of $14,705.80 on the RSUs and stock options.

Overall outcome and monetary relief

In the result, the court confirmed its earlier summary judgment determination that the plaintiff, Kevin Liggett, had been wrongfully dismissed and was entitled to damages reflecting a six-month reasonable notice period, including the value of any RSUs and stock options that would have vested during that time. While the exact quantum of those primary wrongful dismissal damages is not specified in the costs endorsement, the present decision definitively disposes of the remaining financial issues between the parties.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs payable by the defendants in the amount of $58,110.13 and awarded prejudgment interest on the RSU and stock-option component of the judgment in the amount of $14,705.80, both in favour of Mr. Liggett. These two items together total $72,815.93, in addition to the underlying wrongful dismissal damages whose precise figure cannot be determined from the text of this endorsement alone. As a result, the successful party is the plaintiff, who obtains judgment for his common law notice entitlements, associated equity-based compensation, and a combined $72,815.93 in costs and prejudgment interest, with the exact overall monetary recovery remaining unspecified in the available decision.