Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Validity and finality of a property standards order issued under the Building Code Act, 1992 and upheld by a municipal Property Standards Committee, without further appeal to the Superior Court.
• Scope of the Town’s statutory authority to enter private property and demolish structures and remove “refuse, debris and derelict vehicles” after non-compliance with the order.
• Existence and content of a duty of care owed by the municipality in enforcing the order, including whether it acted reasonably, in good faith, and within the scope of the authority granted.
• Alleged municipal obligation to inventory and account for, or return, items of personal property treated as refuse or debris and removed from the property.
• Claimed liability of the regional police service for not stopping the Town’s enforcement actions and for allegedly failing to enforce COVID-19 measures.
• Failure of the self-represented plaintiff to prove any compensable loss or admissible evidence of the value of his allegedly lost personal property, even if liability had been established.

Background and parties

The case concerns long-running property standards issues at a three-acre rural property at 2327 Dominion Road in Ridgeway, Ontario, within the Town of Fort Erie. The plaintiff, Raymond Desmarais, lived at the property and operated a small business as a mechanic under the name “Mobile Mechanic”. He worked on restoring and repairing motor vehicles, trailers, and boats for customers, and kept both project vehicles and inoperable parts vehicles on site. The land itself had originally been purchased by the plaintiff around 1997, but in about 2002 he transferred legal title to his friend, Tammy Franzen, for a stated consideration of $90,000. Tammy thereafter paid the mortgage, while the plaintiff remained in occupation, doing work on and around the property in lieu of rent. The court found that Tammy was the legal owner at all relevant times and that the plaintiff was an occupier and primary resident, not the true owner of the real property. As between the plaintiff and Tammy, however, the court accepted that the plaintiff owned the various items of personal property that later became the subject of the municipal order and removal.
The defendants were (1) The Corporation of the Town of Fort Erie, responsible for property standards and by-law enforcement, and (2) The Regional Municipality of Niagara Police Services Board, which oversees the Niagara Regional Police (“NRP”). The plaintiff, self-represented, sued both, alleging wrongful demolition of buildings, wrongful removal and destruction of his vehicles, equipment, and tools, and failures by police to protect his property or enforce COVID-19 laws. He claimed $200,000 in damages.

Property standards regime and policy terms at issue

The dispute arose under Ontario’s Building Code Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 23 (the “BCA”), and the Town’s Property Standards By-law No. 186-08. The BCA permits municipalities to adopt property standards by-laws and to require non-conforming properties to be repaired, maintained, or cleared of structures, debris, and refuse. Under section 15.1(3) BCA, municipalities may prescribe maintenance and occupancy standards and create a process for property standards orders and appeals. The Town had done so via By-law 186-08, which remained in force at all material times.
The By-law included key definitions and requirements that effectively operate like “policy terms” governing when property can be compelled into compliance. Section 3.1 required every yard, including vacant lots, to be kept “clean and free from” refuse or derelict vehicles (unless incidental to a legitimate industrial or commercial operation), long grass, and “dilapidated, collapsed or partially constructed structures which are not currently under construction.” The By-law defined “refuse” broadly to include debris, junk, rubbish, discarded or broken materials, and “materials or things exposed to the elements”, as well as “wrecked, dismantled, partially dismantled, inoperative, discarded or abandoned machinery, trailers, boats, or vehicles and parts or accessories thereof.” “Debris” was defined to include any material capable of holding water and expressly encompassed “tires, cars, boats, containers of any kind and garden fixtures.” “Derelict vehicle” was defined as an inoperable, rusted or wrecked vehicle body or chassis that is not insured or registered, has no valid licence plate, and has been located outside a building for more than 30 days. These policy-style definitions were critical because they framed whether the plaintiff’s vehicles, boats, trailers, tools, and other equipment could lawfully be treated as refuse, debris, or derelict vehicles subject to removal.

Inspections, the February 2020 order, and appeal to the Property Standards Committee

Following a complaint in early 2020 about the condition of the property, Town by-law officer John Bridgeman attended the property on January 29, 2020. Under section 15.2(1) BCA, officers may enter land at reasonable times to inspect for compliance with property standards by-laws. Bridgeman observed that the plaintiff’s land contained numerous vehicles, boats, and trailers scattered around, most of which were inoperable, damaged, or in disrepair. He also saw tools and mechanical equipment left outside and exposed to weather that appeared rusted, abandoned, or unusable.
Bridgeman further concluded that several structures were dilapidated or unsafe. There had been a 2016 stop work order on one garage. At least two structures lacked complete roofs, had unfinished walls, and had interiors open to the elements; in one case, a collapsed roof was resting on an old vehicle. Based on these observations, the officer determined that the property did not meet the standards in the By-law.
On February 6, 2020, Bridgeman issued a formal property standards order under section 15.2(2) BCA (the “February 2020 order”) on behalf of the Town. With respect to structures, the order required repair or demolition of four specific buildings: the tall barn, a three-car garage, a two-car garage, and a lean-to shed. Regarding personal property, the order required the removal of all “refuse and debris” from the land, listing in detail 29 motor vehicles, a transport tractor-trailer, five boats, nine trailers, two forklift trucks, a bobcat, and an airplane, along with scrap metal, disused lumber, building materials, car parts, tires, and commercial equipment.
The order was mailed to Tammy as owner and a copy was posted on the plaintiff’s residence door, as permitted by section 15.2(3) BCA for service on the owner and other affected persons. The court found as a fact that the order came to the attention of both Tammy and the plaintiff.
The plaintiff appealed this order to the Town’s Property Standards Committee, which is the first-level appeal tribunal under the BCA. The appeal was heard March 5, 2020. The plaintiff addressed the committee but left before the hearing finished and did not give sworn evidence. Bridgeman testified. The Committee upheld the February 2020 order but extended the compliance deadline to April 5, 2020. Its decision was communicated in letters dated March 6, 2020, to both the plaintiff and Tammy. Neither complied.
Under section 15.3(4) BCA, any party dissatisfied with the Committee’s decision could appeal to the Superior Court of Justice. The plaintiff chose not to appeal. The legal consequence was governed by section 15.3(7) BCA: once confirmed by the Committee and not further appealed, the order became “final and binding” on the owner and occupant, who were then obliged to carry out repair or demolition within the time and in the manner specified. In this action, the court held it had no jurisdiction to revisit or relitigate the correctness of the particulars in the order; in other words, it had to accept that each listed item properly fell within the By-law’s definitions of refuse, debris, or derelict vehicle.

Non-compliance, final notice, and municipal entry to enforce the order

After April 5, 2020 passed without compliance, the Town could have moved immediately to enforce. However, on November 6, 2020, the Town sent and posted a “Final Notice” giving the plaintiff until November 20, 2020 to comply, warning that otherwise the Town would perform the work at his expense. The plaintiff denied receiving this notice, but the court rejected that claim, noting that he called the police that same day complaining that Bridgeman had trespassed on his property. Again, there was no compliance by either Tammy or the plaintiff.
In early February 2021, the Town invoked its powers under section 15.4(1)–(2) BCA, which authorise a municipality, on default by the owner, to enter the property “at any reasonable time” to do the required work and to recover its costs from the owner or occupant. The plaintiff later characterized this entry as trespass, but the court found the Town had clear statutory authority, given the final and binding status of the February 2020 order and the repeated, extended opportunities for voluntary compliance. The Town retained a contractor, V. Gibbons Contracting Ltd., to demolish structures and collect refuse; Modern Landfill to supply dumpsters and haul away demolition and scrap material; and Anytime Towing to tow derelict vehicles to a scrapyard.

Demolition and removal operations in February 2021

On February 1–3, 2021, Bridgeman and Town contractors attended the property to enforce the order. When Bridgeman arrived on February 1, he met with the plaintiff and discussed the process. The officer told the plaintiff that some listed items could be set aside on the property if the plaintiff wanted to keep them. The court found that, pursuant to this discussion, a number of listed vehicles, boats, planes, and tools were in fact left on site or placed in a designated area and not removed.
The four structures specified in the order (tall barn, three-car garage, two-car garage, and lean-to) were demolished and debris taken away. Miscellaneous refuse and debris such as old cans, scrap metal, lumber, building material, car parts, and broken furniture were loaded into dumpsters and removed. Many of the listed motor vehicles were towed by Anytime Towing to a scrapyard. Some boats, trailers, and mechanical equipment were crushed on site and removed as scrap.
Neither the plaintiff nor Bridgeman had a complete written inventory of what specifically was removed versus left behind. Both largely relied on photographs at trial. Nonetheless, the court was able to make a series of findings: a significant amount of scrap and garbage went to landfill; the vehicles removed were all inoperable and were disposed of as scrap metal; there was no reliable evidence that any of the towed vehicles were properly licenced, insured, or lawfully operable; and there was no credible proof that any of the removed vehicles were actively being repaired for customers in the ordinary course of the plaintiff’s business. Some listed vehicles were taken away by the plaintiff’s friends to unknown destinations, and others were left in place for him, including certain vehicles, boats, a blue airplane, and various tools.
One point of factual dispute was whether a Ford Classic recreational vehicle listed in the order was removed or remained. The plaintiff said it had been taken; Bridgeman believed it was left. Photographs showed it still at the property. The court held that this disagreement did not matter legally because the vehicle was properly listed as refuse/debris in the order, and its removal would have been permitted in any event. On the evidence, the court concluded on a balance of probabilities that it was not removed by the Town.

Allegations against the Town: wrongful removal, negligence, and lack of accounting

The plaintiff advanced several clusters of allegations against the Town.
First, he attacked the validity of the February 2020 order and argued that some of the listed vehicles and equipment were operable, licenced, or valuable tools of his trade, and thus should not have been classified as refuse, debris, or derelict vehicles. The judge held that because the order had been confirmed by the Property Standards Committee and never appealed to the Superior Court, section 15.3(7) BCA made it final and binding. The Superior Court, in this civil action, could not sit as an appellate tribunal over the committee or re-examine whether particular items ought to have been included. Accordingly, for purposes of this lawsuit, all items listed in the order had to be treated as legitimately categorized under the By-law’s definitions.
Second, the plaintiff argued that the Town had trespassed on his land in February 2021. The court rejected this, holding that the Town had complied with the BCA’s procedural requirements, given him ample time and multiple notices to comply, and then acted squarely within its statutory enforcement powers under section 15.4 BCA when it entered to carry out the work.
Third, the plaintiff claimed that the Town and its contractors acted negligently or in bad faith in how they executed the order—for example, by needlessly destroying valuable property or failing to segregate certain items. Here the court examined the interaction between section 15.4(3) BCA, which provides municipalities with immunity from claims for compensation where actions are taken in the “reasonable exercise” of enforcement powers, and common law negligence principles. The judge concluded that section 15.4(3) is not an absolute shield: it presupposes that a municipality must exercise its powers reasonably and in good faith and within the scope of the order, and that a duty of care arises in enforcing by-laws that materially affect activities or businesses on the property. Relying in part on the Ontario Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Rausch v. Pickering (City), the court held that municipal by-law enforcement officers must act reasonably and in good faith when their actions interfere with a person’s livelihood or property-based activities.
However, on the facts, the court found that the Town had met that standard. It acted within the terms of the February 2020 order, offered the plaintiff extra time to comply, communicated with him about what would be removed, allowed him to identify items he wished to keep, and even asked where he wanted the vehicles sent. The plaintiff signed a note asking that any vehicles removed be towed to Atar Metals, a scrap metal business, and the court found the Town substantially complied with that request. The judge also considered that Town staff avoided confrontation even though the plaintiff became agitated, argued with a Town employee, and drove erratically around the property while the work was underway. Overall, the court held that the Town acted in good faith, within its authority, and with reasonable care, so no duty of care was breached.
Fourth, the plaintiff asserted that the Town had a duty to inventory, track, and account for each removed item and inform him of its location or facilitate its return. The court held that when municipalities remove items as “refuse and debris” under a valid property standards order, they effectively hold them as a common law bailee with the power to dispose of them, subject only to a duty to act reasonably. The court adopted prior authority saying that requiring municipalities to keep a detailed accounting and valuation of every piece of refuse would be “ludicrous”. In this case, the judge found the plaintiff knew, in broad terms, where his removed property went: most scrap and broken equipment were crushed and sent to Modern Landfill, while vehicles were treated as scrap metal and sent to Atar Metals at the plaintiff’s own request. Anomalies involving a transport tractor-trailer and a customised forklift later discovered in Gibbons’ yard did not change the analysis; those items had also been classified as refuse and could be disposed of as the Town saw fit. The court therefore found no breach of any duty to account.

Allegations against the Niagara Regional Police

The plaintiff also sued the Niagara Regional Police Services Board, alleging that police officers should have intervened to stop what he characterized as theft or trespass by the Town and should have laid charges against Town personnel for breaching pandemic-related public health orders during the enforcement operation.
The court rejected these claims outright. Police officers had been present on the property pursuant to a contract with the Town for the limited purpose of keeping the peace while the February 2020 order was enforced. They did just that, and because the Town was lawfully on the property executing a valid order, there was no “trespass” or “theft” for police to prevent. As for the COVID-19 angle, the judge found that any argument about alleged breaches of pandemic rules was irrelevant to the issues in this civil action and did not establish any private law duty or compensable wrong. The court concluded that no duty of care owed by the police to the plaintiff had been breached and that there was “no liability on the NRP.”

Plaintiff’s failure to prove damages

Having concluded that neither the Town nor the NRP was liable, the court did not strictly need to determine damages. Nevertheless, it went on to consider whether the plaintiff had proved any compensable loss in case its liability findings were later found to be incorrect.
The plaintiff’s primary claim related to the value of personal property—vehicles, equipment, and tools—he said had been wrongfully taken or destroyed. As evidence of value, he produced printed advertisements from the internet showing similar items being offered for sale at various asking prices. The court treated these materials as hearsay: they were out-of-court statements by unidentified sellers, not subject to cross-examination and with no assurance regarding the legitimacy of the listings, the condition of the items, or their comparability to the plaintiff’s property. The judge found these advertisements to be presumptively inadmissible hearsay and held that they did not fall within any principled exception to the hearsay rule because they lacked reliability and were unnecessary—among other things, the plaintiff could have retained a qualified valuator or adduced other direct evidence of value. Even if admitted, the court noted, asking prices in advertisements are not equivalent to fair market value; at most they might suggest replacement costs, which is not the measure of damages for lost property.
Without the advertisements, the plaintiff had virtually no evidence on value. He offered no purchase documents, receipts, expert appraisals, or detailed testimony about the age, condition, or working status of most items. He also provided no cogent proof of lost income, despite suggesting that the removal of property affected his business. The court reaffirmed that the onus rests on a plaintiff to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they suffered loss and to establish a reasonable evidentiary basis for quantifying that loss. Here, that burden was not met.
The plaintiff also mentioned physical and mental health issues and even testified that he had, at one point, threatened suicide. However, he led no medical evidence connecting any condition to the defendants’ conduct. The court found these assertions vague, unsubstantiated, and insufficient to ground a claim for general damages or psychiatric injury. Relying on appellate authority, the judge noted that where a plaintiff fails to provide evidence on loss and value, a court may simply decline to award any damages at all. That is the conclusion the court reached: even if liability had been established, there was no sufficient proof of damages.

Outcome and financial consequences

At the end of its analysis, the court found that the Town had validly enacted its Property Standards By-law, lawfully inspected and issued the February 2020 order, obtained a confirmation from the Property Standards Committee, and, after non-compliance, properly exercised its statutory power to enter the property and enforce the order by demolishing unsafe structures and removing refuse, debris, and derelict vehicles. It held that the order had become final and binding under the Building Code Act, that neither the Town nor the police had trespassed, acted negligently, or failed in any legal duty to the plaintiff, and that, even if a breach could somehow be shown, the plaintiff had not proved any recoverable loss. As a result, the court dismissed the action in its entirety. The successful parties in the case were therefore the defendants, The Corporation of the Town of Fort Erie and The Regional Municipality of Niagara Police Services Board, and the plaintiff received no damages. The judge did not fix any specific dollar figure for costs in the reasons but instead invited written submissions, meaning that at the time of this decision no exact monetary amount was ordered in favour of the successful parties.