Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope and interaction of Rules 13.1.01(3) and 13.1.02 regarding venue for mortgage enforcement actions and later transfer motions
• Determination of whether a mortgage proceeding properly commenced in a designated county can nonetheless be transferred to another county in the interests of justice
• Assessment of “rational connection” and forum shopping concerns when a mortgage action is issued in a county with no substantive link to the property or parties
• Evaluation of the defendants’ purpose in bringing the transfer motion and whether admitted use of venue motions as settlement leverage amounts to an abuse of process
• Application of the holistic, non-mechanical balancing of the Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) factors in deciding whether transfer from Milton to Guelph is desirable
• Consequences of improper litigation tactics for procedural relief and costs, including dismissal of the motion and the court’s decision to make no order as to costs

Background and procedural context
This case arises from a mortgage enforcement proceeding brought by Elle Mortgage Corporation as plaintiff against the defendants, Mitchell William Taylor and Laura Emily Kraehling, in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The action was commenced in Milton, a court location in Halton Region, even though the mortgaged property at the heart of the dispute is located in Guelph and the defendants reside in Guelph. The plaintiff mortgagee and its counsel are based in Toronto. The decision is an endorsement of Associate Justice Glick on a motion brought not by the lender but by the defendants, who sought procedural relief relating to where and how the action should proceed. At the time of the motion, a summary judgment motion by the plaintiff and a triage attendance had already been scheduled, signalling that the case was moving forward on the merits.

The defendants’ motion and requested relief
The defendants, one of whom (Mr. Taylor) was self-represented, brought a motion seeking to transfer the proceeding from Milton to Guelph and to stay all steps in the Milton action pending that transfer. Their position was that there was no rational connection between the proceeding and Milton, given that the property and the defendants were in Guelph and the plaintiff’s base of operations was in Toronto. On this basis, they asked the court to exercise its authority under Rule 13.1.02(2) (and the court’s inherent powers under Rule 13.1.02(4)) to move the action to a venue more closely connected to the dispute and to suspend ongoing steps in the meantime. As part of their legal argument, the defendants relied on the recent amendment to Rule 13.1.01(2), the decision of Regional Senior Justice Firestone in Toronto-Dominion Bank v. The Other End Inc., and several recent endorsements in Milton mortgage cases, including matters in which Mr. Taylor had previously been involved. They presented these authorities to show that the court has both the jurisdiction and the willingness to transfer mortgage proceedings away from Halton when there is no genuine link to that region.

The plaintiff’s opposition and interpretation of the Rules
Elle Mortgage Corporation opposed the motion. It relied heavily on Rule 13.1.01(3), which specifically provides that mortgage proceedings are to be commenced in a county designated by the regional senior judge of the region where the property is located, in whole or in part. The plaintiff emphasized that this rule was left intact despite recent amendments to Rule 13.1 more generally. From this, the plaintiff argued that the Rules Committee could not have intended a situation where mortgage claims must be commenced in one designated county only to be routinely transferred elsewhere, such as to the county where the property is physically situated. According to the plaintiff, Rule 13.1.01(3) should be read as requiring that a mortgage enforcement action both be commenced and be continued in the designated court office, and that the usual “rational connection” analysis used in transfer motions should not apply in this context.

The court’s analysis of Rule 13.1.01 and transfer powers
Associate Justice Glick rejected the plaintiff’s restrictive reading of Rule 13.1.01(3). While acknowledging that the Rule obliges a plaintiff to start mortgage enforcement proceedings in a designated county, the court held that nothing in the text or scheme of the Rules prevents a party from later bringing a motion under Rule 13.1.02(2) to transfer the proceeding to another county, nor does it limit the court’s power under Rule 13.1.02(4) to order such a transfer where appropriate. In reaching this conclusion, the endorsement situates Rule 13.1.01(3) within the broader objectives of Rule 13.1 and the overarching principles of fairness and proportionality mandated by Rules 1.04(1) and (1.1). Associate Justice Glick drew support from Justice Kurz’s decision in BFT Mortgage Services Inc. v. Getz, which similarly held that the requirement to commence mortgage actions in designated counties under the practice directions does not oust the court’s authority to entertain transfer motions. Decisions such as BFT Mortgage Services, RBC v. Gill, and BDC v. Ang are cited to show that Rule 13.1 was amended in response to growing concerns about forum shopping and its negative systemic impact, particularly in high-volume mortgage litigation. The court also adopted the approach set out by Regional Senior Justice Firestone in Toronto-Dominion Bank v. The Other End Inc., which holds that the factors listed in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) must be applied holistically, with no single factor being determinative and no simple numerical tally dictating the outcome. Instead, the court must balance all relevant considerations—such as where the parties reside, where the property is located, convenience, expense, and the interests of justice—to determine whether a transfer is desirable.

Application of the venue factors to the facts of this case
Having clarified that a transfer motion is available even in a mortgage proceeding properly commenced in a designated county, the court turned to the specific facts. On a straightforward factual assessment, this case has no meaningful connection to Milton: the property is in Guelph, the defendants live in Guelph, and the plaintiff and its counsel are in Toronto. Guelph, as a court location, would clearly be capable of providing a fair hearing to all parties. Those facts, looked at in isolation, would ordinarily support a transfer away from Milton. However, the defendants’ own submissions changed the complexion of the analysis. During oral argument, Mr. Taylor walked the court through earlier mortgage enforcement cases involving his family members: SHB Holdings Inc. v. Paul and Zlata Kraehling, and Magenta Capital Corporation v. Laura Kraehling, Mitchell Taylor, and Paul Kraehling. In both of those matters, the issue of proper venue between Milton and Guelph had been raised. In one, Justice Mills expressly warned counsel that, absent an apparent rational connection to Halton Region, a transfer to Guelph might be directed. In the Magenta Capital case, Justice Chang, before the amendments to Rule 13.1, concluded that there was no rational connection to Halton Region and ordered that no further steps be taken in the action until a motion to transfer to Guelph was brought, with subsequent endorsements staying steps and treating the transfer as an important precondition to further enforcement activity. In explaining these cases, Mr. Taylor candidly submitted that the transfer motions had been effective tools: they caused the mortgage lenders in those actions to “lower their swords” and facilitated settlement. He suggested that a similar transfer order in the present matter could again encourage the plaintiff to act more reasonably and work towards a resolution.

Finding of abuse of process and dismissal of the motion
It was this candid admission about the strategic use of transfer motions that caused the court serious concern. Associate Justice Glick concluded that the present motion to transfer was being deployed as a tactic to exert settlement pressure, rather than as a good-faith attempt to secure a more appropriate or efficient forum. The court regarded this as an abuse of process and as an improper use of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In the Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) framework, this type of conduct is a relevant factor under the catch-all provision in subparagraph (ix), which allows the court to consider all other matters relevant to the interests of justice. Although there was no dispute that the action has little or no rational connection to Milton and that Guelph might otherwise be a more suitable location, the court held that the defendants’ improper purpose tipped the overall balance in favour of keeping the proceeding in Milton—at least at this stage. On that basis, the motion to transfer the action to Guelph was dismissed. Because no transfer was ordered, the court also refused to stay the existing Milton proceeding or to halt the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. The parties were instead directed to proceed as scheduled, including attending the triage attendance fixed for February 26, 2026 before Justice Coats.

Costs outcome and identification of the successful party
On costs, the defendants did not seek any order. The plaintiff, having successfully resisted the motion, requested costs of $4,016.59 on a substantial indemnity scale and filed a costs outline in support. Associate Justice Glick accepted that the plaintiff was successful in the overall result but noted that the court had not accepted or endorsed the plaintiff’s main legal interpretation of Rule 13.1.01(3). In these circumstances, the court declined to grant the costs sought and made no order as to costs. The net result is that Elle Mortgage Corporation, as plaintiff, is the successful party on this motion, but there is no monetary award of damages, costs, or other sums in its favour arising from this particular endorsement, and the exact amount of any ultimate recovery in the underlying mortgage action cannot be determined from this decision.