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Factual background and the grading dispute
The case arises from a dispute between a graduate student, Yuantao Ji, and the University of Waterloo concerning a course grade and access to historical grading data in an artificial intelligence course. Mr. Ji was enrolled in CS686/486: Introduction to Artificial Intelligence during the Spring 2023 term. After receiving his final grade, he believed there were fairness issues in how grades were distributed across the class. His concern was triggered in part by information from a friend who had taken the course in an earlier term, suggesting that the historical grade-distribution patterns differed significantly from what occurred in Spring 2023.
In September 2023, Mr. Ji initiated a grievance under the University’s Policy 70, first at the course-instructor level. He requested that his final grade be “curved” and that the historical statistical grade-distribution data for CS686/486 be examined. Shortly afterward, he escalated the matter by filing a Notice of Reassessment Challenge with the Department of Computer Science, asking the department to investigate historical grade distributions and to reassess his final grade in light of that data.
On October 11, 2023, the plaintiff emailed the course instructor and the Director of Graduate Studies requesting the statistical grade-distribution data for Spring 2023 and several preceding terms. Both refused to provide the data. From that point through August 2024, Mr. Ji used the University’s internal appeal channels, including appeals and notices of challenge, consistently seeking two outcomes: access to the course’s statistical data and a curve or adjustment of his final grade to align with what he believed historical patterns would support. Each of these internal appeals was denied for various reasons, and the University maintained its refusal to provide the data.
The internal appeals and the UCSA decision
The matter ultimately reached the University Committee on Student Appeals (UCSA). On August 6, 2024, Mr. Ji appealed a July 18, 2024 decision of the Faculty Committee on Student Appeals to the UCSA Tribunal. In his Notice of Appeal, he asked the Tribunal to clarify whether students have a right to the statistical grade-distribution data of a course they have completed and, if so, to order release of such data for Spring 2023 and three to six preceding terms.
The UCSA Tribunal unanimously denied the appeal. It clarified that students at the University of Waterloo do not have a right to access the historical statistical data of a course they have taken, and it further held that mere dissatisfaction with the University’s policy on data access does not constitute sufficient grounds for an academic appeal. This Tribunal decision, issued on October 4, 2024, represented the end of the internal academic process.
The civil claim and the relief sought
Following the Tribunal’s final decision, Mr. Ji turned to the civil courts. He commenced an action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against the “University of Waterloo Board of Governors,” framed in terms of breach of contract and negligence. The central relief he sought in his statement of claim was not damages, but primarily specific performance and declarations.
First, he asked for an order compelling the University to provide statistical grade-distribution data for CS686/486 for Spring 2023 and for six academic terms preceding that term. Second, he sought a declaration that the University breached its contractual obligations to him, including an implied term requiring the University to maintain academic integrity and transparency, and that it further breached fiduciary duties and duties of good faith. Third, he asked for “cost[s]” but did not frame or quantify any damages relating to his grade or to alleged academic harm.
In outlining his legal theory, Mr. Ji asserted that: (1) the student-university relationship is fundamentally contractual; (2) the contract between him and the University contains implied terms of academic transparency and integrity, supported by the officious bystander test; (3) the refusal to disclose grade-distribution data constitutes a breach of that implied term; and (4) the University breached a duty of good faith and honest performance in an extended and collaborative PhD-level relationship by withholding data that he believed necessary to verify fairness in grading. He also argued that any contractual term allowing the University to withhold the data would be unconscionable and contrary to fairness principles in Canadian contract law.
Procedural posture and motion to strike
The University did not respond by filing a defence on the merits. Instead, it brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the statement of claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The University argued that the claim was in substance an indirect attack on academic decisions—specifically, the grade assigned and the decisions by internal tribunals to refuse access to historical statistical data. According to the University, any real complaint lay within the sphere of academic decision-making, which must be challenged, if at all, by way of judicial review rather than a private civil action in contract or negligence.
In addition, the University relied on Rule 21.01(3)(d) and Rule 25.11, which permit the court to stay or dismiss an action, or to strike a pleading, where the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process. On the University’s theory, the claim sought, through the language of contract and good faith, to re-litigate an academic dispute already decided internally, and to obtain in court the very relief denied by the UCSA Tribunal.
The court’s legal framework on motions to strike and academic disputes
Justice Standryk began by setting out the well-established test for motions under Rule 21.01(1)(b). On such a motion, the facts pleaded in the statement of claim are taken as true unless they are patently incapable of proof, and the pleading is read generously. The key inquiry is whether it is “plain and obvious” that the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and has no reasonable prospect of success. If a claim is hopeless on its face, it should be struck at the pleadings stage, subject to the possibility of amendment where an amendment could cure the defect.
The court then situated the case within a long line of Ontario Court of Appeal authority on academic disputes. Decisions such as Jaffer v. York University, Gauthier c. Saint-Germain, and Lam v. University of Western Ontario have confirmed that universities enjoy broad and specialized discretion in academic matters—grading, evaluation, academic policy, program administration, and internal appeal mechanisms. Courts have repeatedly warned that civil actions in contract, tort, or equity cannot be used as a backdoor appeal from academic decisions. Where the essence of what a plaintiff seeks is review of an academic judgment, the proper route is judicial review, not a civil action.
Justice Standryk also referred to the recent decision in Obita v. Laurentian University, where a student’s claims in negligence, breach of contract, and deceit arising from grading and internal appeals were struck. In Obita, the court held that recombining an academic grievance into private-law labels does not alter the essential character of the dispute or open the door to civil litigation.
Deficiencies in pleading breach of contract and specific performance
Applying these principles, the court carefully assessed whether Mr. Ji’s statement of claim properly pleaded the essential elements of a breach of contract cause of action. Those elements include: (1) identifying the contract and its express terms; (2) setting out any implied terms that flow from those express terms or from established categories; (3) specifying the alleged breach; (4) pleading causation; and (5) pleading damages that flowed from the breach.
Justice Standryk found that the statement of claim was deficient on multiple fronts. It did not identify any specific express contractual terms from which the asserted implied terms of “academic transparency” and “integrity” could be derived. Instead, the plaintiff advanced broad, abstract assertions about transparency and integrity without anchoring them in any document, policy, or contractual clause. An implied term cannot exist in a vacuum; it must arise from the express contractual framework or from recognized categories of implied obligations. On the pleading as drafted, the implied terms were described in conclusory form and remained unsupported by material facts.
The court was also critical of the absence of any pleaded damages. In a standard breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must allege how the breach caused loss. Here, Mr. Ji expressly chose not to plead damages at this stage, arguing that he needed the statistical data first to quantify any loss, and that specific performance (i.e., an order compelling disclosure of the data) was a necessary first step. Justice Standryk held that this reversed the proper order of pleading. Essential elements of a cause of action cannot be left open-ended on the expectation that discovery or compelled production will reveal whether there is a viable claim at all. The law requires that the plaintiff first plead material facts capable of showing a loss and a causal link to the alleged breach, even if the plaintiff has not yet proved those facts.
Specific performance also has its own prerequisites. It is only available where there is a clear, enforceable contractual obligation, where damages are inadequate, and where the circumstances justify compelling performance. The court noted that the statement of claim did not allege a damages claim at all, nor did it provide a factual explanation of why damages would be inadequate. In the absence of pleaded damages and an articulated loss, the remedy of specific performance was unavailable on the face of the claim.
Abuse of process: re-litigating academic decisions in civil court
Beyond the lack of a viable cause of action, the court viewed the action as an abuse of process. Under Rule 21.01(3)(d) and Rule 25.11(c), a court may stay or dismiss an action, or strike a pleading, where the proceeding seeks to re-litigate issues previously determined or to obtain, through a civil action, what an appropriate tribunal has refused.
Here, the relief Mr. Ji sought—access to the course’s historical statistical grade-distribution data in the name of academic fairness and transparency—was exactly the relief denied by the UCSA Tribunal. Despite framing the dispute as a breach of contractual duties and good faith, his claim effectively asked the court to revisit and overturn an academic decision already made under the University’s internal appeal structure. Justice Standryk emphasized that a litigant cannot avoid the finality of an academic tribunal’s decision merely by repackaging the same complaint as a contract or equity claim.
Because the decision whether to release historical statistical grading data fell squarely within the University’s broad academic discretion, and because that very decision had already been adjudicated internally, the court found that allowing the civil action to proceed would undermine the integrity and finality of the academic appeal process. On that basis, the action was characterized as untenable and as a misuse of the court’s process.
Denial of leave to amend and final outcome
Normally, courts are reluctant to strike a statement of claim without granting leave to amend, particularly where better pleading might cure deficiencies. However, Justice Standryk reviewed authorities holding that leave to amend is not required when it is plain and obvious that no tenable cause of action can arise from the facts alleged and when any amendment would fundamentally alter, rather than legitimately refine, the underlying claim.
In this case, even if Mr. Ji were allowed to plead more detail about the alleged contract or the University’s policies, the court reasoned that the essential nature of the dispute would remain the same: dissatisfaction with how the University handled his course evaluation, grade, and related appeals. That dispute lies within the University’s academic discretion and is properly the subject of judicial review, not a private-law damages or specific performance claim. No amount of re-pleading could transform an inherently academic grievance into a viable civil cause of action without contradicting settled law on university autonomy and academic judgments.
As a result, the court struck the statement of claim and dismissed the action outright, without leave to amend. The University of Waterloo Board of Governors therefore emerged as the successful party. The judgment does not specify any monetary award, damages, or quantified costs in favour of the University or the plaintiff, and on the face of this decision the total amount ordered in favour of the successful party cannot be determined.
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Superior Court of Justice - OntarioCase Number
CV-25-00001555-0000Practice Area
Civil litigationAmount
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