Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Constitutional challenge to “employer-tying measures” in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, including employer-specific or “closed” work permits for temporary foreign workers.
• Alleged breaches of sections 7 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, focusing on security of the person and equality rights of migrant workers.
• Class action management issues: approval of detailed and short-form notices in English, French and Spanish, plus a publication protocol and 60-day opt-out period from a defined Publication Date.
• Refinement of the class definition to include certain domestic and personal workers employed by foreign representatives, while expressly excluding those employed in embassies, consulates, UN entities and specified international organizations.
• Ongoing contest by the Attorney General of Canada of both the characterization of the provisions as “employer-tying measures” and the substantive merits of the Charter claims.
• Present judgment confined to procedural relief (notices, publication, class wording) rendered without costs except that the Attorney General must bear notice publication expenses, with no damages or quantified monetary awards ordered.

Background and facts of the class action

This case arises from a constitutional class action before the Superior Court of Québec (Class Actions Chamber) in which the Association for the Rights of Household and Farm Workers acts as Representative Plaintiff. The action is brought against the Attorney General of Canada and targets the federal legal framework governing how temporary foreign workers and certain other foreign nationals may work in Canada.
The class consists of individuals who worked in Canada on or after 17 April 1982 while they were foreign nationals—that is, they were neither Canadian citizens nor permanent residents of Canada at the time and may include stateless persons. To fall within the group, these individuals must also have been either (i) issued a work permit that tied them to a specific employer or group of employers, or to a specific workplace or group of workplaces, or (ii) allowed to work without a permit because they were employed on a short-term basis by a foreign entity or employed in a personal capacity by a temporary resident, including a foreign representative.
The Association alleges that these legal arrangements amount to “employer-tying measures,” a term it uses to describe mechanisms that link a worker’s legal right to be in Canada and to work to one particular employer or setting. Examples include employer-specific work permits—often called “closed” permits—which allow work only for a named employer or location, and work-without-permit situations triggered by short-term or personal employment relationships with foreign entities or foreign representatives. The Attorney General disputes the use of the expression “employer-tying measures,” emphasizing that this label comes from the plaintiffs’ allegations and the authorization judgment, rather than from the regulations themselves.

Programs and categories covered by the class

Within that broad framework, the judgment elaborates on the types of workers and programs encompassed by the class. Persons are included if they obtained work authorizations through programs such as the Temporary Foreign Workers Program (TFWP), the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) or the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP), where the permit specified a particular employer or group of employers, or particular workplaces.
The class also extends to those who participated in the International Mobility Program (IMP) or another immigration stream or program on similar terms, provided their permits contained an employer-specific or location-specific condition. In each case, the key feature is not the program label but the fact that the permit or authorization restricted the individual to working for a specific employer or in a specific workplace or set of workplaces.
A second branch of the class consists of workers authorized to work in Canada without a work permit because they were employed by a foreign entity on a short-term basis, or because they were employed “in a personal capacity” by someone who was not a Canadian citizen or permanent resident—such as domestic workers, personal assistants or caregivers (for example, nannies or au pair workers) who accompanied their employers to Canada or came to join them for a short period. The judgment clarifies that this category also includes accredited domestic workers employed personally by certain foreign representatives—ambassadors, high commissioners, heads of international organizations, special representatives or similar positions.
At the same time, the court carefully carves out exclusions. The class does not include individuals employed by a foreign State or other foreign entity to work at an embassy, a high commission, a consulate, a permanent delegation to a United Nations agency or a special representative office. It also does not include individuals employed by the United Nations, its agencies or an international organization of which Canada is a member. The court further notes that, for accredited foreign representatives themselves, the class definition has no impact on their own immigration status.

Constitutional and policy framework

The class action challenges the constitutionality of specific provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. The plaintiffs refer to these as the “Impugned Provisions” and argue that, by allowing or requiring employer-specific work authorization, they effectively impose employer-tying measures on temporary foreign workers and comparable categories of foreign nationals.
The central constitutional claims rest on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Under section 7, the Association argues that employer-tying measures interfere with the life, liberty and security of the person of class members in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice. In practice, the argument is that tying work authorization to one employer makes workers more vulnerable to exploitation, retaliation and unsafe working and living conditions, because the loss of that single job may threaten their immigration status and livelihood. Under section 15(1), the Association alleges that these measures produce discriminatory effects based on race, national or ethnic origin or colour, contrary to the guarantee of equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination.
In addition to substantive Charter breaches, the plaintiffs also raise structural and knowledge-based issues: they say that the Government of Canada was aware of the harmful impacts of employer-tying measures—such as heightened dependency on employers and barriers to changing employment—but continued to apply and defend those measures. The remedies sought include declarations that the impugned regulatory provisions are unconstitutional and of no force and effect insofar as they allow the continued use of employer-tying measures, along with monetary compensation under section 24(1) of the Charter.

Remedies sought and common issues for trial

Although this particular judgment does not decide the case on the merits, it reproduces the main common questions that will be addressed at trial in the class action. These questions ask, in essence: whether the imposition of employer-tying measures deprived class members of life, liberty or security of the person under section 7; whether any such deprivation complied with principles of fundamental justice; whether the measures infringed equality rights under section 15(1) on the prohibited grounds identified; and, if Charter infringements are found, whether they can be justified under section 1.
The claim also asks whether the specific provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations identified—such as those governing work permit conditions and enforcement—are unconstitutional and consequently of no force and effect insofar as they authorize employer-tying measures. Beyond the constitutional declarations, the Association seeks damages for each class member under section 24(1) of the Charter, encompassing both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, as well as punitive damages. The plaintiffs request a regime of collective recovery of damages, followed by individual liquidation of class members’ claims or distribution of a lump sum per member, and they seek costs of the proceedings.
Another common issue identified for trial concerns prescription and limitation periods: the court will have to determine what limitation rules apply to class members’ damages claims, whether and when the limitation clock began to run, and what common circumstances might have suspended or tolled that clock across the class.

Procedural developments and notice regime

The judgment currently under discussion, dated 14 May 2025 (2025 QCCS 1627), addresses a joint application by the Representative Plaintiff and the Attorney General on procedural matters. Specifically, they sought approval of the form and content of notices to class members and of a publication protocol, as well as a modification to the class definition to clarify subparagraph (b)(ii).
The parties agreed on full-length notices in English, French and Spanish; short-form notices in the same three languages; and corresponding press releases. These documents explain the nature of the class action, who qualifies as a class member, the Charter issues at stake, and the right of class members to opt out. They also summarize the main relief sought and indicate that the Attorney General of Canada contests the merits of the action. The notices highlight that class members are automatically included and do not need to take any steps to be part of the proceeding, unless they wish to exclude themselves.
The publication protocol covers a broad range of dissemination methods. It provides for publication of short-form notices in selected newspapers, the launch of a social media campaign (including on Facebook and Instagram), and posting on other platforms. To ensure a clear reference point, the protocol defines a “Publication Date” as the date on which the short-form notices are published in most of the selected newspapers, when the social-media campaign begins, and when notices are published on the other specified platforms.
Justice Nollet carefully reviews the notices and the protocol and concludes that they satisfy the requirements of article 579 of the Québec Code of Civil Procedure, which governs notice to class members in authorized class actions. The court approves the full-length and short-form notices, as well as the press releases, in all three languages, and orders the parties to publish them in line with the agreed protocol. The parties are required to select a Publication Date within 45 days of the judgment and to inform the court once that date has been set.

Opt-out mechanism and impact on class members

A central feature of the judgment is the setting of the opt-out period. The court fixes a 60-day window for class members to exclude themselves from the class action, starting from the Publication Date. Any class member who wishes not to be bound by subsequent judgments or settlements must send a written notice to the clerk of the Superior Court of Québec at the Montréal courthouse, clearly indicating the intention to opt out and referencing the docket number 500-06-001263-231.
The judgment emphasizes the consequences of not opting out. Class members who remain within the class—meaning those who do not send an opt-out notice within the deadline—will be bound by any eventual judgment or approved settlement, whether favourable or unfavourable. If the court ultimately grants the class action or a settlement is reached that provides for monetary compensation, only those who have stayed in the class will be eligible to receive that compensation.
Conversely, individuals who opt out will not be bound by the court’s judgment and will not share in any class-wide monetary award or settlement. The notices also clarify that class members will never be required to pay legal costs arising from the class action unless they choose to actively intervene in the proceedings. Active intervention, which requires filing a declaration of intervention, may expose a class member to examinations and, potentially, to an order to pay costs, but simply remaining a passive class member does not.

Outcome of the present judgment, successful party and monetary amounts

In this 2025 judgment, the court grants the joint procedural relief sought by both the Association and the Attorney General of Canada. It approves, “in substance,” the multilingual full-length notices, short-form notices and press releases, orders that they be published in accordance with the agreed publication protocol, establishes the 60-day opt-out period from the Publication Date, and modifies the class definition to clarify the inclusion and exclusion of particular categories of workers employed by foreign entities and representatives.
The judgment is expressly rendered “without costs,” except that the earlier authorization judgment had already placed responsibility for the costs of the notices on the Attorney General of Canada, and this allocation is maintained. There is no adjudication of the Charter issues, no finding of liability, and no award of damages at this stage. The Attorney General continues to contest the merits of the class action, and those merits will be determined at a future trial in the Montréal judicial district.
Because this decision deals solely with notice approval, publication mechanics and class-definition wording, there is no “successful party” in the sense of a winner on the substantive dispute. The application was joint and was granted as presented, so both sides obtained the procedural orders they requested, but no party has prevailed on the underlying constitutional or damages claims. Likewise, there is no total monetary award, compensation, or quantified costs granted or ordered in favour of any party in this judgment; the only financial aspect is the confirmation that the Attorney General must bear the costs of giving notice, and the precise amount of those costs and any future damages or costs award cannot be determined from this decision.