Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• A teacher's contract was terminated for gross misconduct after she physically interacted with a teenaged student by sitting on his lap, bouncing, and grinding her buttocks on him without consent

• Video evidence captured the 44-second incident, corroborating witness testimony from the program assistant and the student, who described the experience as "extremely uncomfortable"

• The Board of Reference characterized the appellant's conduct as sexual assault — the most serious form of sexual harassment — applying the Calgary v CUPE Local 37 framework rather than a criminal definition

• Procedural fairness was contested on the basis that the sexual characterization of the conduct was raised for the first time in the respondent's written submissions before the Board, but the Court found the appellant reasonably ought to have understood the case she had to meet

• Neither the William Scott framework nor case law requires progressive discipline to proceed linearly in cases of serious misconduct, and a single serious incident may justify dismissal

• All four grounds of appeal were rejected and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming the termination

Background and facts of the case

Teri Edwards was a teacher for 16 years. At the relevant time, she was employed by the Pembina Hills School Division and led a program serving students with behavioural and mental health challenges. Among the students in the program was a teenaged student, identified as "S" in the decision. S had an individual program plan, prepared by Edwards herself, that included an instruction under the heading "Regulation and Sensory Integration" to "Keep your distance when talking to him as he feels threatened if you are too close."

On the afternoon of November 12, 2019, S was sitting beside a program assistant in a classroom. No one else was present. A video camera in the classroom recorded a physical interaction between Edwards and S. The Board of Reference described the 44-second interaction: Edwards marched in without saying anything, put her right hand on S's arm to push his body away from the table, placed her left arm on his right shoulder, pulled his knees out from the table, straddled both his legs, sat on his lap very close to his body, turned her face to him and talked to him, bounced up and down, and ground her buttocks around on his lap twice. The Court of Appeal reviewed the video and confirmed the Board's description was accurate.

The program assistant reported what happened to the principal two days later. During her testimony at the Board hearing, the program assistant described her reaction, stating "my first thought was he just had a lap dance in class" and that Edwards "was bouncing from side to side initially and saying, Isn't my butt bony, and -- she did a few circular motions and got up and left." When S testified, he stated Edwards "started wiggling her ass, and I -- it was extremely uncomfortable." When asked how the appellant's actions made him feel, S repeated he felt "extremely uncomfortable."

The investigation and criminal proceedings

The incident was subsequently reported to the superintendent, who reviewed the video and determined it was necessary to suspend Edwards pending an investigation. He advised Edwards of the suspension in a letter dated November 14, 2019, in which he stated, "it is alleged that you gyrated your bottom on a student's lap." The events were also reported to the police, and the video was provided to them. Edwards was subsequently charged with three offences under the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, including sexual assault. A trial proceeded in November 2020; however, the Crown withdrew the charges at the close of its case and Edwards was acquitted.

At the request of the superintendent, the associate superintendent conducted an investigation on behalf of the respondent in late November or early December 2019. He interviewed S and the program assistant, among others. During the investigation, it came to light that Edwards had used profanity in the classroom and with individual students. Edwards admitted to this, both during the investigation and at the hearing before the Board, stating she repeated back profanity to students as a teaching management strategy. She also admitted she had twice used vulgar language directly to a student.

The recommendation and termination

Following the investigation, the associate superintendent advised Edwards he was recommending that her teaching contract be terminated. In a letter dated December 13, 2019, he described her conduct as "highly inappropriate and unprofessional," stating she had "abused [her] position of trust and authority in initiating unwanted physical contact of an intimate nature with a minor male student in [her] classroom." The matter proceeded to a termination hearing on February 4, 2020, presided over by the superintendent. Following the hearing, the superintendent decided to terminate Edwards's contract, effective March 11, 2020. The superintendent's termination letter, dated February 10, 2020, explained the contract was terminated for gross misconduct, a serious breach of her employment contract, and a serious transgression of the normal student/teacher boundaries. The letter identified specific provisions of applicable codes, policies, and provisions of her employment contract that her conduct violated. It explained that continued employment was untenable, Edwards having "breached the position of trust and authority that teachers hold and ... engaged in behaviour which would undermine public confidence in the education system." Notably, the superintendent's letter did not refer to Edwards's interactions with S as sexual assault, sexual harassment, or in ways that would suggest there was a sexual component.

The Board of Reference proceedings

Edwards appealed her termination to a Board of Reference pursuant to section 231(2)(a) of the Education Act, SA 2012, c E-0.3, seeking reinstatement. The hearing lasted 11 days, during which the Board heard from numerous witnesses, including Edwards, the program assistant, and S. In her evidence, Edwards testified she believed S was upset with her because she had separated him from another student and taken his phone away that day. She said her intention in sitting on S was to try to "change the trajectory of the -- of the mood, of his -- of the atmosphere." She admitted she made a "bad choice" in deciding to be "funny, be stupid, and I went and sat on [S's] lap" and that she did not realize in that moment that she had "crossed a boundary."

The respondent did not initially use the terms "sexual assault" or "sexual harassment" to describe Edwards's conduct. However, in its written submissions to the Board, the respondent urged the Board to consider the "potentially sexual nature" of her conduct, stating her actions could be described as a "lap dance" and were "sexually provocative" in nature. The respondent submitted the conduct constituted "sexual harassment" or alternatively, "an indefensible lack of judgment and gross misconduct." In response, Edwards denied there was a sexual element to her actions and argued the respondent's position was unfair and came as a surprise.

The Board's analysis and application of legal frameworks

The Board applied the William Scott framework, a legal framework commonly applied in assessing termination grievances. It has three components: whether there is just cause for discipline; if so, whether the discipline imposed was excessive in response to all the circumstances of the case; and if the discipline was excessive, what alternative measure should be substituted. Edwards had conceded that both her use of profanity and her physical interaction with S provided just cause for some form of discipline, so the Board's focus was on the second component of the framework, requiring a contextual analysis of the misconduct, the grievor's individual characteristics, and the surrounding circumstances.

The Board requested supplemental written arguments from the parties on the applicability of Calgary (City) v Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 37, 2019 ABCA 388, in which a majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal found that harassment with a physical component constitutes a form of sexual assault and is among the most serious forms of workplace misconduct. Relying on that decision, the Board concluded that Edwards had sexually assaulted S, stating: "The Appellant sat as close to [S's] body as she could and ground around on his lap, without his consent. That constitutes sexual assault." The Board accepted, on a civil standard of a balance of probabilities, that the conduct was harassment of a sexual nature with a physical component and so constituted sexual assault. The Board rejected Edwards's denial of sexual intention, stating "it is difficult for this Board to accept that a female teacher sitting and grinding on the lap of a 15-year-old minor male student has no sexual intention." It further found that even if there was no sexual intention, the conduct would have been characterized as serious sexual harassment.

The Board also considered mitigating, aggravating, and neutral factors. It found Edwards's actions were not part of a pattern of conduct. Her tenure with the respondent was "short" at 3.5 years, and the Board determined her length of service was not mitigating. Edwards had "blatantly and flagrantly" disregarded S's personalized education plan, which required teachers to keep their distance. She had no prior disciplinary record, which was mitigating. Additionally, the Board considered the factors set out in section 237(2) of the Education Act and found they militated against reinstatement, including that reinstating Edwards would risk student safety, allow for the possibility of recidivism, and undermine Albertans' confidence in the public education system. The Board also found "the trust relationship between the Appellant and the school board has been fractured beyond repair."

The appeal to the Court of Appeal of Alberta

Edwards raised four grounds of appeal. First, she argued the Board applied an incorrect definition of sexual assault, pointing to the criminal description in R v Chase, [1987] 2 SCR 293. The Court rejected this, holding that the Board was dealing with an employment issue and properly relied on the description of sexual assault as a manifestation of workplace sexual harassment adopted by the Court in Calgary v CUPE Local 37. The Board did not apply, nor was it required to apply, a criminal definition of sexual assault. The Court found no reason to disturb the Board's finding that Edwards's actions amounted to sexual assault as the most serious form of sexual harassment, nor its finding that the conduct amounted to gross misconduct.

Second, Edwards alleged a breach of procedural fairness, claiming she did not know the case she had to meet. The Court rejected this, stating it would be "naïve to conclude the appellant did not know the case she had to meet or that she was surprised by the characterization of her conduct as sexual in nature." The Court noted that within days of the events, the police had laid charges relating to sexual offences; the suspension letter referenced an allegation that she had "gyrated [her] bottom on a student's lap"; and the associate superintendent's recommendation letter described "initiating unwanted physical contact of an intimate nature with a minor male student." The Court also observed that the Board itself had raised the possibility of sexual contact early in the hearing, approximately two weeks before Edwards gave her evidence. Edwards did not provide any detail about how she would have changed the evidence she adduced, the questions she asked, or the strategy she employed had the respondent expressly stated her employment was terminated for sexual assault.

Third, Edwards contended the Board misinterpreted section 237 of the Education Act by applying the factors enumerated in section 237(2) to its consideration of whether there was just cause for dismissal. The Court held that the narrow interpretation urged by Edwards was untenable, as it would force the Board to decide to order reinstatement before assessing its viability. The Court found the Board's application of section 237(2) did not augment the grounds for discipline but rather served to illustrate why anything less than termination was an untenable disciplinary response. The Court further noted it would dismiss this ground in any event based on the curative proviso, as the Board had already found just cause for dismissal, which foreclosed on the possibility of reinstatement pursuant to section 237(3)(b).

Fourth, Edwards argued the Board determined that lesser forms of discipline did not have to be considered when misconduct has occurred. The Court clarified this was not what the Board decided. The Board ruled that neither Rast v Calgary Board of Education nor William Scott stand for the proposition that all lesser forms of discipline must be considered or that progressive discipline must be applied in a linear fashion in cases of serious and significant misconduct. Citing McKinley v BC Tel, 2001 SCC 38, the Board stated that a single serious incident of misconduct may justify dismissal. The Court also found the respondent had adequately explained why Edwards's conduct could not be addressed through progressive discipline, describing in a five-page letter the misconduct, the superintendent's conclusions, the policies and standards violated, and why continued employment was untenable.

Ruling and outcome

The Court of Appeal of Alberta, in a unanimous decision by Justices Antonio, Friesen, and Shaner filed on February 10, 2026, dismissed the appeal on all four grounds and confirmed the Board of Reference's decision upholding Edwards's termination. The respondent, Pembina Hills School Division, was the successful party. No specific monetary amount was awarded or ordered, as the case concerned the confirmation of a termination decision rather than a monetary claim; the practical effect of the ruling was that Edwards's dismissal stood and her request for reinstatement was denied.